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# Political culture and political development : an analysis of the institution building process in Iran.

Ali Asghar Masalehdan  
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Political Culture and Political Development:  
An Analysis of the Institution Building Process in Iran

A Dissertation Presented

By

Ali Asghar Masalehdan

Submitted to the Graduate School of the  
University of Massachusetts in partial fulfillment  
of the requirement for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

May 1981

The Department of Political Science



Ali Asghar Masalehdan

1981

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An Analysis of the Institution Building Process in Iran

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
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Ali A. Masalehdan



## ABSTRACT

Political Culture and Political Development:  
An Analysis of the Institution Building Process in Iran  
(May 1981)

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This inquiry is an attempt to observe the relationship in Iran between political culture and political development through the building of political institutions. For political development to be initiated, suggests Lucian Pye, three basic forces of social change--equality, capacity and differentiation--are necessary in the society. Socialization is generally achieved through inter-generational communication, impulse control as transfer of personal duties, and role training. While the first two agents are regarded as primary, highly personalized, and relatively unstructured relationships, role training is secondary and can be influenced by the existing institutions through mass communication, schools and other processes. The approach of this inquiry assumes that 'development' in its ultimate form requires two symbiotic elements for it to be attained and maintained. They are referred to as 'software' and 'hardware'. 'Software' are the social prerequisites composed of sociological, cultural, psychological and political conditions which result in the production of a skilled human element. 'Hardware' are the material and physical elements that the human

element utilizes to achieve the desired end--i.e., growth and development. 'Software' is the focus of this inquiry with special attention to norms and values that promote political development.

The inquiry is divided into three main parts. Part I deals with political culture, the prevailing political institutions, and the discussion of the individual in the Iranian socio-political framework. Temporal powers in the absence of the Hidden Imam are considered illegitimate by Shiah doctrine. Conflict existed between the aspirations of the Pahlavi monarchs for hegemony and the ulama (clergy) who see themselves as the link between the ummah (the community of believers) and the Hidden Imam. The domination by the Pahlavi monarchs of the three separate but equal branches of the government, as envisioned by the Constitution of 1906-07, left the political institutions of the nation weak and dependent on royal grace. The Shah was thus guarantor of performance and responsible for all shortcomings. This frustrated the traditional balanced tension of the political web system of the country. Consequently, the Shah was neither able to gain the support of the modern and thus democratic elements of the country nor legitimacy from the traditional and religious-minded segment of the population.

A further problem facing the insufficiency of political development in Iran was the individual himself. Familialism is seen as the main pattern of social relationships and the basis of one's identity. The individualism seen in Iranians is a primarily negative trait not conducive to the establishment of social contracts which would promote

responsible individuals. Insecurity in interpersonal relationships is seen as a major problem facing the society.

Textbooks as socializing agents are the theme of Part II. The educational system caused little motivation for change to a value system conducive to political development. Lacking are rationality, objectivity, personal integrity, initiative or responsibility as the end results of the educational process. The educational system prepares the students to exist in the prevailing socio-cultural mold of the nation. Despite the fair representation of entries in textbooks enumerating hard work, achievement, self discipline and similar values, the methods of teaching and learning, as well as the bulk of the entries in the textbooks, seem to have changed little from those of the traditional maktab system. Memorization, instead of analytical understanding seems to prevail in schools.

Part III deals with transmission of values and norms from parents to students. Data analysis shows that the parent and student orientations seem to concur to a substantial degree. Parental education seems to be the most significant determinant of student's socio-political orientation, but has a different impact on the parent's own orientation which at times seems to be contrary to that of the student's. Family income and place of residence, which are influenced by parental level of education, also somewhat influence the student's orientation. The students and parents remain traditional in their outlook, despite even high level of education. High level of political inefficacy and distrust of government are found among parents and students with socio-economic



status influencing the degree of such orientations. Female students were found to be somewhat more open-minded and democratic in their outlook than their male counterparts, due to the fact they are often from better educated, more cosmopolitan and more prosperous families.

The prospects of development of 'software' in Iran suffer from severe socio-cultural as well as political inadequacies. To even begin to consider the prospects of development of human resources, basic attention must be paid to the changes vital to transformation of a nation from traditional mode to a transitional stage.

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION . . . . .	1
Some Introductory Remarks	
A Framework for Analysis	
PART I. POLITICAL CULTURE AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT	
CHAPTER	
I. POLITICAL CULTURE AND TRADITION . . . . .	17
Religion and Political Culture	
Modernization and Political Culture	
Monarchy	
II. POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS . . . . .	87
The Constitution	
The Legislature	
Political Parties	
Media	
Summary	
III. INDIVIDUALISM AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT . . . . .	143
A Theoretical insight into Individualism	
Individualism in Iranian Social Context	
Some Concluding Remarks	
PART II. TEXTBOOKS AS SOCIALIZING AGENTS	
IV. EDUCATION AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT IN IRAN . . . . .	173
Education as an Instrument of Socio-Cultural Norms	
Education as an Instrument to Promote Political	
System Maintenance	
Education as an Instrument of Political Development	
V. CONTENT ANALYSIS OF THE TEXTBOOKS . . . . .	194
Education System of Iran	
Elementary and Guidance School Textbooks	
A Framework for Analysis	

Analysis  
Summary

PART III. PARENTS AS SOCIALIZING AGENTS

VI. INTERGENERATIONAL SOCIALIZATION PROCESS . . . . .	236
Socio-Cultural Norms	
Political Attitudes	
Focus of the Analysis	
VII. PUBLIC POLICY ORIENTATION . . . . .	248
Role of the Government	
Socio-Political Tolerance	
Summary	
VIII. POLITICAL PARTICIPATION . . . . .	279
Passive Measures	
Active Measures	
Political Efficacy	
Parent-Student Similarities and Differences	
IX. POLITICAL TRUST AND DISTRUST . . . . .	335
Government Distrust	
Trusting the Government	
Political Participation and Trust/Distrust in Government	
Political Orientation and Trust/Distrust in Government	
Parent-Student Similarities	
X. SOCIO-CULTURAL ATTITUDES AND POLITICAL PERSPECTIVE . .	377
Impact of Socio-Cultural Attitudes on Parents and Students	
Factor Analysis of Socio-Cultural Orientations	
XI. CONCLUSIONS . . . . .	407
BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . .	430



## APPENDICES

I. QUESTIONNAIRES . . . . .	459
II. METHODOLOGICAL APPENDIX FOR THE ANALYSIS OF PARENT- STUDENT DATA . . . . .	477
III. FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF PARENT-STUDENT DATA . . . . .	493

# LIST OF TABLES

1. Chronology of National Consultative Assembly (Majlis) . . .	101
2. Chronology of Iranian Political Parties . . . . .	120
3. The Number of Radio Receivers per 1,000 Inhabitants in Some Asian Countries . . . . .	132
4. Analysis of Types of Entries for Grades 1 to 8 . . . . .	206
5. Analysis of Main Participant for Entries for Grades 1 to 8 . . . . .	210
6. Analysis of the Main Moral Theme of Entries for Grades 1 to 8 . . . . .	212
7. The Main Authority Figure Stressed in Entries for Grades 1 to 8 . . . . .	218
8. The Attitude of Authority Stressed in Entries for Grades 1 to 8 . . . . .	224
9. Hierarchical Social Order Present in Entries for Grades 1 to 8 . . . . .	225
10. The Setting of Entries in the First Three Eighth Grade Readers . . . . .	226
11. Relations of Values to Socio-Cultural Variables Thought to be of Importance for Economic Development . . . . .	242
12. Parents' and Students' Attitudes on Public Policy Issues .	251
13. Cross-Tabulation of 'Government Power and Influence Over People' Variable 18 with Socio-Economic Status . . . . .	256
14. Cross-Tabulation of 'Government Aid to the Unemployed' Variable 21 with Socio-Economic Status . . . . .	260
15. Cross-Tabulation of 'Our Socio-Political System is the Best in the World' Variable 26 with Socio-Economic Status . . . . .	265
16. Cross-Tabulation of 'Socio-Religious Toleration,' Vari- able 41 with Socio-Economic Status . . . . .	268
17. Changes in 'Liberal' Responses from Parents to Students .	275
18. Parent-Student Comparison on 'Passive Political Measures .	281
19. Cross-Tabulation of 'Listening to News,' Variable 12, with Socio-Economic Status . . . . .	282
20. Cross-Tabulation of 'Reading Newspapers,' Variable 13, with Socio-Economic Status . . . . .	285
21. Parent-Student Comparison on 'Active' Political Measures .	290
22. Cross-Tabulation of 'Thinking About Politics,' Variable 14 with Socio-Economic Status . . . . .	292
23. Cross-Tabulation of 'Talking About Politics,' with Economic Status . . . . .	294
24. Rate of Change from Parents to Students on 'Active Measures' . . . . .	296
25. Parent-Student Comparison on Levels of Political Efficacy . . . . .	305
26. Cross-Tabulation of 'Government and Politics are Complicated' (Variable 23), with Socio-Economic Status .	308

27.	Gross-Tabulation of 'Political Inefficacy,' Variable 23, with Passive and Active Participation, Trust and Distrust Political Items . . . . .	311
28.	Cross-Tabulation of 'Government Pays no Attention to People,' (Variable 31), with Socio-Economic Status . . .	318
29.	Cross-Tabulation of 'Political Inefficacy,' Variable 31, with Passive and Active Participation, Trust and Distrust Political Items . . . . .	322
30.	Change in Level of Political Efficacy from Parents to Students . . . . .	329
31.	Level of Trust in Government and Change from Parents to Students . . . . .	336
32.	Cross-Tabulation of 'Some People in the Government are Crooked' (Variable 38), with Socio-Economic Status . . .	339
33.	Cross-Tabulation of 'Government is Influenced by big Business' (Variable 30) with Socio-Economic Status . . .	342
34.	Cross-Tabulation of 'Government Needlessly Wastes our Tax Money' (Variable 35) with Socio-Economic Status . .	345
35.	Cross-Tabulation of 'People in the Government are Smart' (Variable 42) with Socio-Economic Status . . . . .	349
36.	Cross-Tabulation of 'Government Knows What is Best for People' (Variable 40) with Socio-Economic Status . . . .	352
37.	Correlation Analysis of the Parent Data . . . . .	361
38.	Correlation Analysis of the Student Data . . . . .	368
39.	Factor Analysis of Indicators of Political Trust/ Distrust . . . . .	373
40.	Correlations of Socio-Cultural Orientations with Politi- cal Perspective of Parents . . . . .	379
41.	Correlations of Socio-Cultural Orientations with Politi- cal Perspective of Students . . . . .	384
42.	A Summary Population Profile of the Sample Provinces . . .	487
43.	A Summary Table of Return Rate on Both Types of Question- naires by <u>Ostan</u> . . . . .	489



## LIST OF FIGURES

1. Comparison of Parent-Student Responses to Variable 18 in a Six-Level Continuum . . . . .	252
2. Comparison of Parent-Student Responses to Variable 21 in a Six-Level Continuum . . . . .	258
3. Comparison of Parent-Student Responses to Variable 26 in a Six-Level Continuum . . . . .	262
4. Comparison of Parent-Student Responses to Variable 41 in a Six-Level Continuum . . . . .	267
5. Scatter Plot Indicating the Impact of Education on Parents 'Passive' and 'Active' Orientations . . . . .	298
6. Scatter Plot Indicating the Impact of Education on Students 'Passive' and 'Active' Orientations . . . . .	301
7. Comparison of Parent-Student Responses to Variable 23 in a Six-Level Continuum . . . . .	306
8. Comparison of Parent-Student Responses to Variable 31 in a Six-Level Continuum . . . . .	317
9. Comparison of Parent-Student Responses to Variable 38 in a Six-Level Continuum . . . . .	338
10. Comparison of Parent-Student Responses to Variable 30 in a Six-Level Continuum . . . . .	341
11. Comparison of Parent-Student Responses to Variable 35 in a Six Level Continuum . . . . .	343
12. Comparison of Parent-Student Responses to Variable 42 in a Six-Level Continuum . . . . .	348
13. Comparison of Parent-Student Responses to Variable 40 in a Six-Level Continuum . . . . .	351
14. Scatter Plot of Political Factors Influencing Parents' Orientations . . . . .	365
15. Scatter Plot of Political Factors Influencing Students' Orientations . . . . .	370
16. Scatter Plot of Items Associated with Determinism that Influence Parents' Orientations . . . . .	394
17. Scatter Plot of Items Associated with Determinism that Influence Students' Orientations . . . . .	396
18. Scatter Plot of Items Associated with Traditional System Values that Influence Parents' Orientations . . .	400
19. Scatter Plot of Items Associated with Traditional System Values that Influence Students' Orientations . .	402
20. The Sample Provinces used for Parent-Student Inquiry . . .	483

## INTRODUCTION

### Some Introductory Remarks

This present undertaking began in 1977 as an inquiry into the prospects of political development in developing countries with emphasis on the Iranian experience. Needless to say, the developments of the past few years would have been an exacting and trying time for any student of area studies whose subject evolved into new circumstances overnight. Although the focus of the inquiry remained constant, new elements entered into consideration, including, but not limited to, failure of political development in the past, the Shah's fall and his impact on socio-political development in Iran. The scope of the inquiry was broad to begin with, including a three-layered study of political culture and political institutions, textbooks as socializing agents, and inter-generational socialization process. The evolving issues made the undertaking into this voluminous work for which I beg the patience of the reader.

### A Framework for Analysis

With the desire for development among the emerging nations of the world following World War II, theoretical groundwork for the actualization of such goals began. All the approaches were different. They were concerned with such issues as capital formation,

technological change and increase in productive capacity. Clearly the theories of development were all one dimensional in their economic orientation and policy focus. Furthermore, they remained incognizant of how the traditional societies functioned. Their theoretical pre-occupation with the economic approach as means to the end and as the only viable methodology for economic development was not shared by many, particularly those outside the discipline. In the Middle East such modernizing individuals as Gamal Abdul-Nasser<sup>1</sup> of Egypt, Michel Aflaq<sup>2</sup> of Syria and Ahmad Kasravi<sup>3</sup> of Iran thought fundamental changes requiring social transformation were a prerequisite for development. Total systems approach and development as a multi-dimensional process of social change also had proponents in the west. Among economists, Walt Rostow proposed his "stage" approach to economic development.<sup>4</sup> Although his approach included sequential stages including "take-off into self-sustained growth," it suffered from "disregard of the need to isolate key behavioralistic relationships which determine the path of the system."<sup>5</sup>

Other prominent theoreticians promoting the multi-dimensional approach to the concept of development are Daniel Lerner,<sup>6</sup> Edward Shils,<sup>7</sup> Bert F. Hoselitz,<sup>8</sup> Max Millikan, and Donald Blackmer.<sup>9</sup> These academicians include political, sociological, anthropological, and psychological, in addition to economic conditions as determinants of total system development. Furthermore, they emphasize the development of the above mentioned conditions as prerequisites for economic development to reach the stage where a system can maintain self-sustaining growth.<sup>10</sup>

Bert F. Hoselitz, as early as 1951, recognized the need for a multifaceted approach to economic development by posing the following question:

Does economic development mean only a change in certain aspects of overt behavior, notably the acquisition of new skills or the exercise of new forms of productive capacity, or is it accompanied by or contingent upon more basic changes in social relations and even the structure of value and beliefs of a culture?<sup>11</sup>

His response was that:

Economic development . . . implies a rapid, and in a sense, revolutionary process which, if it is to take root in a society, must penetrate widely and deeply and hence affects the social, structural and cultural facets of a society. In other words, economic development consists not merely in a change of production techniques, but also, in the last resort, in a reorientation of some special norms and values . . . . Any analysis of economic development which is to be fruitful and complete must include a set of propositions relating changes in production techniques to changes in values.<sup>12</sup>

As far as political scientists are concerned, the end result of changes in values is a reorientation of political norms that would be conducive to political development. With the rising interest in political development, the academicians have elucidated on the process, and, as a result of differences in experience and approaches, there are numerous theories and frameworks. Lucian Pye lists 10 divergent definitions and approaches to the idea of political development used by social scientists during the last quarter of a century.<sup>13</sup> Pye notes that there are three themes which are basic to most of the theories of political development.<sup>14</sup> They include equality, capacity, and differentiation.

The theme of equality entails "mass participation and popular involvement in political activities." This is practiced by both democratic and totalitarian systems through mass mobilization. Furthermore, the idea of equality infers that "laws should be of a universalistic nature, applicable to all and more or less impersonal in their operation." Lastly, equality assumes that "recruitment to political office should reflect achievement standards of performance and not the ascriptive considerations of a traditional social system."

Capacity, as the second major theme, "is related to the output of a political system and the extent to which the political system can affect the rest of the society and economy." Capacity is closely associated with governmental performance and the conditions that affect such performances. The idea of system capacity primarily "entails the sheer magnitude, scope, and the scale of political and governmental performances." Furthermore, it entails "effectiveness and efficiency in the execution of public policy" and is related to "rationality in administration and a secular orientation toward policy."

The final theme involves the "differentiation and specialization of structure" in a system. "Increased functional specificity of the various political roles within the system" is an obvious result of differentiation and specialization. Pye notes that "differentiation is not fragmentation and the isolation of the different parts of the political system but specialization based on an ultimate sense of integration."



The foregoing themes, as Pye himself suggests, do not "assert any particular philosophical orientation or theoretical framework" but "isolate those general characteristics of political development which seem to be most widely held and most fundamental in the general thinking about problems of development."<sup>15</sup>

Thus, to initiate political development in a society, norms and values which are held to be conducive to its realization would have to become major forces of social change. Political or civic culture is the environment in which agents of socialization--i.e., "attitudes, beliefs, and sentiments which give order and meaning to a political process, and which provide the underlying assumptions and rules that govern behavior in the political system"<sup>16</sup>--exist.

Socialization is basically achieved through three agents:

(1) intergenerational communication; (2) impulse control, as transfer of personal duties; and (3) role training. The first two agents are regarded as primary, since they, according to Edward Dawson and Kenneth Prewitt, are "highly personalized and relatively unstructured relationships."<sup>17</sup> Role training, however, could be influenced by the existing institutions instilling beliefs in children through mass communication, schools and other processes.

The role of socializing agents becomes instrumental in social change when it is viewed in light of the foregoing conceptualization. To attain a total system development, political development must also be achieved. Its realization requires system transformation and social

change--i.e., family, peers, school--become crucial in realization of the desired end.

In short, the approach of this inquiry assumes that "development" in its ultimate form requires two symbiotic elements for it to be attained and maintained. For reason of simplicity, they will be called software and hardware. Software refers to social prerequisites composed of sociological, cultural and psychological, as well as political conditions which result in the production of a skilled human element. Hardware, on the other hand, refers to the material and physical elements that the human element utilizes to achieve the desired end--i.e., economic growth. It illustrates that it is not possible to attain economic growth without first acquiring the software prerequisites and that the possession of software will ultimately be translated into economic growth.

Thus, software emerges as the most crucial of the two elements. The focus of this inquiry will be on this social element with particular attention to norms and values that promote political development. The theoretical approach, however, does not promote a total change in socio-cultural and political orientations. It provides and insists on some continuity of the traditional socio-cultural norms but with an emphasis on rationality and objectivity within the perspective. Thus, the inquiry will deal with software that are deemed to be preconditions of development.

Although political development with emphasis on political institutions and the role of socialization in the process of change are

the main focus of this inquiry, methodological approaches used by socio-psychological and sociological studies have been utilized to underline their relevance to this concept of software. For example, certain socio-psychological norms advanced by David McClelland have been found to correlate positively with economic development. They include: role differentiation, universalism, and rationality in outlook.<sup>18</sup> These same norms are also put forth by Lucian Pye as the major determinants of political development.<sup>19</sup>

### The Case Study.

The Iranian revolution during 1978 and early 1979 which led to the replacement of monarchy with an Islamic Republic has been perceived by many as a turn away from "modernization" and "development" --an attempt to return the nation to the Middle Ages. Such an assertion is fueled by false accounts of the planning and development process in Iran during the past twenty-five years by the Pahlavi regime. It is unconvincing that development and modernization could cause revolution. It is precisely social stagnation and lack of development that trigger uprisings and cause revolutions. To argue that the Iranian revolution was against modernization, one must first prove that the Shah's regime was a modernizing force. In light of the above conceptualization, the discussions in the following chapters will demonstrate the lack of social development, in particular political development, which is so crucial in attaining total system development.

It was the government's stated goal for Iran to reach the same level of economic development as West Germany and Japan within a quarter of a century and to become one of the five most developed nations on the globe. Economic development, however, was perceived, in Frances Fitzgerald's words, as "imported pieces of modern technology --a hotel, a hospital, a steel mill--set up around the country like the pieces on a monopoly set."<sup>20</sup> The country also depended on imported foreign managers and technicians to run and maintain these pieces of imported technology.

On the other hand, the insufficiency of planning in the country was caused by lack of a system of checks and balances by the legitimate institutions whereby "all important numbers, proposals, and judgements could be exposed to criticism before decisions were made." The institutions that could exert external influence on the process of planning were "extremely weak" and were not given "much recognition."<sup>21</sup> Furthermore, plans devised by the central government to bring the country to the threshold of economic development were devised by a "relatively small group of economists and engineers,"<sup>22</sup> who had little or no regard for the development of socio-political infra-structure. In James A. Bill's words, "what the Shah ha(d) done, in effect, ha(d) been to encourage enormous economic change and some social change in order to prevent any basic political change."<sup>23</sup> Thus, political and social constraints remained on the system. The system remained traditional and absolutist in its outlook. The political system of the nation basically consisted of weak institutions built or maintained by

the Shah to support and legitimize his rule. Although the country had the oldest existing constitution in the Middle East, it, nevertheless, was nothing more than a superfluous document. It was often ignored by the Shah or, on occasion, was utilized to serve his purposes. Although the Constitution clearly delineated the roles of the branches of the government with separation of the executive, legislative and judiciary branches, the Shah personally was the omnipotent power controlling all three branches. In short, the Iranian political process had been signified, on the one hand, by the extreme weakness of its institutions and, on the other, by the dominant control of the Shah of all its actions and procedures.

None of the three themes outlined above--equality, capacity and differentiation--were maintained by the government. Instead of a rational system of planning, there were grandiose and ostentatious projects. The situation was best pointed out by Amir Taheri, himself a pro-government journalist, who wrote that "an accumulation of discontent with tight control, over-centralization, lack of sufficient open debate and a general feeling that corruption and inefficiency together with arrogance have struck bureaucracy."<sup>24</sup> The economic boom for the few on the top had caused economic dislocation for the many on the bottom. The economic gap between the rich and the poor was becoming greater. The promises and hopes that had been instilled by the Shah and the government could not be fulfilled. Instead, corruption was rampant and the system could not be maintained effectively.



Although the Iranian revolution caught the West, particularly the United States, by surprise, the general social and political discontent was evident as early as 1976. By 1977, even political repression was unable to slow the rising tides of anti-government sentiments. The revolution of 1978-79 was only the logical conclusion to an arrogant system of government that through co-option, corruption, and repression had withstood the growing social, political and economic pressures. The swiftness and the ease with which the Shah's rule came to an end showed the absence of a reliable base of power from which he could rule, despite having been regarded as the ruler of "the island of stability" only a year before by President Carter. The success of the revolution, furthermore, showed the ineffectiveness of the institutions which gave lip service to democracy and the Constitution, while simultaneously aiding the legitimacy of the monarchy and the rule of Shah Mohammad-Reza Pahlavi. The control of the monarch over the Iranian political institutions rendered them dependent and, thus, to the polity they were illegitimate and not credible. As a result, the existing institutions were not able to legitimize actions or processes of the government.

In short, this present inquiry will attempt to analyze all the relevant political institutions in respect to their impact on the political process of the nation.

The case study of Iranian political development is further elucidated by inquiry into the socialization process which was attempted through textbooks. Governments have often used the

educational system for purposes of role training and value transfer. Since the educational system in Iran is under direct government control, it is in a position to disseminate norms and values favorable to its objectives through teaching materials, namely the textbooks. Textbooks are one of the best examples of such efforts, since certain virtues or attitudes can be stressed in the form of stories, prose or poetry. Furthermore, the analysis of the textbooks allows researchers from the outside to observe and analyze the norms and values approved for dissemination by the government to the students. The quality of such values and norms in relation to the diffused support and approval for political institutions is of particular interest to political scientists.

As the political system attempts to intervene in the socialization process through educational systems and mass communication by instilling highly personalized and relatively unstructured values, norms, and beliefs in children, there is simultaneously the intergenerational transmission of values over which the government has no control. Family is the agent best able to influence and instill personalized and unstructured values in children. In the final segment of this inquiry, attempts are made to study the values and orientations attained by high school students after eight years of education under the influence of socialization norms which the Ministry of Education had emphasized in the textbooks. The analysis will display the level of support or lack of it for the Shah's government during the relatively calmer days of early 1978. This is followed by the analysis

of the values and orientations of the parents and the students with an eye to finding similarities and differences between the two, and of the influence that intergenerational transmission of values has on the process of political change.

### Contents of the Inquiry.

This present study is divided into three main sections. Section One deals with political institutions and is composed of three chapters. Chapter I deals with the Iranian political culture and the position that the institution of monarchy had attained within the cultural framework. The chapter also deals with weaknesses and criticism of the institution of monarchy. Chapter II is basically concerned with the prevailing institutions during the Pahlavi monarchy--their strength and weaknesses. Chapter III discusses the concept of individualism and its place in the possible course of political developments.

Section Two is composed of two chapters and deals with the Iranian educational system as an agent of political socialization. Chapter IV deals with the foundation of the modern educational system in Iran and its relevance to the process of political development. Chapter V is basically the content analysis of elementary and grade school Farsi texts used during the Shah's regime, with an eye to the major norms and values implicit in the readers.

Section Three is composed of five chapters and is composed basically of the results from the analysis of parent-student data. Chapter VI is concerned with the theoretical framework for the analysis

of intergenerational transmission of values. Chapter VII deals with public policy attitudes of respondents in regard to the role of government and the level of socio-political toleration. Chapter VIII discusses political participation, dealing with the respondents interest in passive and active political participation and their level of political efficacy/inefficacy. Chapter IX consists of respondents' attitudes to items delineating political trust/distrust. Chapter X is the discussion of the socio-cultural orientations of the respondents and its impact on their political perspectives.

Fianlly, the discussions are concluded with a summary of the analysis and an examination of the findings in relation to the stated thesis.

## FOOTNOTES

- <sup>1</sup>Gamal Abdal-Nasser, Egypt's Liberation (Washington: 1955).
- <sup>2</sup>Michel Aflag, Fi Sabil al-Bá ath al-Arabi (On the road to Arab Renaissance), (Baghdad: 1953).
- <sup>3</sup>Ahmad Kasravi, Ingelab Christ? (What is Revolution), (Tehran: 1336 sh/1957).
- <sup>4</sup>Walt Rostow, The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1963).
- <sup>5</sup>Gustav Ranis, "Economic Growth," Encyclopedia of Social Sciences, vol III, p. 415.
- <sup>6</sup>Daniel Lerner, The Passing of Traditional Society (New York: 1958).
- <sup>7</sup>Edward Shils, Political Development in the New States (the Hague: 1966).
- <sup>8</sup>Bert F. Hoselitz, "Non-economic Barriers to Economic Development," Economic Development and Cultural Change, vol. I, (1952), pp. 8-21.
- <sup>9</sup>Max Millikan and Donald Blackmer, The Emerging Nations (Boston: 1961).
- <sup>10</sup>Lucian Pye, Aspects of Political Development (Boston: Little and Brown, 1966), p. 33.
- <sup>11</sup>Bert Hoselitz, p. 8.
- <sup>12</sup>Ibid.
- <sup>13</sup>Lucian Pye, pp. 33-45.
- <sup>14</sup>Ibid., pp 45-48.
- <sup>15</sup>Ibid.
- <sup>16</sup>Lucian W. Pye, "Political Culture," Encyclopedia of Social Sciences, vol XII, p. 218.
- <sup>17</sup>Edward Dawson and Kenneth Prewitt, Political Socialization, (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1969), p. 100.

<sup>18</sup>David McClelland, The Achieving Society (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961), pp. 173-89.

<sup>19</sup>Lucian Pye, Aspects of Political Development, pp. 45-48.

<sup>20</sup>Frances Fitzgerald, "The Shah Discovers His People," New Times, (December 11, 1978).

<sup>21</sup>George Baldwin, Planning and Development in Iran (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1967), p. 191.

<sup>22</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 192.

<sup>23</sup>James A. Bill, "Iran and the Crisis of 78," Foreign Affairs, (Winter 1979), p. 327.

<sup>24</sup>cited in James A. Bill, p. 331.



PART I

POLITICAL CULTURE AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT

## CHAPTER I

### POLITICAL CULTURE AND TRADITION

Political institutions have become an inseparable part of the process of political development. In Samuel Huntington's words, political institutions enable the more "complex and heterogeneous" societies to maintain order and aid in establishment of the political community. Political institutions develop as a result of competing social conflicts and of "the gradual development of procedures and organizational devices for resolving those disagreements." In short, only simple societies can exist without "highly differentiated political institutions." The more complex a society becomes, the more it demands action and maintenance by political institutions.<sup>1</sup> Huntington's assertion of the significance of political institutions immediately gives away, in many modernizing societies, to a sense of confusion and schizophrenia on the part of the political leadership. The problem, also recognized by Huntington himself, involves the dichotomy between the concept of constitutionalism inherent in the development of political institutions and reformism which often is contradictory to the will of the majority in a traditionally oriented society. A prerequisite for modernization is consolidation of power and creation of an effective bureaucracy. Thus, modernization not only requires "a shift in power from regional, aristocratic, and

religious groups to central secular, national institutions, but also the centralization of authority in a single individual within those institutions." The endeavors of a modernizing monarch, however, are opposed by the religious and aristocratic opponents whose independence would be seriously challenged by a strong central authority. To preserve the traditional balance of power within the nation and their privileged position, as traditional as they may be, their interests eventually would lead them to promote modern ideals of liberty and constitutionalism and a representative form of government whereby they could potentially attain a position of influence vis-a-vis the monarch and his ambitions of reform and political modernization.<sup>2</sup>

This dilemma of reformism vs. constitutionalism is not a recent phenomenon. Huntington uses several examples, among them Alexander II of Russia, Mahmud II of the Ottoman Empire, and Joseph II of Austria-Hungary. These reformist leaders tried to introduce changes into their realms by attempts to subordinate the traditional mode of the society. Joseph II promoted secularism in place of the overwhelming influence of the church. Among many reforms, he instituted equal protection of the law to all, opened up the civil service to all citizens, and issued a kind of land reform whereby the peasants would own their own lands and keep most (70 percent) of their income.<sup>3</sup>

Mahmud II decided on centralization of the political power in his own hands and thereby became "the sole source of authority in the Empire."<sup>4</sup> Such quests often led to the dispossession of power from the traditional political sector--i.e., the nobility and the church groups--

to a central national bureaucracy. Reforms from above, however, most often proved unpopular. The opposition often took the form of a constitutionalist movement whereby the powers of the monarch would be restrained. Opposition to Sultan Abdulmajid, Mahmud II's successor and also a reformist monarch, hoped to replace "the Ottoman absolutism with a constitutional system" and, in doing so, enlisted the support of the clergy. It was argued that the Sultan's reforms had displaced the traditional order and had ignored the religious laws and regulations. It was also argued that the Sultan should re-establish the representative bodies that had been abolished.<sup>5</sup>

Tzar Alexander II confronted similar sentiments when his reforms began to undermine the influence of the aristocracy. The nobility asked for a national assembly with the aim of limiting imperial power.<sup>6</sup> In short, opposition to reforms in many instances took the posture of "modern liberalism and traditional pluralism." Alexander II opposed constitutionalism since he believed it was intended to establish an oligarchical political system which would not have served the interests of the serfs in Russia.<sup>7</sup>

Huntington recognizes the dilemma of a reformist monarch who is caught in the contradiction that while the institution of monarchy remains highly traditional, his policies are modernizing. He prescribes centralization as vital for reforms. He suggests that in the face of an opposition by vested interests, which utilizes the combination of modern constitutionalism with traditional pluralism, a reformist monarch should enlist support from both traditional and modernized

sources. Three of these support sources are bureaucracy, the middle class, and the masses of population which benefit from the reforms of the monarch. A fourth support source, Huntington suggests, could be from outside the boundaries of the political entity in the form of support by a foreign government.<sup>8</sup>

Huntington's stipulations are quite interesting, particularly due to their apparent failure in maintaining the Shah's political fortunes. A quick glance at the Shah's political approach reveals that he may have been moved by Huntington's prescriptions because he did attempt to enlist the support of the middle class, the bureaucracy and the farmers. As will be discussed, such a strategy proved largely unsuccessful due to the socio-cultural and political context from which the Shah operated.

It is with an understanding of the existing problems facing the developing nations that aspire for political development, but whose efforts are thwarted by the traditional elements inherent in such societies that this present inquiry attempts to search for the significance of education on development of political values that would aid modernization. A discussion of the Iranian political system, however, first demands a historical analysis, particularly with reference to the impact of religion on the political process.<sup>9</sup>

#### Religion and Political Culture.

The impact that the ulama (Arabic word for the high clergy) have had on modern Iran has little parallel in other Middle Eastern

countries. Ulama were instrumental in promulgation of the Constitution of 1906-07<sup>10</sup> and then were supportive of Mohammad-Ali Shah when he opposed it in 1908-09.<sup>11</sup> Promotion of monarchy in 1925 by the ulama, instead of republicanism as first entertained by Reza Khan, was essential in establishment of the Pahlavi dynasty.<sup>12</sup> The ulama were again in the forefront of Reza Shah's opposition, denouncing his authoritarianism and anti-Islamic undertakings.

In essence, the Islamic tradition does not distinguish between the political and religious life of the community. Mohammad was both the political and the spiritual leader of the Moslems. The tradition was followed by the four Rashedeen Caliphs (632-661 A.D.), the Ummayyeds (661-750), and the Abbassids (750-1258).<sup>14</sup> Soon after Mohammad's death however, a rift developed as to the "rightful" successor to the Prophet. The Shiah espoused the institution of Imamat, whereby descendants of the Prophet, through his daughter Fatima and her husband Ali, were upheld as the legitimate heirs to the Prophet. Although many claimants to Imamat were espoused,<sup>15</sup> the doctrine that became dominant and subsequently the state religion in Iran during the Safavid period (1502-1722) was Ithna-ashari (belief in twelve imams). Imam is a title for the man who is the divinely appointed guide of the community. Ali is acknowledged as the first imam. At his death (661 A.D.), his eldest son, Hassan, became the imam. He was succeeded at his death by his younger brother, Hussein. Hussein's rivalry with the Ummayyed Caliph, Yazied, and his martyrdom by the latter's troops in Karbala in 680 is regarded as the most significant event in Shiah history.



Imams became "the symbol of recurring demands for utopian justice and equality."<sup>16</sup> The succession of imams continued until Mahdi, the twelfth imam, disappeared in infancy. In Shiah doctrine he lives and continues as imam though he is hidden from view. This situation is known as gheybat-e-Kobra (The Great Occultation).<sup>17</sup>

The doctrine of Occultation has had a profound impact on the development of Shiah political philosophy. In Hamid Algar's words, "To the Imam alone, divinely protected against sin and error, belongs all the legitimate rule. The political vocation of the Imams was continuously frustrated and with the occultation . . . even the possibility of the legitimate exercise of power disappeared from the world."<sup>18</sup> The Ithna-ashari doctrine, thus, legitimized no true authority while the Imam was hidden. The "shadow of illegitimacy" bound all worldly guests, in particular those related to government. This inescapable and necessary illegitimacy of the state has remained the fundamental element of Ithna-ashari political doctrine.<sup>19</sup>

In short, as a result of the doctrine of Occultation, the Shiah political culture was inherently one of lack of respect, contempt, and/or opposition/non-cooperation towards constituted political authority.

Nevertheless, there existed a justification for the existence of temporal powers. In W. Montgomery Watt's words:

Those who believe in the hidden Imam are not required to do anything in the immediate future, not even to work for any particular reform. At the same time it is implied that the regime is not perfect, and the way is left open for action at some future date. Such an attitude might often be politically harmless, but there lurked in it a potential

danger. A change of circumstances might suggest to the adherents of the movement that the time for action had come.<sup>20</sup>

Although the establishment of Shi'ism as the state religion by the Safavids in the 16th century was a contradiction in terms since "the essence of Shi'ism demands a minority status for its adherents who are in opposition, often quiescent but unyielding, to de facto authority."<sup>21</sup> It, nevertheless, gave rise to two fundamental elements: (1) Iran became the homeland for the Shiah and was "inalienably associated" with it; and (2) it served as the departure point for the existence of ulama. Thus, under the Safavids began "an official clergy, exclusively concerned with legality and jurisprudence, to such a point that original Shi'ism, in its essence, gnostic and theosophic, has, so to speak, to hide itself."<sup>22</sup>

The ulama served a practical function as the guide in giving direction to the community. "The ulama were," in Algar's words, "in a limited sense, intermediaries between the community and the (Hidden) Imam." In addition to belief in God and Prophet, shared by all Moslems, the Shiah was required to believe in Imamat, presently embodied in adherence and loyalty to the Hidden Imam. In the absence of the Hidden Imam, the mujtahids (the most learned and pious of the ulama) "provided immediate guidance in matters of practice." Consequently, the community divided "into those who may act according to their own judgement (mujtahid) and those who must accept the judgement of others (mugallids)."<sup>23</sup> The concept of ijtehad (competence in religious law) of mujtahids, promoted by the Usuli ulama, was opposed by the Akhbari

school. Akhbaris were the dominant theological school from the fall of the Safavids to early Qajar, during the 18th century. They asserted that religious competence was within the authority of Imams. They refuted the utility of mujtahids and vied to restrict the role of clergy "both doctrinally and practically." The mujtahids were charged with using a Sunni process of rationalism, embodied in the concept of agl (exertion of the reason) instead of the preferred nagl (transmitted doctrine).<sup>24</sup> The Akhbari controversy is the major attempt from within the ranks of the ulama to suppress the role of the mujtahids, particularly in their function as the legitimate source of guidance and thus the link between the Hidden Imam and the Ummah (community of believers).

With the exile of Mirza Mohammad, the last well known Akhbari, to the holy shrines in Iraq in the 1820s, the last vestige of Akhbarism was removed from Iran.<sup>25</sup> Some two decades earlier, Agha Mohammad Baghir Behbahani (1705-1803) had uprooted the Akhbari influence from the shrines in Iraq. The success of the Usuli ulama in suppression of the Akhbari doctrine enabled the "institution of mujtahid to survive and to lead the community in the period of Qajar rule." Furthermore, the Usuli insistence on the concept of the link with the Hidden Imam "provided for a greater flexibility of the doctrine and a living, continuous leadership of the believers."<sup>26</sup> The predominance of the ulama in the life of the state during the Qajar period (1779-1925) was further enhanced by the twin elements of weak Qajar monarchs whose political power hardly reached beyond the boundaries of their

capital, and the oft mentioned concept of "illegitimacy of the state" in the absence of the Hidden Imam. In fact, according to the dominant Usuli doctrine, the monarch, like his subjects, was required "to submit to the authoritative guidance of a mujtehid and in effect to make the state the executive branch of ulama authority."<sup>28</sup> This theoretical duty, however, was seldom realized. Instead a tension remained between the monarch and the ulama which at times gave way to open hostility. This was best exemplified by the Tobacco Rebellion of 1891 when a fatwa (religious decree) was given by the nation's leading mujtehids against the use of tobacco in any form since it had been given as a monopoly to a British firm.<sup>29</sup> The forbidding of the use of tobacco compelled Nasser al-Din Shah to revoke the monopoly of the Imperial Tobacco Corporation. Furthermore, the participation of the ulama in the Constitutional Revolution is also regarded as a further attempt by the clergy to limit the power of the monarch.<sup>30</sup>

It has been only during the present century that titles have become popular among the clergy. Prior to the Twentieth Century, Sheikh and Mulla were the main titles used by the Shiah clergy. The multitudes of titles and their inclusion in the names of the clergy results in much confusion since the titles that were used by marga-taghlead only a few decades ago are presently used by some of the more humble clergy. The following is a somewhat general categorization of titles that are presently used by the Shiah clergy:

At the lower end of the scale is the mullah, an Islamic priest or preacher. The term is also the generic name applied to Moslem clergyman . . . generally.

The more learned mullahs are called hojatoleslam, roughly meaning "vicar of Islam." They are usually men who have completed higher theological courses and can boast some expertise in religious law.

Next comes the ayatollah or "reglection of Allah." These holy men are regarded as authorities on religious law, teach advanced theological courses and receive major donations from the faithful.

. . . then ayatollahs multiplied so rapidly that an even more authoritative appellation was required. (During the last few decades) a few of the most learned, pious and aged holy men earned the title of ayatollah al-ozma, or grand ayatollah.<sup>31</sup>

Presently marja-taghleid are referred to as ayatollah al-ozma. Although there still remains a dispute as to who the more prominent ayatollahs or ayatollah al-ozma are, clearly Ayatollah Khomeini and Ayatollah Seyyed Kazem Shariatmadari are the most eminent among them.

The ulam have hardly been a homogeneous group. Binder has distinguished three different orientations among the ulama during the first two decades of the present century.

The first group adjusted their allegiance to whoever was in power. The second group compelled the enactment of constitutional provisions prohibiting legislation contrary to the ruling of the general agency, as represented by five officially designated mujtahids, and they also prevented Reza Shah from establishing a republic. It was the third group that became the most vigorous reformers, changing their turbans for hats and taking government jobs, or going into exile for extremist political activity. One of the latter, Sayyid Zia al-Din, led the coup that eventually put Reza Shah in power.<sup>32</sup>

Following the abdication of Reza Shah and as a reaction to his secular and anti-clerical policies, the ulama opted for a greater control of the affairs of the state. The young Mohammad-Reza Shah, eager for help and support from any quarter, cooperated with them and it was during this period that Qum flourished as a main seat of the



ulama, competing with holy shrines in Iraq as the center of Shiah activity.

With the new shah in control of the political situation, his attempts at secular modernization caused a new rift between the clergy and the government to develop. The conflict, precipitated by the announcement of the six point referendum, including land reforms and emancipation of women, reached its zenith during the June 1963 riots during which many were killed.<sup>33</sup> The government contended that the clashes were caused by reactionary elements who opposed the reforms undertaken by the government. The religious opposition, however, based their opposition to the Shah on his dictatorial and undemocratic rule. The reforms did in fact threaten the position and influence of the clergy and other traditional centers of power. The reforms when implemented would expand the central government's reach to all levels of the society and thus undermine the position and influence of the traditional forces. For example, the mandatory standardization and use of textbooks by the Ministry of Education gave the government a free hand in selection of topics to be included in the readers. As such, the government gained a position of influence in effecting the socialization process of school children. The Literacy Corps, as a fundamental basis of the Shah's reforms, was to replace the traditional modes of education, generally Quranic, with a secular education. The clergy, in the statement of Ayatollah Brujerdi, had indicated their opposition to land reforms.<sup>34</sup> Although it was pointed out by the supporters of the clergy that the ulama did not oppose land reforms in



principle, there was perhaps some element of fear that the vagf (religious endowment) lands may be included in the reforms.

Although the clergy are sometimes referred to as an institution, the term may cause some confusion, particularly when compared to the Roman Catholic Church or even Protestant churches. As noted above, the ulama are not a homogeneous group. They are not organized along established hierarchical patterns with one of the ulama as the supreme leader. The Ithna-ashari Shiah, by the virtue of Usuli doctrine, which upholds the ulama as the intermediaries between the Hidden Imam and the ummah, establishes a foundation for ijtehad (competence in religious law) through which the ummah is provided with immediate guidance in religious practice. These religious guides came to be known as marja-taghleed (source of imitation). The position was neither appointive or elective. A marja-taghleed gained such a status through piety and competence in Islamic law. The popular following caused as a result of his public fame would dictate his position as a marja-taghleed. Such a process, however, often resulted in the existence of several marja-taghleed at any given time. Only a few marja-taghleed had universal preeminence, and they were acknowledged as such by the overwhelming majority of the Ithna-ashari Shiahs as their marja-taghleed.

As in Qajar period, there were clergy who were courted by the monarch and in return gave their support to the regime and its policies. Such clergy had gathered around the Imam Jume'h of Tehran (the formal leader of ulama in any given town who also lead the Friday prayer).

The Pahlavi monarchs, like the Qajar monarchs, had reserved the appointment of imam-Jumeh as their prerogative.<sup>35</sup> The more prominent of the ulama, however, resided in Qum and Mashad and pursued an independent line from that of the government. Ayatollah Khomeini, one of these ulama, bitterly opposed the Shah and the institution of monarchy. The Shah reportedly had denounced the ulama who had resisted submission to his rule and had called them parasites. Ayatollah Khomeini had reacted by noting, "Am I a parasite, and men like me such as (Ayatollah) Burujirdi, who was sixty thousand tumans (over \$8,500) in debt when he died, or these students who survive on a stipend of thirty tumans (less than \$5) a month? Or are you, O Shah, the parasite, who has erected towering palaces and filled foreign banks with your untold wealth?"<sup>36</sup>

The Shah's frontal attack on the ulama was contrasted with his frequent and well publicized trips to the holy Shiah shrines within the country. He also travelled to the most holy of the Islamic shrines in Mecca. A picture of him in the white shroud, praying in Ká ba, was prominently displayed in many shops and offices. On formal occasions of salaam (audiences where representatives of the nation paid homage to the Shah), the ulama were ushered in first to the royal presence to display the high regard of the monarch for the institution of religion. Attempts were made to represent to the public eye a cohesive bond between the Shah and the ulama in order to legitimize the Shah's rule as one in conformity with Shiah doctrine. Although such pretensions became a part of the tradition of royal salaams, there never was a

cohesion between the clergy and the court.<sup>37</sup> The ulama participating in salaam ceremonies were usually those who had gathered around Dr. Imami, the Imam Jume'h of Tehran. The independent ulama kept their distance from the court.<sup>38</sup> In fact, the Shah seldom visited Qum which was only 100 miles south of Tehran but was a stronghold of the ulama and a center of opposition to his rule. When he fled Iran in January 1979, it had been a full twenty years since he had been in Qum.

### Modernization and Political Culture.

Nasser al-Din Shah, who ruled Iran during the second half of the 19th Century, had made three trips to Europe and had embarked on some measures of westernization in Iran, particularly in the early years of his rule. The first railroad was built and the first telegraph lines established in Iran during his reign.<sup>39</sup> He also undertook some political changes in his administration, namely the establishment of the first cabinet whose members were directly responsible to the person of the Shah. The Shah was also influenced by the thought of Mirza Malkulm Khan, whose writings and thoughts were of some influence on the Constitutional Movement. Mirza Malkum Khan (1834-1914), born in the Julfa district of Isfahan, spent most of his youth in Paris studying political science.<sup>40</sup> Mirza, who purportedly had converted to Islam, after his return to Iran enjoyed the confidence of the Shah and became a member of his dowreh (circle of confidants).<sup>41</sup> Mirza espoused political and economic reorganization of Iran along Western lines. His modernization concepts were first spelled out in his

Kitabche-ye Gheybi Ya Daftar-e Tanzimat (1858). According to Hamid Algar, the first mention of ganun (law) in its sense of law, in modern Persian literature, was in this book. In Kitabche-ye Gheybi, Mirza Malkum attempted "to define the essential functions of the state and to regulate the relation of its component organs." In his Daftari Qanun (1883), Mirza proposed the codification of the Shari'a (religious law) to make it "the law of the state in the same way" that the states of Europe have codified their laws and drawn up a Quran for themselves."<sup>42</sup>

While in Europe Mirza Malkum Khan had also learned of the Freemasonry movements and their impact on the French Revolution.<sup>43</sup> So, on his return to Iran he had established a 'pseudo-masonic lodge' called Faramoushkhaneh (House of Forgetfulness), through which he had hoped to propagate social and political teachings.<sup>44</sup> Naser al-Din Shah was led to believe that Faramoushkhaneh would result in his members being morally bound to the throne by having sworn fidelity to the Shah who had become the Grand Master of the lodge. By 1861, however, the Shah had become suspicious of the aims of Mirza. Fearing the growing number of secret societies, he forbade the continuation of the society. Mirza's political and social activities, however, surfaced in the form of Majma-i Adamiyat (League of Humanity) which became a center of dissemination of news and ideas. Many leading citizens, including the clergy, purportedly had joined this group and several were among those elected to the first Majlis in 1906.<sup>45</sup>

Due to the perceived excesses of the Shah, the last decade of the 19th Century experienced a move to curtail the authoritarian rule of the monarch. While the religious elements feared the reforms and Westernization that had already been undertaken by the Shah, the liberals urged faster and more radical reforms. The Tobacco Protest, as noted above, was the first major challenge of those who wished to limit the powers of the Shah. The successful outcome of the challenge set in motion a movement that bore fruit in the Constitution of 1906-07. Nikki Keddie asserts that it was exactly such threats of Westernization or "Western-inspired secularization" that inspired the ulama to partake in the constitutional movement. He notes that the ulama were partly led "by their belief that it would further enhance their power" to support a modern constitution.<sup>46</sup> The traditional minded clergy, led by Sheikh Nuri, believed that they could influence the outcome of the constitutional movement by making Sharia a substantial part of the new constitution. Keddie's assertion, in fact, supports Huntington's assumption, discussed earlier, which stipulates that the traditionalist elements in countries ruled by reformist monarchs tend to support a constitutionalist framework embodied in the precepts of "modern liberalism and traditional pluralism."<sup>47</sup>

The Constitutional Movement was not free from foreign influence while the British implicitly supported the movement, the Russians opposed it and gave their support to the Qajar monarchs. Thus it was of little surprise to see the Constitutionalists stage a sit-in at the shrine in Rey in 1904 to demand the dismissal of two pro-Russian



ministers, Amin ol-Doleh and Ala ol-Doleh, and to see the establishment of the House of Justice.<sup>48</sup> When Mozafa al-Din Shah's (1896-1907) promises concerning liberalization were not kept, some 15,000 merchants in July 1906 converged on the British Legation in Tehran and staged a sit-in on its grounds. The clergy, on the other hand, undertook a procession to the holy city of Qum. It was under such pressures that Mozafar al-Din Shah, reluctantly, on August 5, 1906 granted a constitution.<sup>49</sup>

Following the success of the Constitutionalists, a rift between the ulama and the Western-inspired Constitutionalists developed. The dispute was briefly muted by the promulgation of the Supplementary Fundamental Law in 1907 that recognized Shiah Islam as the state religion and promised a council composed of five mujtahids to supervise over legislation to ensure that all laws passed were in accordance with Islam.<sup>50</sup> This submission to the will of the ulama fell far short of the expectation of such previously leading members of the Constitutionalist Movement at Sheikh Fazl-ol-lah Nuri who began to turn Mohammad Ali Shah (1907-1909) against the Constitution and Majlis. Mohammad Ali Shah, who had become the Shah following his father's death, sought to reinstate the authoritative rule of the kings. He had the support of the Russians and the Russian trained Qazak soldiers of his army. It was in June 1908, that, with the Shah's acquiescence, Colonel Liakhov, Commander of the Qazak forces, shelled the Majlis. The coup had the support of Sheikh Nuri and other anti-constitutionalists. It was on the triumphant return of the Constitutionalists to Tehran in



in 1909, and the exile of Mohammad-Ali Shah to Russia, that the Sheikh was arrested and hanged for treason and for attempting to stop the constitutional process in the country.<sup>51</sup>

Sheikh Nuri had insisted that the constitutionalists adopt Sharia (the Law of Islam) as the law of the state while many of the leading ulama, Mulla Mahmmd-Kazem Khorasani, Mulla Abdullah Mazandarani, and Hajji Mirza Hussein Khalili Tehrani, all residing in Iraq, contended that "consistent implementation of the Sharia was impossible during the continued occultation of the Imam."<sup>52</sup> Sheikh Nuri considered neither the monarch nor the people as sovereign but lent his support to Mohammad-Ali Shah when he found the nation "threatened with Western secularism. The events during the first decade of the Twentieth Century and the recent Iranian revolution led by Ayatollah Rouhollah Khomeini have many similarities. Ayatollah Khomeini, by his insistence on the establishment of an Islamic Republic, has demonstrated his contempt for Western inspired secularism and his belief that the Sharia affords the best possible framework for an Islamic Iran.<sup>53</sup> Ayatollah Khomeini's approach, however, differed from that of Sheikh Nuri since the Ayatollah appealed to popular support for the establishment of his "Islamic Republic," once again confirming the stipulation that the traditional political elements vastly utilize "modern liberalism and traditional popularism" to confront secular socio-political movements.

In analysis of the socio-political tradition in Iran, it is fundamental to recognize the impact of Shiah thought on the political

perspective of the citizens. While ignoring the influence of Shiah tradition on the political process of the country, analyses instead often focus on the criticism of Iranians for their cynicism, basic disloyalty to the state, resentment towards authority, anti-intellectualism, and scorn for conventional morality.<sup>54</sup> Amin Banani goes even further and criticizes "inept monarchs (who) chose to share their power with the assembly of Shiah divines" thus leading to paralysis of "every source of cultural vitality and intellectual vigor in Iran."<sup>55</sup> Thus, the concept of "illegitimacy of state" in the absence of the Hidden Imam seldom enters analyses of the political process in Iran by political scientists. The monarchs during the past century have rarely utilized the bond between the ulama and the people for national development schemes. Instead, they have sought to use the ulama and religion for personal gains. In 1924-26, Reza Shah participated in mourning processions during Ashura to allay the fear of the ulama and the public so he could accede to the throne, while Mohammad-Reza Shah in the early parts of his reign tried to gain the favor of the ulama for his rule by courting them. Both monarchs, however, at the height of their power ignored the enormous support and the legitimacy that the ulama, at least the moderate ones, could give to their rules and the support to their reforms and modernization schemes. Such a cooperation may have been possible if the conduct of the affairs of state had taken into consideration some Islamic-Shiah precepts. Mohammad-Reza Shah, instead, deployed religious symbolism and a sense of divine mission for his rule to gain legitimacy.<sup>56</sup> The Shah even had

visions of building "the faith in the way the Prophet really meant the religion to be,"<sup>57</sup> ignoring the fact that the source of the conflict between the state and religion did not lie in the Islamic precepts but in the Shiah tradition of Ithna-ashari doctrine. It is worth noting that it is this doctrine of "illegitimacy" of temporal powers that is related to mystic allusions which suggest "that the inner light is more important than the law, which is described as the shell. Once the shell is broken and the kernel is taken out, one is apt to become somewhat careless about the care of the shell."<sup>58</sup> Although Sufism has not been confined to Iran, nevertheless, it is held as the "supreme manifestation of the Persian mind in the religious sphere."<sup>59</sup>

The above analysis depicts the historical conflict between the state and all institutions emanating from this temporal power and the community of believers led by the ulama in the absence of the Hidden Imam. Based on such a tradition, the Constitution of 1906-07 was only to be tolerated but was not to replace the Laws of Islam. Such a tolerance on the part of the community did not support nor give legitimacy to political institutions that would have been the natural outcome of the implementation of the Constitution.<sup>60</sup> Thus, there seemed to be a lingering contradiction between Shiah tradition and the theories that espoused secular political development. In other words, as long as there was no social, cultural or institutional change, there could not be any real development of political institutions.

Despite the dichotomy between the concept of political state and the Ithna-ashari doctrine, there is a wealth of literature on the

conduct of statesmanship by monarchs. The most important of these are Siasatnameh by Khawjeh Nizam-al-Mulk and Qabusnameh by Kaikavous ibn-Iskandar.<sup>61</sup> There is a strong tradition demanding responsibility from the person of the king while exacting subordination from the community to a "just" king. A just king was regarded as the shadow of God on earth. Wayne Untereiner on the obligation of a ruler and the ruled within the Iranian political perspective declares:

The primary responsibility of a good political authority was to do good things (not only political things) for the people (as determined by the political authority). In return, the people would appreciate what the authority did for them, and in consequence would support the political authority. In order to carry out this political responsibility, political authority must lead the people and clarify the public will, providing the people with supervised guidance and outlining popular duties.<sup>62</sup>

Thus, the wholesale criticism of the cultural tradition of the country for all the shortcomings of the development of political institutions and of the citizens for their political inefficacy is rather unjustified.<sup>63</sup> During the past fifty years, the activist reformers, in Huntingtonian guise, who espoused transformation of traditional societies into modern political states, were less than sincere in their stated goals. Reza Shah, the founder of the Pahlavi dynasty, upheld as a modernizing monarch by Huntington,<sup>64</sup> did not attempt to create political institutions nor did he surround himself with distinguished advisors. His son, Mohammad-Reza, later lamented his father's style, noting his narrow and undistinguished circle of advisors as "one of the few mistakes my father made."<sup>65</sup> Reza Shah instead accumulated a fortune through a mixture of forced gifts: "cheap

acquisitions and expropriations," mostly in land. Marvin Zonis states that by the time of Reza Shah's abdication the royal holdings were 2,000 villages with approximately a quarter of a million peasants "in the direct service of His Imperial Majesty qua landlord." Thus it was not surprising to learn of peasant revolts following Reza Shah's abdication calling for restoration of their properties.<sup>66</sup>

For a proper analysis of the need for political development in Iran, it is essential to add the additional dimension of the present socio-economic condition of the country. The socio-economic stratification of the nation, accelerated during the past quarter of a century, resulted in the expansion of the middle class and thus intensified the demands on the political system. At the turn of the century, some 80 percent of the population lived in rural areas.<sup>67</sup> Agriculture and related works, as recently as 1960, accounted for 28 percent of the gross domestic product.<sup>68</sup> Today, half of the population live in urban areas<sup>69</sup> and agriculture accounts for only nine percent of the gross domestic product,<sup>70</sup> although nearly 40 percent of the national labor force is employed in this sector.<sup>71</sup> The agricultural sector since 1960 has realized the slowest rate of growth per annum compared to the other sectors of economy. While agriculture had achieved a five percent growth rate per year between 1970 to 1976, industry, trade, construction and transportation had gained a growth rate of 6.6, 14.4, 15.3 and 18.4 respectively.<sup>72</sup>

While income per capita had grown from \$176 per year in 1960 to over \$2,000 in 1977, its distribution was far from equitable. While farm families in places such as Baluchistan Province subsisted on \$200



per year, the wealth of the economic elite of the nation grew to phenomenal proportions.<sup>73</sup> These developments have further increased economic stratification in the nation, resulting in different or even opposing demands on the political system.

The middle class, or, as James A. Bill Calls it, the "professional-bureaucratic intelligentsia," influenced by Western-style education and secular tendencies and exposed to varying degrees of Western philosophies, prefers a more open political system with little of the dogma present in the traditional systems.<sup>74</sup> This concept of liberalism, however, is immediately confronted by at least two contradictory principles; on the one hand, the concept of traditional pluralism and the promotion of Sharia used by the ulama and their supporters to offset Western secularism, and, on the other hand, the authoritarian rule of kings, espoused by Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi. These three principles, moreover, have found a common opponent in the Marxian ideology adhered to by the more radical elements of the intelligentsia. The political history of Iran during the present century can best be analyzed in retrospect to these four principles. The political history of the nation, furthermore, for over half of the period since the inception of a constitutional government in 1906, has been manifested in the direct and personal authoritarian rule of two monarchs, Reza Shah and Mohammad-Reza Shah. Perhaps it would be best to discuss the development or lack of development of political institutions in relation to the political style of these two monarchs contrasted against the political process envisioned by the constitution.



A discussion of the institution of monarchy at this juncture would provide us with an insight for the following discussions on political institutions.

### Monarchy.

Although a constitutional monarchy was proclaimed through the Revolution of 1906, it remained elusive. The shahs following the Constitutional Revolution, very much like the ones before the revolution, were eager to rule rather than to reign. Muzafar al-Din Shah had reluctantly given in to the demands of the Constitutionalists. Following his death in December 1906, his son, Mohammad-Ali Mirza, became the Shah. Mohammad-Ali Shah had high religious sentiments and was greatly influenced by the religious opponents of the Constitution. Freedom of press led to editorials that abused and made mockery of the Shah and his friends, agitating the sovereign and shocking his personal vanity. Furthermore, both Russia and Britain had become restless at the independence of the Majlis, particularly when it rejected a proposed joint Russo-British loan in November 1906. The loan was part of a larger scheme to bring the Iranian government under total Russo-British control. The new Shah had appointed, as his financial advisor, Shapshal, who was opposed to the Constitution. The Constitutionalists were suspicious of Mohammad-Ali Shah's aims. In anticipation of his hostility to the Constitution, the deputies in the Majlis had asked him on three separate occasions to swear fidelity to the Constitution.<sup>75</sup> The monarch, during this 18 month period of uncertainty, had the support of

such circles as the anti-Constitutionalist clergy, exemplified by Sheikh Fazi-ollah Nuri, and the Qazak brigade led by Colonel Liakov. The Shah ordered the bombardment of the Majlis building on June 3, 1908, and thus ended the short-lived experiment with democracy. The ensuing national uprising by pro-Constitution anjomans (societies), most vocal in Tabriz, Isfahan and Guilan, finally forced the abdication of Mohammad-Ali Shah on July 16, 1909, after a 13 month civil war which is commonly known as "the lesser autocracy." Ahmad Mirza, Mohammad-Ali Shah's 12 year old son, was pronounced shah and Azed ol-Mulk, the head of the Qajar tribe, the regent.<sup>76</sup> Mohammad-Ali Mirza, nevertheless, attempted to regain the throne two years later in 1911, with support from his brother and several loyal friends. His supporters were defeated in a battle near Varamin and Mohammad-Ali Mirza once again fled back to Russia where he remained.

The political turmoil beginning with the bombardment of the Majlis building lasted well after World War I, exacerbated by foreign intervention in Iranian internal affairs. The division of the country into zones of influence by Brittain and Russia,<sup>76</sup> the invasion of the country by the Ottomans, and the establishment of a pro-German government in Kermanshah in the west hardly expedited the process of government as envisioned by the Constitution. As a result of the Bolshevik Revolution, Russia's intervention in Iranian internal affairs was greatly reduced. This, however, resulted in a freer hand for Britain to intervene in Iranian domestic politics. It culminated in 1919 when Ahmad Shah gave his support to a British proposed treaty in which Iran

would become a colony of Britain all except in name. The treaty, however, was withdrawn in the face of economic considerations in Britain and international opposition to its enactment by France, the Soviet Union and the United States.<sup>77</sup> The treaty was repudiated by the Fourth Majlis as its first order of business in 1921.

Iranian political posture took a new dimension following a coup led by Seyyed Zia al-Din Tabataba-ye, a journalist, with help from a Qazak brigade led by Reza Khan. Seyyed Zia became the prime minister while Reza Khan was given the title of commander-in-Chief. Within a few days, Reza Khan became Minister of War and thus took complete charge of the army. Malek-ol-Shoara, a leading historian of the period, notes that Reza Khan, prior to the coup and during its first days, was used by Seyyed Zia and was not the power behind it as some have suggested.<sup>78</sup> Reza Khan was not even included in Seyyed Zia's first cabinet. Nonetheless, Reza Khan soon found himself in an opportune position with the only military organization--i.e., the Qazak brigade--at his disposal.<sup>79</sup>

Seyyed Zia's reforms immediately earned him the wrath of the aristocracy and the nobility. Within a month of his accession to power, almost all notable people were either under arrest or in exile. Seyyed, as a consequence, was deposed by the combined forces of those opposed to him and sent to exile three months after the success of coup d' etat. Reza Khan assumed the post of Minister of War in the cabinet headed by Qavam-al-Saltaneh,<sup>80</sup> himself a member of the nobility.

Reza Khan pre-occupied himself with reorganization of the army, putting down local revolts, and expanding the central government's authority to all parts of the country. He assumed the post of prime minister in 1923. Ahmad Shah, following the appointment, left for Europe from which he never returned. During the same year in Turkey, Ata-Turk proclaimed a republic and ended Ottoman rule. Reza Khan, who was hoping to copy the success of Ataturk, wished to establish a republic in Iran. The clergy, in particular, opposed such a plan in which they saw the foundation of a secular state. Finally, the Majlis, on October 31, 1925, voted to transfer the monarchy from the Qajar to the Pahlavi dynasty with Reza Khan as its founder.<sup>81</sup>

Reza Shah was basically an uneducated soldier who had little patience for the legal niceties of the constitutional process. In Amin Banani's words, Reza Shah "embodied the impatience of men of action with the endless debate of the articulate reformers and revolutionaries . . . . He proceeded to immediate and practical goals." Banani also notes that Reza Shah was moved by three basic desires: (1) "A complete dedication to the cult of nationalism-statism;" (2) the "assertion of this nationalism by rapid adoption of the material advances of the West;" and (3) "a breakdown of the traditional power of religion and a growing tendency toward secularism." Although it is stated that Reza Shah tried to emulate the West and adopt Western inspired ideals,<sup>82</sup> his adoption of a Western style administrative framework remained superficial. Bureaucratic achievements were due more to fear of the Shah's wrath<sup>83</sup> than to a coherent and responsible

administrative system. Those who opposed him or differed from him were harshly dealt with.<sup>84</sup> Thus, the cronies that remained around Reza Shah were rarely people of high intellectual ability and were not able to give him a proper political-economic perspective.<sup>85</sup> In dealing with the depth of political and administrative modernization in the nation, it suffices to note that on the day of Reza Shah's forced abdication by the invading Allied forces the administrative fabric of the nation disintegrated.

Reza Shah's approach demonstrated his disregard for Islam and Shiah doctrine. On a few occasions prior to becoming the Shah, in attempts to please the devoted and gain their support, Reza Shah had employed the institution of religion to further his goals.<sup>86</sup> Following his accession to the throne, Reza Shah's hostility to Islam and ulama was displayed in attacks on the shrines of Qum in 1928, and of Mashad in 1935. While in the shrine in Qum, the Queen Mother had inadvertently let her veil down which resulted in her denouncement by the officiating clergy. The very next day Reza Shah, at the head of a column of troops and two armoured cars, entered the shrine without taking his boots off and "thrashed" the mulla. Following the forced unveiling of women in 1935, there was an anti-government demonstration in Mashad. When the demonstrators took refuge in the shrine, the troops were ordered inside where many were killed. Reza Shah's disregard for sanctity of holy shrines, discontinuation of many processions during the mourning month of Moharram, and discouragement of taziye (religious plays) earned him the animosity of the clergy and



the faithful.<sup>87</sup> His forced unveiling of women, an anti-Islamic act, made most Iranian women housebound. The superficial nature of Reza Shah's modernization is noted by Ann K. S. Lambton. She stated that while Reza Shah's modernization had displaced traditional values, it had failed to generate new values in their place. In her words, Reza Shah had not succeeded in creating an atmosphere in which "the unimpaired faculties of the people could find scope in effective and creative social action."<sup>88</sup>

On his abdication, Reza Shah appointed Crown Prince Mohammad-Reza as the new monarch. The allied occupation and the new Shah's inexperience gave grounds for re-establishment of the constitutional process and an effort was made by the Majlis to concentrate the political power in its own hands. The British, according to Peter Avery, had used every means possible to downgrade Reza Shah's rule and to encourage the restoration of a constitutional monarchy. During the occupation years, however, the occupying forces continued to pack the Majlis with their sympathizers in their respective zones.<sup>89</sup>

The Shah, meanwhile, observed and learned. His popularity had reached its zenith following the Soviet withdrawal from the Azarbaijan provinces in 1946, where a Soviet backed government had declared its autonomy from the central government in Tehran. The ensuing propaganda portrayed the return of Azarbaijan to the motherland as a result of the Shah's efforts and of his leadership of the armed forces.<sup>90</sup> The Shah's entanglement with the Nationalists, led by Dr. Mossadegh, reversed his popularity with the public. The problem arose when Dr. Mossadegh,



appointed prime minister in April 1951, asked the Shah to relinquish the post of commander-in-chief of the armed forces to him. The ambiguity over the details of where the power of the prime minister ended and that of the monarch began had been a point of contention before, during the premiership of Qavam.<sup>91</sup> Dr. Mossadegh, with the immense popularity gained as a result of his opposition to the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company and its nationalization, was willing to challenge the Shah. In fact, his disdain for the Pahlavi dynasty was well known.<sup>92</sup> On his request, the Shah had sent the Queen Mother and Princess Ashraf, the Shah's twin sister, into exile soon after his appointment as prime minister.<sup>93</sup> Dr. Mossadegh's popularity with the clergy and the merchants began to falter following his miscalculations about the American response to his demands and the ensuing economic downturn as the conflict with Britain over oil was prolonged. Meanwhile, Dr. Mossadegh, in the eyes of many conservative circles, was becoming too close and too dependent on the Tudeh party to stay in power.<sup>94</sup>

Following the abortive coup led by the pro-Shah officers on August 16, 1953, the Shah fled the country and most organizers of the coup, namely General Fazl-ollah Zahedi, went into hiding. On August 19, however, with material and planning support by the CIA, with the help of the armed forces loyal to the Shah, and with the backing of the mobs led by south-Tehran chagukeshan (knife wielders) paid by CIA agents, Dr. Mossadegh's government was overthrown by night fall.<sup>95</sup> Although the Shah returned to a welcome in the Tehran airport on August 22, the American assistance in restoring him to the throne led him to

be portrayed as a foreign puppet. His popularity with the public, particularly the nationalists, took a downturn from which he never recovered.

A model to rule by. Upon his return, the Shah spoke of the need for social reforms.<sup>96</sup> The political approach of the Shah during the next 25 years of his rule seems to have some grounds in the model prescribed by Samuel Huntington. As described briefly before,<sup>97</sup> Huntington prescribes four channels of support for a "modernizing" monarch who is up against a combination of liberal-conservative opposition. Although there are some who would consider the Shah a reformer, a greater number, perhaps, would disagree with such a contention.<sup>98</sup> The Shah's "reformist" policies, as will be discussed shortly, were basically undertaken with the primary goal of making the monarchy, once again, the dominant institution in Iran.<sup>99</sup> To achieve such an end, the Shah, in the process, attained such eventualities as land reforms and centralization of power which do coincide with the process of political modernization from a traditional feudalistic culture into a modern polity.<sup>100</sup>

Bureaucracy. The first basis of support was to be the state bureaucracy, but certainly not in the terms anticipated by Huntington where an efficient bureaucracy was to be utilized to transform the traditional society. The many studies on the Iranian political elite<sup>101</sup> clearly indicate the accumulation of power in the state, the Shah's ability to direct such power, and the political elite's ability to reap material and political benefit as a result of its support for such a

process.<sup>102</sup> The Shah's attainment of power and control resulted in a weak cabinet, legislature and bureaucracy. For example, the Plan and Budget Organization (PBO), which was established with much fanfare in 1949 as the national planning arm of the government to prepare development plans, had lost much of its clout in the 1970s. The warnings of the PBO against a high growth rate went unheeded<sup>103</sup> and when, in 1976, a critical report from the PBO to ministries and other government agencies was circulated, its publication was suppressed.<sup>104</sup> It was commonly claimed within the PBO that an overwhelming number of projects were "pet" projects of the court, namely the Reza Pahlavi Industrial Complex in Shahreza, Shahestan-e Pahlavi,<sup>105</sup> Pahlavi Library,<sup>106</sup> and Tehran Metro.<sup>107</sup> It was widely felt within the ranks of the planners that when orders came down favoring a project, the role of PBO was to provide justification as to why it deserved priority.<sup>108</sup>

Furthermore, the government bureaucracy was plagued with insecurity and lack of authority to deal with matters that theoretically were their responsibility. Insecurity was caused by fear of reprisals if certain projects or undertakings proved contradictory to the wishes of somebody higher up, resulting in situations where nobody was willing to take responsibility for any action.<sup>109</sup> The accumulation of decision making powers in certain quarters had made almost every action of the bureaucracy dependent on orders from above. George Baldwin recognized this crisis of bureaucracy in the insufficiency of the planning process in Iran, which was caused by a lack of system of checks and balances by the legitimate institutions whereby "all important numbers,

proposals, and judgements could be exposed to criticism before decisions are made." The institutions that could exert external influence on the process of planning were "extremely weak" and were not given much "recognition."<sup>110</sup> In fact, the bureaucracy, excluding the military and the universities, included in its ranks some 57,000 individuals<sup>111</sup> with above high school education who were basically dependent on the government for their livelihood. Through the bureaucracy, these individuals were given employment in order to be coopted into the ranks of government supporters or at least to prevent them, particularly those with a higher education level, from drifting into the ranks of the opposition.<sup>112</sup>

The inability to influence the course of events was hardly limited to the middle ranking bureaucrats. Many high ranking individuals, namely those in the cabinet, complained about the absurdities of the cabinet meetings, since major decisions had previously been made in audiences with the Shah. Robert Graham reports the "unedifying" impression of a cabinet member after his first meeting with the cabinet:<sup>113</sup>

At my first Cabinet meeting I was very nervous, but then I almost laughed when I saw how frivolous the whole thing was. No one talked very much. They (the ministers) just sat there signing documents or listened to Hoveida (the Prime Minister). I remember one day a Minister got up and asked something like "Why do we bother to come here if no one discusses anything?" This created little reaction and changed nothing.

A further weakness of the bureaucracy was caused by the Shah's parallel government. The parallel government duplicated the ministries and other national agencies. For example, although there was a cabinet

post responsible for Ministry of Energy, the affairs of the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) fell outside the limits of that ministry. NIOC was headed by a chairman and board of directors who reported directly to the Shah. Such matters as defense and foreign policy were the exclusive domain of the Shah. The Minister of Court, appointed by the Shah, reported directly to the Shah and did not attend cabinet discussions. The Minister of Court was a representative of the Shah to the cabinet and, as such, his presence had the "royal authority behind it." He could cancel "or overrule orders from all other bodies or individuals in government and (officials of the ministry had) considerable authority over the Shah's parallel government."<sup>114</sup>

In short, the civilian bureaucracy possessed little power, if any, to give support to the monarch against the aristocracy or, for that matter, against any social or economic class. In fact, the bureaucracy, due to its inability to initiate any action or to influence the political process of the nation, was rather frustrated and was among the first groups to oppose the Shah by strikes and work slowdowns early in the fall of 1978.<sup>115</sup>

The armed forces. The armed forces, during most of the Pahlavi rule, were primarily charged with responsibility for internal security.<sup>116</sup> Their inadequacy in defending the country against foreign invasion was displayed in August 1941 when the Soviet and British forces invaded the country with little challenge from Iranian armed forces. Mohammad-Reza Shah's approach from 1953 on clearly displayed his reliance on the armed forces to keep him in power. Loyalty to the



person of the Shah became the highest priority of the armed forces. "Khoda, Shah, Meehan" (God, King and Country) became the motto of the armed forces. The Shah had felt secure enough to elevate himself above the "country." In the mid-1950s, the armed forces were purged of officers who were suspected of being sympathetic to the Tudeh (Communist) Party. General Zahedi, who had led the loyal armed forces to oust Dr. Mossadegh, was dropped in 1955 as prime minister and was appointed as Iranian representative to the United Nations in Geneva. The armed forces had been a source of contention to Shah's rule. The ranks of officers, particularly at junior levels during the 1950s and 1960s, were composed mostly of men from middle class backgrounds. Such individuals, given the middle class sympathy for the Nationalist cause, were a source of concern for the Shah. The general staff, however, posed a greater threat due to their influence and, in some cases, due to regional or tribal affiliations which were independent from the court. By the 1960s, the armed forces were stripped of officers who had any basis of support independent from the Shah. Thus, the armed forces were fast becoming the sole domain of the Shah.<sup>117</sup> They showed their unwavering loyalty to the Shah during the 1963 uprising by putting it down brutally.<sup>118</sup> As a result of this suppression, the armed forces went down in popular esteem. Due to the dwindling number of middle class recruits, particularly during the 1970s, the armed forces became a haven for lower-middle and lower class recruits. As the rate of migration to larger urban areas increased, the armed forces became a source of attraction for upwardly mobile emigrants. By the



virtue of their function as protectors of the monarchy, the armed forces had put a distance between themselves and the Shah's opponents.

The army itself, however, was plagued with problems and insecurity. The high echelon of the army lined their purses with kickbacks from foreign purchases<sup>119</sup> while the middle ranking officers looked on. The omnipresence of American advisors and the total dependence of the Imperial Armed Forces on foreign technicians was a demoralizing experience for these proud men. During 1978, the armed forces once again found themselves as the protectors of the Shah and his rule. Although most of the Army remained loyal, there were signs of defection<sup>120</sup> and it was thought that the armed forces might collapse in the face of prolonged civil strife.

Although during the 1970s the Iranian armed forces had been turned into a mighty force with over 300,000 in uniform equipped with the most advanced weapons system; this force never posed any threat to the Shah himself. The high ranking generals were tightly controlled and were devoted to the person of the Shah. The Shah, as commander-in-chief, was personally involved in details of operations and promotions above the rank of colonel. The Shah was also in control of the Iranian equivalent of joint chiefs of staff which provided the only forum where the three services could communicate and harmonize planning. The intended separation of the services was to offset the potential for any individual within the services to gain control and, thus, to be in a position to challenge the Shah.

In short, the organization and the goals of the armed forces were made to coincide with the goals and ambitions of the Shah. Thus, the institution of the armed forces was dependent on the Shah and identified with his goals. The armed forces, by the same token, suffered from the the same inadequacies as that of the institution of monarchy. Since they, at least on the general staff, had lost all basis of legitimacy besides the Shah, they were not able to be a moderating influence on the opposition during periods of crisis. In fact, the appointment of a military government in November 1978, which was done at the urging of the high ranking generals, aggravated the political upheaval and hastened the Shah's downfall. This was in dire contrast to the appointment of General Razm-Ara to lead the government in 1950. The nation then was facing constitutional problems and civilian governments, one after another, were falling. The general proved rather popular and his programs won the approval of the Majlis by a vote of 95 to 8. The general was able to end the constitutional problems and restore some calm to the government until he fell to an assassin's bullet nine months later.<sup>121</sup>

Although the armed forces were rewarded for their loyalty to the Shah, the high ranking generals were courted only so long as they served the purposes of the Shah. General Zahedi, who had led the coup against Dr. Mossadegh and had brought back the Shah to power, was relieved of his post as prime minister in 1955 to make way for the Shah's personal control of the government and the armed forces. The most recent example was General Nematollah Nassiri who had served the

Shah for 14 years as chief of SAVAK and who was the officer who dared to deliver the Shah's dismissal order to Prime Minister Mossadegh on August 13, 1953. Nassiri, who had been appointed as Ambassador to Pakistan in 1978, was recalled by the Shah several months later to face charges stemming from corruption and excess during his years as chief of SAVAK. The army found that, to appease the opposition, the Shah would go to any length to assure the survival of his regime even if it entailed sacrificing his most loyal generals.

SAVAK (State Security and Intelligence Organization). Sazeman-e Ettela at Va Amniyat-e, acronym SAVAK, was established in 1957 with aid and technical assistance from the United States. During its course of development, the Israeli intelligence service, Mosad, also assisted SAVAK in some of its undertakings.<sup>122</sup> SAVAK was basically set up to infiltrate the opposition groups and to nullify the enemies of the crown. Its chief had the designation of "deputy prime minister" and reported directly to the Shah. There were estimates of up to 90,000 SAVAK agents inside and outside the country, monitoring the activities of potential anti-Shah elements.<sup>123</sup> As such, the security services, including SAVAK, became pillars of the Shah's government. SAVAK arrested suspected individuals, interrogated, tortured and then either imprisoned or eliminated them.<sup>124</sup> The civil courts had no jurisdiction over SAVAK's investigations. Its prosecutions were channeled through military tribunals where the panel of judges and often the defense counsel were all military personnel.

In the early 1970s, SAVAK's actions under new management headed by Parviz Sabeti (the head of Tehran Committee and the most powerful individual after General Nassiri) became more repressive. In Robert Graham's words, "For SAVAK there [were] only those who approved[d] of Mohammad-Reza Shah and those who disapproved."<sup>125</sup> The security forces harassed and imprisoned anybody who was suspected of being disloyal to the throne. Just before the beginning of celebrations for the 2,500th anniversary of the Persian Empire in 1971, tens of thousands of people suspected of opposition to the celebration were arrested to spare the Shah embarrassment during the festivities.<sup>126</sup>

The excesses of SAVAK soon became a severe liability for the Shah.<sup>127</sup> These agencies had been employed to destroy the opposition to the Shah wherever they were to be found. In the process, the ulama and the bazaaris, as well as the students and intellectuals, were insulted and ridiculed. The letter published in the Ettela'at of January 9, 1978 accusing Ayatollah Khomeini of disloyalty to the nation, political subversion and sexual deviancies, was reportedly prepared and submitted by SAVAK under the falsified signature of a clergyman. The reaction against the letter was the start of the political uprising that would cost the Shah his throne.

The Iranian bureaucracy, due to its lack of power and decision-making prerogatives, was made inefficient and, as a result, a source of discontent to the many educated civil servants who filled the most important ranks of the civil service. Although the military had become a firm source of support for the Shah's policies and guarantors

of the Pahlavi monarchy, it could not be a useful tool in a prolonged civil strife where the soldiers were asked constantly to shoot the people from amongst whom they had been drafted. The military's over-dependence on the Shah proved a further liability since it was not capable of intervening as an independent institution, as in Turkey, to put an end to the crisis. The excesses of the security forces put an even further distance between the people and the Shah. The Shah's direct control of SAVAK and other security agencies displayed the extent to which the Shah was personally involved in the political repression committed by the security forces in the name of national security. These excesses earned him deep rooted public animosity.

Middle class. In an ideal reformist situation where there is a genuine reformist monarch, it is anticipated that the middle class would be supportive of the king. Huntington, concurring with such an assumption, regards the middle class as the second source which could be utilized as a basis of support when reforms are undertaken.<sup>128</sup> The Iranian middle class, with its centers of power in bazaars and in the universities, has long had nationalistic and reformist aspirations. The National Front, since the days of Dr. Mossadegh, has been the rallying point of middle class sympathies.<sup>129</sup> The overthrow of Dr. Mossadegh's government by a regime whose central figure was Shah Mohammad-Reza could never gain their loyalty. Thus, the relationship of the Iranian middle class and Shah Mohammad-Reza has been one of conflict and distrust.<sup>130</sup> The Shah offered cabinet posts to the leaders of the National Front during the political crisis of 1961



under pressure from the Kennedy administration, but this was not adequate to attract them into a coalition government while the Shah still retained almost all his power.

The economic boom of the late 1960s, reaching its zenith following the infusion of petro-dollars into the economy after 1973, did benefit the bazaar merchants. But it also resulted in the creation of a class of nouveau riche composed of courtiers and those with close connections to the court, namely the Khayyami brothers who earlier had been minor provincial businessmen.<sup>131</sup> The fact that those with close connections to the court received the preponderant benefits of the economic boom, while the bazaar merchants were blamed by the court for the economic ills of the country and were accused of price gauging and hoarding, resulted in total alienation of the middle class.<sup>132</sup>

Furthermore, as the major supporters of nationalism, the political approach of the middle class and the Shah's political style were in contrast. The middle class favored a European style democracy with the Shah as a figurehead without much power and with the legislature regaining the role it had had during the 1941-1953 era. This contradicted the Shah's belief in his naked power and his disregard for democratic procedures, as reflected in his interview with Oriana Fallaci. He had said that:

When you don't have monarchy, you have anarchy or oligarchy or dictatorship. Anyway, monarchy is the only way of governing Iran . . . . To get things done you need power, and to keep power you shouldn't have to ask permission or advice from anyone . . . . I can't separate the man from the king. Before being a man, I am a king. A king whose destiny is swayed by a mission to be accomplished. And the rest don't count. A king means first of all duty,



and I have always had such a strong sense of duty . . . . One is either a king or one isn't . . . . But I don't want that kind of democracy! . . . I wouldn't know what to do with such a democracy! . . . Freedom of thought! Democracy, democracy! With five year old children going on strike and parading through the streets. That's democracy? That's freedom?<sup>133</sup>

Thus the Shah did not appease the middle class either by responding to their political demands--i.e., granting a democratic form of government--or by placating them with the economic benefits of his rule. The middle class turned into an opponent of the Shah. The religious feelings of the middle class were, furthermore, with the ulama. It was the bazaar merchants that provided the mujtahids with funds for either theological or political purposes during the 1978 uprising. The added insult and degradation of the ulama had been salt on the wounds of the middle class which resulted in the latter's total support for the ulama in opposition to the Shah.<sup>134</sup>

Land reforms. While attempting to win the support of the middle class to his side in the early 1960s, the Shah also undertook to rally the support of the lower class, namely the landless peasants and workers. The Shah, on two occasions, had attempted agrarian reforms by selling some of the family lands to the farmers in 1941, soon after his accession to the throne, and by selling lands to the government for distribution among farmers in 1951. Following the Shah's failure to coopt the National Front into a coalition government in 1961, the Shah appointed Dr. Ali Amini prime minister to direct "land reforms" under the auspices of Hassan Arsanjani, the Minister of Agriculture, who had formulated the process and its application several

years beforehand.<sup>135</sup> The Shah had tried to pass agrarian reforms but had confronted bitter opposition in the Majlis which was packed with the aristocracy and their agents.<sup>136</sup> The aristocracy had felt that land reforms would result in their displacement as political figures and thus had resisted it. The Majlis was dissolved in 1962 at the request of Dr. Amini; the Shah later resorted to a national referendum to have the six points of his well-publicized "White Revolution" approved. The major components of the reforms were: distribution of land among the farmers (by the order of the Shah, the word "peasant" was removed from Persian dictionaries); sale of shares of government owned factories to the ex-landlords for payment of their lands (the price of land was based on the annual tax paid to the government in previous years); and the establishment of the Education Corps to be sent to rural areas to establish schools and help in the improvement of quality of life in the villages.

The first land reform law was enacted in 1960, calling for distribution of all lands above 400 irrigated and 800 non-irrigated hectars. The law was poorly planned and was full of loopholes that enabled the landlords to hold on to more land. This law was amended in 1962 by what has since become known as the land reform law. This law permitted the landlords to keep one village. It also exempted from distribution lands under mechanized farming, tea gardens, orchards, and farms employing wage labor. The land was sold to share croppers who had to pay for the land over a 15 year period. During this stage, some

16,000 villages (one-quarter of all villages), making up 19 percent of all arable land, was affected by the reforms.

The second stage was an apparent attempt to placate the landlords and in fact was a formalization of the existing status quo.<sup>137</sup> During this phase, "five methods of settlement were offered: sale, division of land on the same basis as the old share cropping arrangement, fixed tenancy, formation of a rural cooperative, or purchase of the tenants rights due under the law by the landlord." Cooperatives were under government control.

The last phase, beginning in 1967, was basically concerned with management of farms, small and fragmented as a result of the reforms. It undertook to group such farms into cooperatives whereby government assistance would be possible and manageable. In 1973, cooperatives were consolidated into fewer numbers which took into consideration the manpower limitations of the government.<sup>138</sup>

With such reforms directed at the farming population of Iran, which made up over half of the population, the Shah felt that he could be certain of majority support for his role as a reforming king as well as an all-powerful ruler of the nation. The Shah's approach, however, suffered from several shortcomings. Within a few months of the enactment of the land reform laws, the Shah saw and feared the increasing power of the farmers, particularly following the National Congress of Farmers held in Tehran in January 1963. During the congress the farmers raised the possibility of a Peasants' Party. The high temper of some farmers in realizing the newly instituted reforms was perhaps

responsible for making the Shah think twice before further destroying the traditional rural balance of power. As a result, the second stage of the land reforms were made more palatable for the landlords.<sup>139</sup> Furthermore, the rural communities were also a stronghold of traditionalism and, as such, strongly loyal to the ulama. In a conflict between the Shah and the clergy, the government could not count on the support of the farmers on its behalf. In addition, the farmers also suffered from a very low level of literacy, often below 10 percent;<sup>140</sup> and, due to the physical nature of the country, many farm communities were not within easy access of seats of political power--i.e., Tehran and/or provincial centers.

The land reforms also suffered from major problems. The removal of landlords and their representatives from villages also removed the backup they gave the farmers during a bad harvest which is not uncommon in arid Iran. It would take several years for the government to establish cooperatives and banks that could assist the farmers, meanwhile the cash-short farmers had to acquire, on their own, seed, water and plows which were formerly supplied by the landlords. The landlords, with their knowledge of the agriculture market, also had helped to decide on the kind and amount of crops that were to be planted. During famine, pestilence and other catastrophies, the peasants "expected and received help from the landlords." The peasants also expected the landlords' protection against the government and its agents. Often the landlords and their representatives "intervened to

help the peasants escape crushing tax exactions and to rescue the peasants' sons from military conscription."<sup>141</sup>

On several occasions following the land reforms, the agricultural market experienced shortages of certain crops and overabundance of others due to poor planning. The inefficient bureaucracy, as already discussed, was a poor protection for farmers as was obvious in the poor results from the Khuzistan agrobusiness.<sup>142</sup> The farmers suffered also from severe infrastructure inadequacies, such as transportation and marketing facilities, resulting in an estimated \$2 billion worth of agricultural crop losses each year. Furthermore, farming profits proved far from satisfactory to the farmers who got an estimated 5.5 percent of the final retail price for most of their crops.<sup>143</sup> Such gross negligence of agriculture greatly contributed to the rural-to-urban migration during the 1970s. In the cities, wages for unskilled workers had increased some 500 percent within five years. This was attractive to the farmers who were absorbed mainly as construction workers. The high cost of living and the huge gap between the haves and have nots subsequently became more real as the need for unskilled labor grew. The farmers continued flowing to the urban centers, creating tin and cardboard shacks on vacant lots in the middle of the urban sprawl.

In short, at the onset of the revolution, the farmers, usually the females, the very young and very old, remained on the farms, managing barely a minimal living. They were perhaps slightly better off than they were in the 1950s, while the urban entrepreneurs were



reaping financial gains at an unimaginable speed, creating a gap with the rest of the society at a growing daily margin. The immense wealth of a certain few contrasted against the stark destitute of those young farmers who had come to the cities in search of a better life. This situation did not fit with the benevolent image that the Shah had attempted to build for himself. Consequently, the urban poor were attracted by the ulama and the opposition who, by 1977, once again had become outspoken about popular grievances.

During the height of the revolution in December 1978, nevertheless, the government brought in farmers from rural areas around Isfahan to the city to show their support for the regime.<sup>144</sup> Such attempts failed in comparison to the huge outpouring of people, estimated in excess of a million, on Ashura (December 10, 1978) in Tehran. The hope of utilizing the farmers as a basis of support and legitimacy to offset the general appeal of the opposition had failed.

Support from outside. It had been common during the nineteenth-century by those claiming the throne to enlist the support of a foreign power. The Qajars often used Russia to back their claims.<sup>145</sup> With the advent of nationalism in the second half of the twentieth-century, such affiliations with a foreign power were scorned and regarded as tutelage to foreign powers. The anglophiles and Russophiles of the Qajar period who boasted of their connections with foreign legations<sup>146</sup> would not do so, at least, publicly. Thus, the Shah's return to Iran with the help of the CIA following Dr. Mossadegh's overthrow was a blow to Iranian national pride and ego. Consequently, the Shah was viewed as the



embodiment of American and Western interests which were seen as contradictory to Iranian national interest. It is within such a framework that Huntington prescribes support from a foreign government as the fourth source which a reforming monarch can utilize. He actually uses the American support of the Shah as an example of his contention, neglecting the fact that the Shah's reliance on Washington was partly responsible for his low rating with his people which eventually resulted in his downfall.

The reliance of a political leader on a foreign power is considered an act of weakness in the Iranian political culture. A political leader, as discussed by Professor Norman Jacobs, is to cause pride and respect in the eyes of foreigners.<sup>147</sup> As such, the subservience and tutelage of the Iranian political hierarchy, including the Shah, to a foreign power, namely the United States, has been a source of resentment and a reason to oppose the Shah. This dependency, to a great extent, prevented the establishment of an independent Iranian political posture with Iranian national interests as its primary goal.

The present rupture of relations between Iran and the United States, following the taking of 53 hostages at the American Embassy in Tehran by militants with the apparent blessing of Ayatollah Khomeini, has its roots in such historical experience. The independent policy of the Ayatollah and his opposition to foreign interference, particularly the United States and the Soviet Union, in Iranian internal affairs receives tremendous public support since it invokes pride and feelings of "rubbing the nose of a superpower in dirt." The escalation of

political conflict with the United States and the super-power's inability to exert much influence over events in Iran, despite all the resultant political, social and economic ill effects on Iran, has become a cause celebri. The conflict's attainment of international scope with some perceived support for the Iranian cause among some third world countries, especially amongst Islamic revivalists, has become a further cause of pride since the Iranian leader is being viewed as an international leader.

Some further remarks. Monarchy under the Pahlavis took a drastic turn away from its traditional mold. Centralization of power in the hands of the monarch and the destruction of the traditional national balance of power caused political chaos that resulted in the downfall of the institution of monarch.

The political approach of the Pahlavis aimed at establishing the institution of monarchy as the only legitimate political institution and the "people" as the only other viable "institution." This approach manifested itself in the so called "Shah-People Revolution" (another name for the 1963 reforms). The Shah, in support of his approach, asserted that:

In making revolution, the leader of the nation plays the crucial role. A strong enlightened leader, fully comprehending existing condition, nurtures and develops the idea of revolution in his mind, transfers the idea to the people and then moves to implement it.

The document, furthermore, likens the relationship of the Shah to the nation as that of a father to a son. The Shah stands above all the people. He is "in the first instance teacher and spiritual leader,

an individual who not only builds his nation roads, bridges, dams and ganat but also guides the spirit, thought and hearts of his people."<sup>148</sup> In short, the people play only a passive role, while the Shah generates ideas and policies. As such, all organizations are there to serve the Shah in the transfer of ideas from the monarch to the people and to help to implement and operationalize such ideas.

Such an image of the Shah greatly contradicted the traditional mold of monarchy. Traditionally, the Iranian political culture was a "web system," composed of "a network of power relationships which possess profound plasticity due to the balancing nature of these tensions." In such a system, although the Shah remains the central figure in the political structure, he shares power, depending on the circumstances, with members of the royal family, the high ulama, the tribal elite, the military elite, the landlords, the economic aristocracy, the landless rentier elite, and/or the foreign capitalists. The system, with its built-in safety valves such as "power reciprocity, informality, personalism, secrecy, and insecurity" through a system of conflict, was supported and maintained.<sup>149</sup>

With the growing power of the monarch during the rule of Reza Shah and from 1953 to 1978 under Mohammad-Reza Shah, the web system was employed to enhance the position of the monarch rather than to afford stability to the political structure of the nation. As discussed already, the groups that traditionally shared power with the monarch were made dependent on royal grace. The political base of the elite had become the person of the Shah. The Shah continued to employ

the traditional conflict system to prevent any one group from gaining excessive advantage thereby reinforcing the royal position as the dominant one within the political structure. The political structure of the nation, from a symbiotic relationship between the monarch and the political elite, was reduced to a system of dependency of the political elite on the person of the Shah. The land reforms of 1963, for example, achieved such an end by debasing the landed aristocracy from its traditional political power base.

The subversion of the traditional political structure by the establishment of a structure where the institution of monarchy, or, in reality, the person of the Shah as the only legitimate and viable institution was not well thought out nor well executed. In the process, the Shah had underestimated his unpopularity, particularly following the overthrow of Dr. Mossadegh, and overestimated his own capacity as "a strong enlightened leader" who fully comprehended existing conditions. The Shah apparently suffered from severe insecurity problems. Such feelings were well revealed in his own conversations:

My father said that he wanted to improve the government machinery to such a degree that, if he should die, the day-to-day process of administration would operate almost automatically without the need of continuous supervision from the top. I was still rather young and perhaps not very mature; and I took his remark as an insult. "What does he mean?" I thought. "Does he think that if he were gone I couldn't take over and continue his work?"<sup>150</sup>

Although he seemed an astute observer of his father's style of rule, noting that as his father became older his circle of advisors grew narrower and consisted of undistinguished subservients,<sup>151</sup> Mohammad-Reza Shah, in 1963 during the June political crisis, displayed

his limited capacity for receiving advice from some of his most loyal devotees. They had come to the monarch with the best of intentions to aid the monarchy at its dark hours. The Shah was furious at the four for thinking of "giving" advice to the Shah. These four, including Hussein Ala, Sardar Fakher-e Hekmat, Abdollah Entezam, and General Morteza Yazdan-Panah, were rebuffed, dismissed from their positions, and thrown into political oblivion.<sup>152</sup> The insecurity of Mohammad-Reza Shah marked the major difference in the style of kingship between himself and Reza Shah. Walter Lacqueur notes that a great difference between the father and the son was that "whereas no one dared to lie to (Reza Shah), no one dared to tell the truth to (Mohammad-Reza Shah)."<sup>153</sup>

Recognizing the depth of Shi'ism in the country, the Shah also tried to employ religious symbolism to gain legitimacy for his rule. On many occasions the Shah claimed divine support for his rule and the institution of monarchy. In his book, Mission for My Country, he claims to have seen apparitions of Shiah saints giving their support to him in his childhood. Furthermore, the failure of several attempts on his life was interpreted to mean divine support for his "missions." The Shah's person was labeled as "Shadow of God," gaining further divine right for the role of the Shah and for the institution of monarchy.

Some concluding remarks. With the socio-political tradition of Iran, the sources of support put forth by Samuel Huntington to be used by a "reforming monarch" and their seeming application in Iran has proved their inadequacies. Too little attention has been paid to the



cultural milieu of nations in formulation and application of such proposals. Furthermore, there seemed to be a great discrepancy between Huntington's perception of a reformist monarch and the reality of the Shah's rule. Although certain periods of the Shah's rule may be heralded as "reformist," the primary purpose remained the survival of the Pahlavi regime. To attain such an end, the monarch utilized the carrot and stick approach; the carrot heralded as "reformist" undertakings and the stick, as SAVAK.

The Shah proclaimed the institution of monarchy as inseparable from Iranian culture and tradition, claiming it was the true and inherent desire of the Iranian people to be ruled by kings.<sup>154</sup> However, the organic and symbiotic relationship that the Shah claimed has rarely been displayed in Iranian history despite over 2,500 years of claimed kingship. In essence, the country remained feudalistic with an aristocracy or a religious oligarchy ruling the empire. The rigid class structure through which the aristocracy and religious nobility ruled ancient Iran became so brittle that the Mazdakian revolt, which proscribed a communistic society, nearly destroyed the social fabric of the Sassanid Empire in the early sixth-century A.D. The destruction of the huge Sassanid Empire finally came about when faced with the Islamic surge that preached equality for all. The ideals of Islam had attracted huge numbers of peasants who composed the bulk of the empire's armies. The tiny Arab armies that were outnumbered ten-to-one were able to defeat the huge but demoralized Sassanid armies in the



middle of the seventh century and, thus, the Sassanid Empire came to an end.<sup>155</sup>

The history of Iran is full of invasions and tribal feuds which, every so often, resulted in the establishment of new dynasties. Following the Arab conquest of Iran it took over 800 years until a native Iranian dynasty took control of the nation. Meanwhile, the country had been overrun by various Mongol and Turkic tribes. It was, therefore, the military might that gained its possessor the throne of Iran and not a popular desire by the masses to be ruled by kings. While the kings retained titular control of the nation, it was the local overlords that in effect controlled the nation. They had their own administrative system, taxed the population under their control and supplied the king with troops in times of war. These overlords had their own dynasties and held court. As such, the system gave rise to the concept of shah-in-shah (king of kings) that was even retained by the last Pahlavi monarch.

During the Safavid and Qajar periods, as already noted, the kings retained their position by a balanced tension between the institution of monarchy and the political elite. The monarchs, recognizing the inherent weakness of the institution of monarchy, utilized support from such quarters as the aristocracy, the ulama, the bureaucracy and the tribes to maintain their position.

Furthermore, the Iranian experience of kingship for the past several thousand years has been no exception since the world, for most parts, was ruled by kings. Until recent times, the Iranian society,

in essence, was feudal and tribal and, as such, feudal lords and chiefs retained autonomy within their fiefdoms. With the advancement of statism and centralized political authority, the local lords and chiefs were replaced by governors appointed by monarchs who, as the result of the centralization of power, had become the central authority. The most imposing objection to the rule of kings came from the Shiah ulama who considered all temporal authority illegitimate in the absence of the Hidden Imam, as already has been discussed. While the ulama were able to influence the political process of the nation during late Safavid (1666-1732) and early Qajar periods (1779-1848), a balance between the ulama and the political body of the nation was achieved during early Safavid (1500-1666) and late Qajar period (1848-1907). During the Pahlavi period (1925-1978), for the most part, the governing political body shifted the balance of power to itself thus reducing the influence of the ulama on the political process.<sup>156</sup>

With the infiltration of democratic ideals during the past century, there have been serious challenges to the authority of the kings. This is exemplified in the Constitutional Revolution and in attempts by individuals, such as Reza Khan, to establish a republic in Iran. Therefore, it follows that the Iranian culture is no more attracted to the institution of monarchy than most other cultures in the world. In fact, of the last six kings in the Qajar and Pahlavi dynasties during the past century, only Mozafar al-Din Shah (1898-1906) had died as a king as a result of natural causes. Of the remaining five, Naser al-Din Shah (1848-1898) was assassinated and the last four:

Mohammad-Ali Shah (1906-1990), Ahmad Shah (1909-1925), Reza Shah Pahlavi (1925-1941), and Mohammad-Reza Shah (1941-1979) have all abidicated in the face of either internal or external opposition to their rule. Perhaps it was the recognition of the traditional "weakness" of the institution of monarchy that led Shah Mohammad-Reza to undertake to establish monarchy as the dominant political institution. In doing so, he utilized all means of propaganda including pomp and ostentation. Although earlier he had said that there was no pride in ruling over a hungry nation and that he would not crown himself a king unless substantial improvements were made in the citizens' lives, he crowned himself and his wife in 1967 at the cost of millions of dollars. The Shah's thirst for lavish and extravagant parties culminated in celebrations such as the 2500th anniversary of the Persian Empire in 1971 at a cost of \$40 million reported by the government itself. Two-hundred million dollars was the cost claimed by the Shah's opponents.<sup>157</sup> The Shah's silver jubilee in 1965, the 50th anniversary of the Pahlavi dynasty in 1976 and the 100th birthday of Reza Shah in 1978 were also celebrated at enormous costs. There was forced participation in the above events in forms of parades, political gatherings or even forced donations towards the cost of festivities by well-to-do businessmen. There were also such annual events as the birthdays of the Shah, Farah and the Crown Prince; the overthrow of Dr. Mossadegh; thanksgiving on the occasion of the Shah's escaping from an assassination attempt in 1964; and the anniversary of the "White Revolution," where the public, in particular the civil servants and industrial workers, were forced

to participate. Furthermore, newspaper advertisements congratulating these occasions pretended public approval and support for the Shah's rule. To the dismay of its benefactors, such wholesale approaches had little, if any, impact on placating the public or gaining support for the Shah's rule. There never was any doubt in the people's minds as to the spuriousness of the events.

Furthermore, there was an attempt by the regime to connect the Pahlavi dynasty with the ancient Persian tradition of kingship. It was regarded as "the Pahlavi revival of the sacred kingship." As such, the hand-picked Majlis in 1967, on the occasion of the Shah's coronation, bestowed on him the title of Aryamehr (the Light of Aryans), which purportedly was to reaffirm the "primordial spirit of Iran fostered by a monarchy whose aim was to combine the continuity of the ancient principles with modern transformations."<sup>158</sup> The act was supplemented in March 1976 when the Majlis voted for a monarchy calendar replacing the Islamic calendar based on the solar Hijra year. The new calendar was based on the coronation of Cyrus the Great, 2,535 years earlier. While the title of "Aryamehr" was regarded as a farce by the general public, the change of calendar was regarded as an affront to the Islamic tradition of the nation. As such, it aroused considerable opposition.

Furthermore, a major problem facing the Iranian political process had been the uncertainty of political direction, exacerbated by the Shah's lack of political conviction and the lack of a coherent political philosophy. For example, in his first book, Mission for My Country (1961) the Shah hails a two-party political system, while in

his most recent book, Towards the Great Civilization (1975), he applauded a single party system.

It has been said that during the early 1970s the Shah lost sight of his intended reforms that he had begun with much fanfare a decade earlier.<sup>159</sup> He became more concerned with the trappings of kingship and power, since he saw himself in the total control of the country with his rule and position secured. However, both during his "reform" period (1961-1971) and during his megalomania years (1971-1978), the policies of the government became the expressed wishes of the person of the Shah. Thus, as the Shah's mood changed so did the process of government. It was felt that there was no need for contending political institutions with which the Shah would share power or with whom he would consult. Absence of independent political institutions served two primary purposes: it lessened the possibility of challenge to the Shah's rule; it made the survival of the nation dependent on the person of the Shah. So it was not unusual to hear, even during the height of the uprising in 1978, serious questions regarding the leadership of the country in the absence of the shah. The question was serious since the 25 year authoritarian rule of the Shah, since 1953, had left the country without leaders who had political and managerial expertise with political and national base or support. Most of the leaders of the opposition were old and consisted of the colleagues of Dr. Mossadegh in the National Front. They had all been pushed out of the existing political arena for 25 years and had little, if any, base of political support from which they could operate.



Ayatollah Khomeini, on the other hand, had gathered an immense following among the people and was the unquestioned leader of the opposition. However, the Ayatollah had no administrative or managerial experience and thus was unable to guide the nation to the shores of political stability. In the face of the oppressive Pahlavi rule and the deteriorating economic and political situation in late 1978, such an argument, however, attracted little support. All the frustrations that had accumulated, particularly over the past 25 years, spewed out, washing away the Pahlavi monarchy. There seemed to be little concern for the institution of monarchy that the Shah attempted to portray as second nature to Iranians. None of the institutions that the Shah had manipulated or attempted to build--i.e., the legislature and the Rastakhis Party--were able to aid the faltering monarchy or even to maintain their own survival. The armed forces that the Shah had so dearly groomed, patronized, and transformed into a force to assure the survival of the Pahlavi dynasty burst open at the seams. Nonetheless, opposition political parties and organizations that had been severely suppressed and punished surfaced overnight, but were unable to exert any real influence over the course of events.



## FOOTNOTES

<sup>1</sup>Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1969), p. 9.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid., pp. 140-191.

<sup>3</sup>R. R. Palmer, The Age of Democratic Revolution, vol. I, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959), pp. 373-84.

<sup>4</sup>Bernard Lewis, The Emergence of Modern Turkey, (London: Oxford University Press, 1961), p. 88.

<sup>5</sup>Ibid., pp. 137-56.

<sup>6</sup>W. E. Mosse, Alexander II and the Modernization of Russia, (London: English Universities Press, 1958), pp. 57-79.

<sup>7</sup>Ibid., pp. 131-32.

<sup>8</sup>Huntington, pp. 162-66.

<sup>9</sup>For detailed analysis of the influence of religion on state in Iran see: Hamid Algar, Religion and State in Iran; 1785-1906, (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1969), "The Oppositional Role of the Ulama in Twentieth-Century Iran" in Nikkie R. Keddie (ed.), Scholars, Saints and Sufis, (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1972), pp. 231-55; Leonard Binder, "The Proofs of Islam: Religion and Politics in Iran," Arabic and Islamic Studies in Honor of Hamilton A. R. Gibb, George Makdisi (ed.), (Leiden: 1965), pp. 118-40; Charles F. Gallegher, "Contemporary Islam: The Plateau of Particularism, Problems of Religion and Nationalism in Iran," American Universities Field Staff Reports New York: 1966; Nikkie R. Keddie, "The Roots of the Ulama's Power in Modern Iran," in Nikkie R. Keddie, Scholars, Saints and Sufis, op. cit., pp. 211-29, and Religion and Rebellion in Iran: The Tobacco Protest of 1891-1892, London: Frank Cass and Co., 1966; A. K. S. Lambton, "A Reconsideration of the Position of the Marja' al-Taglid and the Religious Institution," Studica Islamica, XX (1964), pp. 115-35.

<sup>10</sup>Ahmad Kasravi, Tarikhe Mashrutyat-e Iran (Constitutional History of Iran), 5th imprint, (Tehran 1340 sh/1961).

<sup>11</sup>\_\_\_\_\_, Tarikhe Hijdah Saleh-e Azarbaijan (The 18 year History of Azarbaijan), 2nd imprint, (Tehran 1340 sh/1961).

<sup>12</sup>Leonard Binder, Iran: Political Development in a Changing Society, (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1962), p. 75.

- <sup>13</sup>Ayatollah Mudarris, a deputy in the Majlis from 1921 to 1928, was the most vocal of Reza Shah's opponents. He was excluded from the "exclusively decorative" Majlis in 1928. Protests by the ulama were voiced in 1928 and 1935 against Reza Shah, which resulted in violations of shrines in Qum and in Mashad respectively.
- <sup>14</sup>Yahya Armanjani, Contemporary Iran, (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1972), p. 10.
- <sup>15</sup>For detail see W. Montgomery Watt, "Shi'ism Under Umayyads," Journal of Royal Asiatic Society, (1961), p. 161.
- <sup>16</sup>Binder, Iran: Political Development in a Changing Society, p. 71.
- <sup>17</sup>See Louis Massignon, La Passion d'Al-Hosayn ibn Mansur, (Paris: 1962), p. 144, cited in Hamid Algar, Religion and State in Iran, p. 3.
- <sup>18</sup>Hamid Algar, "The Oppositional Role of Ulama,," p. 232.
- <sup>19</sup>Hamid Algar, Religion and State in Iran, pp. 4-5.
- <sup>20</sup>Montgomery, p. 167.
- <sup>21</sup>Hamid Algar, Religion and State in Iran, p. 5.
- <sup>22</sup>Henry Corbin, "Pour une Morphologie de la Spiritualite Shiite," Eranos-Jahrbuch (Zurich), XXIX, (1960), p. 69, cited in Algar, Religion and State in Iran, p. 5.
- <sup>23</sup>Algar, Religion and State in Iran, pp. 5-6.
- <sup>24</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 35.
- <sup>25</sup>*Ibid.*, pp. 65-66.
- <sup>26</sup>*Ibid.*, pp. 34-36.
- <sup>27</sup>Nikkie R. Keddie, "The Roots of the Ulama's Power in Modern Iran," p. 213.
- <sup>28</sup>Hamid Algar, "The Oppositional Role of the Ulama," p. 235.
- <sup>29</sup>For detailed analysis see Nikkie R. Keddie, Religion and Rebellion in Iran: The Tobacco Protest of 1891-1892.
- <sup>30</sup>Hamid Algar, "The Oppositional Role of the Ulama," p. 235.
- <sup>31</sup>William Branigin, "Many in New Iran Resent Clergy's Growing Authority," Washington Post, (May 14, 1979), p. A-16.

<sup>32</sup>Leonard Binder, Iran: Political Development in a Changing Society, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1962), p. 75.

<sup>33</sup>According to the government, 124 people died during the June uprising. The opposition, however, has claimed several thousand people dead and injured.

<sup>34</sup>Peter Avery, Modern Iran, (New York: Praeger, 1965), p. 505.

<sup>35</sup>For detailed analysis see James A. Bill, The Politics of Iran: Groups, Classes and Modernization, (Columbus, Ohio: Charles E. Merrill, 1973), pp. 21-25.

<sup>36</sup>Quoted from a pamphlet "Ruhaniyat va 15 Khordad," published in 1970 by the Confederation of Iranian Muslim Students in the United States and Canada, cited in Hamid Algar, "The Oppositional Role of the Ulama," op. cit. p. 275.

<sup>37</sup>Reza Barahani, The Crowned Cannibals, (New York: Vintage Books, 1977), pp. 102-103.

<sup>38</sup>James A. Bill notes that the clergy who in recent years has supported the government were not held in high esteem by the public. He states that a former leading mujtahid told him that since he began supporting the government and seeing the Shah, the number of people who prayed behind him had dwindled. See The Politics of Iran, ff. p. 25.

<sup>39</sup>A narrow gauge railroad, six miles long, was built by the Belgians in 1832, connecting Tehran with the Shrine of Shah Abdul-Azim in Rey.

<sup>40</sup>For detailed analysis of Mirza Malkum Khan's role in the Qajar Court and the analysis of his thoughts see Hamid Algar, Mirza Malkum Khan: Study in the History of Iranian Modernism, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973).

<sup>41</sup>For further information see William G. Miller, "The Dowreh and Iranian Politics," Middle East Journal, (Spring, 1969, pp. 159-67; Summer, 1969), pp. 343-50. See also the next chapter, the discussion under Political Parties.

<sup>42</sup>Hamid Algar, Mirza Malkum Khan, pp. 190-91.

<sup>43</sup>J. J. Mournier, De l'influence attribuee aux philosophes, aux francs-macon et aux illumines sur la revolution francaise (Paris: 1822) cited in Algar, Religion and State in Iran, ff. p. 186.

<sup>44</sup>Algar, Religion and State in Iran: 1785-1906, p. 185

<sup>45</sup>Ibid., p. 191.

<sup>46</sup>Nikkie R. Keddie, "The Roots of the Ulama's Power in Modern Iran," p. 227.

<sup>47</sup>See the discussions above in pp. 1-4.

<sup>48</sup>Peter Avery, p. 126.

<sup>49</sup>For some details of British Government's intervention see Ibid., pp. 119-20.

<sup>50</sup>Articles 1 and 2 of the Supplementary Fundamental Law of Iran 1907.

<sup>51</sup>Peter Avery, Modern Iran, pp. 130-32.

<sup>52</sup>Algar, "The Oppositional Role of the Ulama," p. 238.

<sup>53</sup>Ayatollah R. Khomeini, Collection of Speeches, Position Statements, (Springfield, Virginia: NTIS Press, 1979, also Islamic Government, (Springfield, Virginia: NTIS Press, 1979).

<sup>54</sup>Marvin Zonis, The Political Elite of Iran, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971), p. 252.

<sup>55</sup>Amin Banani, The Modernization of Iran: 1921-1941 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1961), p. 156.

<sup>56</sup>Mohammad-Reza Pahlavi, Mission For My Country, (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1961), pp. 54-55.

<sup>57</sup>E. A. Bayne, Persian Kingship in Transition, (New York: American Universities Field Staff, 1968), p. 50.

<sup>58</sup>Yahya Armanjani, pp. 11-12.

<sup>59</sup>G. M. Wickens, "Religion," in A. J. Arberry (ed.), The Legacy of Persia (London: Oxford University Press, 1953), p. 158.

<sup>60</sup>Article 27 of the Supplementary Fundamental Law (1907) divides the power of the State into legislative, judiciary and executive.

<sup>61</sup>Marvin Zonis, The Political Elite of Iran, p. 370.

<sup>62</sup>Norman Jacobs, The Sociology of Development: Iran as an Asian Case Study (New York: Praeger, 1966), p. 19ers 3.

<sup>63</sup>Ibid., see Chapters 3 and 12. Jacobs believes that Iranians have not accepted, understood or absorbed the social and cultural foundation of the West.

<sup>64</sup>Huntington, p. 162.

<sup>65</sup>Mohammad-Reza Pahlavi, p. 322.

<sup>66</sup>Marvin Zonis, The Political Elites of Iran, pp. 55-56.

<sup>67</sup>Julian Bharier, Economic Development in Iran: 1900-1970, (London: Oxford University Press, 1971), p. 27.

<sup>68</sup>Yearbook of National Accounts Statistics: 1977, Vol. II, (New York: United Nations, 1978), p. 105.

<sup>69</sup>Iran Almanac and Book of Facts: 1977, (Tehran: Echo of Iran, 1977) p. 382.

<sup>70</sup>Yearbook of National Accounts Statistics, 1977, p. 105.

<sup>71</sup>Iran Almanc and Book of Facts: 1977, p. 385.

<sup>72</sup>Yearbook of National Accounts Statistics: 1977, p. 743.

<sup>73</sup>Robert Graham, Iran: The Illusions of Power, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1978), pp. 47-49.

<sup>74</sup>James A. Bill, The Politics of Iran, Chapter Two. See particularly the discussions on pp. 56-62.

<sup>75</sup>Peter Avery, pp. 128-29.

<sup>76</sup>For detailed analysis see: Firuz Kazemzadeh, Britain and Russia in Iran 1864-1914, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968); George Lenczowski, Russia and the West in Iran: 1918-1948, (Ithica: Cornell University Press, 1949); Rouhollah K. Ramazani, The Foreign Policy of Iran: 1500-1941, (Charlottesville, Virginia: Virginia University Press, 1966).

<sup>77</sup>Peter Avery, pp. 202-208.

<sup>78</sup>Amin Banani, pp. 35-36.

<sup>79</sup>Malek ol-Shoara Bahar, Tarikhe Mokhtasar-e Azhab-e Siasi-e Iran, (The Brief History of Political Parties of Iran) Vol. I (Tehran: Jeebie Books Inc., 1357/sh1978), pp. 93, 109-15, 125-30.

<sup>80</sup>Amin Banani, p. 40.



<sup>81</sup>Article 36, Supplementary Fundamental Law of Iran (1907).

<sup>82</sup>Amin Banani, pp. 45-46.

<sup>83</sup>Peter Avery, p. 303.

<sup>84</sup>Political parties were prohibited by Reza Shah. On the occasion of the discovery of two groups; a pro-communist group led by Dr. Arani, and a pro-faciest group led by Dr. Jahansuz, both parties were suppressed. Dr. Arani later died in prison; he was reportedly murdered (see the discussions of political parties in the next chapter.

<sup>85</sup>See page 17 above, ff. 65, and also Peter Avery, pp. 329-30.

<sup>86</sup>Amin Banani, p. 42.

<sup>87</sup>Peter Avery, pp. 288-92.

<sup>88</sup>Ann K. S. Lambton, "Persia," Journal of the Royal Center Asian Society, Vol. XXXI (1944), pp. 114-15.

<sup>89</sup>Peter Avery, pp. 359-63.

<sup>90</sup>George Lenczowski, "Political Process and Institutions in Iran," in Iran Under the Pahlavis, George Lenczowski (ed.), (Palo Alto, California: Hoover Institution Press; Stanford University Press, 1978), pp. 448, 453-54.

<sup>91</sup>Mohammad-Reza Pahlavi, p. 116.

<sup>92</sup>Robert Graham, Iran: The Illusion of Power, pp. 64-65.

<sup>93</sup>Avery, p. 436.

<sup>94</sup>Cottom, p. 216.

<sup>95</sup>Kermit Roosevelt, Countercoup: The Struggle for Control of Iran, (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979), the book was withdrawn from market after two months. Excerpts from it were reported in "How the CIA Brought the Shah to Power," Washington Post, (May 6, 1979), pp. B1 and B5.

<sup>96</sup>Donald Wilbur, Iran: Past and Present, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975), p. 148.

<sup>97</sup>See pages 2 and 3 above, ff. 10 and 11.



<sup>98</sup>For pro-Shah literature see: E. A. Bayne, Persian Kingship in Transition, op. cit.; George Lenczowski (ed.) Iran Under the Pahlavis, of. cit.; Ramesh Sanghavi, Aryamehr: The Shah of Iran (London: Macmillan, 1969); Donald Wilbur, Riza Shah Pahlavi: The Resurrection and Reconstruction of Iran, 1878-1944 (Hicksville, New York: Exposition Press, 1975).

For literature critical of the Pahlavis see: Reza Barahani, The Crowned Cannibals. (New York: Vintage Books, 1977); Documents on Pahlavi Reign of Terror in Iran: Eyewitness Reports and Newspaper Articles, (Frankfurt, Germany: Confederation of Iranian Students Documentation Center, 1971); Ayatollah Rouholla Khomeini, op. cit.; Bahman Nirumand, Iran: New Imperialism in Action, (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1969).

<sup>99</sup>Robert Graham, p. 67. See also: Marvin Zonis, "The Political Elite of Iran: A Second Stratum?" in Frank Tachau (ed.), Political Elites and Political Development in the Middle East, (New York: Wiley & Sons, 1975).

<sup>100</sup>Huntington, pp. 148-49.

<sup>101</sup>James A. Bill, "The Pattern of Elite Politics in Iran," in George Lenczowski (ed.), Political Elites in the Middle East, (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1975), pp. 17-40; Marvin Zonis, "The Political Elite of Iran: A Second Stratum?" in Frank Tachau (ed.), Political Elites and Political Development, (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1975), pp. 193-216.

<sup>102</sup>Marvin Zonis, "Political Elites of Iran: A Second Stratum?" p. 212.

<sup>103</sup>Financial Times, (London), December 17, 1974.

<sup>104</sup>Robert Graham, p. 101.

<sup>105</sup>A barren hill area in north central Tehran was designated as the administrative center of Tehran which would have resulted in relocating all the ministries and government agencies from the center of Tehran, near Bazaar and commercial center of Tehran, to this area which is closer to the residence of the elite and the upper middle class.

<sup>106</sup>A library, as the main and central structure in Shahestan, with primary purpose of focusing on achievements of the Pahlavi dynasty, and also a depository for the Shah's documents. Also equipped with the most advanced communication technology to make all resources anywhere in the world's major libraries accessible to the researchers at this library.

<sup>107</sup>Ground for the Metro was broken in 1977. The first segment of the metro was being built in Shahestan where there was no need for a mass transit system since nobody lived there anyway. Moreover, the daily population movement in Tehran is from east to west, while the first line of the metro was being built from north to south. It is worth noting that the rich reside in the north of the city.

<sup>108</sup>As a planner with the Plan and Budget Organization, I was witness to the calamities facing planning process in Iran. While such "pet" projects as the heliport on the roof of the Ministry of Arts and Culture, headed by the Shah's brother-in-law, Mehrdad Pahlbod, received millions of Rials in funds, such projects as piped water and electricity for villages in the country (90 percent of Iranian villages lack such basic services) were brushed aside for lack of funds.

<sup>109</sup>To undertake the third segment of this present research--i.e., the questionnaires for parents and students--I obtained an introductory letter from Ministry of Science and Higher Education. However, I had to obtain another letter from Ministry of Education which supervises the Iranian school systems. The schools, however, refused to allow me to administer the questionnaires. I was required to get permission from the local education district to enable me to proceed with my plans. Once at the local education district office, I was told I needed to get permission from the regional education office in order for them to give their permission. Finally I took the letter from Ministry of Education to the head of Tehran Regional Education Department. However, before the director of the department could give his permission, I needed to get the approval of the Security Bureau of the Regional Education Department. After having left the questionnaire at the Security Bureau for several days, I received their approval. On the basis of this approval, I was given a permit by the Regional Education Department, which had to be further approved, down the line, by the district education office before I was able to administer the questionnaires to the students.

<sup>110</sup>George Baldwin, Planning and Development in Iran, (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1967), p. 191.

<sup>111</sup>Iran Almanac and Book of Facts: 1977, p. 435.

<sup>112</sup>See the discussion of recruitment-by-cooption, Marvin Zonis, Political Elite of Iran, pp. 23-25 and 322-27.

<sup>113</sup>Robert Graham, p. 132.

<sup>114</sup>*Ibid.*, pp. 132-39.

<sup>115</sup>Strikes were first begun by Telecommunication workers of the Ministry of Post, Telegraph and Telephone, and then spread to Bank Melli Iran, and ministries, including Finance, Commerce and Plan and Budget Organization. See Times (London), October 3, 1978.

<sup>116</sup>Amin Banani, p. 57; see also Leonard Binder, Iran: Political Development in a Changing Society, p. 272.

<sup>117</sup>Many generals, including Teymour Bakhtiar, Abdollah Hedayat, Ali Keya were retired in 1961.

<sup>118</sup>See above, p. 9 for causes of the uprising.

<sup>119</sup>Robert Graham, pp. 111-12, also General Toufanian, the head of Military Procurement Department, reportedly, was involved.

<sup>120</sup>New York Times, December 14, 1978; see for example: three soldiers opening fire on the officers mess hall in Lavizan military camp.

<sup>121</sup>Peter Avery, pp. 402-15.

<sup>122</sup>Robert Graham, p. 68.

<sup>123</sup>For details of SAVAK activities in Iran see: Reza Barahani, The Crowned Cannibals. For details of SAVAK activity in the U.S. see: G. F. Rose, "Shah's Secret Police are Here," New York (December 18, 1978), pp. 45-51.

<sup>124</sup>As late as December 1978, Amnesty International had accused the government of Iran of continued torture of political prisoners, New York Times, (December 11, 1978).

<sup>125</sup>Robert Graham, p. 143, see also Reza Barahani, p. 178.

<sup>126</sup>Reza Barahani, p. 100.

<sup>127</sup>A report circulated in Tehran during October 1978 detailed the murder of a young man by a bodyguard of Mrs. Parviz Sabeti in 1973. The report stated that Mrs. Sabeti, shopping at Gucci Shoestore, at a plush neighborhood in north Tehran, upon finding that money was missing from her purse ordered the shop manager to lock the doors and her bodyguard to search those on the premises to uncover the missing money. Meanwhile, Mrs. Sabeti's maid telephoned the shop to tell her that she had left her money at home. Annoyed by the accusation, a young man who was at the store with his sister suggested that an apology would be appropriate. An apology was not given and, in the ensuing argument, the young man was shot and killed by Mrs. Sabetti's bodyguard. The bodyguard, after serving less than one year in prison was pardoned. For detailed analysis of torture and SAVAK activities see: Reza

Barahani, The Crowned Cannibals; and William H. Forbis, Fall of the Peacock Throne: The Story of Iran, (New York: Harper and Row: 1980), pp. 132-38.

<sup>128</sup>Huntington, pp. 163-64.

<sup>129</sup>Richard Cottam, pp. 264-68.

<sup>130</sup>Ibid., pp. 288-90.

<sup>131</sup>Mohammad-Reza Vaghefi, Entrepreneurs of Iran: The Role of Business in the Development of Iran (Palo Alto, California: Alton Press, 1975), see also Robert Graham, pp. 47-49.

<sup>132</sup>Nicholas Gage, "Iran: Making of a Revolution," New York Times Magazine, (December 17, 1978), p. 135.

<sup>133</sup>Oriana Fallaci, "An Oriana Fallaci Interview: The Shah of Iran," The New Republic (December 1, 1973), pp. 16-21.

<sup>134</sup>See above, pp. 11-12 and 25-26.

<sup>135</sup>Marvin Zonis, Political Elite of Iran, pp. 53-61.

<sup>136</sup>Zuhreh Shajai'i, Nemayandegan-e Majlis-e Shoray-e Melli dar Bistoyek Dowreh-e Qanunguzari (The Representatives of the National Consultative Assembly During the Twenty-One Legislative Sessions), (Tehran: 1344 sh/1965), p. 230, cited in James A. Bill, "Modernization and Reforms from Above: The Case of Iran," The Journal of Politics, Vol. 32 (February 1970), p. 36.

<sup>137</sup>For details of land reforms see: Ann K. S. Lambton, The Persian Land Reforms: 1962-1966, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1969).

<sup>138</sup>Robert Graham, pp. 40-41.

<sup>139</sup>Peter Avery, pp. 502-503.

<sup>140</sup>In a study of villages in Khorasan Province, I had confronted places where rate of literacy was around five percent.

<sup>141</sup>James A. Bill, The Politics of Iran: Groups, Classes and Modernization, (Columbus, Ohio: Charles E. Merrill Publishing Co., 1972), p. 19.

<sup>142</sup>The four companies were: Shellcott (foreign partners Shell and Mit-hell Cotts); Iran America (foreign partners Citicorp International); Iran International (foreign partners Mitsui, Diamond A Cattle Ranch, Chase Investment Company and Hawaiian Agronomics); Iran California (foreign partners John Deere, Bank of America, Transworld America).



Shellcott by mid-1976 had accumulated losses of about \$58 million; Iran California had accumulated losses in 1975 of over \$15 million; and Iran American was restructured in 1975 with a \$65 million cash injection from Agricultural and Development Bank of Iran. Cited in Robert Graham, p. 124.

<sup>143</sup>Robert Graham, p. 117.

<sup>144</sup>New York Times, (December 14, 1978).

<sup>145</sup>Peter Avery, p. 39; see also text of Turkomanchai Treaty between Iran and Russia in 1826.

<sup>146</sup>Richard Cottam, Nationalism in Iran, p. 160; Marvin Zonis, The Political Elite of Iran, p. 265.

<sup>147</sup>Norman Jacobs, pp. 20-21.

<sup>148</sup>Keyhan International, (November 11, 1976).

<sup>149</sup>James A. Bill, The Politics of Iran, p. 15.

<sup>150</sup>Mohammad-Reza Pahlavi, p. 65.

<sup>151</sup>Ibid., p. 322.

<sup>152</sup>Marvin Zonis, Political Elites of Iran, pp. 62-66.

<sup>153</sup>Walter Lacqueur, "Trouble for the Shah," The New Republic, (September 23, 1978), p. 18.

<sup>154</sup>E. A. Bayne, Persian Kingship in Transition, pp. 74-75.

<sup>155</sup>George Rawlinson, The Great Oriental Monarchy or the Geography, History, and Antiquities of the Sassanian or New Persian Empire (New York: Dodd, Mead and Company, 1882), pp. 212-34.

<sup>156</sup>James A. Bill, Politics of Iran, pp. 20-25.

<sup>157</sup>New York Times, (October 12, 1971) reported the cost of festivities at about \$100 million which is somewhat in between the two above figures. For additional sources see Gerard de Villiers, The Imperial Shah (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1976), p. 284.

<sup>158</sup>Pio Filippani-Ronconi, "The Tradition of Sacred Kingship in Iran," in George Lenczowski (ed.), Iran Under the Pahlavis, pp. 51-83.

<sup>159</sup>Freydoun Hoveyda, The Fall of the Shah, (New York: Wyndham Books, 1980), pp. 134-56.



## CHAPTER II

### POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS

Although Iran boasts an ancient political tradition, none of its present-day formal political institutions predate the Constitutional Revolution of 1906. The parliament, the judiciary, and the executive have all been created since the inception of a constitutional government. The only exception was the institution of monarchy which was changed from that of feudal tradition to an institution of centralized authoritarianism with increased control over the daily affairs of the citizens.

The constitutional movement was born out of a rivalry of the clergy and the intellectuals and the aristocracy headed by the Shah. While the former were supported and encouraged by the British, the latter had the blessing of the Russians.<sup>1</sup> In other words, the constitutional movement in Iran was partly due to the power rivalry to control the internal affairs of Iran which reached its zenith during the first two decades of the twentieth century.<sup>2</sup>

The constitution, nonetheless, provided the nation with a foundation for modern political institutions. This constitutional process of government needs to be contrasted against the de facto powers of the shahs which, in Robert Grahams words, well demonstrated the "unconstitutional side" of the political process in Iran.<sup>3</sup>

### The Constitution

The Belgian constitution was used as a reference for the drafting of the 1906 Iranian constitution. The Fundamental Law provided for the election of the Majlis (National Consultative Assembly). The Supplementary Fundamental Law of 1907 was composed of more extensive rules pertaining to the political process of the nation. It established the religious board for review of the legislature and separated governmental powers into three branches: legislative, executive, and judiciary. The foundation of the constitution rested on three principles: Shiah Islam, separation of powers and monarchy. Article 35 of the Supplementary Fundamental Law stated that "The sovereignty is a trust confided (as a Divine gift) by the people to the person of the King." This reasserted the basic inviolability of people's rights regarding the king as credible ruler only as long as he served the interests of the community. The power of the legislature was also curtailed by Article 2 of the Supplementary Fundamental Law that stated that "At no time must any legal enactment of the (Majlis), established by the favor and assistance of (the Hidden Imam), the favor of (the Shah) of Iran, the care of (the ulama), and the whole people of the Iranian nation, be at variance with the sacred principles of Islam or the laws established by (the Prophet--i.e., the Sharia)." The council of five mujtehids was to act as the ultimate body to review all laws to establish that they were not in variance with the Sharia. The council of five mujtehids never materialized.

The Iranian constitutional system, at least in theory, was a parliamentary system with the Majlis as the central focus of the process. Both the proponents and the opponents of the government justified their policies by citing the legislature's support or constitutional prerogatives.

A truly representative political process as envisioned by the constitution has rarely materialized since the inception of a constitutional government in Iran. From 1906 to 1921, the Majlis was in session for a total of less than five years (see Table II-1). The Majlis then was turned into an obedient instrument of Reza Shah, particularly following the 1928 elections to the VIIth Majlis. After the brief period from 1941 to 1953 when the parliamentary process took partial control of the political process in Iran, the Majlis, following Dr. Mossadegh's overthrow, once again was closely controlled by the ruling monarch, Mohammad-Reza Pahlavi.<sup>4</sup>

The constitution was amended on four occasions. To do this, Parliament (Majlis alone until 1950; since the establishment of the Senate in 1950, both houses), with a two-thirds majority, called for elections for the Constituent Assembly. Its representatives were equal to the number of members of Parliament. They had to approve any amendment to the constitution by a two-thirds majority. In 1925, the Supplementary Laws were amended to change the monarchy from the Qajar dynasty to the Pahlavi dynasty. In 1949, some procedural changes were made delineating the election of the Senate and the Shah's right to dissolve the Majlis and/or the Senate. An amendment in 1957 increased

the number of deputies from 136 to 200, extended the term of the Majlis from two to four years, and determined the quorum as half of the membership of the Majlis. The Supplementary Laws were further amended to give the Shah a suspensive veto over financial bills passed by the Majlis which had the right to approve the national budget.

The fourth and last amendment dealt with Supplementary Laws regarding the regency. The amendment made the Queen the regent. She was to have formed a council to execute the royal duties until the crown prince reached the age of twenty. Along with the above amendments, there were also changes in the electoral laws pertaining to the length of the terms of the Senate and the Majlis with an increase in the number of deputies in the Majlis based on the most recent population census.

The last three amendments were made to enhance the royal prerogatives vis-a-vis the Majlis. The changes were made in the legislative periods when the Shah enjoyed overwhelming support among Majlis deputies. The legal and extralegal powers of the monarch included appointment and dismissal of cabinet ministers, general staff of the armed forces and half of the senators. The Shah was also commander-in-chief of the armed forces and, thus, could declare war, make peace and negotiate treaties. He could also dissolve the parliament, call for new elections, and reject the national budget approved by the Majlis unless overridden by a three-fourths majority.

### Legislature

From the inception of constitutional government until 1921, the Majlis sat for a total of five years. It convened from 1906 to 1908, but upon the bombardment of the Majlis by Mohammad-Ali Shah, it was dissolved and the constitution was abrogated.<sup>5</sup> A new Majlis was convened on October 28, 1909 and sat until a coup d'etat against the Second Majlis on December 24, 1911 when it refused the request of Samsam al-Saltaneh cabinet to comply with the Russian ultimatum<sup>6</sup> demanding the dismissal of Morgan Shuster, an American financial advisor hired by Iran, along with an apology for interference with a contingent of Russian troops guarding the house of Shoa al-Saltaneh, an Iranian in exile in Russia, by gendarmes under orders from Shuster. The Third Majlis was convened three years later in November 1914, dissolving a year later in the face of fear that the pressure of the Majlis seriously perturbed the British and Russian legations.<sup>7</sup>

In short, the political turmoil that began as a result of the Russo-British intervention in the internal affairs of Iran retarded the nation's constitutional development. Following the Russo-British agreement in 1907, which divided Iran into zones of influence, the two powers developed a parallel approach to Iranian affairs that did not include constitutional government which the British had earlier supported.<sup>8</sup> The Russian Revolution of 1917 and the economic hardship in Britain following the First World War afforded Iranians some respite from foreign intervention and domination.



The emergence of Reza Khan in 1921, his success in quelling the prevailing political disturbances all across the country, and the establishment of a centralized administrative authority in Tehran brought about some measure of political tranquillity. The elections for the Fourth Majlis had been in the works for many months. It finally convened in February 1921. The role of the Majlis became important in Reza Khan's consolidation of power, although he soon began to develop a contempt and distrust for the Majlis.<sup>9</sup> He employed the Majlis to meet his aims, but he was not sympathetic to the ideals of constitutional democracy or legal procedure. Reza Khan had hoped to establish a republic in Iran on the same theme as that of the new republic being formed by Ataturk in Turkey.<sup>10</sup> As noted earlier, however, the clergy persuaded Reza Khan to seek a change from the Qajar dynasty to his own family instead,<sup>11</sup> on fears that republicanism would spread secularism. The Majlis by its first amendment to the constitution, in 1925, transferred the monarchy from the Qajar dynasty to the Pahlavi dynasty.

Although there was some opposition to Reza Khan in the Majlis, namely by Seyyed Hassan Modaress<sup>12</sup> and Mohammad Mossadegh,<sup>13</sup> Reza Khan's control over the Majlis was strengthened following each election. With the elections for the VIIth Majlis in 1928, the parliament had turned into an institution of virtual tutelage dedicated to legitimizing Reza Shah's rule. Opposition figures such as Modaress were prevented from being elected to the Majlis; Mossadegh took refuge among the tribes in the south. The Majlis remained a political backwater for the monarch

until 1941, when he was forced to abdicate the throne by the Allies on the suspicion of his German sympathies.<sup>14</sup>

The rule of parliament was strengthened in 1941, partly due to the Allied presence. They tried to influence the course of political process through legitimate channels by establishing political parties favorable to them. Iradeh Melli (National Will) Party, headed by Seyyed Ziaaldin Tabatabai, supported the British<sup>15</sup> and the Tudeh (Mass) Party (communist orientation) supported the Soviet Union's perspective.<sup>16</sup> Both the British and the Soviets attempted to use the parliamentary process to gain further advantages. The Russians were interested in oil concessions and, as later revealed, in political and territorial gains in northern and northwestern Iran. The British were interested in maintaining and extending their influence in southern Iran, particularly in the oil fields and territories close to the British colonial territories in South Asia. The Majlis, however, had attained a very nationalistic posture as displayed by the measures undertaken by it between 1941 and 1953. Among its major accomplishments were: (1) adoption of a law in 1944 which forbade the government to negotiate or grant any oil concession without the prior approval and subsequent ratification by the Majlis; (2) repudiation, by an almost unanimous vote in 1947, of an oil concession granted by the then prime minister, Qavvam, to the Soviet Union; and most importantly, (3) nationalization of the oil industry in Iran in 1951. This last act left a lasting impact on the Iranian political situation, in particular, and on the Middle Eastern political posture, in general.<sup>17</sup>

During this period the Majlis also began to exercise the prerogative, first exercised in 1910 by Nasir al-Mulk, the first regent for the minor Ahamad Shah, of being consulted before a prime minister was appointed.<sup>18</sup> The constitution had, in fact, given the right of selection of the prime minister and members of the cabinet to the Shah.<sup>19</sup> Unlike the British parliamentary system, the members of the cabinet were not to be selected from amongst the deputies in the Majlis.<sup>20</sup> In effect, a Majlis deputy could not retain his seat after becoming a member of the cabinet. This was intended to separate the legislative and executive branches of government. Ministers had the primary responsibility for introducing bills in the Majlis,<sup>21</sup> but the bills still had to receive the prior approval of the cabinet.<sup>22</sup> Deputies also could initiate legislation. One such piece of legislation that has gained fame was the Oil Nationalization Act, sponsored by Dr. Mossadegh and his colleagues in the XVIth Majlis (1950).

Following the overthrow of Dr. Mossadegh's government in 1953, martial law was proclaimed and General Fazl-ollah Zahedi was appointed prime minister. The Majlis was dissolved in December and new elections were called for in early 1954. With martial law in full force, General Zahedi was in total control of the government while the anti-Shah elements were in hiding, in jails, or in exile. The XVIIIth session of the Majlis (1954-56) contained no known anti-Shah elements nor any sympathizers of Dr. Mossadegh and his National Front.<sup>23</sup> All subsequent parliamentary elections, particularly in Tehran and larger cities, were controlled by the government. Thus, deputies favorable to the

government were "elected." In rural areas and smaller cities where the landed aristocracy and the tribes had a controlling influence, the deputies to the Majlis were elected from amongst the aristocracy or those loyal to them.<sup>24</sup> Although the posture of the Majlis remained conservative, it was not within the total control of the government. For example, the Majlis refused on several occasions to ratify the land reform bill which had the Shah's support or to revise it in a way that was anything but land "reform."<sup>25</sup>

Although the constitution had provided for a Senate,<sup>26</sup> elections for the first Senate were not held until 1950. The 1949 Constituent Assembly provided for an electoral procedure of electing the Senate. The membership of the Senate was composed of 60 senators; half of whom were to be elected with the remaining to be appointed by the Shah. From Tehran, 15 were elected and 15 appointed with the remaining apportioned to the provinces.<sup>27</sup> Although the Senate lacked the constitutional prerogatives of the Majlis, the monarch anticipated an increased control over the legislature particularly through his appointment of half the senators.

The period of 1953 to 1963 was basically a period during which the Shah assumed more control of the government. He attempted to control the Majlis while, at the same time, to project a semblance of democratic rule through the establishment of a two-party political system. The experiment in democracy failed due to the overzealousness of Dr. Manuchehr Iqbal, the then prime minister, who rigged the elections for his own benefit,<sup>28</sup> and to the general government policy

of not permitting the Nationalists to seek election to the Majlis.<sup>29</sup> The ensuing embarrassment over the election procedure resulted in the Shah's dissolution of the XXth Majlis (1960) three months after its election with a call for new elections. The new Majlis (1961) was also dissolved a few months later by the Shah at the request of Dr. Ali Amini, the then prime minister, who saw the Majlis as an obstacle to his reformist approach. New elections were not scheduled. This was in clear violation of the constitution.<sup>30</sup>

Dr. Amini had confronted staunch opposition in the Majlis toward his reformist legislation, particularly the land reform bill. As already noted, the legislation would have eventually resulted in the transfer to the peasants of the land owned by the landed aristocracy who were immensely influential in the Majlis, either directly or through their agents.<sup>31</sup> Aside from the economic impact of the land reforms, its political consequences were feared. The displacement of the landlords from their traditional strongholds in rural areas and smaller towns would also cost them their long-held political influence. Thus, the land reforms, aside from the reformist objectives, intended to centralize power in the hands of the central government in Tehran.<sup>32</sup> It was this latter objective that raised fear among the aristocracy and also among the ulama who saw a further increase in the totalitarian powers of the Shah. Although Dr. Amini and his Minister of Agriculture, Hassan Arsanjani, were moved by reformist intentions, their land reforms, in political terms, could not but lead to an increase in the power of the central government. Dr. Amini objected to the domination of the



political process by the Shah and hoped to limit the monarch's administrative prerogatives, but he was relieved of his post in July 1962. Mr. Arsanjani, however, was retained to pursue the course of land reform. Opposition to the Shah's undertakings was also vehement among tribes, particularly the Qashgaies who fought government control for two years before being subdued in 1964.

The XXth Majlis (1961) saw the end of an era in Iranian parliamentary history. With the displacement of the power of the landed aristocracy, the authority of the central government was extended to all parts of the country. Elections for the XXIst Majlis (1963-67) were held in October 1963. Most deputies joined the newly formed Iran Novin (New Iran) Party, founded by Hassan-Ali Mansur, a young rising politician, and his colleagues, with the blessings of the Shah. A few deputies retained their affiliation with Mardom Party which took the role of the opposition.<sup>33</sup> A few months later, Mansur was appointed prime minister, and thus the Iran Novin era that would last for some 13 years began.

A comparison of the percentages of the landlords in the Majlis during the pre-1963 sessions of Majlis and the XXIInd Majlis (1967-71) best describes the impact of land reforms on the legislative process in Iran. While some 50 percent of the deputies during the first 20 sessions of the Majlis came from landlord backgrounds, the level dropped to less than 25 percent in the XXIst and the XXIInd Majlis sessions.<sup>34</sup> The government, by manipulating the party system and the electoral process, was able to control access to the Majlis and the

Senate and, thus, to reduce the parliamentary process to the legitimization of the policies of the monarch's government. It was only in such a forum that it was possible to legislate a bill giving diplomatic immunity to American military personnel and their families. The bill was ratified by the Majlis within a few hours after its submission by the government in October 1964. It was the outrage against the enactment of this bill that finally resulted in the banishment of Ayatollah Khomeini, who vehemently and actively opposed it, to exile.<sup>35</sup> The passage of the aforementioned bill clearly represents the extent to which the Majlis had been turned into a subordinate branch of the executive. Such submission to executive power was unparalleled in other parliamentary periods, perhaps with the exception of the period from 1928 to 1941 under Reza Shah. Reza Shah, however, was moved by nationalistic aspirations to end foreign capitulatory rights in Iran granted during the Qajar period.

On the inauguration of the single party process in 1975, the government sponsored political parties, Iran Novin and Mardom, along with the government sanctioned parties, Pan Iranist and Iranian with a total of four deputies in the XXIIIrd Majlis, dissolved their respective political parties and joined the new Rastakhiz (Resurgence) Party.<sup>36</sup>

In 1978, with the political turmoil well under way, there were movements within the Majlis indicating an emerging opposition to the government. In June the Pan Iranists revived their old party and resigned from Rastakhiz.<sup>37</sup> Ahmad Bani-Ahmad, an independent from Tabriz, along with a few others also resigned from Rastakhiz.

Nevertheless, most deputies remained loyal to the Shah to the end, as was reflected in the overwhelming approval of the military government's program to restore order.<sup>38</sup> The Majlis, however, was experiencing emotion-packed days like those of 1941-1953 as genuinely heated debates became a part of parliamentary process.<sup>39</sup>

Despite these debates, the Majlis remained in the service of the Shah.<sup>40</sup> The call for the dissolution of the Majlis and for freely contested elections went unheeded. Despite the vote of confidence given to Dr. Shahpour Bakhtiar's government, as prime minister he had a very shaky month-long rule which finally toppled in the face of popular agitation and political opposition from forces loyal to Ayatollah Khomeini. With the success of the Islamic Revolution came the end of the Majlis as provided for by the Constitution of 1906-07.

Although the parliament in Iran existed on paper for three-quarters of a century, in actuality parliamentary rule existed barely in excess of a decade. The legislature was prevented from establishing a tradition of independence from which it could seek equality with the other branches of the government, particularly the executive. The Majlis was dominated by the aristocracy, particularly the landlords. After the emergence of Reza Khan and his domination of the administration of the government, the Majlis for a time was the only arena which could effectively challenge his authority and control. With the 1928 election, Reza Shah effectively muted the Majlis and gained total control. Aside from sheer force in subduing the opposition, particularly the Qajars, he cultivated their loyalties in marrying a Qajar.

The lineage of Iranian aristocracy, better known as the "thousand family," is traced back to the families of tribal khans; Qashqaies, Bakhtiaries and, of course, Qajars.<sup>41</sup> Qajars, who ruled Iran for some 150 years, incorporated other lesser tribes into the ruling elite during their rule. The tribal elites had control over the fortunes of their respective tribes and were the unquestioned masters of their traditional tribal territory that, in some instances, included all or parts of several provinces. The khans and their children, particularly the sons, had high levels of education (the sons were often sent to Europe or the United States for education). They lived in the urban centers closest to their tribal domain (Qashqaie khans lived in their mansions in Shiraz while the Bakhtiary khans lived in Isfahan). The khans were recognized as the legitimate power by their respective tribesmen. The common tribesmen, in contrast to their khans, were illiterate and extremely poor, even by Iranian standards.

Aside from tribal khans, a major portion of the farming lands were owned by landlords who had moved to cities in years past but still had kept control of villages owned by their families. Some such holdings included several hundred villages and thousands of peasants --the Alam family holdings in South Khorasan for example. The landlords rarely visited their holdings but were represented by their agents who collected royalties. As noted already, this system had its benefits as well as its shortcomings.<sup>42</sup> In sum, both the khans and the landlords had a controlling influence over their respective peoples. As such, they or their representatives gained access to the parliament. As a

TABLE 1

## Chronology of National Consultative Assembly (Majlis)

	Date inaugurated	Date dissolved
First Majlis	August 7, 1906	June 23, 1908
Second Majlis	November 17, 1909	December 24, 1911
Third Majlis	December 6, 1914	November 1915
Fourth Majlis	June 21, 1921	June 1923
Fifth Majlis	January 1924	February 1926
Sixth Majlis	July 6, 1926	May 1928
Seventh Majlis	October 6, 1928	September 1930
Eighth Majlis	December 15, 1930	February 1933
Ninth Majlis	March 15, 1933	March 1935
Tenth Majlis	June 4, 1935	June 12, 1937
Eleventh Majlis	September 11, 1938	September 1939
Twelfth Majlis	October 27, 1939	October 1941
Thirteenth Majlis	November 12, 1941	(1943)
Fourteenth Majlis (1)	(1944)	March 12, 1946
Fifteenth Majlis	July 15, 1947	August 7, 1949
Sixteenth Majlis	February 1950	February 1952
Seventeenth Majlis	April 27, 1952	December 19, 1953
Eighteenth Majlis	March 15, 1954	April 1956
Nineteenth Majlis (2)	May 31, 1956	June 1960
Twentieth Majlis (3)	August 27, 1960	October 1960
Twenty-First Majlis	February 21, 1961	May 9, 1961
Twenty-Second Majlis	October 1963	September 1967
Twenty-Third Majlis	October 6, 1967	August 1971
Twenty-Fourth Majlis	September 1971	August 1975
	September 1975	February 1979

(1) The elections for the Fourteenth Majlis were conducted under certain conditions. Hence no really proper elections were held, and, in fact, the Fourteenth Majlis was a continuation of the Thirteenth Majlis.

(2) The term of the Majlis was extended from 2 to 4 years.

(3) Due to overt impropriety and rigging in the elections for the Twentieth Majlis, the elections of June-July 1960 were nullified and new elections were held in January-February 1961.



result, for much of its life, the Majlis remained within the domain of the landed aristocracy in their battle to safeguard their privileged position vis-a-vis the ruling monarchs. In essence, the Iranian parliament, for much of its life, was neither a forum to legitimize the traditional pluralism nor to institute democratic reforms. Despite the reformist claims of Mohammad-Reza Pahlavi from 1962-1978, he used the legislature to broaden his power base by eliminating any challenge from the Majlis in order, he felt, to ensure stability and durability for himself and his dynasty. This was a further step in instituting a political system where all political power emanated from the throne. In effect, the Shah became the only viable institution.

### Political Parties

Political parties in Iran are a product of constitutional government, emerging for the first time in the Second Majlis in 1910. The idea of political parties, in fact a political division in the Majlis, was promoted by Nasir al-Mulk, the first regent for the minor Ahmad Shah, who was fond of the British Parliamentary system. As a result, the Majlis was organized into two political groupings, Democrats and Ettedallion (the moderates). The Democrats were the minority with some 20 deputies joining their ranks. There had been some political groupings previously in the fight against Mohammad-Ali Shah for safeguarding the constitution. The Democrats had their foundation in the ranks of the liberals in Tabriz and the workers in the Baku oil fields in Russian Azarbaijan who had become acquainted with socialist

theories.<sup>43</sup> The Ettedallion were supported by more moderate elements, such as the Bakhtiary Khans, Ephraim Khan, the Armenian constitutionalist, and his comrade-in-arms, Sephadar Azam, who assumed premiership following their victory over anti-Constitutionalists led by Mohammad-Ali Shah.<sup>44</sup> Neither party, however, had a Western style party organization. Thus, as the fate of the Majlis fluctuated so did that of the parties. With the dissolution of the Majlis in November 1915, the issue of political parties subsided for six years until the elections of 1921.

Dowreh system. Traditionally, the political process in Iran has been influenced by a system of dowreh.<sup>45</sup> Dowreh, which literally means circle, is basically a gathering of a number of individuals, between 10 to 15, who share similar interests. Dowrehs serve economic, social and cultural, as well as political purposes. Although dowrehs exist among middle class as well as upper class individuals, the ones with elite membership, of course, are more powerful and wield more political clout. Members of dowrehs meet regularly, usually once a week or once every other week. The political dowrehs meet to discuss and exchange information regarding prevailing political events. As such, the dowreh system acts as a channel for dissemination of political news and rumors. The most significant function of dowreh, however, is that when a member is elevated to a politically important position, "there exists a long established coterie of fellow elites who can be called upon to fill" other positions attached to the member's new post.<sup>46</sup> Sometimes a few members of a dowreh are better known or are economically or

politically more powerful than other members. Such dowrehs are usually referred to by the name of that influential person or persons. Dowrehs criss-cross social and political lines. For example, there are dowrehs representing graduates of a certain foreign university or country. The membership within a dowreh remains fairly constant and meetings are limited to the dowreh members. At times the activities of a dowreh are shrouded in secrecy.

Although the dowreh system is informal and limited in membership it, nevertheless, wields much influence on the Iranian political process. M. M. Balfour explained the role of the dowreh at the turn of the century by noting that "In practice the country is run . . . by small rings of politicians cooperating with a powerful and corrupt bureaucracy, whose aim is to enrich themselves so far as possible before a turn of the political wheel brings their term of office to an end."<sup>47</sup> Members of a dowreh usually belong to the same generation and have a similar educational background. By having their membership in different positions within the political structure, the members are assured of being able to utilize the system for "purposes of mutual welfare."

As noted earlier, there are social and cultural dowrehs as well. An individual can be a member of several dowrehs. As such, the dowreh provides "multiple association membership," facilitates "contact with diversity of individuals within and without the elite," and establishes a system of "reciprocal obligations with as many individuals representing as diverse sectors of Iranian life as possible."<sup>48</sup>

The dowreh system was part of the Qajar system; the Qajar kings were themselves members of the dowrehs.<sup>49</sup> After the transfer of monarchy from the Qajar dynasty to the Pahlavi dynasty, the dowreh system retained its influence on the political structure. Even today, the dowreh system remains influential. Members of dowrehs, through their informal system, assist each other in obtaining positions of influence in the system. A recent example displaying the importance of the dowreh system was that, upon the ascendancy of Hassan-Ali Mansur in 1964 to premiership, members of his cabinet or gained influential posts in the government.<sup>50</sup> Aside from controlling the cabinet, members of Mansur's dowreh also formed the nucleus of Iran Novin (New Iran) Party which became the dominant political party from 1964-1975. Dowreh system earlier had also provided the foundation of Mardom (People) Party, formed in 1957 by Assadollah Alam, a very close confidant of the Shah, out of the former's dowreh. The Mardom Party remained influential in the Majlis until 1975 when all parties were dissolved in favor of a single party-system.

As such, the dowreh system has served as the first stage for the development of a political party, whereby the membership has been broadened and opened to the public. However, such a transition served mainly the political ambitions of the original members who strove for greater political role by establishing their own political parties. Such parties also helped to legitimize the political ambitions of the aspirants. As a consequence, most Iranian political parties remained

devoid of grassroots support, with the major exception of the Tudeh Party.

Dowreh system has remained strong within the Iranian political tradition since it directly benefits the close-knit membership, whereas, in political parties the individual political gains have to be shared by a greatly expanded membership and an individual's political actions and gains become public knowledge. This is contrary to the desires of most Iranians who prefer secrecy and privacy to maximize their gains. Nonetheless, the historical analysis of political parties in Iran reveals a transformation from dowreh to party when such transformations were deemed useful; otherwise, the dowreh system was retained.

Political parties in early Pahlavi period. Despite the significance of the dowreh in the political process of Iran, parties have assumed a certain significance also. The importance of the party has been due to the composition of its leadership or to its political ideology. From 1957 until 1978, however, the parties were formed by the government to give it a sense of legitimacy and an aura of democracy. The Tudeh (masses) party, with communist ideology, nonetheless, had remained the best organized political party with a coherent ideology, relying on "intellectuals and popular agitation."<sup>51</sup>

With the opening of the IVth Majlis in 1921, some elements from the Democratic Party and Ettehadion formed a Socialist Party. Soon, however, there was a factionalism within the new party between the younger members who favored Marxism and a close relationship with the Soviet Union and the second group, who were older and distrusted both



the Russians and the British. Thus, while the former group found a new Socialist Party, the latter became known as the Ettedalion. The Ettedalion was able to gain a majority in the Vth Majlis which opened in 1923. The Majlis, until 1928, witnessed intense rivalry between the two parties. The Ettedalion had fallen under the control of the clergy led by Seyyed Hassan Moddaress. Reza Shah, who had a deep suspicion of the parliamentary system,<sup>52</sup> by 1928 had gained complete control of the electoral procedure and thus had turned the Majlis into his virtual domain.

Reza Shah banned political parties of any kind after 1928. Nevertheless, there were underground political movements: Communists led by Dr. Arani and Facscists led by Dr. Jahansuz. Both groups were uncovered; their members were arrested; and several, along with Dr. Arani, died in the process.<sup>53</sup>

Political parties from 1941 to 1953. Following Reza Shah's abdication in 1941, several parties appeared on the political scene, publishing newspapers and seeking representation in the Majlis. They represented divergent political perspectives and, as in many other developing countries, they were built around one or a few well-known politicians. It was the personality, philosophy and/or the conviction of the party leader or leaders that attracted followers. In other words, political parties became vehicles for the advancement of the politician's goals and ambitions. The rise or decline of the fortunes of the political leader directly affected the future of the political party. The Tudeh Party was an exception. It is most often cited as an example of the

most effective political party in the Middle East due to its tight organization and its coherent ideology. The Tudeh "attempted to aggregate through its own organization, and was truly conspiratorial."<sup>54</sup>

Its organizational structure was used as a model by other parties as divergent as Qavvam's Democrat-e Iran Party and Alam's Mardom Party.

During this period political parties were constitutional, liberal or nationalistic in outlook while a few were surrogates of the occupying forces (British and Soviets). The beginning of this period is symbolized by the activities of the Tudeh, supported by the Soviet Union, and the Iradeh Melli (National Will) Party, led by Seyyed Zia al-Din Tabatabai which was established with the blessings of the British to counter the Tudeh.

The Tudeh Party. The Tudeh Party has its roots in the Socialist movement in Iran which dates back to the first decade of the present century. Among its early supporters was Iskadar Mirza (later Iraj Iskandari), a Qajar prince. Prior to any organized Marxist political party, there had been labor movements in many parts of the country, initiated mainly by Iranians who worked in the border regions of Russia, particularly in the Baku oil fields.<sup>55</sup> In the IVth Majlis, the Socialist Party (Ejtemayoun Amiyoun) which represented some Marxist sentiments, developed a link with communist-inspired labor organizations and supported their strikes. Following Reza Shah's accession to the throne, all political parties were suppressed. Dr. Arani, a physician, is credited with the establishment of the Communist Party in Iran.<sup>56</sup> Following his return to Iran from Berlin in the early 1930s, he founded

his group, composed mainly of students and professionals with sympathies for Marxian ideals. Dr. Arani and 52 of his colleagues were arrested in 1937 and tried under the 1931 Act forbidding communist activities. All were sentenced to long prison terms and Dr. Arani reportedly was murdered in prison.<sup>57</sup> The Communist Party reemerged as the Tudeh Party in January 1942 as a result of the "new wartime democracy" which was enjoyed following the occupation of the country by the Allies in 1941. The leadership of the Tudeh consisted mostly of those members of the Communist Party who had just been freed from prison. The Party was also joined by others, namely Seyyed Jaffar Pishevari, who later gained fame as a result of his position in the Azarbaijan separatist movement in 1945-46.

The Tudeh had an organization similar to other communist parties with a Central Executive Committee and a Control Commission.<sup>58</sup> The party operated several papers and had subsidiary organizations for students, women, workers, and peasants. It also collaborated with other political groups such as the Anti-Fascist Society in the communist-oriented United Front.<sup>59</sup> The Tudeh, however, avoided revolutionary rhetoric. "Its platform included all the essential features of traditional liberalism"; there was no mention of collectivization or nationalization of private properties. The party, nonetheless, remained strongest in the Russian zone of occupation. The Tudeh, for the first time, gained eight seats in the XIVth Majlis, inaugurated in early 1944.<sup>60</sup> The Tudeh faced its first challenges from within its own ranks, when, with Soviet support, the Azerbaijan Democratic Party, the

provincial arms of the Tudeh in Azerbaijan, and the Kurdish Democratic Party (Kumelah) in Kurdistan announced the autonomy of their respective regions in 1945. The Azerbaijan Democratic Party, under the leadership of Pischevari, in September declared Azerbaijan an autonomous state. In December, he severed relations with the central government in Tehran and declared the separation of Azerbaijan.<sup>61</sup> The Kurdish separatist movement, centered in the Mahabad Republic, was led by Qazi Mohammad, elected as its president.<sup>62</sup>

The blow to the communist movement, in general, and to the Tudeh, in particular, was severe. The party's central committee in Tehran, however, tried to keep its distance from the separatist movements. Nevertheless, the party had appeared as the covert front for Soviet ambitions in Iran which brought back to attention the imperialist Tzarist aims of reaching the warm waters of the Indian Ocean through Iran. Such a process was seen to be undertaken through dismemberment of the nation through separatist movement under the guise of the Tudeh. In Cottam's words, many Tudeh members for the first time understood that "the objectives of Iranian nationalism and international communism were inherently contradictory."<sup>63</sup> As a result, many of the Tudeh membership split and established their own separate organizations or cooperated with other leftist groups. Khalil Maleki was one such individual who joined Qavvam's Iran Democratic Party, later joined by Dr. Muzafar Baqai who finally established his own Third Force Party, a Titoist association.

The Tudeh, following the Azarbaijan and Kurdistan affairs, was reduced in influence and prestige. With the assassination attempt on the Shah in 1949 blamed on it, its activities were prohibited and made illegal.<sup>64</sup> Tudeh activities, however, continued underground, resurfacing in the early 1950s with increased anti-British agitation centered on the issue of nationalization of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. In mid-1953, Dr. Mossadegh used the Tudeh and its organization to counter the rightist and pro-monarchist activities against his government. The Tudeh was allowed a public demonstration on July 21, in the Majlis square where the same morning the National Front had held their meeting. The Tudeh attracted between 50,000 to 100,000 people-- five to ten times more than the National Front.<sup>65</sup> Once again the Tudeh had shown its political strength and vitality.

Following the abortive coup led by pro-Shah officers on August 16, the Shah fled the country and most organizers of the coup, including General Zahedi, went into hiding. From a historical perspective, the greatest mistake took place when the Tudeh turned out mobs who pulled down Reza Shah's statues and "raised red flags over the city." In Guilan Province, the Tudeh elements took control of the government.<sup>66</sup> Suddenly the Tudeh had emerged as the chief threat to Dr. Mossadegh's government, which was ironic because he had thought that he was employing the Tudeh to further his own aims. He struck back on August 18 by ordering the dispersal of the Tudeh mobs. Within a few hours the Tudeh was in retreat.<sup>67</sup>



The Iran Democratic Party. In 1945, Ahmad Qavvam (Qavvam al-Saltaneh) established the Iran Democratic Party during his premiership. The main objective of this party was to sustain Qavvam's premiership. It established a central committee with nine members and had a youth and women's organization connected with it. Almost all the politicians of any consequence had joined the ranks of the Iran Democratic Party with the exception of Dr. Mossadegh, who was seen as a "bull in a china shop." Politicians with close connection to the Court were also avoided. Ahmad Qavvam invited the Tudeh and the Iran Party to join the Iran Democratic Party in a coalition. The coalition was seen as an attempt on Qavvam's part to weaken the Tudeh Party and to help him to pack the Majlis,<sup>68</sup> the elections for which had been delayed since early 1946 by a legislative rule that forbade holding of elections so long as there remained foreign troops in Iran.<sup>69</sup> This legal bind had left the nation without a parliament for almost a year and a half until the elections for the XVth Majlis were concluded in July 1947. The absence of a legislative assembly gave Qavvam a freer hand in the conducting of affairs of state, particularly in his negotiations with the Soviet Union regarding the affairs of Azarbaijan.

Three Tudeh members joined Qavvam in his 1946 cabinet to display good faith and an eagerness to work closely with the Soviet Union in resolving the conflict over Azarbaijan and to give Qavvam a show of continued support for the oil agreement with the Soviet Union which needed the ratification of the Majlis whose elections were postponed until all Soviet troops were removed from Iranian soil. In the

elections of 1947, 85 out of 136 deputies were affiliated with Qavvam's Iran Democratic Party, the rest going mostly to the candidates of the court who were elected following the army's entrance to Azarbaijan after the Soviet withdrawal. Qavvam's control over the Majlis, however, declined sharply when his acquiescence to the Soviet demands were made public. Qavvam had worked out an agreement with the Soviets, including a 51 percent share in an oil concession to them in northern Iran.<sup>70</sup> This was in dire contrast to the Majlis guidelines that forbade any such talks prior to an approval by the Majlis. The Russo-Iranian Oil agreement was rejected by a vote of 100 to 2. A subsequent vote of no confidence resulted in the resignation of Qavvam as prime minister and the appointment of Ebrahim Hakimy on December 27, 1947 as the new premier.

Iran Party. The Iran Party was formed primarily as an engineers association in 1941. In 1943, at the urging of Alahyar Saleh, an engineer-politician and later a prominent figure in the National Front, it became a political party and adopted its name. Due to its composition from the ranks of the educated and intellectuals, it was a valuable ally for those advocating radical reforms and modernization. The party joined Qavvam in a coalition with the Tudeh. Although the coalition was shortlived, the Iran Party attained prominence.<sup>71</sup> It joined other parties in the National Front led by Dr. Mohammad Mossadegh, advocating radical reforms, nationalism, and nationalization of the oil industry.

The Toilers Party (Hezb-e Zahmat-keshan). With the decline of Qavvam and his party, many new political parties came into being whose leaders had been his associates. Baqai established the Toilers Party. He had been elected to the XVth Majlis (1947-49) under the banner of Qavvam's Iran Democratic Party, but he split with Qavvam a year later to form the Organization for Supervising the Freedom of Elections in his native Kerman in preparation for the elections for the XVth Majlis in 1950. After his election this organization was changed to Organization for Supervising the Implementation of the Law. Following Dr. Mossadegh's accession to premiership, Baqai brought together all his political organizations under the Toilers Party and later joined Dr. Mossadegh's National Front coalition.

The Toilers Party is an example of the middle class parties that were used as vehicles of personal interests. Contrasted with the Toilers Party is the case of organizations such as the Iran Party that represented class interests. Leonard Binder notes that the platforms of the Toilers Party and Iran Party "were essentially programs rather than reasoned systems of values," and, as such, they were similar. The Toilers Party, under the leadership of Dr. Baqai and his personal approach, attempted "to achieve power through cooperation and bargaining with existing, even traditional, leaders of groups or interests."<sup>72</sup> Such an approach, however, resulted in the distrust of Dr. Baqai and some of his associates in the Toilers Party by Dr. Mossadegh. The friction resulted in a split in the Toilers Party, resulting in the

formation of a new group called the Third Force under the leadership of Khalil Maleki.

Third Force Party (Niru-ye Sevvum). Khalil Maleki had been a member of the original Communist Party, jailed and suppressed under Reza Shah. Following the establishment of the Tudeh by the remnants of the communist group, Maleki had become a member of the Tudeh. However, he broke with Tudeh and established the Iranian Socialist Society as the only "true" communist party in Iran. The Socialist Society was dissolved upon Soviet opposition to Maleki's claim. Maleki subsequently joined Dr. Baqai and gained prominence through the latter's political organization. Upon the split, Maleki expounded on the nature of his party's anti-communism and its promotion of "Nehru Socialism," "Titoism," and "West European Socialism." After a brief detention following the Shah's return to power, Maleki resumed his anti-communist activities mainly by translating articles for his journal.<sup>73</sup>

Pan Iranists. Historically, the Pan-Iranists have been divided into two groups. Hezb-e Mellat-e Iran (Iranian Nation's Party) led by Dariush Foruhar was formed from the followers of Dr. Jahansuz and was basically anti-communist. Its rank and file was composed of members of bazaar guilds and small merchants.<sup>74</sup> This group cooperated with Dr. Mossadegh and until 1979 was part of the National Front.<sup>75</sup>

The second group, under the leadership of Dr. Munshizadeh, grew out of Sumka (National Socialist Workers Party of Iran). The party opposed the Tudeh, but it also criticized Dr. Mossadegh and cooperated with the Court. Sumka reportedly had a working relationship with

General Zahedi and some other right-wing generals. Sumka was banned, along with all other parties, during General Zahedi's premiership. It was asked, however, to participate in the Shah's birthday celebrations in 1954 by putting a wreath on Reza Shah's grave.

The Sumka split into several factions during the 1950s. Arya Party was formed by the Sepher brothers as a result of an internal dispute. It later joined the Mardum (People) Party. Another group, led by Abbas Amini, split from the party, calling itself Feday-e Iranshah (sacrifices for Shah) Party in 1956. Another group led by Dr. Fazl-ollah Sadr left the party in 1967 and formed the Iranian Party. The remnants of the party are presently known as Pan Iranists, led by Mr. Mohsen Pezeshkpour who had been a deputy in the Majlis from 1964 until 1978.

The Sumka ideology was patterned after the Nazi Party in Germany "glorifying the struggle for power above all else, stressing racialism, attacking capitalism and imperialism, (and) attacking democracy."<sup>76</sup>

Fundamentalists. Two groups that gained national prominence in the late 1940s and early 1950s were Fedaeyan-e Islam and Mjuahedeen-e Islam.<sup>77</sup> The former, led by Navvab Safavi, gained fame by the assassination of Premier Haj Ali Razmara in 1951 and other political violence including assassinations and attempted assassinations.<sup>78</sup> The group, although underground, remained active during the 1950s and 1960s as seen by the attempted assassination of Premier Hussein Ala in 1955 and the assassination of Premier Hassan-Ali Mansur in 1965. The Fedaeyan



was an Islamic fundamentalist group. They were also motivated by nationalism "seeking to purify the Persian language and reunite the Iranian-Shi'ite lands as well as to establish an Islamic government under an Imam."<sup>79</sup>

The Mujahedeen-e Islam was led by Shams Qanat-abadi and had close association with Mulla Kashani, a member of the clergy and a Majlis deputy. Like the Fedaeyan, the Mujahedeen were also nationalistic and fundamentalists. The two groups cooperated for a short while, but the opposition of the Fedaeyan to the traditional clergy, of which Kashani was one, led to their eventual split.<sup>80</sup> The Mujahedeen was basically a political organization built by Safavi and nurtured by Kashani to further their aims of pan-Islamism. With the break between Dr. Mossadegh and Mulla Kashani, brought about by the former's heavy reliance on the Tudeh to accomplish his goals, the coalition between the National Front and the Mujahedeen was severed and the latter, as a viable political group, was nullified.

National Front (Jebhe-ye Melli). Following the decline of Qavvam's Iran Democratic Party, many of its members joined Dr. Mossadegh in the National Front: Dr. Shayegan, Hussein Makki, and Amir Alaei among many. The National Front was a coalition of several political parties, including the Iran Party, Toilers Party, The Third Force Party, and the Pan Iranists led by Darisuh Foruhar. The National Front coalition was composed of elements representing all social classes and all segments of the body politic including right and left, upper-class and lower-class, professionals and farmers, as well as clergy and

secular. The front was composed of political leaders united behind Mossadegh "in a struggle against the political predominance of the oligarchy." Dr. Mossadegh had become the personification of the Iranian demand for political independence and national dignity. As such, he was accepted and trusted by an ever increasing public as an "absolutely trustworthy leader who deserved their wholehearted and uncritical support." The "symbolic leadership" of Dr. Mossadegh and the formation of political groupings behind him gave the National Front the vitality for it to become the dominant political factor from 1951 to 1953. The groups represented in the National Front ranged from the Marxist Third Force on the left to the Pan Iranists on the right. Nonetheless, the central gravity of the front was with the middle class and, ideologically, the center-left dominated the political perspective. The disparate nature of the front, however, made possible only the broadest and most general policy platforms.<sup>81</sup>

In sum, the political parties of this period, for the most part, remained short-lived and as the political fortune of its leader/leaders declined so did the party. Thus, only a few of the parties of this period lasted more than a few years. The main exceptions were the Tudeh and the National Front, both of which went underground following the overthrow of Mossadegh. Patterns of membership and support differed greatly. While party discipline and organized cell-structure prevailed in the Tudeh Party, others, such as the fundamentalist groups, had loose organizations and a changing pattern of affiliation. The National Front, due to its broad scope of affiliation, had the largest national

mass support, whereas, supporters of the Tudeh, although less numerous, were more disciplined and as such were more effective. As noted already, most other parties reflected class and guild interests, in addition to some that were vehicles of personal political ambitions. Effective membership in most parties was somewhere between a few hundred to a few thousand, if even that, at the high point of their popularity.

Political Parties from 1953 to 1978. Following the fall of Dr. Mossadegh, all political parties, even those friendly to the court, were suppressed. Neither prime minister Zahedi (1953-1955) nor Hussein Ala (1955-1957) were friendly towards the idea of formation of political parties.<sup>82</sup> The Tudeh was severely repressed. Following the uncovering of an alleged ring of over 500 Tudeh sympathizers within the ranks of the armed forces, the Tudeh's resistance had broken down and its organization was in disarray.<sup>83</sup> Most of its leadership fled the country and regrouped in Eastern Europe with East Berlin as their center of political activities. Although some Tudeh elements remained active among Iranian student organizations in the West, their significance was negligible.

The two party system. Beginning in 1957, two political parties were formed by the Shah's closest aides, Asadolla Alam and Dr. Manuchehr Eqbal, at the urging of the United States. The former named his party Mardum (People), while the latter called his Melliyoun (Nationalists). Since Dr. Eqbal had been appointed prime minister in 1957, his party became the government party while Mardum remained the opposition. In

TABLE 2  
Chronology of Iranian Political Parties (\*)

Political Party	Leader	ideology	year founded
Democrats			
Ettedallion (Moderates) Party		nationalist	1910
Socialist Party (old Democrats and some Moderates)		conservative	1911
Communist Party		liberal socialist	1921
Tudeh (Mass) Party	Dr. Arani	communist	1935
Kumleh (Kurdish Democratic Party)		communist	1941
Firqueh Democrat (Azarbaijan Democratic Party)	Qazi Mohammad	communist oriented	1943
Iranian Socialist Party	Jafar Pishevari	communist	1944
Pan Iranist	Khalil Maleki	communist	1945
SUMKA (National Socialist Workers Party of Iran)	Dr. Jahansuz	fascist	1935
Gorouh-e Nejat Melli (National Salvation Group)	Dr. Munshi-zadeh	fascist	1949
Pan Iranist		nationalist	1950
Arya Party	Dariush Foruher	anti-communist	1951
Fedaey-e Iranshah (Sacrificees of Shah) Party	Mohsen Pezeshkpour	nationalist	1956
Iranian Party	Sepehr Brothers	nationalist	1956
Iran Party	Abbas Amini	pro-court	1967
Iran Party	Fazlolah Sadr	nationalist	1942
Iran Party	Saleh & Zirak-zadeh	liberal socialist	1943
Iran Party	Zia-eddin Tabatabai	pro-British	1946
Iran Party	Ahmad Qavvam	liberal socialist	1951
Iran Party	Navvab Safavi	fundamentalist	1951
Iran Party	Shams Qanat-abadi	fundamentalist	1951
Iran Party	Dr. Muzafar Baqai	Titoist	1951
Iran Party	Dr. Mussadegh	nationalist	1951
Iran Party	Bazargan & Taleghani	Islamic nationalist	1951
Iran Party	Khalil Maleki	liberal socialist	1952
Iran Party	Asadolah Alam	pro-court (liberal)	1957
Iran Party	Dr. Iqbal	pro-court (moderate)	1958
Iran Party	Hassan-Ali Mansur	pro-court (liberal)	1963
Iran Party		pro-court	1975

(\*) Some of the groups included in this list are not political parties in the Western sense of the word and could be considered more as political activist groups.

the Shah's own words, the establishment of these parties was "helped by a kind of sentimental desire on the part of the Americans and British to have a Westminster-type of democracy (in Iran)." In short, the political parties were supposed to give an air of democracy to the political process in Iran, whereas, in reality, the system was controlled by the Shah since he was the final authority who approved the list of candidates for the Majlis elections.<sup>84</sup>

Neither party had any grassroots support and their memberships mostly consisted, in the one case, of the members of Alam's dowreh,<sup>85</sup> and, in the other, of the ambitious civil servants who, by joining the Mellioun party, had hoped to advance their positions within the government.<sup>86</sup> The parties were commonly referred to as the "yes" and the "of course" parties. The two parties, nevertheless, were supposed to have some ideological differences. Mardum represented itself as a reformist party favoring land reforms, "labor welfare, equal rights for women, and social insurance." The Mellioun, on the other hand, represented a more traditional mode of the country with its rank and file dependent on individuals who enjoyed much influence and access to sources of power within the establishment. Its ideology differed little from that of Mardum, but it stressed free medical service, labor benefits, purification of the Persian language, and "physical exercise and scouting."<sup>87</sup>

Corruption and ballot box rigging in the 1960 elections, mostly as a result of Dr. Eqbal's excesses, led the Shah to nullify the elections.<sup>88</sup> Dr. Eqbal's prompt resignation was asked and new elections



were scheduled for 1961. In spite of the fact that the subsequent elections in 1961 were also fraught with rigging and abuse, Alahyar Saleh, the leader of the Iran Party and a National Front leader, was elected to the Majlis from Kashan.<sup>89</sup> With the elections for the XXth Majlis, the Shah stated intentions to hold free elections and to allow the world press to cover the election process. The opposition used the occasion as an opportunity to increase its activities.<sup>90</sup> The National Front revived its activities and held its largest post-1953 demonstration in 1961. The Front also welcomed to its ranks Nehzat-e Azadi Iran (Freedom Movement of Iran), led by Mehdi Bazargan and Ayatollah Mahmoud Taleghani.<sup>91</sup> The Freedom Movement was a coalition of activists with Islamic orientation with a political base among the bazaaris, clergy and students.

With the resignation of Dr. Amini from premiership in 1962, the newly appointed premier, Asadollah Alam, proposed a coalition government to the National Front. The proposition fell through when the gap between the Shah and the National Front proved unbridgeable.<sup>92</sup>

One dominant party system. Following the January 1963 referendum approving the Shah sponsored measures which became known as the White Revolution,<sup>93</sup> a government sponsored congress of Free Men and Women of Iran was inaugurated in Tehran. This congress became the foundation of the Iran Novin (New Iran) Party, led by Hassan-Ali Mansur and the members of his dowreh. Some 85 percent of the deputies of the XXist Majlis that had been opened in October promptly joined the new party with the remaining going to Alam's Mardum Party, functioning

still as the minority party. There were also three deputies from the Pan Iranist Party which had Iranian claims to Bahrein Islands and support for the Kurdish insurgents in Iraq as part of its platform. Other political parties were suppressed and were not allowed to compete for seats in either house of parliament.

The dominance of Iran Novin in the Iranian political process lasted for 12 years under the leadership of Amir Abbas Hoveida who became the prime minister in 1965 after the assassination of Mansur. During this period the Shah was able to manipulate the Iranian political process including the legislature through the party and, thus, to legislate his own policies. However, the public remained indifferent and apathetic to the political process devised by the Shah. Voter turnout at elections was scant and those who participated did so often under pressure from their supervisors at government or factory jobs.

During the late 1960s and the 1970s extremist attacks on the government, in the form of guerrilla operations, began to appear with increased frequency. Although the police and SAVAK were able to neutralize the guerrilla operations to a great extent, they were never effectively neutralized.

A single party system. In the face of growing opposition to his increasingly oppressive rule, the Shah, in order to broaden the base of support for his rule, envisioned politicizing the whole adult population of the country and to involve everybody in the political process. This approach was based on the assumption that the silent majority, particularly the working class and the farmers, supported his

rule. Thus, by involving all these huge segments of the population in the political process, he could offset the criticism of the opposition. Rastakhiz-e Melli (National Resurgence) Party, in March 1975, became the only officially sanctioned political party in the country. All other previously sanctioned parties were dissolved and joined the ranks of the new party. The political philosophy of Rastakhiz was based on three fundamentals: "The Shah-People Revolution" (The White Revolution); the institution of monarchy as an inseparable part of the Iranian socio-political system; and adherence to the constitution of 1906-07. Within this framework, it was envisioned that diverse political opinion could be formed so long as the fundamental principles were adhered to. The party was intended as a permanent institution and membership in the party was seen as an indication of loyalty to the monarchy.<sup>94</sup> Thus the Shah had declared that "Everyone must be man enough to clarify his position in this country. He either approves of the conditions or he does not." Therefore, an Iranian not joining the Rastakhiz Party was rejecting the principles set forth and was regarded by the Shah as a "traitor who should be in an Iranian prison, or should leave the country."<sup>95</sup> The Iranian press actually carried reports on one person who opted to leave the country. Therefore, the assumption was that all who had remained were loyal to the principles of the Rastakhiz Party. Neighborhood branches of the party were set up all over the country. By 1976, there were 7,289 urban and 13,578 rural units of the party with some 2.4 million members.<sup>96</sup> Since membership in the party was rumored to be compulsory, many had actually joined for fear of reprisals and attendance at meetings was very poor.

The organizational apparatus of the party included at its head the secretary general with several deputies and a political bureau with 25 members. Some of the party leaders had had experience in party organization as members of the Tudeh, namely Mohammad Baheri and Mahmoud Jafarian. In anticipation of divergent political views and to control such views, two leading members of the government, Jamsheed Amuzegar and Hushang Ansari, were designated respectively as the leaders of the "Progressive" and "Constructive" wings of the party. Under the auspices of the party, elections were held in August 1975 in which only the candidates of the Rastakhiz Party would compete for seats.

The economic problems of 1977, with rising unemployment, rampant inflation and shortage of raw materials and food stuffs, on top of the ever increasing gap between the poor and the rich, was straining the political structure as well. Jamsheed Amuzegar, previously the leader of the "Progressive" wing in the party which believed that "too high of a price should not be paid for economic development," was asked to form a cabinet. Hoveida, after 13 years of premiership, the longest in the constitutional history of Iran, resigned. Amuzegar's appointment, although he was a reform minded technocrat, was a disappointment for many. Public opinion had been made ready for the appointment of a prime minister who would not be connected with the Shah and his political apparatus. The rumors had persistently named Ali Amini, the one time prime minister from 1961-62 as the probable candidate.

The change in the government in 1977 coincided with the beginning of Jimmy Carter's presidency in Washington with his promise that "human rights" would be a major issue in his administration's foreign policy. Coinciding with Carter's election to the presidency was also a relative freedom of press in Iran. The Rastakhiz party became one of the first targets for criticism by the press. The political alienation and indignation that had been brewing as the result of the establishment of a single political party, based on principles which generally had little support from the public, burst into the open. Even the Shah himself criticized the party for its corruption, inefficiency and deviation from his goals and ambitions. However, it was not until mid-1978 that several deputies in the Majlis, elected on the Rastakhiz ticket, declared their independence from the party.<sup>97</sup> By the end of the year, the number of Majlis deputies who challenged the government and its policies had reached two dozen.<sup>98</sup> With the rising revolutionary fervor, the Shah and the institution of the Rastakhiz Party that he had built and had envisioned to endure beyond his lifetime crumbled before him.

A brief summary. This brief history of Iranian political parties clearly indicates that, while gaining control of the institutions of government, the Shah was not interested in political parties that would have had grassroots support, i.e., parties that would develop from the public need for a vehicle of political expression. The parties since 1957 had been created by the government and given a philosophical framework based on support for the Shah, with attempts



then made to gain popular legitimacy for them. All failed. Neither the formalized dowrehs of Alam and Mansur nor the government created parties of Melliyoun and Rastakhiz had much interest in becoming the vehicles of public political expressions. They never gained popularity or legitimacy with the public. The parties that had grassroots support, such as the National Front and Tudeh, were suppressed. It is interesting to note that the Shah, in January 1979, relied on a member of the National Front, Dr. Shahpour Bakhtiar, to save the monarchy. By the time of Mohammad-Reza Shah's abdication in January 1979, some 100 political parties and groups had come into existence vying for political power. Some of these groups, like the Tudeh and the National Front, were just emerging from underground, whereas, many other parties had just been founded.

### Media

The recent experience of the media has been similar to that of other institutions. Just as there was freedom of expression in the media during the periods of relative political freedom, namely 1941-53, so the media was controlled by the authoritarian rule very much like the political parties and other political institutions.

Printed media. The press, newspapers and magazines were introduced to Iran early in the 19th century. During the Constitutional Revolution, the press was greatly responsible for disseminating democratic ideals and principles that resulted in the adoption of the Constitution of 1906-07.

The press suffered from the authoritarian and repressive rule of Reza Shah and flourished upon his abdication in 1941. The relative freedom from 1941 to 1953 resulted in the emergence of many newspapers and weekly journals, either of an independent nature or as organs of political groups and parties. For example, during this period the Tudeh Party and its affiliate organizations published some 10 separate newspapers or magazines. With the coup against Dr. Mossadegh and the return of the Shah to power, all the newspapers and magazines associated with the political groups that had supported Dr. Mossadegh were banned. Only a few independents, namely Keyhan and Ettela'at, remained in operation. The content of these papers, however, was controlled and censored.

The censorship and unreliability of news, especially domestic, rendered the press ineffective as a vehicle of news reporting. In fact, the most popular pages of the two leading evening Tehran papers, Keyhan and Ettela'at, were the obituary and the classified sections.

The 1963 Press Laws greatly reduced the number of newspapers and news magazines thus further undermining the effectiveness of the press. The law forbade the publication of newspapers with circulation of less than 3,000 copies and magazines with less than 5,000. In 1970, an optimistic estimate of press circulation in Iran included 200,000 copies of daily newspapers, 50,000 copies of weekly newspapers, 200,000 copies of weekly magazines, 20,000 copies of monthly magazines, and 30,000 copies of almanacs.<sup>99</sup>

The newspapers, however, served a purpose of disseminating information on new policies and new political and economic directives. With the establishment of the Rastakhiz Party, a new morning daily, appropriately called Rastakhiz as it was the official newspaper of the party, was added to the short list of Iranian newspapers. The morning Rastakhiz in a very short time gained such a reputation as the spokesman of the government that its editorials and news releases were carefully read by the interested public. Even high placed government officials would resort to the newspaper as their primary source of information and guidelines for new government policies.

With increased economic problems and desperate urban problems, mainly housing and traffic, articles began to appear in 1977 in most newspapers criticizing government officials but never reaching the highest officials. By mid-1978, when the revolution was well underway, criticism of highly placed individuals, many close confidants of the Shah, began to appear in the papers. Still there was no direct criticism of the Shah or the royal family. There even was some support for the Shah, who, according to the then highly respected editor of the independent Khondaniha, Ali Asghar Amirani, had been misled by the corrupt officials of the government. Soon after this assertion in an issue which carried a picture of the Shah praying on its cover, there was a large drop in sales. However, with relative freedom and relaxation of censorship on the press, circulation of daily papers such as Keyhan and Ettela-at had reached a million copies a day. Following the demonstrations in Tehran on November 4 and 5, the Shah installed a

military government headed by the armed forces' chief of staff, General Azhari. With the imposition of censorship and curtailment of press rights that had been guaranteed by the outgoing prime minister Sharief-Emami, the press went on strike and the majority of the newspapers, including Keyhan and Ettela'at, did not publish for two months, until January 6, 1979 when Shahpour Bakhtiar's government was installed.<sup>100</sup>

In 1967, following the reorganization of the Ministry of Education, a new ministry called Ministry of Arts and Culture, headed by Mehrdad Pahlbod, the Shah's brother-in-law, was established. This ministry, along with Ministry of Information and Tourism, was delegated power over publication of newspapers, magazines and books. Many books waited for years at the Ministry of Arts and Culture to be approved for publication. Those that did, obviously applauded the government's perspective. Often there would be so much of a book deleted in order to get the government's approval that the authors would forego the publication of the book. Those writers who had dared to make any direct or even indirect criticism of the Shah were harshly dealt with, often with torture and imprisonment.<sup>101</sup> As a result, very few books dealing with the socio-political situation in Iran were approved for publication. The book publishing industry in Iran was in a bleak state. Few books ever went beyond the first printing. Anything over 3,000 copies was regarded as a best seller. Most of the 1,500 titles published in Iran during 1976-77 were on literary and religious subjects.<sup>102</sup> In short, the interested public had little opportunity to read expository works on socio-political issues.

The classical tradition of poetry remained a vehicle for some to express their political frustrations and thus to communicate with those who searched for elusive meanings. Reza Barahani, an Iranian writer and poet, notes that "Iranian poetry is full of double-and-tripled-tongued metaphors. One meaning opens the secrets of repression to the people; the other conceals them from the curious eyes of the censors. Thus, the new school of Iranian poetry is written on one hand from the viewpoint of the people and on the other from that of the police." Furthermore, Iranian writers go through "ingenious methods to get permission from the government censors" to publish their books. Barahani, for example, concedes that he wrote a whole piece on "the situation of repression in the country and simply signed it Bertolt Brecht." The piece was published without any problems since Brecht was on the approved list.<sup>103</sup>

In contrast, 1978 experienced a tremendous boom in the sale of books, mostly the previously banned books by both Iranian and foreign writers. Sidewalk book stalls sprouted all over Tehran and all major cities, offering books on social and political, as well as critical literary works. Although many books were being pirated, there was a flourishing book publishing business, with many books going into second and third printings in a matter of one year. The Iranians, who only five years before were reading an average of less than 30 seconds of books per year,<sup>104</sup> had turned into avid readers of all kinds of publications, including newspapers, magazines and books.



Electronic media. Although the first radio station in Iran was established in 1940, many Iranians still tuned into the stations in the neighboring countries, Turkey and the Soviet Union. The program of the first radio station in Iran was most devoted to the praise of Reza Shah and his modernizing achievements. The radio system in Iran, since its establishment, has been state owned and operated. Thus, it always has been the instrument of government policies and propaganda. The radio networks broadcast the government version of the news. It also had programs geared towards farmers and workers along with general entertainment.

The National Iranian Radio and Television (NIRT), in the late 1970s, had a transmitting station in all major cities with some programs in the local languages and dialects. The country was also covered by two 2,000 kilowatt stations. Among major Asian nations, after Japan, Iran had the highest number of radio receivers per capita (see TABLE 3). Thus, the radio networks were becoming an increasingly

TABLE 3

The number of radio receivers per 1,000 inhabitants in some Asian countries\*

Bahrein (1974)	412	Iraq (1974)	116
Hong Kong (1975)	574	Japan (1975)	465
India (1974)	25	Kuwait (1974)	231
Iran (1974)	249	Lebanon (1974)	474

\*Source: United Nations Statistical Yearbook: 1976, Table 217, p. 944.

effective means of communication in the country. Despite the revolutionary fervor and relaxation of press censorship, the radio networks, except on a few occasions, never achieved the freedom to disseminate news which the press had during most of 1978. A large portion of radio listeners, during the 1978 uprising, listened to the British Broadcasting Company (BBC) programs in Farsi to learn of the events in Iran and to get a firsthand report of the political developments, particularly in the absence of newspapers during the military government of General Azhari in November and December 1978. Since the 1950s, two radio stations, Paik-e Iran and Radio Melli-e Iran, both Soviet sponsored, had been broadcasting news to Iranian listeners on a daily basis. These stations, however, ended their activities following the improvement of Iranian relations with the Soviet Union and were both off the air by 1976.

The first television station in Iran began operation in 1958. Within a short time another station in Abadan, southwestern Iran, began operations. These two private stations, along with an American Armed Forces Radio and Television station, were the only television stations in the country until the mid-1960s. Although the two stations were private, nevertheless, their broadcasts, especially the news programs, were controlled by the government. The government, under the auspices of the Ministry of Information and Tourism, set up television stations in Tehran and other major cities and soon brought under its control both of the privately owned stations. The American stations, radio and television, however, continued their independent course until 1977 when

they were taken over by NIRT. The programming of these stations, however, remained in English and was basically intended for the foreign community residing in Iran.

Television broadcasting, despite having been in private hands for several years, remained a tool of government propaganda. Like the radio networks, it never achieved a respectable position as a reliable source of domestic news so far as the public was concerned. The entertainment programs of the television stations were mostly of a foreign nature, mainly American. The domestically produced programs, although dealing critically with certain social problems, nevertheless, avoided prevailing political issues. The television media, particularly during the last decade, was used effectively as a propaganda medium. The evening news, news shows and special shows were used to publicize the policies of the government and its achievements and to praise the Shah and the benefits of his reforms for the nation, and thus attempted to gain support for his rule. Furthermore, on occasion some philosophical debates would be conducted on the air to display the openness of the television media as a vehicle for dissemination of ideas. The debates, however, would center on issues least relevant to the on-going problems of the country. According to the government's plan, by the end of the 1970s, the television medium would have covered some 70 percent of the population of the country, and thus would have been an effective medium of communication.

### Summary

With the centralization of authority in Tehran achieved by Reza Shah and the supremacy of monarch over other institutions, a new era in the Iranian political process began. Despite the stipulations in the Constitution of 1906-07 dividing the government into three separate but equal branches, the executive, led by Reza Shah and later by Mohammad-Reza Shah, manipulated the legislature and the judiciary. The decade following the Allied occupation of Iran with Reza Shah deposed saw rule of law brought back to the country. However, with the overthrow of Dr. Mossadegh's government in 1953, the political power reverted back to the hands of the monarch, with other institutions, once again, subjugated to the policies of the court. The dominance of the institution of monarchy, naturally, meant the weakness of other institutions. Contributing to the inability of the legislature and political parties to withstand the pressures of the monarchy was the use of such institutions by individuals for personal purposes. Political parties were mainly vehicles of the personal ambitions of one or more politicians. Such parties lacked organization, discipline, and coherent ideology. The legislature, furthermore, functioned as an arena for political power brokers and political opportunists, landed aristocracy who dominated the Majlis through the 1950s. Although at times moved by nationalist aspirations, the Majlis deputies represented a more traditional cross-section of the country and resisted changes that would cause any weakening of their traditional power bases. The conflict between the Shah and the legislature was resolved, with the

former in total control, when the Shah led land reforms that debased the landed aristocracy, thus changing the Shah from an authoritarian ruler to a totalitarian one. This re-established the power of the Shah over all other political institutions. The Shah, nonetheless, retained "democratic-looking" institutions to be able to laud himself as a liberal-minded monarch who utilized a constitutional process in running the affairs of the state. Only a shell remained of the constitutional political system of the nation after the monarch had destroyed or weakened other contending institutions, thus making the monarchy the pervasive institution. No thought was given to the prospect that perhaps there lurked a danger for the monarchy in a weakened constitutional process where the inadequacies of the political institutions did not allow them to withstand political threats from within. As such, the Rastakhiz Party and the legislature were in no position to come to the aid of the monarchy at its darkest hour.



## FOOTNOTES

<sup>1</sup>Firuz Kazemzadeh, Russia and Britian in Persian, 1964-1914: A Study in Imperialism (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), pp. 491-93.

<sup>2</sup>Russo-British treaty of 1907, dividing Iran into zones of influence. While the northern part of the country fell into the Russian zone of influence, the southeastern part became a British zone. The remaining parts of the country were declared a neutral zone. For a detailed analysis see Chapters 7, 8 and 9 in op. cit.

<sup>3</sup>Robert Graham, Iran: The Illusions of Power (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1978), pp. 129-49.

<sup>4</sup>Leonard Binder, Iran: Political Development in a Changing Society (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1962), pp. 83-84.

<sup>5</sup>Peter Avery, Modern Iran (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1965), pp. 133-39.

<sup>6</sup>Ibid., pp. 161-63.

<sup>7</sup>Ibid., p. 194.

<sup>8</sup>Kazemzadeh, pp. 491-92.

<sup>9</sup>Amin Banani, The Modernization of Iran: 1921-1941 (Palo Alto: Standford University Press, 1961), p. 41.

<sup>10</sup>Richard W. Cottam, Nationalism in Iran (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1979), pp. 20-21.

<sup>11</sup>Binder, p. 75.

<sup>12</sup>Cottam, pp. 146-50; see also Avery, pp. 266-67.

<sup>13</sup>Donald Wilbur, Iran: Past and Present (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975), p. 143.

<sup>14</sup>For detailed analysis of the Allied occupation of Iran see: George Lenczowski, Russia and the West in Iran: 1918-1948 (Ithica: Cornell University Press, 1949).

<sup>15</sup>Binder, p. 202.

<sup>16</sup>For detailed analysis of Communist movement in Iran see: Sepehr Zabih, The Communist Movement in Iran (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1966).

<sup>17</sup>For a detailed analysis of impact of oil in politics of the period see: L. P. Elwell-Sutton, Persian Oil: A Study in Power Politics (London: 1955).

<sup>18</sup>Binder, p. 111.

<sup>19</sup>Supplementary Fundamental Law of Iran, Article 46.

<sup>20</sup>Established in the electoral law of 1911, as amended in 1927.

<sup>21</sup>Fundamental Law of Iran, Article 33.

<sup>22</sup>Qasemzadeh, Hughugh-e Asasi (Fundamental Law), (Tehran: 6th edition, 1334/1955), pp. 376-77.

<sup>23</sup>Wilbur, p. 149.

<sup>24</sup>An analysis of background of Majlis deputies is presented by Zuhreh Shajai, Nemayandegan-e Majlis-e Shura-ye Melli dar Bisto-yek Dowreh-e Qanunquzari (The Representatives of the National Consultative Assembly during Twenty-one Legislative Sessions) (Tehran: 1344-1965).

<sup>25</sup>Cottom, footnote 2, p. 290.

<sup>26</sup>Fundamental Law of Iran, Articles 43-50.

<sup>27</sup>According to the schedule annexed to the Senate Election Law, approved in 1949, the Senators to be elected from provinces were as follows: Ahwaz 1; Hamadan 1; Isfahan 1; Kerman 1; Kermanshah 1; Mashad 2; Qazvin 1; Rasht 1; Rezaieyeh 1; Sari 1; Tabriz 2.

A same proportion of Senators were to be appointed by the Shah from provinces.

<sup>28</sup>Peter Avery, p. 490.

<sup>29</sup>Richard Cottam, pp. 296-98.

<sup>30</sup>The 1949 Amendment gave the Shah the power to dissolve the Majlis and Senate together or individually, but asserted that new elections should be held within one month of the dissolution.

<sup>31</sup>Zuhreh Shajai, p. 230.

<sup>32</sup>James A. Bill, "Modernization and Reforms from Above: The Case of Iran," The Journal of Politics, (Vol. 32, 1970), p. 33.

<sup>33</sup>Donald Wilbur, pp. 155-56.

<sup>34</sup>Zuhreh Shajai, pp. 230 & 276.

<sup>35</sup>Cited in Marvin Zonis, The Political Elite of Iran (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971), pp. 46-47.

<sup>36</sup>Keyhan (Tehran), (March 2, 1975).

<sup>37</sup>Middle East Economic Digest (MEED), (June 19, 1978).

<sup>38</sup>New York Times, (November 22, 1978). The vote was 191 for the measure, 27 against it, with 6 abstentions.

<sup>39</sup>Times (London), (September 10, 1978), reported disruption of parliamentary procedures by walkout of nine Majlis deputies. A further walkout by 18 Majlis deputies during the debate on the introduction of martial law in 12 cities, Times (London), (September 17, 1978).

<sup>40</sup>Salar Jaaf, the deputy from Paveh, Kurdistan, in the XXIVth Majlis, along with his hired gunmen, attacked his own constituents to suppress their anti-Shah uprising. He was arrested by the order of the then Speaker of Majlis, Dr. Javad Saeed, but was later released. Salar Jaaf was arrested following the installment of the Provisional Revolutionary Islamic Republic, convicted by the Islamic Revolutionary Tribunal and executed.

<sup>41</sup>See Tabaqeh-e Hakemeh-e Iran ra Beshenasid (Know the ruling class of Iran), (Tehran 1321/1944).

<sup>42</sup>For previous discussion of this subject see "Land Reform," in Chapter I, with particular emphasis on p. 42.

<sup>43</sup>Peter Avery, p. 143. For detailed analysis of Iranian political parties before 1928 see: Malek ol-Suara Bahar, Tarikh-e Mokhtasar-e Ahzab-e Siasi (A Short History of Political Parties), 2 vols., (Tehran: Amir Kabir Publishers, 1944).

<sup>44</sup>Peter Avery, p. 144.

<sup>45</sup>For a detailed analysis of impact of dowreh in Iranian political process see: William G. Miller, "The Dowreh and Iranian Politics," The Middle East Journal (Spring 1969), pp. 159-67, and (Summer 1969), pp. 343-50.

<sup>46</sup>Marvin Zonis, p. 240.

<sup>47</sup>J. M. Balfour, Recent Happenings in Persia (Edinburg: W. Blackwood and Sons, 1922), p. 90.

<sup>48</sup>Zonis, p. 241.

<sup>49</sup>Hamid Algar, Mirza Malkum Khan; Study in the History of Iranian Modernism (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973).

<sup>50</sup>Zonis, pp. 87-88 and 238-43.

<sup>51</sup>Leonard Binder, p. 204.

<sup>52</sup>Amin Banani, p. 40.

<sup>53</sup>Binder, p. 202.

<sup>54</sup>Ibid., p. 204.

<sup>55</sup>Lenczowski, p. 97.

<sup>56</sup>Ibid., p. 104.

<sup>57</sup>L. P. Elwell-Sutton, "Political Parties in Iran; 1941-1948," The Middle East Journal (January 1949), pp. 46-47.

<sup>58</sup>Lenczowski, p. 224.

<sup>59</sup>Elwell-Sutton, "Political Parties in Iran," pp. 48-49.

<sup>60</sup>For a detailed analysis see: Lenczowski, pp. 286-306.

<sup>61</sup>Ibid., pp. 291-92.

<sup>62</sup>For a detailed analysis see: William Eagleton, Jr., The Kurdish Republic of 1946 (London: 1963).

<sup>63</sup>Richard Cottam, p. 199.

<sup>64</sup>Donald Wilbur, p. 140.

<sup>65</sup>Cottam, p. 225.

<sup>66</sup>Richard N. Frye, "Iran Under Zahedi," Foreign Policy Bulletin, (February 1, 1954), p. 8, cited in Cottam, pp. 225-26.

<sup>67</sup>Cottam, p. 226.

<sup>68</sup>Leonard Binder, pp. 206-08.

<sup>69</sup>Richard Cottam, p. 198.

<sup>70</sup>Peter Avery, pp. 400-401.

<sup>71</sup>Binder, p. 210.

<sup>72</sup>Ibid., pp. 212-213.

<sup>73</sup>Ibid., pp. 214-15.

<sup>74</sup>Ibid., pp. 219-20.

<sup>75</sup>Iran Times, June 29, 1979.

<sup>76</sup>Leonard Binder, pp. 216-18.

<sup>77</sup>For a detailed analysis see: Chapter 10, titled "Religio-Nationalism and Pan-Islam," in Richard Cottam, pp. 134-57.

<sup>78</sup>Also assassinated by the Fedayyan were Hazhir, the Minister of Court, and a former prime minister, in 1949. Assassination attempts were also made against the Shah in 1949 at Tehran University, causing multiple injuries, and against Hussein Ala, in 1955, the prime minister and later a minister of court.

<sup>79</sup>Leonard Binder, p. 82.

<sup>80</sup>Richard Cottam, p. 152.

<sup>81</sup>Ibid., pp. 264-68.

<sup>82</sup>Binder, p. 203.

<sup>83</sup>Ibid., p. 147. For an account of trials, imprisonment and execution of the Tudeh officers see: Documents on the Pahlavi Reign of Terror in Iran (Frankfurt, German Federal Republic: Confederation of Iranian Students, 1971), pp. 1-16.

<sup>84</sup>E. A. Bayne, Persian Kingship in Transition: Conversation With a Monarch Whose Office is Traditional and Whose Goal is Modernization, (New York: American Universities Field Staff, 1968), pp. 107-108.

<sup>85</sup>Ibid., p. 108.

<sup>86</sup>Binder, pp. 222-23.

<sup>87</sup>Ibid., p. 224.

<sup>88</sup>Donald Wilbur, p. 154.

<sup>89</sup>For a detailed analysis of Alahyar Saleh's election and its impact on opposition see: Cottam, p. 301.

<sup>90</sup>Cottam, p. 297.



<sup>91</sup>Marvin Zonis, p. 72.

<sup>92</sup>*Ibid.*, pp. 73-74.

<sup>93</sup>The "White Revolution" included Land Reform bill, establishment of a Literacy Corps, the sale of state-owned factories to finance land reform, amendment of the election law to include female suffrage, sharing of workers in up to 20 percent of industrial profits, and nationalization of forests. These measures were later followed by other acts: establishment of a Health Corps, Reconstruction and Development Corps, nationalization of water resources, the decentralization of administration, and a House of Justice.

<sup>94</sup>Iran Almanac and Book of Facts: 1976 (Tehran: Echo of Iran, 1976), p. 107.

<sup>95</sup>Rastakhiz (Tehran), March 4, 1976.

<sup>96</sup>Iran Almanac and Book of Facts: 1976, p. 108.

<sup>97</sup>Middle East Economic Digest, June 19, 1978.

<sup>98</sup>See footnote 38.

<sup>99</sup>Iran Almanac and Book of Facts: 1971, p. 168.

<sup>100</sup>New York Times, January 6, 1979.

<sup>101</sup>Reza Barahani, The Crowned Cannibals: Writings on Repression in Iran, (New York: Vintage Books, 1977), p. 116.

<sup>102</sup>Iran Almanac and Book of Facts: 1977, p. 140.

<sup>103</sup>Reza Barahani, p. 118.

<sup>104</sup>Air Mail edition of Ettela'at, (February 3, 1975).

## C H A P T E R        I I I

### INDIVIDUALISM AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT

Like so many attributes of Iranian society, the political ideal of the nation and its religious sentiments are in contrast and antipathy to each other. The traditional political ideal calls for a strong and benevolent leader, while Shiah doctrine holds all temporal powers illegitimate. This contrast is reflected in the outlook of the members of the society who are torn between these two opposing traditions. Although one feeling may win out as the overriding reality for a time, the other twin, nonetheless, lingers on until the time for its rise to political supremacy comes. Many regard Shi'ism as a philosophical outcome of the Iranian cultural tradition which is estranged from the rational-political world as a result of a history that has been filled with phsyical insecurities resulting from Mongol, Turkic and Afghan invasions, to name but a few, coupled with natural catastrophies such as disease, earthquake and drought. These have rendered the average Iranian a very insecure person who feels that the course of his life is generally out of his control. Depending on myth, magic and fate serve as an escape from the harsh realities of the world. The result is a person turned inside. Since God is held to be just, therefore, one has no fear of relegating oneself unto His hands. The earthly life may be harsh but it is believed to be only a testing ground to prove one's

devotion to the Creator. Piety and communion with God take precedence over one's relationships with fellow beings. Mysticism is a natural outgrowth of this metaphysical and nonrational philosophy. Disregard for temporalities, as already noted, render all things related to them as superfluous and unnecessary, including the political apparatus. The only legitimate political authority that matters is belief in the Hidden Imam whose return is sought to bring justice to the world.

Thus the individual is on his own without any attachments or responsibilities to political authority or to society in general. His responsibility is to his family, both immediate and extended. Disregard for society in general influences the development/lack of development of political institutions in the country. For example, the formation of political parties, the bureaucracy, the cabinet, and even the personal and dictatorial rule of the kings with the power emanating from the top of the pyramid are all by-products of this self-centeredness ingrained in Iranian political culture. This individualism, as observed by experts on Iran, namely Sir Percy Sikes,<sup>1</sup> Leonard Binder,<sup>2</sup> Richard Cottam,<sup>3</sup> Marvin Zonis,<sup>4</sup> James A. Bill,<sup>5</sup> and William Forbis,<sup>6</sup> does not include the positive connotations that are associated with development in Western industrial societies. The attributes of Iranian individualism are feelings of rejection, uniqueness, anxiety, self-condemnation and mistrust, perceptions of the world as dangerous and hostile, general pessimism, and an individualistic trend. These eight sub-syndromes that Zonis has detected in general Iranian behavior are part of Abraham Maslow's 14 subsyndromes of personal insecurity.<sup>7</sup> Zonis thus concludes

that it is personal insecurity that has helped to shape the Iranian mind and outlook.<sup>8</sup> This feeling of insecurity, in turn, has had an immense influence on the process of political socialization.

A theoretical insight into individualism. A differentiation is made between individualism as the property of individual and individualism as a group quality. Robert Lane defines an individualistic society as one in which "individualism prevails and where the control over behavior and thought is vested in the individual relatively more than in customs, tradition and consensus (as is the case in primitive and traditional societies) and relatively more than in authority (as in command economies and authoritarian societies)." He then distinguishes between two types of individualism. Functional individualism enables an individual to function adequately in an individualistic society--i.e., "to energize and coordinate the tasks which such societies usually set for themselves." The other type is developmental individualism which is "not only separate from the evaluation of the group but which, in accord with much humanistic thought, gives priority to the individual over the group and its code of practices." This last kind represents "a conviction that the ultimate value lies in the development of the individual to his full powers." Functional individualism, on the other hand, implies that properties are developed because "they are functional to any society where neither tradition nor authority serves as an adequate guide to behavior." In short, in functional individualism man is perceived as the means, whereas, man is seen as the end in developmental individualism.<sup>9</sup>

Individualism, in the above modes, is not a product of ancient cultures but is traced back only to the Renaissance, Reformation and the rise of the industrial revolution. The social contracts, beginning in the 17th century, also gave a new perspective to the individual. They valued individuals separately and thus the individual was viewed as subject rather than object. Finally, Lane contends, "the idea of social contracts served to break the grip of the customary order for it implied that people can create their own institutions, and it led to the concept of popular sovereignty thrusting responsibilities back upon individuals." The individual as seen through the social contract, however, was a functional one and had not reached the developmental stage as yet.<sup>10</sup>

Unlike the traditional cultures where routines for coordination and achievement of communal goals are developed and authoritarian societies where hierarchy and command are utilized for similar purposes, in individualistic societies, according to Robert Lane, the individual is required to take on some of the functions which tradition and command achieve in these other two kinds of societies. However, to undertake such a task, certain cognitive, motivational, emotional, and behavioral properties are required of the individual who must also develop the ability to think for himself. Thinking for oneself requires freedom. It also requires "cognitive complexity." In other words, since decisions in an individualistic society are placed on the individual, a notion of self-awareness is required.<sup>11</sup> Self-aware individuals, according to Witkin, are aware of needs, feelings and attributes,



recognized as their own and as distinct from those of others.<sup>12</sup> As a result, when a society demands rational analysis, the wholes are broken down into parts and these parts are combined into new realities where a different "field independent cognitive style" is developed. In this cognitive style, the individual has the sense of self as a distinctly separate part of the environment.<sup>13</sup>

Socio-psychological research reveals that since an individualistic society would be competitive and therefore often unpleasant, it would result in agonizing comparisons between the self and others. This would most likely inspire ambition, causing frustrations when goals can't be reached. "Deindividuation," a state where individual identity is over-shadowed by the environment (a situation promulgated in traditional and authoritarian societies), on the other hand, hinders or prevents an individual from "facing contradictions between his opinion or norms and his behavior; he is not required to face internal discrepancies."<sup>14</sup>

An end result of an individualistic society is thought to be egoism, selfishness and narcissism. Pride, envy and generally inflated self-concern are said to be the natural outcome of a society that encourages the individual to think for himself as free from the rest of the community. There are also those, among them Eric Fromm, who argue that self-awareness will cause the growth and development of the individual resulting in a search for a higher moral code reaching for self-respect instead of self-love."<sup>15</sup> Supporting Fromm's contention, Abraham Maslow believes that the "growth instinct, once released, will

make for a better version of man, a version not only compatible with but a condition for human society."<sup>16</sup>

Robert Lane, citing several sociological studies, notes that although it is true that man is in harmony with nature when he is embedded in a community, it is also instinctive that he would want to control his own environment.<sup>17</sup> Supporting Lane's contentions, Richard deCharms notes that "man's primary motivational propensity is to be effective in producing change in his environment."<sup>18</sup> Motive satisfaction, however, is dependent on three conditions. These are:

1. The motive must be aroused or released by a culture which legitimizes it
2. The individual must believe that he is, in fact, the agent of his own powers, the origin of his own acts and not the pawn of fate
3. He must perceive that his acts make a difference, that outcomes are contingent on what he does. Like most motives, it is therefore associated with appropriate cognition.<sup>19</sup>

It is obvious that internal controls, or "pro-social behavior," is required of an individual in an individualistic society. As noted above, absence of self-monitoring cognition would lead into the supremacy of deadly sins--i.e., lust, envy, avarice, hate--in such a society. An idealistic individual would be cognizant of the fact that it is his actions (and not that of others) which can be responsible and influence the pain or lack of pain in another. These internal controls are obviously taught and learned through social conditioning and are not naturally imbedded in human ego.<sup>20</sup>

Having satisfied the requirements laid out above: thinking for himself, using his freedom to control his environment, bringing his

environment, bringing his emotional self under control, the individual is ready to take up his position in an individualistic society. This view is supported by Philip Slater, who feels that everyone should pursue autonomously his own destiny.<sup>21</sup> Also supporting the contention that assuming responsibility for one's own fate is the central focus of individualism, Codorcet had predicted that in time people "would approach a condition in which everyone will have the knowledge necessary to conduct himself in the ordinary affairs of life according to the light of his own reason . . . (and) become able to find the means of providing for his own needs . . . ." <sup>22</sup> Lane regards this state of mind as "self-reliance."

Having satisfied the personality requirements for determining one's own destiny, the individual also becomes faced with problems arising out of authority. Most individuals accept the control of authority as legitimate and thus give up their own sense of moral responsibility and their self-censoring mechanisms. Abdication of one's sense of moral principles to authority, Lane argues, is part of functional individualism which encourages the authority to become the external moral force. Since law and order is relatively uncoerced in developmental individualism, the individual has incorporated his sense of responsibility into his principles of moral reasoning. Although not directly related to our discussion, it should be noted that Lane feels that economic rewards in a free market society would reinforce such behavior by the individual.<sup>23</sup>

Interpersonal relations, as the last category of individual responsibility, have to be governed by mutual trust. With removal of cultural and traditional restraints as the motivating elements, the individual is left without a coordinating device to control his interpersonal relationships. Social contracts, in their traditional meaning, are not the socialization mechanism required. According to Lane, "conditions of relative abundance and the reinforcement of trusting behavior by appropriate rewards throughout one's life" in a nurturant family are the preferred mechanism. "Scarcity leads to mistrust," Lane argues, "because one may not survive, for example, waiting your turn; the goods will give out before your turn comes around."<sup>24</sup> Many studies have found mistrust to be common in traditional societies.<sup>25</sup> Eric Erikson notes that the first lesson in child socialization must be to learn to trust.<sup>26</sup>

Abraham Maslow, as noted in the earlier parts of this chapter, contends that an individual would be in a condition to actualize his full potential only if he has satisfied his physiological and safety needs and has gained a feeling of self-esteem and "belongingness."<sup>27</sup> Personal insecurity weighs heavily since it can prevent an individual from trusting others and thus from forming interpersonal relations.

It should be pointed out that functional individualism serves as a significant transition point on the way to developmental individualism. Individualism, in the first instance, requires people to think for themselves although it is neither deep nor broad based. It also demands that the individual be self-aware and know his desires but not

his needs and values which are necessary in developing a reliable identity. It further demands an individual to work for himself either egotistically or developmentally.<sup>28</sup>

In short, Robert Lane describes an individualistic society as one which:

. . . releases and legitimizes men's desires to control their own environment, that is, to resist external control, for better or worse; it requires them to master and use their emotions, but may direct them into narrower channels; it encourages men to take responsibility for their own fate, but it is deficient in encouraging a similar sense of responsibility for their own acts; it requires that men trust each other, but not that they love each other.<sup>29</sup>

Individualism in Iranian social context. Iranian social behavior has been called excessively individualistic,<sup>30</sup> portraying Iranians as dishonest and pessimistic with even a national schizophrenia brought about, as already noted above, by the dichotomy between the Persian heritage and Shiah Islam. The theoretical presentation above, put forth by Robert Lane, refutes, if not dismisses, such contentions that Iranian society is individualistic. Thus, to consider Iranian social behavior as individualistic, at best, is misleading. As Ralph Patai correctly puts it, Iranian national character, like that of the rest of the Middle East, is based on family rather than individual as a unit. Family is the central focus of all social organizations and demands loyalty over individual desires. Familialism is the backbone of the culture with all social organizations such as clans, tribes and villages regarded as mere extensions of families. It is believed that the larger social aggregates in actuality are functioning families that have for countless



generations consisted of the descendants of one male through the male line.<sup>31</sup> In urban Iran, for example, seyyeds (descendants of Prophet Mohammad through his daughter Fatima) still claim lineage credit by adding the title seyyed to the beginning of their names and distinguishing themselves by wearing a black turban if they happen to be clergy. It is also common that they refer to each other as "cousins."

The impact of familialism and its extended and aggregated forms is of great significance to the political institutions of Iran and the Middle East. The idea of Arab nationalism, for example, easily crossed national borders and became the rallying point for Arabs who believed in a common heritage divided by artificial borders. The mythical concept that all Arabs had a common ancestry, in Esmael, son of Abraham, certainly helped to bind the Arab brotherhood together, at least in theory. Due to ethnic diversity in Iran, however, Iranian nationalism has emerged slowly. Cottam admits some limitations on Iranian nationalism as a political determinant, since for 15 years, 1963 to 1978, the Shah was able to rule by satisfying the demands of broad sections of the political and economic elite for influence and material goods.<sup>32</sup> In contrast, the "aggregated family" in the form of tribes and minorities have periodically challenged the authority of the central government. The Azarbaijan autonomous republic of 1946-47, the Kurdish republic of the same period and Qashaqai tribal uprisings in the early 1960s are the best illustrations of such feelings of extended familialism forming the foundation of political and social institutions in Iran. Since the Islamic Revolution, the Iranian government has

faced the furor of "extended familialism" in a more violent form from the Kurds, Turkomans, Baluchis, Arabs, and tribes such as Qashqais. Iranian history during the present century has witnessed an upsurge in tribalism and regionalism whenever the power and the authority of the central government has declined. Cases in point are 1908-1921, 1941-1947, and post 1978, during which tribal uprisings and calls for autonomy reached a new level with the central government in disarray. Power struggles between tribes and ethnic groups which also have their own tribal and clan organizations, on the one hand, and the central government, on the other, testify to the fact that family and its aggregated extensions still form the basis of Iranian society. Nationhood remains a superimposed concept for people who think of their family as the most basic social unit. Such concepts were promoted even by the modernizing educational system. Grade school textbooks of a decade ago had a story where a father handed his feuding sons a bunch of twigs tied together with a rope and asked each of them to break the bunch. None of the five strong sons could break the bunch. The feeble old father broke the twigs by untying the rope and breaking the twigs one by one. The story depicted the significance and necessity of unity among family members, particularly among the males who traditionally are the decision makers of the family with responsibility lying in them. The same concept extends to the extended family. As an old Middle Eastern proverb says, "I and my cousins against the world: I and my brothers against my cousins; I against my brother."

Although the aforementioned social traits are the cultural framework of the region and perhaps the inclination of the majority of its inhabitants, many of the elite of the country do not subscribe to various of these behavioral attitudes. The study of the Iranian elite has revealed this segment of the society, although very small, to be almost Western in their social attitudes and behavior. For example, statistical analysis of Maslow's insecurity syndrome, referred to earlier in this chapter, among the Iranian elite proved to be almost similar to that of the average American studied.<sup>33</sup> The Iranian elite, as revealed by the data, was highly educated and had had extensive exposure to Western socio-cultural norms.<sup>34</sup> With the stress on Westernization since the turn of the century and an educational system that has promoted Western norms and ideals, sometimes in conjunction with traditional Iranian cultural norms, the growing Westernized Iranian public has been caught between two contradictory socio-cultural forces. The Islamic Revolution is perhaps the epitome of this conflict, particularly for those who have been under constant Western influence.

It is those people who are in a transitional stage from traditional Iranian values and norms to more individualistic Western norms who are the most alienated. While they have not been able to totally adopt Western norms and values, they have, nevertheless, been loosened from their traditional value system. The dilemma of "transitional Iranian man" was recognized and studied by the sociologists. During the seventies, there was an explosion of sociological studies nurtured by a school of thought that sought to appeal to the emotional side of man.

In Iran among the leading proponents of this school of humanism was Ehsan Naraghi, the director of Iran's Institute for Educational and Scientific Research and Planning. He thought that support for Westernization of "body and soul" was losing ground among Iranian intellectuals since it was too objective and rational to satisfy the human needs. In a paper presented at the Persepolis symposium, Naraghi had asked the question:<sup>35</sup>

Why should cultures like ours in which man is considered in all his aspects be deprived of all their substance by following a so-called rational course at the end of which lies the vast expanse of the non-rational and the impossibility of receiving an answer to our questions? Why should this wealth of feeling and emotions which has reached us after centuries of tradition and mystical-poetic experience and which is one of the outstanding features of the Iranian personality in history have to be considered as something shameful and subjective that we must rid ourselves of.

Naraghi concluded by noting that:

If only for our survival, we cannot do without science and technology in order to make the best possible use of our resources and enable our people to accede to material well-being in conditions of dignity and equity. However, this does not mean that we regard this material well-being as the sole objective or bestow on it the same forms as it assumes in the West . . . Our principal concern might be to interrogate other societies on their various experiences.

For the majority, Westernization and modernization during the Pahlavi era was only skin deep with a desire for superfluous trappings of the West. Modernization had manifested itself in fondness for luxury homes, cars and European designer clothes. Western institutional norms such as freedom of speech, press, elections, or even an effective bureaucracy were non-existent. As a university student related during the height of the revolution in December 1978:

(The Shah) kept telling us we were a great people . . . but all he did was copy the damn Europeans . . . . Despite the Shah's pronouncements on "the Great Civilization," (the Iranian) culture was moribund with few books published, no new buildings to compare with the great works of Shah Abbas in the 17th century, no musical or theatrical life. Instead, there were a few imported art festivals, a few skyscrapers in the Bauhaus mode, St. Laurent dresses and Gucci shoes for the women of northern Tehran, and Levis and boots for the girls in the shops and universities.<sup>36</sup>

Iranian frustrations over this unedited importation of Western values and norms were also reflected in the literary works of recent Iranian writers. Jalal Al-Ahmad in his famous work, Gharb-zadegi (Westomania), bitterly attacked the Iranian submission to the "machine." Al-Ahmad wrote:

Our whole existence has to be tailored to the height and size of the machine. If the person who has made the machine is now rebelling against it and feeling its oppressive force, we who have become the servants thereof do not even show signs of complaint. We even put on airs. And this is what I mean by "Westomania." My main contention is that we have not been able to preserve our own original cultural identity in the face of invasion by the machine, but have in fact given away completely.<sup>37</sup>

By 1978, even those who had espoused the line of government for many years were complaining of excessive Westernization. Amir Taheri, editor of the daily Keyhan, called the phenomenon "Westoxication," proposing that, whereas the Arabs, Mongols and Turks had not been able to culturally conquer Iran, the West was being successful in its attempts to undermine Iranian culture.<sup>38</sup>

Naraghi saw the political turmoil of 1978 to be the result of increased production of consumer goods, coupled with insatiable desire for Western way of life, and the breakdown of traditional social



relations that were the pillars of Iranian society, resulting in increased intervention of government in people's lives. According to Naraghi, traditional Iranian political culture prescribes a just king, not a king who would push them on the road to Westernization without the consent of the people. As a result of the "royalty ordained" national goals which kept the population in the dark about their implementation with resort to oppression and coercion, there was non-involvement of the people in the affairs of the nation. With the realities hidden from the people, political turmoil was unavoidable.<sup>39</sup>

Underlying all these criticisms of Westernization is the belief by Iranians that their culture is one of the most unique in the world. Such an assumption is shared by almost all. The ex-king, Mohammad-Reza Pahlavi, saw this uniqueness in 2,500 years of Iranian monarchy while Ayatollah Khomeini, the leader of the Islamic Revolution, sees it in his revolution which has legitimacy in the Shiah doctrine which is believed to be the only hope for the oppressed people of the world. The more common citizens pride themselves in a glorious past and a rich literary history. Cross-nationally, they compare themselves to the Europeans and not to the geographically closer developing countries. The Indo-European heritage of the nation is seen as a link with Europe though the nation is positioned in the heart of the Middle East. Cultural and social relations with the neighboring countries, particularly the Arab countries, has been almost non-existent, while there has been a profusion of cultural and social exchange with the West.

This feeling of uniqueness, as claimed by Abraham Maslow, is perhaps the result of insecurity borne by Iranians during the past 160 years due to defeats by European powers and an inability to sustain the ancient glory. Fall-back on the past history and a glorious culture, portrayed even more gloriously by the surrounding myths, has been the mechanism by which Iranians have tried to maintain their pride during a difficult transition period in which they are trying to establish their place, once again, among the reputable nations of the world.

Although Iranians on the surface boast about their cultural heritage, in reality, they are torn between opposing versions of it. This is the conflict between Iranian nationalism, inherent in the ancient history and tradition, and Shiah Islam. It is no small problem, as Forbis correctly notes, that many Iranians are torn between opposing emotions even when naming a child. Should the child have a Moslem, and therefore an Arabic name, or should he have a Persian, and therefore, a non-Moslem name?<sup>40</sup> Thus, the conflict in Iranian society is not so much between classes, tribes, ethnic groups, or religious groups but within the individual. In Forbis' words, "One half of Iranian past is at war with the other half, and modern Iranians, seeking identity, are torn in two directions." The effect of this cultural schizophrenia, perhaps, is a feeling of not belonging to the society at large. History has taught the Iranian to look out for his own and his family's interests. The people in positions of power and authority are distrusted since they also are thought to be looking out for their own interests. It is not without reason that social justice is the most stressed value

in Iranian culture. Since all men are thought to be looking out for their own interests, it is difficult for them to be just. Authority is thus sought out to mediate justly between the opposing interests. It is no coincidence that Shiah Islam adds justice as the fourth attribute of God while Sunni Islam has not taken the ascription as a foundation of the religion. By the same logic, the tradition of persian kingship declares that "a just king is the shadow of God on earth." Justice, therefore, is the highest responsibility of the authority. Shiah mythology claims that the Prophet said that "it had been a honor to have been born during the reign of a just king"--reference to Khosrow I (531-579), also known as Anooshiravan the Just. To make certain that his subordinates performed their duties effectively and efficiently and that justice was done to his subjects, Cyrus the Great (580-529 B.C.) employed spies to report to him of the performance of his sartraps (governors). The myths have it that Shah Abbas the Great (1571-1629) bedecked himself in dervish clothing and travelled among his subjects inquiring about their problems and the inadequacies of his administration in order to correct them.

Tales that relate justice and fairness dominate a good portion of Iranian literature. The Golestan of Saadi (1213-1292), in particular, is filled with fables exemplifying this theme. Justice is also a theme stressed in Siassat-Nameh (Book of Politics) by Khawjeh Nezam al-Mulk and Qabus-Nameh by Kaikavous Ibn-Iskandar, both written in the eleventh century as guidebooks for kings. Reflecting back on the literary tradition of Iran, it is safe to note that the theme of justice

is the most pronounced attribute noted in relationships between men. The thirst for justice seemed to abound in a culture that has periodically been ravaged by disease, foreign invasion, massacre, despotic kings, wicked governors, untrustworthy neighbors, and chronic banditry on the roads.

The sense of insecurity and pessimism over time has also merged with religious tradition of the nation. In Norman Jacobs' words:

The Iranian religious heritage, not abstractly in its own right, but in so far as can be related to social behavior by inference, has coincided with a pessimistic view of this world and this life, and with a feeling of hopelessness or at least insecurity before a destiny the individual never feels competent he can control. For Iranian individualism is a sign of distrust, even fear, of one's fellow men in society, and is not a sign of a self-discipline born of confidence in one's ability to act successfully and rewardingly in social relationships. Subsequently, society primarily is of negative interest to the Iranians and its prescriptions are more to be avoided than to be manipulated positively or challenged to serve one's rational interests.<sup>41</sup>

Jacobs distinguishes five basic cultural traits that are responsible for the present social value prevalent in Iran: (1) the rules made by men can not be trusted and relied upon; (2) there is no point in trying to develop morals for the society as a whole since honesty and integrity on such levels do not exist; (3) when faced with temptation, it is more useful to withdraw than to overcome with self-discipline or social change; (4) the insecurity of social relationships negates the ability to plan for the future; and (5) fate denies control of one's life.<sup>42</sup>

If the development of mysticism is in anyway related to cultural and environmental conditioning, the Iranian culture had the correct

ingredients to nurture a flourishing mystic tradition, conceptualized through Sufism. Ravaged by a hostile physical environment, the Iranian mind created a metaphysical paradise, seen in poems of Attar, Mulavi, Hafez and many others, and sought harmony with the Creator through exaltation. Sufism allowed the individual mind to reach a "stage where man could see nothing but God." Escape from the physical world was the natural outcome of this abounding insecurity where man was seen as unable to produce a major impact on his physical surroundings. This is even today verbalized as: "History tells the Iranians that you always lose in the end," as was noted by Mahmoud Ziai, a deputy in the last Pahlavi Majlis.<sup>43</sup> As Zonis has pointed out, this sense of pessimism abounds among Iranians. Distrust in fellow man and the belief that qismat (fate) is more often unfavorable than not have had their impact on making Iranians reserved, non-committal and unenterprising.

Iranian architecture is a vivid reflection of the insecurity of its people, their isolation from outside and the dominance of the concept of family on the traditional society. The houses are surrounded with high walls and are usually located off narrow lanes. Inside they usually have a foyer just beyond the main door where non-family male visitors and strangers are admitted. The larger houses are divided into two parts: birouni, where visitors are received and which is also the official quarters of the male head of the household; and andarouni, where the females and children live. No male, except first of kin, is usually received here. This system dominated the Iranian residential



architecture until the turn of the century. Although Reza Shah was partly responsible for giving a new look to major cities, including spacious official buildings, city parks, and wide tree-lined avenues, the acceptance of Western mode of architecture was partly due to the increased feeling of security brought about by the centralization of authority and annihilation of bandits and banditry. As the streets in towns and the roads outside the cities were made safe to travel, the physical insecurity of the population was reduced. The walls and gates around cities and villages were first to go. Furthermore, there was no need for narrow and winding lanes to keep the pillaging bandits out of a neighborhood or high walls to keep the attackers from reaching the inner sanctuary of the house.

The relative security following the ascendancy of the first Pahlavi, Reza Shah, to power reduced the physical insecurity of the individual but new demands were soon made on the government, such as "security from arbitrary arrest, from dismissal from their occupation without due cause, from financial manipulation and economic confiscation by the government or the elite."<sup>44</sup> The political institutions set up and operated by the Pahlavis were able to offer little of this latter type of security. The physical insecurity of the pre-Pahlavi period was transformed into a perception of cynicism and social injustice, even by the elite, during this period.<sup>45</sup> Zonis relates his encounter with the Iranian elite and their perception of national problems. One had noted that "To become outstanding in any field of endeavor in Iran requires an appetite for corruption and a taste for personal decay."

The perception of corruption became even more widespread following the four-fold increase in oil income beginning in October 1973. Corruption, of course, was nothing new. It had often thrived in the country, particularly during the Qajar period (1779-1925). With the economic developments during the 1960s and increased oil income during the 1970s, the amount of money on hand was unsurpassed in the history of the nation. The gross national product rose from around \$7 billion in 1965 to almost \$70 billion in 1975, or almost 10 times that of a decade ago.<sup>46</sup> With an increase in the money supply, the appetite for greater capital accumulation grew at an even faster rate. Since the wealth of the country was controlled by one man, the Shah, those close to him became even more influential in the disbursement of funds while lining their own coffers with untold millions. It was believed by the public that, for a major business to succeed, it was necessary to offer shares to the members of the royal family or influential courtiers. It was as a result of the royal family's influence pedalling that the Shah, in the fall of 1978, in the face of growing political strife, barred his family members and their respective businesses from doing any transactions with the government. The remedy was too late. Although the great bulk of the population had benefited from the oil boom, the overwhelming proportion had gone to those well-placed families on the top. The gap between rich and poor had gotten wider. The visibility of upper class wealth as seen in their cars, luxury mansions, and exclusive boutiques was too omnipresent for the general population to ignore. The most disillusioned segment of the society was the middle

class bazaar merchants. With the economic downturn in 1977 and a war on inflation, the bazaaris became the whipping boys of the society. While the royal family and those connected to the court continued to reap huge profits in their respective business dealings and the corruption in high places continued, the bazaaris were harassed and accused of profiteering and hoarding. As a result, their resentment of the government and its policies began to surface. Bazaaris have traditionally been the backbone of the Iranian economy. As such, they have played a significant social and political as well as economic role in the history of the nation. Loose class structure has made upward mobility possible. Many of the upper-class families of recent years, like Sabet, Ladjevardi, Nemazi, and Khayami, have moved up from middle-class ranks to their present status only since World War II.<sup>47</sup> Individual effort, creativity and achievement are traditionally encouraged and appreciated even though such dynamics usually are family-centered with family members encouraged to participate in further enhancing the undertaking.

Post-war years, as noted above, provided a rather opportune period for many ambitious and hardworking individuals to forge ahead and progress. The Years 1963-1973 were a period, in particular, of sustained economic and industrial growth which provided an even more conducive arena for personal and familial advancement. The real growth of the economy was amongst the highest in the world, partly due to increased oil revenue, but mainly as a result of intensive and aggressive economic growth. The Third (1963-1967) and Fourth (1968-1972)

economic plans had attained most of their stated objectives. These plans depended on oil revenues for about 62 percent of their investments, whereas the Fifth Plan (1973-1977) depended on oil revenues for 80 percent. Between 1963 and 1973, the private sector became increasingly more interested in investments in large scale industry. The number of large industrial units grew from 694 in 1956 to 1,191 in 1961. By 1966 their numbers had risen to 3,661 units and again jumped to 5,651 by 1972.<sup>48</sup> In short, the period provided a rather secure epoch for flourishing economic growth. The private sector was a significant partner in this economic growth spurt. Many leading private corporations, as noted above, were products of individuals from lower or middle income background who had a modicum of initiative. The particular characteristic of these businesses was the tendency with which they had been kept within close-knit family groups. This, as already noted above, is mainly due to the security that family provides. In Norman Jacobs' words: "The Iranian family is . . . the sole surviving source of security, cooperative mutuality, succor, and selfless social action in Iranian society." This intra-familial bond is contrasted against the general society where self-interest in interpersonal relationships dominates. The security that familial interaction provides is mainly due to the known behavior of family members.<sup>49</sup>

Jacobs' sociological study of interpersonal relationships among Iranians has further revealed that social action in Iran suffers from the following inadequacies: (1) Interpersonal relationships work most effectively, if at all, under authoritarian conditions, for a very

limited time with limited goals and with limited number of participants; (2) That there is no basis for "establishing reasonable trust and reciprocal, calculable self-interest in social actions--that is, the confidence that self-interest and other interests operating in the same direction are productive."; and (3) Rigidity in interpersonal relationships. These result in the "inability to understand that intellect is more than the cultivation of rote mastery of the concrete, and that intellect is not nurtured only through the accumulative, additive knowledge of age and experience." The belief that "the concrete only, in and of itself, is what really matters, tends to associate whatever absolute values the Iranian has inevitably with (existing) concrete ways of doing things."<sup>50</sup>

To cope with the above shortcomings in interpersonal relationships, the individual Iranian has developed "mechanisms" that, in Jacobs' words, "make life bearable." These mechanisms include: (1) Acting within two distinct worlds--"a world of absolute ethical standards (the inner-self) and a world of no ethical standards (the outer-self) . . . ."; (2) Responding negatively to the challenges of his environment, the individual chooses the path of escapism, through different means, instead of acting positively and improving the quality of the society; (3) Most Iranians do not see themselves in a position to reform the system, and hence they hope "to make the existing system of patterns work for (themselves) by being as clever as possible."; and (4) Resignation and withdrawal, nonetheless, do not pacify the individual. In contrast, the frustrations arising from the prevailing



relationships, more often than not, result in "aggression, open hostility, and even violence." This aggression "is both a personalized and irrational attack upon the obvious frustrations of Iranian society; subsequently, violence does not offer any constructive, positive solutions to the interpersonal problems which provoked the violence in the first place."<sup>51</sup>

In summarizing the interpersonal relationship of Iranians, Jacobs believes that long-term commitments are avoided since ever present chances of disaster are here and now. More importantly, it is believed that no one "in Iran is about to reshape his environment in a way that long-range commitments ever will be feasible." "Hence too many Iranians are convinced that long-range commitment can realize the utopia of development only in heaven as far as Iran is concerned, although it may exist on earth in other societies."<sup>52</sup>

Some concluding remarks. Socio-economic observations made by Norman Jacobs complement the political observations of Marvin Zonis in regards to the concept of "underdeveloped" social man in Iran. The average Iranian, due to environmental conditioning of the past, suffers from social and personal insecurity. With social and economic developments of this present century, such insecurities, however, seemed less tangible and rather irrational. The social conditions under the Pahlavis, at least, provided for a period some semblance of personal-physical, if not psychological, security. The poverty and ignorance of the past, in the form of scarcity of resources which were partly responsible for the added dimensions of insecurity, were largely muted during the

years. Based on such an assumption, it could have been argued that the individual, in due time, as a result of relatively abundant resources, would have developed a trusting behavior leading to the emergence of a secure individual. This secure individual is the basic ingredient of all political institutions. As long as there is no security, trust and belief that self-interest and other interests can cooperate in the same direction, all political institutions are only a facade. For institutions to be self-generating and serve the interests of all individuals, social contracts must be laid down and abided by. The socio-psychological studies of Iranians do not show such inclinations as of yet on the part of the general public. It is suggested that the Iranian society needs to develop the interpersonal behaviors that are seen as the *apriori* requirements needed for transition onto the threshold of functional individualism. This, in turn, would supply the individuals with necessary properties to develop their potentials, including political institutions that would aid in coordinating and accomplishing their communal goals.

## FOOTNOTES

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<sup>2</sup>Leonard Binder, Iran: Political Development in a Changing Society (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1962).

<sup>3</sup>Richard Cottam, Nationalism in Iran (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1979).

<sup>4</sup>Marvin Zonis, The Political Elite of Iran (Princeton: University Press, 1976), esp. Chs. 7 & 8.

<sup>5</sup>James A. Bill, The Politics of Iran: Groups, Classes and Modernization (Columbus, Ohio: Charles E. Merrill, 1972).

<sup>6</sup>Willaim H. Forbis, Fall of the Peacock Throne: The Story of Iran (New York: Harper and Row, 1980), see esp. chs. 6 & 7.

<sup>7</sup>Zonis, pp. 207-15.

<sup>8</sup>Ibid., pp. 249-50.

<sup>9</sup>Robert E. Lane, "Individualism and the Market Society," a paper presented at the 76th annual APSA meeting in Washington, D.C., August 28-31, 1980, pp. 1-2.

<sup>10</sup>Ibid., p. 6.

<sup>11</sup>Ibid., pp. 7-8.

<sup>12</sup>Herman Witkin, Thought and Personality (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1970), pp. 201-202, cited in Robert Lane, p. 10.

<sup>13</sup>Lane, pp. 9-10.

<sup>14</sup>Ibid., p. 11.

<sup>15</sup>Eric Fromm, Man for Himself (New York: Rinehart, 1947), cited in Robert Lane, p. 11.

<sup>16</sup>Abraham Maslow, Toward a Psychology of Being, (Princeton: Van Nostrand, 1969, 2nd ed.), cited in Robert Lane, pp. 11-12.

<sup>17</sup>Richard De Charms, Personal Causation: The internal Affective Determinants of Behavior (New York: Academic Press, 1968), p. 269, cited in Robert Lane, p. 12.

<sup>18</sup>Lane, pp. 12-13.

<sup>19</sup>Ibid.

<sup>20</sup>Ibid., p. 14.

<sup>21</sup>Philip E. Slater, The Pursuit of Loneliness: American Culture at the Breaking Point (Boston: Beacon Press, 1970), p. 29, cited in Lane, p. 15.

<sup>22</sup>Antoine-Nicolas de Cudorcet, "Sketches of the Progress of the Human Mind," in Peter Gray (ed.), The Enlightenment: A Comprehensive Anthology (New York: Simon & Shuster, 1973), p. 805, cited in Lane, p. 15.

<sup>23</sup>Lane, pp. 15-16.

<sup>24</sup>Ibid., p. 17.

<sup>25</sup>Oscar Lewis, La Vida: A Puerto Rican Family in the Culture of Poverty (New York: Random House, 1966); Irving A. Hallowell, Culture and Experience (New York: Schocken, 1967); Edward C. Banfield, The Moral Basis of a Backward Society (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1958); J. K. Campbell, "The Honour of the Greeks," Times Literary Supplement, (November 14, 1975), p. 1355.

<sup>26</sup>Eric Erikson, "The Problem of Ego Identity," Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association (Vol. 4, 1956, pp. 58-121), cited in Robert Lane, p. 17.

<sup>27</sup>Abraham Maslow, Towards a Psychology of Being, p. 36, cited in Lane, p. 17.

<sup>28</sup>Lane, pp. 17-18.

<sup>29</sup>Ibid.

<sup>30</sup>Forbis, p. 92.

<sup>31</sup>Ralph Patai, Society, Culture and Change in the Middle East (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1971), pp. 350-51.

<sup>32</sup>Cottam, pp. 320-21.

<sup>33</sup>Zonis, pp. 218-19.

<sup>34</sup>Ibid., pp. 176-89.

<sup>35</sup>Forbis, p. 98.

<sup>36</sup>R. W. Apple, Jr., "Iran: Heart of the Matter," New York Times Magazine, (March 11, 1979).

<sup>37</sup>Jalal Al-Ahmad, Gharbzadegi (Westomania), (Tehran: published in part by Keyhan-e Mah, in full by underground publishers, 1961), p. 8.

<sup>38</sup>Forbis, p. 99.

<sup>39</sup>Keyhan (Tehran: October 2k, 1978), p. 6.

<sup>40</sup>Forbis, pp. 89-90.

<sup>41</sup>Norman Jacobs, The Sociology of Development: Iran as an Asian Case Study (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1966), p. 229.

<sup>42</sup>Ibid., pp. 225-28.

<sup>43</sup>Forbis, p. 89.

<sup>44</sup>Zonis, p. 203.

<sup>45</sup>Ibid., pp. 251-68.

<sup>46</sup>United Nations Statistical Yearbook; 1978, table 185, p. 704.

<sup>47</sup>For a general discussion of modern Iranian entrepreneurs see: Mohammad-Reza Vaghefi, Entrepreneurs of Iran: The Role of Business in the Development of Iran (Palo Alto, California: Alton Press, 1975), also see: Robert Graham, Iran: Illusions of Power (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1979), pp. 47-49.

<sup>48</sup>Firuz Towfigh, "Development of Iran: a statistical none," a paper presented to Persepolis symposium, September 1975. Published by Aspen Institute of Humanistic Studies (New York, 1976).

<sup>49</sup>Jacobs, pp. 253-54.

<sup>50</sup>Ibid., pp. 256-66.

<sup>51</sup>Ibid., pp. 266-80.

<sup>52</sup>Ibid., p. 284.



PART II

TEXTBOOKS AS SOCIALIZING AGENTS

## CHAPTER IV

### EDUCATION AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT IN IRAN

As discussed in some detail in the beginning of the Introductory Chapter, Lucian Pye posits three key elements for the attainment of political development: equality, capacity and differentiation. These key elements can be studied in a culture through the analysis of values and norms that pertain to such principles as equality, trust, rationality and planning, collectivity and role specification. These principles supplied by Pye closely correspond to others offered by David McClelland which also contributed to the perspective of and the analytical framework of this study. The association between political development and other aspects of cultural change provide a dynamic view of continuity and change in the political system. In Pye's words:

The concept of political culture also provides a useful basis for examining the links between social and economic factors and political performance. Through the socialization process which sustains and shapes the political culture of each generation, we can observe the impact of not only the explicitly political but also all the relevant non-political behavior. In so investigating the social and economic parameters of the political culture, we can come to grips with the historically significant issues about the relationships between economic development and the prospects for stable political change.<sup>1</sup>

The dynamic link between political development and economic factors, as asserted by Lucian Pye, is also held to be important by Robert Lane, as discussed in the last chapter, and David McClelland.<sup>2</sup>

It is based on such assertions that such values as work and competitiveness with material rewards encouraging impersonal cooperation are linked to cultural change which in turn influence political development. Nonetheless, there are limits and constraints as to the speed and degree at which it is possible to initiate policies of change in a political culture. Pye notes, however, that "we must be impressed with the potency of education in creating the attitudes and values essential for national development."<sup>3</sup>

Education is regarded as one of the more significant vehicles of development. Robert Ward, in his observation of Japanese society, held that the educational preparation of a sizable portion of a population was a basic requirement for modernization of political culture.<sup>4</sup> Educational institutions, as revealed by Dunkwart Rustow in his study of cultural change in Turkey, proved most durable and fruitful during the transitional change in the nineteenth century whereas others, such as the army, the centralized tax system and the Constitution, were overcome by problems and inadequacies.<sup>5</sup> It is with such conceptual premises that this inquiry, as noted in the previous chapters, intends to approach the subject of political development in Iran.

It is difficult to overstate the impact of education and schooling where it is supervised by government and its curricula is loaded with systematic and explicit political indoctrination. Robert Ward, in observing the Japanese educational system from 1868 to 1945, notes the great degree to which "moral" courses played a role in primary and secondary school curricula.<sup>6</sup> The emphasis, for example, in

R. P. Dore's words, was on the extent to which "the Imperial Institution (became) the fount and origin of all morality."<sup>7</sup> Similar level of indoctrination was evident in the school curricula in Egypt during President Nasser's rule. In Leonard Binder's words: ". . . especially in the primary and secondary schools, efforts were made to develop a strong loyalty to the regime, to President Nasser, and to the religion of Islam."<sup>8</sup> The intent is to give a picture of the society in its ideal state. The intended result is that:

(The student) will begin to recognize the disparity between the two sets of standards to which he is exposed and will gradually adjust his external behavior in accordance with the demands of his school environment rather than solely in terms of his father's representational behavior. He will gradually learn to recognize the same national symbols when repeated on the radio, in the press, and in public speeches. He will become accustomed to participating in group demonstrations and generally become acquainted with the duties of an educated citizen in a modernizing oligarchy.<sup>9</sup>

For some time schools have become associated with or even have been relegated the responsibility of character development. Thus the purposes of schooling were thought to be "to develop the head, the heart, and the hand." Although the terminology in recent years has been changed, the basic concepts have remained pretty much intact. There are, however, substantial differences between the educational approach in the developed societies as contrasted against the developing world. The former has adopted an experimental psychological approach with such objectives as practical experience for conduct development, encouraging participation in circumstances where the student will learn correct behavior. The latter is still very much pre-occupied with character

development through moral stories, proverbs, and the study of lives of great men whom the students could emulate.<sup>9</sup>

Consequently, the developmental approaches of the textbook writers can be ascertained by the analysis of these books to find the prevailing tendencies. Thus, it is no surprise that content analysis of textbooks in recent years has provided a fertile ground for social scientists. Their assumption has been that there is a definite link between cultural values and the potential for development. Those cultures that possess certain values that are favorable towards development ought to be more successful in becoming developed than those cultures that do not possess such values. Inquiries into folktales, proverbs, and similar cultural expressions are used to measure the values that are stressed in a culture.

In recent years, governments and education boards have made a conscious effort to promote values and norms in school texts that they find favorable to their orientation. Thus, the underlying assumption is that values favorable to certain policies are able to be transmitted via textbooks to the students.

It is based on this assumption that this section of this inquiry is undertaken. Since it was the professed policy of the Pahlavi regime to "modernize" the country, it is assumed that one can look into the educational materials that were used in Iran and find values and norms that stress modernization being transmitted to the students. This is particularly so due to the fact that the Iranian



students were being educated in an environment in which the government had a high level of influence and control.

A close relationship between political system maintenance and the role of education has existed in modern Iran. During the late nineteenth century, with travel to Europe becoming more of a possibility, some of the children of the elite and aristocracy were sent to Europe for higher education, while others received their higher education in Iran at Dar al-Fonoun (House of Sciences), established in 1851. The graduates of Dar al-Fonoun and the returning students from Europe filled high positions in the government, and administrations of the Qajar kings. Until the emergence of Reza Khan in 1921, the elite and their children comprised almost all the Western-educated Iranians. Following the Constitutional Revolution of 1906-1907, the middle class began to grow and thus the sheer numbers of their children who acquired a Western-style education grew.

After ascendancy to power, Reza Khan sent many students to Europe, particularly France, for higher education. The students mostly came from the middle class, a few from the lower-middle class.<sup>10</sup> These individuals owed their allegiance to Reza Shah and were placed in important administrative, professional and legal positions upon their return to the country. As such, a new breed of technocrats who were not members of the traditional aristocracy were introduced into the ranks of the political elite. Thus, education became an instrument enabling one to become a member of the elite. The point was not lost to Iranians. Soon there was stiff competition for the limited number

of admissions to Tehran University that had opened in 1937. Many students also pursued their higher education in the European and American institutions of higher learning. Today, there are as many Iranian students enrolled in colleges and universities outside the country as there are in the country.

The indications are that the educational system functioned for dual purposes. It provided a professional education that often was intended as an entry visa to the ranks of the elite. Both groups, however, by and large, depended on the government for their respective endeavors. The Shah personally supervised movements of all individuals in high government positions. Positions would be bestowed on individuals for their services or to coopt them into the system. With the Shah's virtual control of all major industries and educational institutions, in addition to bureaucracies, there were few places for the counter-elite to find any meaningful employment where they could remain outside the government's sphere of influence. Thus, the educated had to be either pro-government or apolitical to survive and remain immune from harassment in the Iranian socio-political environment. This fact is a major reason for the enormous "brain drain" of Iranian professionals to Europe and the United States during the 1950s, 1960s and the early 1970s.

For the purpose of more indepth analysis, the role of education in modern Iranian history will be dealt with in the following sequence:

- (1) Education as an instrument to promote socio-cultural norms;

(2) Education as an instrument of the regime for political system maintenance; and (3) Education as an instrument of political development.

Education as an instrument of socio-cultural norms. The impact of Islamic attributes, whether real or imagined, have been of immense importance to the Iranian educational system. In Shiah Islam, which is the dominant branch in Iran, education is considered to be the teachings of moral knowledge. Norman Jacobs contends that "This association between moral knowledge and education persisted, even after education formally was disassociated from religion; that is, at the time when religious values came to affect education only in diffused form."<sup>11</sup> The impact of religion on the educational system and its values, according to Jacobs, was five fold: (1) All learnings that promoted "religious perfectibility" were desired and those that were not considered to be so, at best, were regarded to be of "secondary interest"; (2) With the introduction of secular curriculum into religious schools and with the establishment of secular schools in the twentieth century there were few, if any, qualitative modifications in the process of learning; (3) Despite the apparent modernization of the education process, "acquisition of morality" remained the basic concern of the educational system; (4) Since religious education had been considered as the proper preparation for statecraft, the association has been carried over to secular education also, thus it came to be considered the proper preparation for statecraft; (5) Lastly, secular education was regarded primarily as a way to gain access to the "Iranian spirit" more than as a way of gaining empirical skills.<sup>12</sup>

The dynamic relationship between religion and politics is very visible in Iran. Furthermore, religious prescriptions govern all facets of life. However, many long held beliefs are also adopted to reflect religious values that in fact have no Koranic basis. Thus, the term religion acquires wider perspective and includes norms and values that reflect cultural traits.

Lack of intellectual and rational attitudes within the whole Iranian society, in general, and within the educational institutions, in particular, has been the subject of criticism by Iranians and non-Iranians alike. In this vein, the educational system actually prepared the student very well to cope with the society. Abstract educational theory would expect the system to encourage intellectual and rational attitudes. From this viewpoint, the Iranian educational system was a failure. The result of the existing system was:

the "educated man" who, primarily, although not exclusively, is a political animal, who is a good memorizer, who speaks well, but not concretely, who is quick to copy and serve those in authority, who tends to talk rather than to act, who hates to make decisions, who is not utilitarian, who is not objective, who cannot operate effectively in a critical environment, who does not necessarily understand what he accepts, who cannot analyze his responsibilities, who is not adaptable as far as work and the positive environment are concerned (but only as far as maneuvering people is concerned), and finally who basically is insecure and mal-adjusted to any of his occupational demands and consequently, unproductive--in brief, an individual who is the very antithesis of the kind of educated or sophisticated individual required to participate in, let alone, create and develop, a rational, self-generating economic system.<sup>13</sup>

Richard W. Gable, who also has studied the impact of culture on Iranian institutions, notes that many of these traits influence the Iranian pattern of administrative behavior.<sup>14</sup> These, combined with the

pattern of Iranian individualism discussed earlier, create an administrative bureaucracy whose decision-making patterns are unplanned, illogical, fatalistic, centralized, and lacking in delegation of authority. In short, it is a system which is dominated by subjectivity and traditionalism.

Consequently, almost all educational reforms that were initiated at junior or senior levels at the Ministry of Education were doomed to failure. Many of these reforms were attentive merely to the formal structure of the institution in question with little regard for the dynamics involved or to actual conditions. This is best demonstrated in the recent educational "revolution" in which the 5-3-4 concept (5 years of elementary, 3 years of guidance, 4 years of high school education in place of the traditional system of 6 years of elementary, and 6 years of high school, divided into 3 years of first and 3 years of second cycle) was adopted. Many of the science and math textbooks were rewritten with the intent of making students think rather than memorize. The teachers in many cases did not receive adequate preparation to deal with this basic change in approach. The students were still required to memorize rather than to understand. Moreover, few counselors were available to assist the teachers or the students in the planning of their programs. Furthermore, the new concept had not been "analyzed in terms of practicality, costs, and benefits."<sup>15</sup>

Meaningful changes in the educational system were impossible within the existing framework due to major bottlenecks in coordination, implementation, cooperation, and planning. These patterns are closely



related to political and cultural conditions.<sup>16</sup> Any reforms, including educational, have to include the total society within their scope

Education as an instrument of the regime to promote political system maintenance. When Reza Shah came to power, the elite was composed of individuals from families that had had close contact and relations with the deposed Qajar dynasty. Thus, Reza Shah created a new elite that owed its allegiance solely to him. The incoming elite was composed mostly of professionals, technocrats and army officers whose education and training was their hall mark of entry into the new status.

Education took a new dimension, and soon there was stiff competition for entry into the newly founded Tehran University. With the great public demand for education just after the Second World War, educational institutions expanded greatly. As a result, the number of graduates at all levels soon began to exceed the government's absorptive capacity. The high school graduates, in particular, had a difficult task since there were few jobs available and only about 11 to 16 percent of them could gain admission to Iranian universities.<sup>17</sup> The entrance to an Iranian university was not based only on the academic record of a student. Marvin Zonis relates his meeting with an Iranian who had been influential in formulating higher education policies. He said that:

Orders had come from above to restrict entrance to Iranian universities. He was to make higher education more expensive while raising the minimum entrance examination grade considered necessary for admission. Thus access to higher education would be limited to those students who had the most at stake in maintaining the present system.<sup>18</sup>

The result was the obvious admission of those students who were committed to maintaining the status quo.

Despite such a policy, the Iranian universities continued as major centers of opposition to the government. The process of selection had its flaws. Many children of the elite were instrumental in anti-government agitation. Furthermore, the incoming students were soon politicized and coopted into the student activist groups on campus.

Following the infusion of petro-dollars beginning in 1973, a shortage of skilled and semi-skilled workers developed. In 1975, the government adopted a new educational policy by which secondary education (grades 9 through 12)) and college education at all public educational institutions that had carried little tuition (approximately \$15 per year at high schools; \$300 at universities) were to charge extremely high fees (approximately \$300 at high schools; \$3,000 per year at universities). However, the students would have been exempt from paying these exorbitant tuitions if they pledged government service of one year for every year of high school free of tuition; two years for every year at college level. The jobs and their locations were designated by the government for which a government salary was paid. Although some who had the financial means opted for tuition payment rather than a pledge to work for the government, most did not have a choice. Their only choice was between no education or a pledge to work for the government at a government appointed position and location at the low government salary. Although the measure supposedly was designated to lure educated individuals into government service in locations

that most would not have opted for, it also gave the government control over the individual's destiny for the duration of the obligation years. A student who had received four years of high school and four years of college education through the pledge system would have had to serve 12 years to fulfill his pledge of obligations. If such a system had matured, it would have been a punishing experience for the political activists who had opted for the pledge system during their school years.

The government's control over education was not limited to financial considerations. Since the early 1960s, the government had established direct control over the content of textbooks from first through twelfth grade. Prior to this time, schools had been given the choice of selection from amongst the available texts in the market. However, since 1960 the Ministry of Education has taken over the writing, editing and publishing of all school texts. The significance of textbooks as a socializing agent was not lost on the government. As will be seen in the next chapter, the Farsi readers, particularly at the elementary school level, were turned into instruments of cooption into a value system in which several entries held the Shah and his family in high esteem and praised his undertakings. The high school students were not immune from such a process either. By the end of the decade, the students enrolled in high schools had to study the text of the White Revolution as an academic subject.

The students also served as an instrument of government showmanship. Aside from lining the streets during parades for major

political events or for visits by friendly heads of states; students performed sports shows on the birthdays of the Shah, Shahbanou (Queen) and Crown Prince in Tehran's main sports field. The students were also encouraged to join the Boy or Girl Scouts as another means of socialization. The royal family took a particular interest in the Scouts' movement and the Shah was the titular head of the Iranian Scout Organization. The government had gone further in 1975 by promoting the formation of a youth vanguard for the Rastakhiz (National Resurgence) Party which would have been recruited from amongst the high school students.

The Education Corps has been another institution through which the political values promoted by the regime were to be inculcated to rural inhabitants. The promoters of the Education Corps have praised the undertaking as a major modernizing scheme. Its success in improvement of educational, economic, and health conditions in villages has also accompanied changes favorable to the regime in political orientation among tribes and villagers. The political objectives of Corpsmen as viewed by the government were as follows:

In order to inculcate the spirit of national unity, the people in the isolated villages and of the migrating tribes who speak different dialects and who have different customs and mores should be led to the feeling that they belong to the nation. The national ties must be strengthened. Knowledge of the past national contributions to the development of world civilization and visions of the future participation in national and international development are important facets of the Education Corps training.<sup>19</sup>

The objection here certainly is not aimed at creation of a national feeling among the citizens but at the displacement of

traditional systems by a newer system that at best was inadequate. From the onset of the land reforms in 1963, the village system hierarchy based on landlords and their representatives and their selected kadkhoda (village administrator) was displaced. The villages that were lucky enough to receive a Corpsman got to elect their kadkhoda, under the Corpsmen's supervision, and even got to elect members to the village House of Justice. Otherwise, the village elections were embroiled in clan and tribal feuds.

The Corpsmen, based on the formula of its establishment, were all recent high school graduates. They had received four months of training, almost 70 percent of which was devoted to military subjects.<sup>20</sup> These youth, many of whom were rather idealistic, were given the task of "transforming a peasant into a farmer." Inexperience and inadequate training were hardly the only problems facing the Corpsmen. They also suffered from the traditional distrust of outsiders by the villagers. This was coupled with the reverence the villagers had for old age--which these corpsmen lacked. The short period of stay--at most 20 months--was another added shortcoming.

The most vital contribution of the Education Corpsmen, however, was their regular teaching of classes to rural children. Although there were classes for adults, the attendance ratio for such classes was lower. The textbooks that the rural children read were basically the same as the ones that the students in urban areas read. Little provision was made in the books to adapt them to the rural, physical, or cultural environment that differs so drastically from one region of



Iran to the next. There were but a few items in the elementary textbooks that depicted life in rural areas.

Another problem facing the rural students was the fact that very few secondary schools existed in rural areas. Although almost 50 percent of Iranians live in rural areas (places with less than 5,000 inhabitants), almost all the secondary schools are located in urban areas. The level of literacy in some villages is less than 5 percent, although the national average is 40 percent.<sup>21</sup>

As discussed before, aside from wealth, education has been looked upon as the major vehicle of upward social mobility by many Iranians.<sup>22</sup> The government recognized this fact by promoting the educated as individuals who would "occupy the directing position in the country."<sup>23</sup> The educated, particularly those with a university education, represented a very small segment of the Iranian population. This small segment, moreover, had been gaining significance as the Iranian economy grew and there was a higher demand for their skills. The significance of their presence in the Iranian society was not lost on the Shah. He had become increasingly more involved in all facets of higher education. Furthermore, as Zonis points out, the Shah's most significant undertaking as far as the educated elite were concerned was his allocation of positions to these individuals. This in turn made it possible for the Shah to maintain his power because the educated elite then owed their loyalty to the person of the Shah.<sup>24</sup>

Education as an instrument of political development. Political development, as a component of the general theory of development, involves the building of institutions. The presence of references to political institutions and citizenship role in school texts, therefore, would indicate a desire by the government to bring about a political change through means of education. The frequency of references to political institutions would, theoretically, reveal the extent to which the government hoped to induce norms that were favorable to the ideals of political development and promotion of civic training among students.

Attempts by the government to use school textbooks as a means of political socialization is not a recent phenomena. When the modern educational system was adopted in Iran by Reza Shah in the 1920s, one of the main ambitions was secularization of education. Although there had been several secular schools, their numbers and the number of students were extremely limited. Reza Shah had hoped that with the introduction of Western style education he would be able to create a "modern" Iran, emulating European countries. The emphasis was typically put on the structure with little attention paid to the dynamics of modern education. Furthermore, Reza Shah's hopes of "Westernization" were over-powered by his despotism. He was more interested in self-aggrandizement and had little commitment to the goal of "democratization or modernization."<sup>25</sup>

Educational institutions were used to promote secular education to establish a scientific and Western-oriented foundation for the future development of the nation. The courses of instruction for the

elementary school included Persian, arithmetic, geography, history, and physical education. The secondary school curriculum included subjects in natural sciences, geometry, algebra and mathematics, and foreign languages. Soon other subjects were added to both elementary and secondary school curriculum. As discussed previously, this "modern" educational system was built on the existing cultural foundation that molded the new system after the old fashion. Emphasis was put on the passing of exams to enable a student to attain the desired end-- i.e., the diploma. In short, the educational system conceived by Reza Shah had retained the "traditionalistic orientation." Amin Banani notes that with the introduction of modern education "the group recitation-for-memorization method of the maktab was discarded. Reliance upon memorization, however, continued."<sup>26</sup> This superficial method of learning is still widely practiced, and the method is not limited only to the students. The teachers often read aloud from the textbooks or their notes in the class. This method of memorization is not limited to Persian poetry and prose. It also includes mathematical and scientific principles. It is obvious why this method of learning is referred to as "parrot-like." This modern education system has been criticized for having produced "many superficially educated people, maladjusted and filled with undistinguished facts which they were incapable of applying in everyday life."<sup>27</sup>

Higher education, when obtained abroad, was perceived to undertake any possible task, and thus to be able to work in any possible capacity. As an example, the managing director of the National Iranian

Oil Company for several years was a French-educated physician. Furthermore, a distinguished engineer and head of Tehran Polytechnique Institute for over a decade served as Speaker of Majlis. The distinguishing factor about such individuals was their loyalty to the person of the monarch and not their ability as distinguished managers or politicians. Although education served as a requirement for entry into the ranks of the political elites, it was loyalty to the regime that assured a post in the cabinet or other rewarding positions. A similar feeling was put forth by Ali-Mohammad Kardan who wrote:

The job of revising the school program was entrusted, for the most parts, to individuals who had been trained in France. Their blind imitation of the French system of education, and even more, their limited understanding of the purpose of education, severely damaged Iranian education. They had knowledge per se more than its applicability, theory more than practice, and the lecture method in preference to the laboratory approach . . . The result was a secondary curriculum extremely broad in subject matter but unrelated to the life experience of the students.<sup>28</sup>

The above observation is no less true of present-day Iranian education. The progress in the last quarter of a century has been the structural change from the 6-3-3 concept to the 5-3-4, which in theory demands even greater emphasis on the understanding of the principles of natural and physical sciences. Nevertheless, the mechanics of the system, as of present, are still based on the tradition of rote learning and memorization.

It is obvious that a change in the educational system can not be achieved without basic changes in the total system. In essence, any change in the educational system of the country and its

prerequisites demands a change in the political-cultural milieu. The question posed, therefore, is if the willingness of the new regime in Iran to undertake a policy of change of such magnitude exists.



## FOOTNOTES

<sup>1</sup>Lucian W. Pye, "Introduction: Political Culture and Political Development," in Lucian W. Pye and Sidney Verba (eds.), Political Culture and Political Development (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1972), p. 10.

<sup>2</sup>David McClelland, The Achieving Society (Toronto, Canada: Van Nostrand, 1961), pp. 172-75.

<sup>3</sup>Pye, p. 25.

<sup>4</sup>Robert E. Ward, "Japan: The Continuity of Modernization," in Lucian W. Pye and Sidney Verba (eds.), Political Culture and Political Development, op. cit., p. 29.

<sup>5</sup>Dankwart A. Rustow, "Turkey: The Modernity of Tradition," in Lucian W. Pye and Sidney Verba (eds.) Political Culture and Political Development, op. cit., pp. 193-94.

<sup>6</sup>Ward, p. 45.

<sup>7</sup>Ibid., p. 46.

<sup>8</sup>Leonard Binder, "Egypt: The Integrative Revolution," in Lucian W. Pye and Sidney Verba (eds.) Political Culture and Political Development, op. cit., p. 413.

<sup>9</sup>B. Othanel Smith and Donald E. Orlosky, Socialization and Schooling: Basics of Reform (Bloomington, Indiana: Phi Delta Kappa, 1975), pp. 28-29.

<sup>10</sup>Peter Avery, Modern Iran (Praeger, New York: 1965), p. 289.

<sup>11</sup>Norman Jacons, The Sociology of Development: Iran as a case study (Praeger, New York: 1966), p. 230.

<sup>12</sup>Ibid., pp. 230-31.

<sup>13</sup>Ibid., p. 159.

<sup>14</sup>Joseph S. Szyliowicz, Education and Modernization in the Middle East (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1973), pp. 429-30.

<sup>15</sup>Ibid., p. 425.

<sup>16</sup>Ibid., p. 426.

<sup>17</sup>James A. Bill, The Politics of Iran: Groups, Classes and Modernization (Columbus, Ohio: Charles E. Merrill Publishers, 1972) p. 65; Marvin Zonis, The Political Elite of Iran (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971), p. 36.

<sup>18</sup>Zonis, pp. 36-37.

<sup>19</sup>Szyliowicz, p. 414.

<sup>20</sup>Ibid., p. 415.

<sup>21</sup>From the data by Malaria Eradication Organization, Ministry of Health, Government of Iran, obtained during a research on the conditions of the rural areas of South and Central Khorasan. The data was collected annually. The reference here is to the most recent data-- i.e., 1976.

<sup>22</sup>Zonis, from Table 2.1, p. 32.

<sup>23</sup>Ibid.

<sup>24</sup>Ibid., p. 36.

<sup>25</sup>Szyliowicz, p. 232.

<sup>26</sup>Amin Banani, The Modernization of Iran: 1921-1941 (Palo Alto, California: Stanford University Press, 1961).

<sup>27</sup>Avery, p. 280.

<sup>28</sup>Szyliowicz, p. 236.

## C H A P T E R        V

### CONTENT ANALYSIS OF TEXTBOOKS

Children's stories have often been used to measure the motivation level within a culture for "achievement," "development," or "modernization." The assumption has been that the culture would function as a framework for "development." Cultural norms are transferred from one generation to another through many means of which stories, be they oral or written, are only one. The presence of folktales in all cultures provides an empirical foundation for comparison. Folktales are a vivid and apparent part of any culture. They "reflect the motives and values of the culture in the way they are told or in their themes or plots" in a way that is both interesting and unintentionally instructive.<sup>1</sup>

The interest in stories, so far as this inquiry is concerned, is limited to the entries that have been selected for publication in the school texts. It is not unusual to find folktales that convey two contradictory values of the same culture. This is particularly true in a culture that has had an unbroken and a written tradition for a few thousand years. Certainly the prevailing philosophical and moral patterns in different periods of the history have left their imprints on the national cultural tradition of Iran. Thus, norms and values that are of contradictory nature are abundant in the cultural heritage

of the nation. Thus, this huge pool of folktales, proverbs, and anecdotes provide a resource with varying philosophical perspectives. This offers the different administrations the opportunity to select stories that are deemed appropriate and culturally relevant. The selection of entries that appeared in the textbooks during the Shah's regime were certainly in accordance with such a premise. A department within the Ministry of Education, Sazeman-e Ketabhay-e Darsi-e Iran (Textbooks Department of Iran) has been responsible for the editing and publishing of all Iranian school texts since 1960. The entries in the textbooks are there with the government's approval or, at the least, its tolerance. Many of the entries are from classical Persian literature and have been an integral part of education in Iran for generations. Examples are stories from Bustan and Golestan by Saadi, fables from Kalikh va Dimneh, and poetry by Firdousi. Some entries are there by the design of the textbook writers. These promote modern values such as cooperation, hard work, and achievement. Finally, some entries are deliberately included as acts of political indoctrination through which the government hoped to instill values favorable to its legitimization and preservation.

Although "political development" is often mentioned in the course of this present inquiry, nonetheless, the idea of political development, as is evident from the entries in the texts, was never held by the Pahlavi regime to be an important facet of development. Instead, economic development was promoted by the government to be the most important goal to be achieved. It was envisioned by the Shah that

in 25 years Iran would achieve a similar economic status to that of Japan and the Federal Republic of Germany. He referred to this goal as Tamaddon-e Bozorg (the Great Civilization). In the face of inadequacies, problems, and bottlenecks confronting his ambitious and unrealistic goals, the Shah soon retreated from his earlier remarks and professed that in 25 years Iran will reach the gates of the great Civilization. The point, however, is that economic development was held in high esteem, while other facets of development, including political development, were either totally or partially ignored.

McClelland lists 14 values that are purportedly of some influence on economic development (see Table 11). Of these, three have been confirmed--traditional interaction pressure less frequent; ego's relation to others more often contractual; impersonal cooperation pressure more often of a material sort--and two have been partially indirectly confirmed--peer pressure for interaction more frequent; deceit and magic as instrumental acts less frequent with hard work and intelligence more frequent.<sup>2</sup>

Pye, as discussed in the previous chapter, postulates that there is a close relationship between economic and political development. Thus, many of the values that promote economic development also promote political development. Pye presents three themes which are seen as essential to political development: equality, capacity and differentiation and specialization. These coincide with certain of McClelland's variables: equality with universalistic versus



particularistic norms; capacity with rationality, planning and orderliness; differentiation and specialization with specificity vs. diffuseness of role relations.<sup>3</sup>

Specificity vs. diffuseness of role relations, according to the social theorists, stresses contract rather than status. According to McClelland, "traditional societies are often characterized . . . as consisting of diffuse network(s) of relationships that individuals have with each other which are not functionally specific, not entered into with a specific objective to be accomplished on each side."<sup>4</sup>

Rationality, planning and orderliness are regarded by Max Weber to be the prime determinants of economic development. It is contended that systems "which stress rationality in planning ought to be able to adapt to . . . a system of production more readily and move ahead more rapidly."<sup>5</sup> Rational values are thought to include hard work, intelligence and planning as opposed to the irrational, involving magic, chance and belief in fate.

Universalism vs. particularism is the dichotomy between the concept of equality before the law for all which is believed to promote development and the concept of status distinction which is believed to be a deterrent to development.

The content analysis of textbooks which follows will attempt to ascertain if these values are present. The presence or absence of these values postulated affects the ability of the textbooks to aid in the creation of a "software" which is a prerequisite for development.

Educational system in Iran. Until 1971, the Iranian school system was based on the 6-3-3 concept of which the first six years were devoted to elementary education. The high school was divided into two three-year cycles. The first cycle was a general introductory discipline in which students were introduced to physical and natural sciences, literature, social sciences and fine arts. The second cycle was more specialized and was divided into branches such as mathematics, natural sciences, social sciences and literature, with home economics for girls. There were also specialized schools for music, commerce and technical training. The Ministry of Education by 1971 began to phase out this system and replaced it with the new 5-3-3 concept. As a result of the Ramsar Educational Conference in 1975, an additional year was added to the high school which made the system into a 5-3-4 concept. It was envisioned that the first five years would function as elementary education after which the student would take a general exam to determine whether he should continue on to guidance school or not. The guidance level, which is three years, aims to identify the students who have the capacity and wish to continue their education, and also to determine their abilities and interests so they can be guided to the professions that they are best suited for. A series of examinations at the end of the three years would determine the future schooling of the students. Those who pass the necessary examinations would be guided either to further academic education or into technical or professional fields.

High school curriculum is divided into either a four-year academic program or a two-year or a four-year technical-vocational program,

depending on the capabilities of the student. The academic program, for the first two years, consists of general subjects and the last two years are specialized in mathematics and physical sciences, natural sciences or social sciences. Every year there is a nationwide examination, administered by the Ministry of Education, to determine the capabilities of the twelfth-graders, based on which a high school diploma is granted to the passing students.

Elementary and guidance school textbooks. As noted at the beginning of this inquiry, since the focus of the analysis for which the questionnaires were drafted were high school students, it was deemed appropriate to content analyze the books that presumably would have transmitted the "system" norms to the students during their earlier years of education. Therefore, the content analysis is limited to the Farsi readers for the first through the eighth grade.

Traditionally the Farsi reader has been the bulwark of moral and socio-cultural teaching to the students in forms of prose and poetry. The present-day Farsi readers have replaced books such as Bustan and Golestan by Saadi and Kalileh va Demneh, which were the backbones of the traditional maktab education system, and were very concerned with teachings of moral codes of conduct in addition to the basic reading and writing skills. The present-day Farsi readers include many entries from the above books, plus items from other famous Iranian books of prose and poetry, along with translations from foreign, mainly European, sources. Among the famous Iranian poets, Firdousi and his book Shahnameh (Book of Kings) receive the most attention, since

nationalism, patriotism and bravery, in addition to moral codes of conduct, are frequent subjects dealt with by Firdousi's emphasis on Iranian monarchy. In it the national and cultural heritage of Iran are portrayed as unique and superior to that of others.

For the first three years of elementary school, the Farsi readers function as both a literature and a social science book. From fourth grade on there are books that are specifically devoted to sciences and social sciences. These books, however, are devoid of moral teachings; they discuss mechanical information which has little value so far as political development is concerned. Little attention is paid to the analysis and criticism of the prevailing Iranian socio-political institutions in the real sense of the word. The Farsi readers, on the other hand, are full of stories, proverbs and anecdotes that relate concepts that are very much a part of everyday life. Thus, it was deemed more relevant to limit the analysis only to the Farsi readers. Besides functioning as the main literature book, the readers are used for dictation, poems from them are assigned for memorization, and they are used as guides for the writing of compositions. As a result, the Farsi readers are directly or indirectly involved in up to one-quarter of the subjects, particularly in the elementary schools. The role of the Farsi readers diminishes to some extent in the guidance school with the introduction of many new subjects, such as algebra, geometry, chemistry, physics, natural sciences, and foreign languages. Some of the Farsi readers, as will be observed in the following analysis, do in fact include items that were categorized as "civic

training" and "political indoctrination" along with the more customary moral value enforcement.

The first grade Farsi reader is divided into two basic segments. The first segment deals with the teaching of letters, word composition, and sentence structure. Although there are expressed words that could conceivably be coded to represent certain values, the thrust is word introduction not plot or meaning. Therefore, the first segment of the first grade Farsi readers was excluded from content analysis. The second segment, which is composed of seventeen entries, is included in the content analysis. There are an average of 37 entries in the readers for grades two to eight.

It should also be noted that only the written material has been used in the analysis. There were many drawings, especially in the elementary textbooks, that were very expressive in relating the stories and in transmission of certain concepts via visual effects. Furthermore, all the textbooks for the years prior to 1976 had, in this order, photographs of the Shah, the queen, the crown prince, and the Shah's twin sister, Ashraf, who was the titular head of the Imperial Organization for Social Services. From 1976 on, however, only the Shah's photograph appeared at the beginning of school textbooks.

Each lesson in the Farsi readers, aside from the main entry, is supplemented by a section composed of vocabulary, questions, and exercises. The elementary readers, in addition, have a grammar supplement. It is assumed that the intention, aside from teaching of vocabulary and



grammar, is to make the students analyze and understand the concepts implicit in each lesson.

A framework for content analysis. In the previous pages some values thought to be related to economic as well as political development were introduced. As noted, this analysis will attempt to ascertain if the textbooks convey these values to the students. The general framework for the content analysis is borrowed from the study by Richard W. Wilson.<sup>6</sup> Some changes were made in the categories suggested by Wilson (Appendix 2, Table 2) to conform the outline to the Iranian case study.

The content analysis of each entry was based on seven parameters. The include: (1) type of story; (2) main participant; (3) main moral theme; (4) authority figure stressed; (5) attitude of the authority; (6) hierarchical social order; and (7) whether contemporary setting or not. Of course, not all the entries could be categorized on all these parameters. Some entries that discussed, for example, "practical knowledge" or "know your country" could not be categorized under parameters 2 through 7.

Four Iranians, with at least a bachelors degree, with professional backgrounds in economics, education, and sociology, who were all very well versed in the English language, were asked to analyze the content of each entry and codify them according to the above mentioned categories and enter their decisions on a prepared sheet that was supplied to them with titles and classifications all in English. There were a certain number of entries that included two or more stories. In

such cases, each story was analyzed and codified separately. The entries varied greatly in length; some were pages long, while others were only several lines. Some were prose and poetry; others discussed science and technology; other, practical matters. In general, in the lower grades, entries were shorter, while in the guidance school the entries were much longer.

In the final stage, all results were gathered and compared. The responses that had a 75 percent agreement (3 out of 4) on codification were included in the final stage. In a few cases, where there was a 50 percent agreement (2 out of 4) on an entry, my own content analysis of that particular item was used in computations. If, as a result, majority was achieved, the results were entered in the final analysis.

In general there was little disagreement on the codification, especially since sub-categories for each level were supplied to each codifier, along with a broader definition of each sub-category. This was particularly important in the case of "main moral theme," since each item had to be defined in broader terms. The definitions for the themes are as follows:

Respect: obedience, deference, politeness and filiality

Self-discipline: responsibility, orderliness, value of time

Achievement: value of learning, perseverance, competitiveness,  
willingness to work

Value of intelligence: using one's head to solve problems

Affect: kindness, love, gratitude, forgiveness

Patriotism: love for country or culture

Group and cooperation: helpfulness, loyalty, cohesiveness

Bravery: courage

The remaining sub-categories for other levels are self-explanatory and there is no need for their repetition here.

### Analysis

Type of entries. This category is divided into eight sub-categories and one "miscellaneous." The eight sub-categories are: political institutions and civic training; political indoctrination; nationalism; sports, health and safety; practical knowledge and know your country; education, science, and technology; moralistic, including religion; and arts, culture and folklore.

In the analysis of the data (see Table 4), it was found that the entries dealing with moralistic subjects made up 40 percent of all the entries. The number of such entries were fewer in the elementary readers, while in the guidance readers the numbers had increased. Moralistic items made up 30 percent of the total in the elementary readers, while they composed 55 percent of the total in guidance readers. This is expected, since, as noted earlier, the Farsi readers function as the main vehicle by which moral codes are taught to the students. The heavy emphasis on the classical books which promote moralistic behavior, such as Golestan and Bustan of Saadi, are examples of such a process. As we shall see later, many different moral values are conveyed to the students with certain norms receiving more emphasis.

Entries that dealt with practical matters, such as "letter writing" and "know your country," which were descriptions of major Iranian cities, made up 26 percent of all entries in the elementary schools, whereas, there were only three entries dealing with such subjects in the guidance school readers. Traveling and vacationing are not institutionalized in Iran as they are in the West.<sup>7</sup> Therefore, the government had included a description of major Iranian cities for the elementary students to broaden their view of their nation, and thus provide them with a more cohesive feeling of belonging to the nation of Iran.

Entries dealing with political institutions composed a substantial portion of the first-to third-grade readers. None of these entries, however, directly dealt with political institutions as such. There was no mention of the Majlis, the cabinet, political parties, or the Constitution. The entries that are codified as dealing with political symbols and institutions, for example, included such subjects as saluting the national flag. There was also a village scene where a boy views the results of the benefits from the reforms undertaken by the Literacy and Rural Development Corpsmen. There was also an entry that dealt with the election of class representatives. This was as far as any of the readers went in dealing with a subject that involved a democratic process, thus giving a semblance of civic training to the students.

The sub-category of "political indoctrination" included such subjects as promotion of the monarchy and the royal family, particularly

TABLE 4

Analysis of Types of Entries for Grades 1 to 8

Types of entries	g r a d e								average % n
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	
Political institutions & civic training	18%	7%	11%	3%	-	-	3%	3%	4.7% (13)
Political indoctrina- tion	12	5	6	3	-	3	3	-	3.2.. (9)
Nationalism	6	-	5	6	10	-	11	28	8.2 (23)
Sports, health & safety	-	7	-	-	8	-	-	-	2.1 (6)
Practical knowledge & know your country	41	27	22	27	15	3	-	6	16.1 (45)
Education, science & technology	-	-	8	8	5	8	17	-	6.1 (17)
Moralistic including religion	24	29	27	31	41	71	54	42	40.9 (114)
Arts, Culture & folklore	-	10	18	19	15	13	9	19	14.0 (39)
Others (*)	-	15	3	3	5	3	3	3	4.7 (13)
total % n	101% (17)	100% (41)	100% (37)	100% (37)	99% (39)	101% (38)	100% (35)	101% (36)	100% (279)

(\*) Includes entries that as a result of disagreement could not be codified.

the Shah, the Shahbanou (queen) and Crown Prince Reza. Also included in this sub-category are discussions of the Shah-People Revolution (also referred to as the White Revolution). The achievements of the Pahlavi period under Mohammad-Reza Shah are also included in this sub-category. There were a total of nine such entries in these textbooks which made up about three percent of the total entries. There seemed to have been more emphasis on the Shah and his family during the first few years of the schooling. Fifth grade and eighth grade textbooks had no direct references to the Shah and his family or reforms undertaken by him; there was one entry each for grades four, six and seven.



There were 23 entries, or over eight percent of all entries, that dealt with nationalism. More recent articles on the subject of nationalism were supplemented by poetry from Shahnameh that deals with mythical Iranian national heroes. Although Shahnameh has always been a favorite book with Iranians, nevertheless, it has received more attention than before as an object of rising nationalistic feelings. As Firdousi himself put it, Shahnameh was a means by which Iranian national feelings and cultural heritage were resurrected after three centuries of Arab domination following the Arab conquest of Iran in 642 A.D. Thus, Shahnameh was used to promote Iranian nationalism, patriotism and bravery. It also helped to give a cohesive feeling of nationalism to the present-day citizens of Iran, among whom ethnic, tribal and linguistic differences are considerable. Nationalism, as a subject, received great attention during eighth grade, making up 28 percent of the total entries for that year.

Subjects discussing the importance of education or the significance of scientific and technological innovations made up six percent of the entries. Many of the items were in poetry, praising the importance of education. Others dealing with scientific and technological innovations dealt with both Western and Iranian achievements. Abu-Ali Sina (Avicenna) and Razi were among the prominent classical Iranian scholars mentioned. The Wright Brothers, Bell, Edison, the history of film making, paper and printing, and Madame Curie were among the subjects that were included.

Introduction to arts, culture and folklore has retained a consistently prominent position in the readers from second to eighth grade. Excerpts from European, Japanese, American-Indian and Australian Aborigine folktales are even included in the readers. There were a total of 39 entries, or 14 percent of the total, that were codified to have dealt with this sub-category.

The subject of health, sports and safety received the least attention. There were a total of 6 entries, 3 each for second and fifth grades, that dealt with this subject. The entries were about such topics as permanent teeth replacing baby teeth, history of sports during the Safavid period, and the story of the Olympics. There was no emphasis on health education, which is very important in a culture that has its high share of taboo and superstition.<sup>8</sup>

Schools have traditionally ignored sports. Individual sports such as wrestling and weightlifting have been popular and have been pursued outside the school environment. Iranians have done well in international competition in these sports. Team sports which ought to encourage cooperation and role specificity are played in Iran, not as a cohesive group, but as a number of individuals. Iranian soccer teams have had a success in international soccer competition even though the sport has been played based on individual initiative rather than team cooperation. An example of this is that Iranian soccer players become proficient at dribbling the ball but not at passing.<sup>9</sup>

Main participant. As noted in the previous chapter, individualism is a cultural characteristic of Iranians. This kind of individualism,

however, has been criticized for having produced individuals who are egotistic, self-centered, and rather selfish. Self-reliance, self-perfection, and self-esteem are rarely displayed as Iranian individual traits. Although Iranian literature is full of stories and historical accounts enumerating personal achievements with such individuals held in high moral esteem, nevertheless, the socio-political environment, at least in the past two centuries, has not been conducive to the development of such attitudes.<sup>10</sup>

The analysis of Farsi readers reveals that entries promoting or having an individual as its main participant had a clear majority. A total of 149 entries, or almost 54 percent of all entries, had an individual as the main participant. There was also an increase in the number of entries with individual as the main participant as the grade-level increased (see Table 5).

Although the institution of the family is the most respected and the most effective means of communication in Iranian culture, it received the lowest attention. Stories that had family as the main participant were present only up to grade three with one further entry in grade five. There was a total absence of entries with family as the main participant in guidance school readers.

Despite the lack of attention given to the family, the group as the central participant in entries was steadily about 20 percent all the way from the second to the eighth grade. There were a total of 55 entries with group as the central participant. As noted earlier, many social scientists believe that collectivity is one of the major

TABLE 5

Analysis of Main Participant for Entries for Grades 1 to 8

Main participant	g r a d e s								%	n
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8		
Individual	43%	49%	49%	59%	68%	78%	71%	71%	62.0	(149)
Family	14	22	22	-	4	-	-	-	7.0	(18)
Group	14	24	16	24	25	22	23	29	23.0	(55)
Others (a)	29	5	14	18	4	-	6	-	7.0	(18)
total %	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	99.0	
n	(7)	(37)	(37)	(34)	(28)	(36)	(31)	(31)		(240)
Not relevant (b)	(10)	(4)	-	(3)	(11)	(2)	(4)	(5)		(39)

(a) Includes entries that as a result of disagreement could not be codified.

(b) These items are made up of entries where there were no actual participation by any individual.

norms that could aid in the development of an environment conducive to political, as well as economic development. It seems that the authors of the Farsi readers were aware of the impact of collectivity and thus a fair portion of the entries had topics promoting group and collective undertakings.

Lack of collective action or group cooperation is legendary in Iranian history. Many attribute the Iranian lack of success in the Irano-Afghan war of 1837 over the city of Herat to the lack of cooperation and coordination among the Iranian generals.<sup>11</sup> It is said that each general wished to capture the city on his own and claim the victory for himself. This episode is also supported by other similar accounts detailing lack of group cooperation among Iranians. Jacobs relates the story of Nasser Khosrow, the medieval Iranian poet-philosopher.

Nasser Khosrow had raised the ire of the clergy for certain anti-religious sentiments in his writings, and the religious leaders organized a party to kill him. When the party came to his house, Nasser Khosrow offered to submit if the party would nominate a single individual to kill him. Each member of the party, eager for the prestige to be gained by the killing of the famous Nasser Khosrow, disputed who would be the one to carry out the decision. In the anticipated confusion, the clever Nasser Khosrow escaped.<sup>12</sup>

Many entries relate tales of betrayal. Given the Iranian fear of betrayal,<sup>13</sup> this emphasis is not unexpected.

Thus, the prominence of entries with an individual as the main participant is only a cultural extension. As we shall see later, the stories in the readers have tried to emphasize an individualism that promotes a societal sense of responsibility as well as commitment to self-preservation, which is a far cry from the negative individualism that was discussed above.

Main moral theme. As noted earlier, not all of the entries dealt with subjects that had an explicit moral theme. Especially in the first three readers, some entries dealt with "practical knowledge," know your country," and technical and mechanical information.

The most emphasized theme in all the readers was achievement and hard work. A total of 63 entries, or 25 percent of the total entries were devoted to these two themes. Entries from both the Iranian and foreign sources were used to promote achievement and hard work. Except for the first two grades, where there was more emphasis on respect and self-discipline, achievement was the most prominent theme



TABLE 6

Analysis of the Main Moral theme of Entries for Grades 1 to 8

Main moral theme	g r a d e s								%	n
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8		
Respect	55%	11%	12%	3%	6%	-	-	3%	6.0	(17)
Self discipline	-	19	6	3	12	6	18	14	11.0	(27)
Achievement & hard work	11	8	19	40	20	31	26	34	25.0	(63)
Value of intelligence	-	8	3	3	6	6	-	3	4.0	(10)
Affect and thoughtfulness	22	8	12	6	18	19	15	3	12.0	(30)
Patriotism	11	17	12	14	18	14	15	20	15.0	(39)
Group & cooperation	-	14	9	11	6	8	3	-	7.0	(18)
Bravery	-	3	16	9	9	6	6	11	8.0	(20)
Others (a)	-	11	9	11	6	11	18	11	11.0	(27)
total %	99%	99%	98%	100%	101%	101%	101%	99%	100%	
n	(9)	(36)	(32)	(35)	(34)	(36)	(34)	(35)		(251)
Not relevant (b)	(8)	(5)	(5)	(2)	(5)	(2)	(1)	(1)		(28)

(a) Includes entries that as a result of disagreement could not be codified.

(b) This row indicates the number of entries for each grade that was deemed to have no moral theme present.

in the textbooks. The Wright brothers, Hans Christian Anderson, Hellen Keller, Madame Curie, Leonardo Da Vinci, Magellan, Captain Scott, Amundsen and Richard Byrd are some of the foreign achievers mentioned in the readers. The famous Iranian achievers of middle ages, such as Avicenna, Khayyam, Abu-Reyhan-e Biruni, and Khawjeh Nassir-e Tusi, as well as the more recent personalities such as Hussein Behzad<sup>14</sup> and Jabar Baghcheban,<sup>15</sup> are also mentioned. The biographies of these individuals are supplemented with poetry and prose from works of Saadi, Attar, and Nezami. Although sometimes the stories relate Sufi philosophy and have spiritual connotations, nevertheless, attainment of goals

through hard work is prominently displayed. Modern poetry and prose by writers such as Jalal Al-Ahmad<sup>16</sup> and Parviz-e Natel-e Khanlari<sup>17</sup> promote achievement and hard work as an end in itself. Kahnari relates the story of the eagle and the crow, where the crow has no self-respect and derives satisfaction from the least desirable worldly materials. The eagle, on the other hand, has to fly high and try hard to get his share of the hunt. Although the crow lives longer than the eagle, the eagle's life is filled with challenge, goals and ambitions that are high and above those that the crow expects from himself.

Another entry which promotes achievement but is filled with Sufi symbolism, philosophy and the approach to the spiritual ultimate is the story Simorgh by Attar, the medieval Persian Sufi poet. The story describes the search of birds for their leader Simorgh, a legendary bird, also mentioned in Shahnameh, where he raised Zal, Rostam's father. Most of the birds either die or relinquish their pursuit, since it involved hard work and a painful journey, along with separation from readily available pleasures. Of all the birds, only thirty reached their destiny, finding no sign of their expected leader. However, when they looked at themselves, they saw thirty birds (Farsi's translation of thirty birds is sie morgh), and realized that through challenges and perseverance, they had become the ultimate in themselves.

To promote group cooperation for achievement, the authors of the textbooks have relied on present-day stories or descriptions of foreign cooperative actions. Rochdale collective experience in England is portrayed as the fruit of cooperative action among citizens. The

beneficial results from the cooperation between a crow, a tree, a stream and a farmer which result in the formation of a new town are depicted in a folktale.

Patriotism is the second most common theme in the readers. Items from classical Persian literature and modern-day writings are used to emphasize this theme. Thirty-nine entries, which account for 15 percent of the total items, deal with patriotism as the main theme. The emphasis on patriotism is almost equally present in all the readers, making up between 11 to 20 percent of the entries in each reader.

Patriotism is usually treated as an extension of love for the nation. Historical events highlighting patriotism are usually used to promote the theme. In some cases, however, patriotism is mixed with love for the institution of monarchy, support for the Shah and his family, and reforms undertaken by the Shah--i.e., the White Revolution. Often achievements by ancient Iranian kings and contributions made by Iranian civilization to world civilization are used as a basis of patriotic themes. Sometimes patriotism and bravery are mixed to achieve the maximum effect. Self-sacrifice of Iranian soldiers and generals against Greeks, Mongols and other invaders of the "motherland" are used to emphasize the significance of bravery and patriotism.

There were a total of 30 entries that dealt with affect and thoughtfulness, about 12 percent of the total items. Aside from the eighth grade reader, where there was only one entry dealing with the theme, there were two in the fourth grade reader and the remaining readers had three or more entries each dealing with "affect." Readers

for fifth and sixth grades had the highest number of items dealing with "affect" and "thoughtfulness."

The objects of affect and kindness were not limited to mankind. Animals were also objects of kindness and love. Once again, the entries were often borrowed from classical Persian literature. Many were in the form of poetry, from such classical poets as Saadi, Nezami and such modern poets as Bahar. Recent examples of human kindness, such as Albert Schweitzer, were reflected in the readers.

Entries promoting bravery and courage made up eight percent of the total. There were entries discussing bravery in all grades except the first grade. Many of the items were drawn, once again, from classical Persian literature or from historical events. There were also several examples from Western lore in the readers. The courage and bravery by William Tell and Peter, the little Dutch boy, who prevented a dike breaking by putting his finger in a leaking hole, thus saving his hometown, were noted. A recent example of Iranian courage and bravery was exhibited in the story of the shepherd who, on seeing fallen rocks on railroad tracks at night, made a torch from his clothing and thus saved the lives of many passengers on the train. These stories are but a few of the entries used in the readers to promote bravery in the students.

Besides several excerpts from Shahnameh describing the courage and bravery of its heroes, there were stories relating the bravery of Iranians in battles against foreign invaders. The Iranian resistance against the Mongol invaders is a favorite topic.

Bravery is promoted in a micro and a macro sense. Bravery and courage within peer group and family, as well as heroism against foreign invaders is applauded.

Sub-categories of respect, group and cooperation each made up seven percent of the entries. Over half of the entries in the first grade reader had respect as their central moral theme. However, there was a decline in attention given to respect as the grade level increased. There were no items with respect as the central theme in the sixth or seventh grade readers. There was only one item in the eighth grade reader with respect as the main moral theme. The objects of respect are varied. They include God and religious figures; the Shah and the royal family; and of course, parents and family members.

Group and cooperation themes also received varied attention. There were no items dealing with cooperation in either the first grade reader or the eighth grade reader. There was one entry with cooperation as the central theme in the seventh grade reader. Most of the discussions in the previous categories dealing with individualism, emphasizing the impact of individualism in Iranian culture, are also relevant here. Kalileh va Demneh, the classical Indian literary book that uses animals as its main actors, is one of the few sources for the classical stories on group work and cooperation that is utilized in the readers. The story of the first cooperative in Rochdale, England is another of the highlights for this theme.

The fewest number of entries, based on our classification, were used in discussing the "value of intelligence." There were 10 items



altogether, at least one entry for each grade, except for the first and seventh grades which had none.

There were also items dealing with "love of life," "fate," "universalism," and "arrogance" in the readers. Since the number of such items were few, they were all grouped and categorized as "others" in the classification.

Authority figure stressed. About 70 percent of all the entries had a central authority figure. The most common authority figures were individuals with national and political prominence, most of whom were kings, governors or persons with high administrative positions. This was rather expected since many of the entries were drawn from classical literature as was noted earlier. Shahnameh, Golestan and Bustan also supply a substantial portion of the guidance school entries. Of the total of 109 entries in the guidance school Farsi readers, 45 entries, or 42 percent, were direct excerpts from classical Persian literature. Saadi's works got the highest attention. They included 10 items, six of which were from Golestan (combination of prose and poetry) and four from Bustan (exclusively poetry). Saadi's works are almost all moral teachings which are usually related in the form of stories, many from his extensive travels in the Islamic world of the thirteenth century. Firdowsi's work, Shahnameh, received the second highest attention with eight items. Although there are implicit moral teachings in Shahnameh, the work is the account of mythical Iranian kings with Rustam, a brave, moral and very strong contender, as the hero. The work details Rustam's bravery, patriotism and service to the Iranian monarchs. Firdowsi was

TABLE 7

The Main Authority Figure Stressed in Entries for Grades 1 to 8

Authority figure stressed	g r a d e s								%	n
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8		
Father	-	3%	6%	7%	7%	10%	14%	-	7.0	(13)
Mother	-	15	9	7	-	-	5	-	6.0	(11)
Other family members	-	-	6	7	7	-	-	-	3.0	(6)
Elders	-	21	9	14	14	3	14	6	12.0	(23)
Educational	-	21	12	4	-	3	5	6	8.0	(15)
Peer	-	24	6	-	25	19	10	29	15.0	(30)
Police	-	-	-	-	4	3	-	-	1.0	(2)
Kings, princes, rulers										
men of power & wealth	25	-	21	25	25	42	43	47	27.0	(53)
The Shah & his family	25	6	6	7	-	3	-	-	5.0	(9)
Religious, incl. God	37	-	6	4	14	3	10	6	7.0	(14)
Others (a)	12	9	15	25	4	13	-	6	11.0	(22)
total %	99%	99%	101%	100%	100%	99%	101%	100%	102.0%	
n	(8)	(33)	(32)	(29)	(28)	(31)	(21)	(17)		(198)
Not relevant (b)	(9)	(8)	(5)	(8)	(11)	(7)	(14)	(19)		(81)

(a) Includes entries that as a result of disagreement could not be codified.

(b) This row indicates the number of entries for each grade that had no central authority figure present.

a favorite with the Pahlavi regime since his teachings of patriotism and promotion of monarchy corresponded with the regime's ideals, and thus his work was used (or misused) to promote the institution and legitimacy of monarchy.

There are also four excerpts from Siasatnameh (Book of Politics) of Khawjeh Nassir Tousi and Qabus-Nameh of Kaikavos ibn-Iskandar both of which were written in the twelfth century. Both books are concerned with moral teachings written for the attention of the royalty of this period to assist them in governing. There are also two items each from

Kalileh va Demneh and Manteg at-Tair of Attar, details of which were discussed earlier. The rest of the entries were from individual classic writers and poets.<sup>18</sup>

The entries in the elementary readers are less sophisticated and are sometimes simplified versions of stories from classical Persian literature. These simplified stories have kept their implied moral teachings intact.

Items with peers as the main authority figures are thought to be a positive educational reinforcement among the children. McClelland includes "peer pressure for interaction" among norms which are thought to be important for achievement. As noted previously, the hypothesis for this theory has been partially indirectly confirmed and is one of the items noted under the general heading of "collectivity." McClelland notes that "peer collectivity . . . more successfully forces the individual into line in the more rapidly developing countries."<sup>19</sup> Furthermore, it is also found that even among the more economically successful authoritarian societies, there is greater peer orientation. Thus, peer collectivity has been suggested to be an orientation which is quite helpful to development. The development of peer collectivity is as valuable to socio-political development of a nation as it is to its economic development.

Some 15 percent of the entries, or 30 of them, had peers as their central authority figure. Some of these, as usual, were drawn from the classical literature, but most were from recent writings by Iranian and foreign writers. The attention paid to peers as the main

authority figure was rather uneven throughout the readers. There were no items with peer as the authority figure in the readers for first and fourth grade. On the other hand, one-fourth of the entries in second, fifth and eighth grade readers had peers as the main authority figure.

Elders occupy an important socio-cultural position in Iranian society. They are revered and respect for them is urged. Also, a great deal of emphasis is put on advice from elders due to their longer life experience. Thus, elders traditionally have served as a major source of authority in Iranian literature and folklore. It is, therefore, not surprising to find that 23 entries, or 12 percent of all the items, have elders as the main authority figure. In some of the stories even the rulers turn to elders for advice, which is usually beneficial.

Educational figures, such as teachers and school principals, also received a fair share of emphasis as the main authority figure in the entries. A total of 15 entries, or eight percent of the items, had educational figures as the main authority image. However, there were fewer entries with such authority figures in the guidance school readers. There were none in the first and fifth grade readers either. The second grade reader had educational authorities as its main figures in one-fifth of the entries. There was a decreasing emphasis on educational figures in third and fourth grade readers. Most of the materials dealing with educational figures as the main authority are of recent nature. They mostly deal with classroom situations and/or with educational matters.

Although almost all the elders and politically prominent individuals were male, there were male and female individuals performing as the educational figure of authority. As it has been noted often, the classical literature supplies most of the materials, especially for the guidance school readers. Since classical Persian literature is extremely male oriented, females, as figures of authority, are almost absent. Women are rarely mentioned in Shahnameh, except when there is a love scene or the discussion involves a wife, mother, or daughter of the actor. The major exception is the story of Bahram-e Gur (Sassanid King) and Azadeh, who, through perseverance, is able to teach the king that "achievement is the end result of perseverance and hard work."

Religious figures, such as the Prophet Mohammad, other Biblical prophets, Imams (successors to the Prophet, beginning with Ali) and God, make up seven percent of the total entries. As a norm, all the readers begin with praise for God in their first entry in which God's aid and assistance for achievement and success is sought. The only reader which had no direct reference to God or other religious figures was the second grade reader. On the other hand, more than one-third, or 37 percent of all the items in the first grade reader had God or religious personalities as the main figures of authority. Biographies of the religious personalities or Koranic descriptions of events such as Noah's ark and the flood supply most of such religious figures of authority.

Some 30 entries, or 16 percent of all items had a family member as the main authority figure. Of that total, seven percent, or 13



items, had the father as the main authority figure, while five percent, or 11 items, stressed mother. Other family members, such as siblings and grandparents, made up only three percent of the total authority figures in the readers.

Mothers, as main authority figures, are stressed more in the elementary school readers, particularly during the first few grades. Fathers, on the other hand, are stressed more in the guidance school readers as the main figure of authority. There are no mentions of any family member as an authority figure in the eighth grade reader. Fathers are usually dealt with as individuals with strength, wisdom and also as a source of guidance. However, there were also items showing the support that children could give to their families and the interdependence of family members on each other. Mothers are usually depicted as a source of love, kindness and self-sacrificing for their families, particularly to their children.

There were two entries each in first through fourth grade readers that had the Shah and his family as the main figures of authority. There was also one item in the sixth grade reader discussing the Shah's childhood as depicted in his book, Mission For My County. There was no mention of the Shah or his family in the fifth, seventh and eighth grade readers. The items with the Shah and his family as the main authority figures discussed the Shah, his wife and their children, particularly Crown Prince Reza. The items dealt with their achievements, contributions to the welfare of the nation, and sought respect

and love for them. There was also one entry that dealt exclusively with the accomplishments of Reza Shah.

There were two items that had the police--as it is institutionalized today--as the central authority figure. These items dealt with the observance of traffic regulations and depicted policemen as benevolent and helpful. Of the two items, one was in the fifth grade and the other in the sixth grade reader, making up one percent of the total entries.

Attitude of authority. The sub-categories dividing this classification are benevolence, non-benevolence and neutral. In all the readers, except the fifth grade, the majority of items had the main authority figure as a benevolent person. Some two-thirds of all the items had a benevolent individual as the main authority figure. The remaining entries were divided between those with either non-benevolent or neutral attitudes. The entries, particularly in the first four readers, had fewer authority figures with non-benevolent attitudes than in the next four years. Even the entries with non-benevolent authority figures are themselves reinforcing a positive moral theme by depicting negative consequences. The story of the shepherd who cried wolf is a good example of this mode of teaching (see Table 8).

Hierarchical social order. Very few of the entries in the elementary school readers had a hierarchical social order implicit in them. Over 85 percent of the readers from second to fifth grade had no hierarchical social order present. There were five entries in the first grade reader

TABLE 8

The Attitude of Authority Stressed in Entries for Grades 1 to 8

Attitudes of authority stressed	G r a d e s								%	n
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8		
Benevolent	83%	61%	66%	75%	39%	81%	65%	56%	64.0	(127)
Non-benevolent	-	9	6	14	39	16	30	31	18.0	(36)
Neutral (a)	17	30	29	11	21	3	5	12	17.0	(34)
total %	100%	100%	101%	100%	99%	100%	100%	99%	99.0%	
n	(6)	(33)	(35)	(29)	(28)	(31)	(20)	(17)		(197)
No authority present (b)	(11)	(8)	(2)	(8)	(11)	(7)	(15)	(20)		(82)

(a) Includes entries that as a result of disagreement could not be codified.

(b) This row indicates the number of entries for each grade that was deemed to have no authoritative attitude stressed.

that were relevant to this classification, three of which dealt with religious hierarchy and the monarchy.

The presence of classical literature, which is often influenced by hierarchical social order, in the guidance school readers gave rise to the number of items with hierarchical social order explicit in them. At the most, one-third of all the entries had an explicit social order. The table below (Table 9) displays the increasing number of items where hierarchical social order is present and rather explicit as the grade level increases.

Social stratification is still very much a part of Iranian social structure. The often talked about hezar famil (thousand family) is a socio-economic class that has dominated the affairs of the nation at least since the late eighteenth century. Their significance and

TABLE 9

Hierarchical Social Order present in Entries for Grades 1 to 8

Hierarchical social order	G r a d e s								%	n
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8		
Present	60%	6%	7%	14%	14%	23%	33%	34%	19.0	(43)
Not present	40	94	93	86	86	77	67	66	81.0	(182)
total %	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	
n	(5)	(32)	(30)	(32)	(35)	(36)	(27)	(30)		(225)
Not relevant (a)	(12)	(9)	(7)	(5)	(4)	(3)	(8)	(7)		(54)

(a) Includes entries that as a result of disagreement could not be codified and those that had no hierarchical social order present in them.

influence on the economic and political affairs of revolutionary Iran, however, cannot be determined as of yet.

The social class system, which was so much a part of Iranian life in pre-Islamic Iran, had its influence on the Iranian Constitution of 1906, when the class system was recognized as a basis for parliamentary representation with all classes electing their deputies to the Majlis. Although class basis for parliamentary election was soon abolished, it is no coincidence that hierarchical social order is an integral part of classical Persian literature and is often depicted in school texts, particularly in the guidance school readers.

Contemporary setting. Students are able to relate more easily to entries with contemporary settings. Items depicted in setting of the distant past or of more fairy-tale than real life experience are thought to be of little help, if any, to students in the development of the senses and the concepts that would be helpful in real life

TABLE 10

The Setting of Entries in the First thru Eighth Grade Readers

Setting	G r a d e s								%	n
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8		
Contemporary	100%	100%	64%	71%	49%	37%	23%	19%	55.0	(110)
Non-contemporary	-	-	36	29	51	63	77	81	45.0	(89)
total %	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	
n	(6)	(28)	(33)	(28)	(35)	(28)	(22)	(22)		(199)
Not relevant (a)	(11)	(13)	(4)	(9)	(4)	(11)	(13)	(15)		(80)

(a) Includes entries that as a result of disagreement could not be codified and those that had no particular setting explicit in them.

situations. As Table 10 shows, the setting of most entries in the first four years are contemporary, while the majority of the entries in the last four years are not.

Of course, the nature of classical literature, particularly present in the guidance school, aids the high proportion of items set in non-contemporary situations. Also, biographies of famous men, poets, inventors, explorers, artists and scientists all add to the number of items that have taken place in the past. All settings taking place in the nineteenth century and before have been regarded as not contemporary for the sake of analysis here.

However, most of the items, as shown in Table 10 above, have a contemporary setting. All the items in the first and second grade readers are set in a contemporary situation, while less than one-fifth of all the items in the eighth grade reader are set in contemporary circumstances.



Summary. As the data analysis shows, the average Iranian student in his eight years of elementary and guidance school education has been exposed to varying themes in his Farsi readers. Certain moral values are stressed while some others are less apparent. Achievement and hard work, for example, receive a proportionately high representation in the readers, while group work and cooperation leading to achievement are very much neglected. Love of country, as reflected in patriotism, also receives a very high representation in the Farsi textbooks. Some of the entries promoting bravery also have a fair amount of patriotism implicit in them.

Most of the items delineated by McClelland to have an influence on economic development are present in the readers. The five norms that were outlined to have a proven or indirectly proven impact on economic development are all included in the readers. The institutional norms, such as respect and friendship, are also well represented, making up almost one-fifth of the total entries. As noted above, group activity and cooperation do not receive the prominence that they require. There are many entries, however, that stress the significance of rationality, planning and orderliness. There are few items that deal either with specificity, role relation or impersonal cooperation.

Almost totally absent are civic training in its present-day context. There are no discussions of the role of government, its responsibility to a modern polity, or the public's obligations to the government. There are no discussions of the Iranian constitution, the parliament, the cabinet, or any other civil or military institution.

In short, the Farsi readers attempt no citizenship training. Although there is a social science text in the three years of guidance school, it also attempts to present factual information without much elaboration on the concepts, such as what gave rise to the promulgation of the Constitution of 1906-07.

So far as the authority figures present in the entries, the traditional sources of authority, such as kings, governors, vaziers (ministers), elders, and parents are very much the norm. They contribute most of the authority figures present in some classical literary works, are but a recent concept in modern Persian literature. Traditionally, the emphasis has been on hierarchical social order which has very much been part of Iranian life and, as was apparent above, is very much present in modern-day Persian textbooks.

The Farsi readers perform a many faceted educational task. Although their primary purpose is to teach the Persian alphabet, writing, vocabulary and grammar in the elementary school, and to provide a basic introduction to classical Persian literature in the guidance school, their mission, nevertheless, is influenced by other objectives. Historically, Persian literature has served as a moral and philosophical vehicle. Moral and philosophical teachings still compose the most significant portion of the readers that were analyzed here. Excerpts from classical Persian literature, along with modern Persian literature, compose the majority of the items present in the readers. This is not surprising, since the readers are primarily intended to introduce the students to Persian literature.

Another task of books that deal with teachings of mores and values is their relevance to the present-day needs of men. A major shortcoming of the readers stems from the fact that certain norms and values which, as suggested earlier, are crucial to development of socio-political and economic institutions have received little attention. For example, too little attention is paid to collective activity for purposes of communal good. In light of the discussions detailing the negative form of "individualism" and its impact on the perceptions of each individual, the subject of collectivity demands more rigorous attention. The socio-cultural notion of individualism, as represented in the textbooks, has to be moderated. Too often, the individual as the champion and prodigy remains the central attention of the entries. Too frequently survival of an individual is portrayed as dependent on his wit and intelligence since those around him, often striving and competing for realization of their own personal interests, are indifferent, if not hostile, to his interests.

Furthermore, the notion of individualism is supported by the philosophical tradition implicit in Sufism and displayed in classical Persian literature. The emphasis on the individual attempt for ultimate perfection has been in a large part responsible for the omnipresence of "individualism" in the Iranian mind. Thus, the literature, in general, and the Farsi readers, in particular, are an extension of the Iranian socio-cultural tradition.

The shortcoming of the Iranian cultural tradition, on the other hand, has not been compensated to an effective degree by the inclusion

of new innovative entries or stories from foreign literary sources. Although there is a wide representation of foreign literary works in the readers with items from Tolstoy, Victor Hugo, Schiller, H. C. Anderson, Moliere and Nehru, and biographies of famous men and women such as Magellan, DaVinci, Albert Schweitzer, Alexander Graham Bell, Thomas Edison, Helen Keller and the Wright brothers, the spirit of group work and collective action is lacking.

Family activity, which is the only group activity that serves as a source of support for most Iranians, receives very little attention. Family bonds, especially at a time of industrialization and very active urbanization which undermines such bonds, need to be further affirmed and supported.

The readers also perform as a major vehicle for politicalization in the forms of nationalism, patriotism and political indoctrination. Many of the items classified under "know you country" also serve to create a national identity in the students, thus making about one-fourth of all entries in the readers related to political socialization. Individualism and de-emphasis of group action means that values needed for development of political institutions are missing, since all such activities require cooperative action. Furthermore, the subject of political institutions and citizenship roles are totally ignored. No discussions of political institutions, such as the Majlis, political parties, the system of justice, labor organizations, or the army is available in any of the readers, although these institutions

were created or promoted by the Pahlavi regime to serve its purposes and to help to legitimize its rule.

The values and norms present in the readers greatly emphasize themes that are either of little relevance to political development or are in contrast to the ideals of political modernization and development. The case in point is the emphasis on individual action and de-emphasis on collective action. Furthermore, institutional norms seem to predominate in the textbooks, while such norms as universalism or "salience of nature" are rather absent.

The attention paid to the development of achievement oriented norms, while ignoring development of institutions to perform as the infra-structure of a developed society, is a classic example of the "modernization" that was envisioned by the Shah. Modernization to the Shah had been pieces of highly sophisticated technology, imported from abroad and maintained by foreign experts, while having no real relevance to the needs and lives of Iranians.<sup>20</sup> These show pieces served as the Shah's vision of modernization. The school readers are another manifestation of such modernizing visions. While attention is paid to achievement oriented themes, the contradictory traditional foundation which perpetuates the cultural framework is also retained. Thus, in a sense, attempts are made to impose modern and developed values on a foundation which is basically alien to such themes.

In short, it could be noted that the second Pahlavi monarch, like the first, had little interest in the development of the nation, be it economic or political. Like his father, Mahammad Reza Pahlavi



was more interested in self-aggrandizement than in modernizing the state.

A student's relationship to his or her environment, however, is not bound just to the textbooks that he or she reads and has to pass exams on. Peer groups, mass communication, teacher-student relationship, and most important of all, the parent-student relationship serve as further vehicles of socialization and politicization. The next section, Part III, deals with comparison of student-parent values and perhaps will offer an added dimension by which some suggestions could be made as to the impact of the textbooks on the students, on one hand, and the influence of parent's values on the students, on the other hand, in determining the direction of socialization and political learning among students.

## FOOTNOTES

<sup>1</sup>David McClelland, The Achieving Society (Toronto, Canada: 1961), p. 71.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid., p. 173.

<sup>3</sup>Lucian Pye, Aspects of Political Development (Boston: Little and Brown, 1966), pp. 45-48.

<sup>4</sup>Ibid., p. 181.

<sup>5</sup>Ibid., p. 188.

<sup>6</sup>Richard Wilson, Learning to be Chinese (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1970), Appendix II.

<sup>7</sup>There are both economic and cultural reasons for it. Since the majority of Iranians have no cash savings, vacationing is considered a frivolous activity, except for those few who can afford it. Traditionally, the well-to-do, during the summer seasons, moved to more pleasant locations outside the city, where they either owned an orchard or rented one. For example, the rich Tehranis took up summer residence in Shemiran, on the foothills of Alburz, 10 miles to the north. It was this same class, and the expanding middle class, that now could afford either travelling to the beaches on the Caspian or to foreign resort areas for vacations.

<sup>8</sup>It is not unusual to find many Iranian youth in their 20s that know very little about biological matters involving the opposite sex. I was recently astounded to find out from a 21 year old Iranian youth that he had never heard or known about a woman's monthly period.

<sup>9</sup>Almost all Iranian schools lack sport facilities at the barest level. Most schools only have a few hundred square yards of playground that are used as playing ground, recreation area, and, when needed, as either volleyball or basketball courts. The ground is either asphalt or of cement tiles, which make falling a hazardous eventuality. There are a few sports fields that are used by some of the schools in the more prosperous neighborhoods. The government, in the past two summer Olympics and the Asian Olympics, spent a fortune to promote sports at home and abroad, but the results, particularly at the Mexico City Olympics, were disastrous. The sports had only been attended to at the post-high school amateur level. The schools, on the other hand, were on their own. Neighborhood alleyways and streets performed as sports arenas for the youth. Such elements as danger of being run over by cars and unsupervised training certainly were not conducive to the kind

of training that would result in impressive showings in international competition. In 1976 the Ministry of Education decided that sports had to have a higher place in the Iranian educational system. So it was decided that all students had to perform calisthenics every morning to the tune broadcast over the radio to the whole nation. The whole undertaking was seen more as a joke than as a serious issue. The teachers who were to lead the students had hardly any knowledge of the movements. Furthermore, the poor students who attended schools in central Tehran, particularly those schools by the main traffic thoroughfares, had to deeply breathe the infamous Tehran pollution first thing in the morning at 8 o'clock. The whole thing provided the cynical Iranians with more fuel for their jokes and discussions.

<sup>10</sup>See Chapter III for discussions on individualism.

<sup>11</sup>Marvin Zonis, The Political Elite of Iran (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971) p. 214.

<sup>12</sup>Norman Jacobs, The Sociology of Development: Iran as a case study (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1966), p. 252.

<sup>13</sup>Ibid.

<sup>14</sup>A modern painter who revived the art of miniature painting.

<sup>15</sup>The founder of a school for deaf and mute in Iran.

<sup>16</sup>A modern novelist and author whose progressive writings are highly respected.

<sup>17</sup>A modern poet-educationalist and one-time Minister of Education.

<sup>18</sup>Items from classical poets such as Anvari, Farokhi, Ibn-e Yamin, Jami, Nasser Khosrow, Nesami and modern poets such as Bahar, Dekhoda, Foroughi, Naderpour, Parvin Etesami, Shahriyar, Soratgar are included in the readers.

<sup>19</sup>McClelland, p. 187.

<sup>20</sup>Among extravagant items are nuclear reactors, Pahlavi Library with the most sophisticated equipment to get any material in any library in the world in a few hours (see Iran Almanac and Book of Facts: 1976, p. 127), while there is chronic shortage of readers and absence of regular libraries in most major cities. Also, Kish Resort Island in the Persian Gulf, paid for by revenues from National Iranian Oil Company, constructed for foreign tourists during the winter months for vacation, gambling and duty free shopping. Iranians were not allowed to the island and needed a special permit and clearance to visit it.

PART III

Ali Masalehdan

PART III

PARENTS AS SOCIALIZING AGENTS



## CHAPTER VI

### INTERGENERATIONAL SOCIALIZATION PROCESS

The family, as the first socializing institution, is perhaps the most crucial source of values and norms taught to children. The family's role in socialization is important for the deliberate teaching of values and, paradoxically, for the lack of transmission of values and norms. Dawson and Prewitt note that two main factors are responsible for the importance of the family role in socialization process. First, in the child's early years when his political self is forming, the family is a major influence and in many cases the only influence. Second, the child develops relationships with his family which are among the most important and emotionally intense he will ever have.<sup>1</sup>

The family's impact on the process of political socialization of its members is achieved through several means. The family may transmit values and norms to its children through direct teaching or indoctrination methods. The family also influences the development of the children's personalities and of their non-political social orientations and values. Moreover, the family is a major influence on the child's basic self-identification. Finally, the political outlook of those in the family is affected by a network of social and economic relationships.<sup>2</sup>

The family, as a primary socializing agent, cannot be controlled or manipulated by centralized agencies and is able to transmit political values or to abstain from transmitting them at its will.<sup>3</sup> The significance of family impact on political socialization was noted by the Greenstein and the Easton-Hess studies, showing the feeling of national identification and loyalty developed by children prior to their enrollment in schools.<sup>4</sup>

In traditional societies, in the absence of formalized political institutions, the impact of family on the process of political socialization is amplified. While one would expect to find a greater similarity in societal norms and values adhered to by parents and children in the traditional societies, in the transitional societies where there is a rapid change in the process of socialization, the difference between the parental values and norms and that of their children could be expected to be greater.<sup>5</sup>

As noted earlier, the parental interest or, as Dawson and Prewitt have noted, the parental lack of interest has significant impact on the development of political participation and political interest in children.<sup>6</sup> Political interest or the lack of it is of crucial importance in the process of socialization in any society. The political socialization militated by the family is usually not executed in a conscious manner. The parents do not usually plan or intend in any systematic way to transfer these values. The political socialization of the children occurs as a by-product of the interactions of the family. Furthermore, the family seldom thinks of political training

as one of its tasks.<sup>7</sup> It is on rare occasions that there is a deliberate intention by the family to instill political values in children. Such a situation exists to the dismay of political leadership, particularly in the authoritarian political systems where the centralized political authorities seek to have total control over the "process and contents of political learning."<sup>8</sup> They wish to ensure that the family would transmit only the "right" political and social norms and would refrain from injecting the "wrong" norms to the children. Of course, with the severe limitations on the power of any authoritarian government to control the transmission of values from parents to children, the role of family as a very important socializing agent remains formidable.

Socio-cultural norms. While the primary focus in this study of the intergenerational socialization process is the similarities and differences between the parents and students, an analysis of norms and value associated with the orientations of both groups is also undertaken. These norms, termed "socio-cultural variables," measure a wide spectrum of social behavior. They are selected because of their presumed association with the general concept of development. These items are borrowed from the "Four Country Study," reported in David McClelland's The Achieving Society. The utilization of the following socio-cultural variables in this section of the inquiry will create a comparable basis for the comparative analysis of the value coding schemes used for the textbook analysis with an eye to the fundamental socio-cultural traits

which are present in the Iranian culture and which may influence the political orientation of the respondents, (see Table 11).<sup>9</sup>

Traditional interaction pressure. Traditional values are defined in Parsonian terms as "force(s) for conformity which (are) highly generalized, super individual, persistent over time, and supplying to the actor a set of rules for his behavior."<sup>10</sup> There are four items in the questionnaire dealing with traditionalism, divided into two segments: respect and friendship. The following two variables deal with respect. While variable 19 measures the level of respect for parents, variable 25 is an indicator of the level of respect for elders.

Variable 19: There is hardly anybody lower than a person who does not feel a great love, gratitude and respect for his parents.

Variable 25: Respect is due an older man, no matter what kind of a person he is.

The level of friendship, as a traditional mode of behavior, is measured by the following two items:

Variable 27: Real friendship is permanent friendship; friends don't change with circumstances.

Variable 39: No sane and decent person would ever think of hurting a close friend.

Universalism vs. particularism. The Parsonian contention is that having the attitude that "all (are) equal before the law," aids political development. Values promoting "status distinction among the the protagonists" tend to suppress the ideal of universalism which aims in development of a "code of law which applies equally to all individuals."<sup>11</sup> Particularism is thought to be a detriment to development.

Two items in the questionnaire measured this mode of behavior. They are:

Variable 24: There are some people like great artists and musicians who can be forgiven for not being considerate of others, kind to poor, etc.

Variable 34: A man with money cannot really learn how to behave among dignified people if he has not had the proper upbringing.

Collectivity vs. self-orientation. Parsons argues that the value systems where collectivity--i.e., the group, society, nation, etc.--is put above the goals promoting personal interests are instrumental in political development. Two measures are proposed for delineating collectivity. Interaction under pressure from peers and modes of cooperation are suggested as "the extent to which pressure for conformity came from peers or the generalized others."<sup>12</sup> The two statements measuring peer pressure are:

Variable 20: The negative opinion of others often keeps me from seeing a movie or a play that I had planned to attend.

Variable 28: My political opinion is not easily swayed by what I read in the newspapers.

The second measurement of collectivity is described as "the extent to which motives for cooperation were selfish."<sup>13</sup> The items measuring levels of collectivity among the respondents were:

Variable 22: There is no satisfaction in any good without a companion.

Variable 45: It is better to go without something than to ask for a favor.



McClelland contends that modern industrialized societies require a "greater degree of public coordination" than was previously required by lower levels of technology.<sup>14</sup>

Rationality and planning vs. determinism. Rationality and planning are regarded by Weber to be prime determinants of development. It is contended that systems "which stress rationality and planning ought to be able to adapt to . . . a system of production more readily and move ahead more rapidly."<sup>15</sup> Rational values are thought to include hard work, intelligence and planning as opposed to irrational, involving magic, chance and belief in fate. Items measuring hard work in the questionnaire are:

- Variable 32: I set difficult goals for myself which I attempt to reach.
- Variable 36: I work hard at everything I undertake until I am satisfied with the results.
- Variable 46: I often do something just to prove to myself that I can do it.

Items measuring planning in the questionnaire are:

- Variable 17: When a man is born, the success he is going to have is already in the cards, so he might as well accept it and not fight against it.
- Variable 43: Planning only makes a person unhappy since plans hardly ever work out anyway.
- Variable 44: Nowadays, with the world condition the way it is, the wise person lives for today and lets tomorrow take care of itself.

Although the next item was originally intended for measurement of risk taking behavior, due to the composition of the question and the cultural framework of the country, it actually measured the

TABLE 11

Relations of Values to Socio-Cultural Variables Thought to be of Importance for Economic Development

Social variables thought to be important for economic development	Corresponding items which should characterize more rapidly growing economies.
1. 'Modern' vs. 'traditional' social structure. (a) Universalistic vs. particularistic norms. (b) Specificity vs. diffuseness of role relations. (c) Achieved vs. ascribed status (d) Collectivity vs. self-orientation. 2. Affective neutrality (asceticism, thrift). 3. Rationality, planning, orderliness. 4. Man <u>over</u> nature, optimism, belief in progress. 5. Material needs over other concerns.	1. * Institutional (traditional) interaction pressure <u>less frequent</u> 2. Peer status of 'ego' more frequent (a society of equals). 3. * Ego's relation to others more often 'contractual' (e.g. motivated with an outcome). 4. Achieved status <u>more frequent</u> ; ascribed status <u>less frequent</u> . 5. + Peer pressure for interaction <u>more frequent</u> . 6. Self-interest, self-esteem and nurturance <u>less frequent</u> as motive for interaction. 7. Impulse control and/or punishment for impulse expression <u>more frequent</u> . 8. + Deceit and magic as instrumental acts <u>less frequent</u> ; hard work and 'intelligence' <u>more frequent</u> 9. Fate and magic as influence on ego <u>less frequent</u> . 10. Man <u>over</u> nature <u>more frequent</u> . 11. Ego's action <u>more often</u> successful. 12. Biological needs <u>more frequent</u> as a motive for 'ego'. 13. Material reward <u>more frequent</u> as means of exerting interaction pressure. 14. + Impersonal cooperation pressure <u>more often</u> of a material sort.

\* Hypothesis confirmed.

+ Hypothesis indirectly or partly confirmed

This table in its entirety has been borrowed from David McClelland, The Achieving Society, (Princeton: Van Nostrand, 1961), p. 173, Table 5.4

respondents' attitude on "chance." Therefore, it is included in this category indicating deterministic behavior. It state that:

Variable 37: I enjoy a race or a game when I bet on it.

Importance of time. R.H. Knapp and many others have stressed the significance of time in assessing the level of achievement.<sup>16</sup> Those with high level of achievement tend to stress the significance of time. Although in the "Four Country Study" no significant relationship between importance of time and level of achievement was found, nevertheless, the question was included in this inquiry. The item measuring importance of time states:

Variable 29: It would irritate me very much to have a watch or a clock which was off by several minutes everyday.

Impulse control. Weber contends that this mode of behavior, a key characteristic of Protestantism, displayed in the forms of "hard work, savings, asceticism, and renunciation of worldly pleasures," is instrumental in business expansion. Thus, it is argued that the "nations which were developing rapidly would stress the importance of controlling one's impulses."<sup>17</sup> Impulse control is measured by the following item:

Variable 16: If you get bad news, it is better to hide what you feel and behave as if you don't care.

Respect for children. This category is actually intended to denote child-rearing attitudes, emphasizing parental attitudes with stress on the importance of self-reliance and "of an individual's finding out things on his own, and that they are often better when they are on their own."<sup>18</sup> Self-reliance is assumed to be a value that would

promote high achievement. As in "importance of time," little evidence has been found to support the assumption that self-reliance in children actually promotes achievement. Nevertheless, the item is included in the questionnaire for purposes of analysis. It states that:

Variable 33: A child should never be asked to do anything unless he is first told why he is asked to do it.

Political attitudes. The examination of political orientation of parents and students is undertaken with respect to several basic postures. The questions in this inquiry are the general items which are often used in the study of political character of individuals. They include political participation, public policy orientation, political efficacy and political trust and distrust in the government.

Political participation. This segment of the study is divided into passive and active political participation. Each category is measured by two items. Those indicating passive political participation are:

Variable 12: Some people often listen to the news on radio or television, how about you?

Variable 13: Some people often read newspaper and magazine articles about socio-political events in our country, how about you?

Items measuring active political participation are:

Variable 14: Some people often think about the political and economic condition of our country, how about you?

Variable 15: Some people often talk about the political and economic issues of our country with their friends, how about you?

Public policy orientation. This segment is also divided into two sections. They include role of the government and socio-political tolerance. Variables measuring the extent to which an individual believes the government should have a role include:

Variable 18: The government should have plenty of power and influence over people's lives.

Variable 21: The government should give money and food to the unemployed.

Items measuring socio-political toleration are:

Variable 26: Our socio-political system should be a blue-print for all other nations in the world.

Variable 41: If a person wanted to make a speech against religion in this community, he should be allowed.

Political efficacy. Political efficacy is defined as an individual's responsiveness to political system functions. In other words, a politically efficacious individual will indicate that the government is responsive to his demands, whereas, an inefficacious individual will be cynical of the government. Two items are used to measure the extent of political efficacy. They are:

Variable 23: Sometimes politics and government seem so complicated that a person like me cannot really understand what is going on.

Variable 31: Over the years, the government has paid no attention to what people like me think when it decides what to do.

Political trust/distrust. Items indicating both political trust and distrust in the government are used. The items indicating political trust are:

Variable 40: The government usually knows what is best for people.



Variable 42: People running the government are smart people who usually know what they are doing.

Items measuring the level of political distrust in the government are:

Variable 30: The government is pretty much influenced by a few big interests looking out for themselves.

Variable 35: I think the government wastes needlessly a lot of the money we pay in taxes.

Variable 38: I think some people in the government are crooked.

Focus of the analysis. The study of parent-student similarities and differences will be pursued on several different levels. While there will be a primary attention paid to the impact of socio-economic variables on parent-student orientation, the impact of political convictions on the shaping of further political orientation of the respondents also will be analyzed. Finally, an analysis of relationships between socio-cultural norms and parent student political orientations will be undertaken. In all these three levels, particular attention will be paid to the similarities and differences between the two samples.

## FOOTNOTES

<sup>1</sup>Richard Dawson and Kenneth Prewitt, Political Socialization (Boston: 1969) p. 108.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid., pp. 108-109.

<sup>3</sup>Ibid., p. 122

<sup>4</sup>Ibid., p. 115.

<sup>5</sup>Ibid., p. 111.

<sup>6</sup>Ibid., p. 115.

<sup>7</sup>Ibid., p. 122.

<sup>8</sup>Ibid.

<sup>9</sup>See the discussion in Chapter IV, and also David McClelland, The Achieving Society (New York: Van Nostrand, 1961), Chapter 5.

<sup>10</sup>McClelland, p. 178.

<sup>11</sup>Talcott Parsons, Politics and Social Structure (New York: Free Press, 1969), p. 377.

<sup>12</sup>McClelland, p. 186.

<sup>13</sup>Ibid.

<sup>14</sup>Ibid.

<sup>15</sup>Ibid., pp. 188-89.

<sup>16</sup>Ibid., pp. 331-35.

<sup>17</sup>Ibid., p. 188.

<sup>18</sup>Ibid., pp. 356-59.

## C H A P T E R        V I I

### PUBLIC POLICY ORIENTATION

A major portion of this study was undertaken during the year preceding the establishment of the Islamic Republic. That year saw a chaotic socio-political situation with four cabinet changes, martial law in most major cities and a breakdown of the socio-economic status quo. Although there was limited toleration of political expression, there was also increased fear of the government security agency, SAVAK. To establish the necessary trust in this research by the respondents during the fast moving events of the revolutionary upsurge proved to be a cumbersome task. Consequently, general questions regarding socio-political outlook were used rather than questions relating to specific situations. These general questions were designed to measure sets of norms that are long lived, not relating only to the present situation but to the general expectations of the respondents as to how the system ought to be. One set of questions, relating to the socio-political tolerance of the individual and to his preference for what role the government should have in his life, relates to public policy issues that cut across the recent revolution.

The study of public policy orientation among the students is significant since it provides "an indication of the likelihood and the direction of change along major policy dimensions."<sup>1</sup> Furthermore, the

orientations of the incoming generation could provide a clue as to the longevity of socio-political controversies. One should also note the impact of issues on the forming of broader political attitudes.

None of the questions used concerning public policy attitudes could be regarded as very controversial. It was thought that controversial questions, particularly ones seeking responses related to the Shah or the performance of the government, might result either in a high percentage of no responses or perhaps some falsified answers to save the respondent from a possible fear of harassment by the security forces.

As noted in Appendix II, only about 15 percent of all Iranians of high school age, or 24 percent of the urban population of high school age, ever go to high school. This segment of the population, as evidenced during the revolution, is highly politicized, and has become increasingly vocal about the socio-political situation in Iran.<sup>2</sup> Our sample of parents was selected from among student parents who are almost all urban dwellers. Their level of education and income is above the national average, and it is assumed they also have reasonably well informed attitudes and knowledge of public policy issues.

### Role of the Government

In this chapter, the variables related to socio-political tolerance/intolerance, and to the role and scope of government in every day life will be examined. Variable 18, "The government should have plenty of power and influence over people's lives," and variable 21, "The government should give money and food to the unemployed," measure

what students and parents feel should be the role of government.

Variable 26, "Our socio-political system should be a blueprint for all other nations in the world," and variable 41, "If a person wanted to make a speech against religion in this community, he should be allowed," measure how politically tolerant parents and students are.

Along with analyzing the political orientations, these items also extract the prevailing modes of behavior that may contribute to or impede the process of political development. For example, there is a prevailing feeling, supported by the data, that the government should provide goods and services to the general public. Such was not expected a century or even a few decades ago. These demands aid in creation of a society where slowly government control over and involvement in the life of the individual increases. Needless to say, as the transitional society inches its way onto the threshold of modernization, popular demands are aggregated through institutions and these political institutions become the essence of the process of political development.

Parent-student comparison. On the set of issues dealing with government's role, students follow the pattern of parent preference, seemingly, to a great extent. Both students and parents overwhelmingly agree with greater influence by government over the affairs of people. This finding was puzzling when compared to previous studies that have reported a great deal of political cynicism amongst Iranians.<sup>3</sup> On the other hand, other studies have shown support for political authority when such authorities have lead the people and acted according to the public will.<sup>4</sup> If the data in Table 12 is taken into consideration in



TABLE 12  
Parents and Students Attitudes on Public Policy Issues


Issue	Agree %	Disagree %	total % n
Variable 18: "The government should have plenty of power and influence over people's lives."			
parents	83	17	100 (167)
students	81	19	100 (601)
Variable 21: "The government should give money and food to the unemployed."			
parents	58	42	100 (168)
students	62	38	100 (611)
Variable 26: "Our socio-political system should be a blue-print for all other nations in the world."			
parents	77	23	100 (162)
students	79	21	100 (606)
Variable 41: "If a person wanted to make a speech against religion in this community he should be allowed."			
parents	28	72	100 (151)
students	53	47	100 (589)

light of recent events and the overwhelming support for the inception of the Islamic Republic, it can be argued that the cynicism found, for example, by Zonis was against the unpopular Pahlavi regime and not against the institution of government itself.

In all, students and parents displayed similar tendencies to favor government power and influence over their lives. However, as is evident in the following diagram (Fig. 1), while 28 percent of students strongly agreed (+3) with variable 18, thirty-eight percent of the

Figure 1

Comparison of Parent-Student Responses to Variable 18 in a Six-Level Continuum



parents had a similar attitude, thus displaying a more assertive parental view on the issue. Such a tendency, as will be seen throughout this chapter, is displayed by parents on all issues--i.e., the parents tend to strongly agree (+3) or disagree (-3) more often than the students. The degree of difference on the other points of this continuum diminish, resulting in proportions in which the student and parent tabulations are almost identical when viewed in an agree-disagree dichotomy.

As Table 13 and Fig. 1 indicate, a vast majority of parents and students agreed with variable 18, stating that "government should have power and influence over people's lives." In cross-tabulation of the socio-economic status of the students with variable 18, it was found

that the male students favored a greater government role than the female students ( $\gamma = .263$ ). The trend points to an attitudinal difference between the male and female students that will often be observed. The data suggests that the orientation of female students is towards somewhat less government control than that of the male students. The difference between the male and female high school students is inherent in the social posture of the female students in Iran. As noted in Appendix II (Table 42), only one-third of students attending high schools in Iran are female. Most Iranian parents allow their daughters to acquire grade school education; fewer allow them to progress as far as the middle school or guidance level. Since learning to perform the duties of being wife and mother are considered to be the primary goal of a young female, schooling is not felt to be especially important.

It is mostly among the educated and more modern families that high school education is accepted to be equally important for both male and female. Consequently, the female students, particularly in the high school level, usually come from a more educated background than male students. Thus, it is a statement of fact that the female students are more often open and broad-minded than their male counterparts. The impact of familial education on the student's orientation will be observed in the next two chapters.

The parent's level of education had a significant association with the student's preference for government control ( $\gamma = .337$ ). Although even those with a high level of parental education still

overwhelmingly approved of a greater role for the government, nevertheless, there was an evident trend indicating that those students whose fathers had had a high level of education favored less government control (74 percent) than those students whose fathers had had no education (91 percent).

Mothers' education was also significantly associated with students' attitude to variable 18 ( $\gamma = .332$ ). This trend was expected since, generally, a higher level of education results in a broader socio-political outlook whereby an individual seeks to participate in the political process that determines policies of the state. The overwhelming support for a government with power and influence over people's lives, as indicated earlier, is a manifestation of traditional political desire whereby the people are supportive of a "supervised guidance and outlining (of) popular duties."<sup>5</sup>

The student's family income was also a significant factor, associating with variable 18 ( $\gamma = .296$ ); those students from high income families favored less government control than those from low income families. Since family income itself tends to depend on parent's level of education, i.e., those with high education had high income and those with low education had low income ( $\gamma = .548$  for parent sample;  $\gamma = .472$  for student sample), the same general premise influencing education would also apply here. An additional explanation could be that these poor, who are also less educated, want to have more access to the material well-being which they think the government can and should provide. The better educated, who have higher incomes, are less

inclined to support government intervention in their affairs, since, in providing services to the needy, the government will have to tax them. Those parents with a high level of education and income don't need the government's help to find jobs and would be less likely to support government programs that supply employment to the poor.

For the parents, the data analysis revealed that only the family income had a significant association with the parents' response to variable 18 ( $\gamma = .239$ ). The cross-tabulation also suggested a slight trend where, as in the case of the student sample, those with higher income level favored less government control than those with lower income. Still, three-quarters of both students and parents with high income agreed with government power and influence over people's lives. As noted above, the cultural tradition orients both parents and students from varying education and economic backgrounds towards this political orientation.

The level of cosmopolitanism, which measures the respondent's degree of urbanization, associated at a significant level with student's attitude toward government control ( $\gamma = -.261$ ). Those with the highest degree of urbanization--i.e., residents of Tehran--agreed less with government control (77 percent) than those from low cosmopolitan areas--i.e., towns between 10,000 to 25,000 population--(97 percent). The same did not hold true for the parent sample, which actually showed no distinctive pattern. The lack of influence of cosmopolitanism on parents, in this case and other cases to be followed, is the result of many factors such as length of residency in present place of residence,



TABLE 13

Cross-Tabulation of "Government power and influence over people"  
Variable 18 with Socio-Economic Status

Socio-Economic Status		"Government should have plenty of power and influence over people's lives."	
		Agree	
		parents	students
Sex	male	81%	85%
	female	91	77
(parents) $\chi^2 = 1.45$ ; df = 1; p = .22; phi = .11; gamma = .427			
(students) $\chi^2 = 6.14$ ; df = 1; p = .01; phi = .10; gamma = .263			
Father's Level of Education (1)	high	75%	74%
	medium	82	71
	low	90	82
	no education	91	86
(parents) $\chi^2 = 3.42$ ; df = 3; p = .33; V = .14; gamma = .260			
(students) $\chi^2 = 17.5$ ; df = 3; p = .0006; V = .17; gamma = .337			
Mother's Level of Education	high	--	86%
	medium	--	70
	low	--	79
	no education	--	88
(students) $\chi^2 = 16.1$ ; df = 3; p = .001; V = .16; gamma = .332			
Family Income Level	high	76%	74%
	medium	84	79
	low	87	87
(parents) $\chi^2 = 6.62$ ; df = 2; p = .036; V = .20; gamma = .239			
(students) $\chi^2 = 12.5$ ; df = 2; p = .019; V = .15; gamma = .296			
Level of Cosmopolitanism	1- highest	79%	77%
	2	90	81
	3	88	84
	4	85	97
	5- lowest	75	81
(parents) $\chi^2 = 2.92$ ; df = 4; p = .57; V = .13; gamma = -.041			
(students) $\chi^2 = 13.8$ ; df = 4; p = .008; V = .15; gamma = -.260			


(1) For parents' column, the "Father's Level of Education" is the mother's level of education when she was the respondent.

place of birth, and migratory history. For example, 34 percent of the responding parents were residents of Tehran, yet only 15 percent had actually been born there. Moreover, 9 percent of responding parents lived in places that were termed "least cosmopolitan"--i.e., places with less than 10,000 population--while some 22 percent had been born there. Therefore, a high level of rural to urban migration amongst the parent sample made the category of cosmopolitanism of little value in analyzing its impact on the variables.

The student sample, however, was much less transitory than the parent sample. As evidenced by the data, 81 percent of those who lived in Tehran at the time of this inquiry were born there. Student migration in other parts of the country was also minimal. Thus, as we can observe in this case and many other cases to be followed, the level of cosmopolitanism proves to be an influential variable in the analysis of student orientation. In many developing countries, where usually one or a few cities become the focus of all major socio-political and economic activities, the rest of the nation usually suffers neglect. In Iran, where the capital city, Tehran, has taken the appearance of a Western-style cosmopolitan hub with 15 percent of the nation's population, the rest of the country, including small and medium size towns, remains eons away. To emphasize the disparity of cosmopolitanism in Iran, let it suffice to note that in 1970-71, three out of eight universities in Iran were located in Tehran with 78 percent of the total university enrollment.<sup>6</sup> Furthermore, of the 20 daily newspapers published in Iran in 1971, 13 were put out in Tehran with over 95 percent

Figure 2

Comparison of Parent-Student Responses to Variable 21 in a Six-Level Continuum



of the total national circulation.<sup>7</sup> It is with such a background that the impact of cosmopolitanism in attitude orientation of the responding students is stressed.

In variable 21, dealing with government's role, although a few more of the students favored government aid to the unemployed than the parents, the difference was not significant. As the graph (Fig. 2) shows, the parent-student attitudes were rather similar except in the somewhat agree (+1) category, where 13 percent of the students agreed with government aid to the unemployed, whereas only 9 percent of the parents did the same, resulting in an overall difference of four percent for parent-student response to variable 21, which is not considered significant.

The student's sex associated at a significant level with variable 21 ( $\gamma = .210$ ). While 70 percent of the female students approved of government aid, only 56 percent of the male students responded similarly (Table 14). As indicated above, the attitudinal difference between male and female students is most likely the result of higher level of parental education among the female students. Thus, finding the female students, on the average, more sympathetic to government aid for the unemployed than the male students is a function of a broader perspective brought about by the higher level of familial education.

Father's level of education was significant, as expected, in shaping student's attitude ( $\gamma = -.195$ ). It is assumed that high level of education is often credited with higher level of socio-political interest and broader perspective, whereas low level of education, particularly impoverished parental education, results in a narrow and parochial perspective in the students. Supporting such an assumption, we find that of those students whose fathers had had high level of education, 83 percent approved of government aid to unemployed, whereas of those students whose fathers had had no education, only 58 percent did the same (Table 14).

Mother's education was also significant ( $\gamma = -.206$ ). Of those students whose mother had had a high level of education, 78 percent approved of aid for unemployed, whereas of those students whose mother had had no education, only 44 percent did the same.

TABLE 14

Cross-Tabulation of "Government aid to the unemployed"  
Variable 21 with Socio-Economic Status

Socio-Economic Status		"Government should give money and food to the unemployed."	
		Agree	
		parents	students
Sex	male	56%	56%
	female	55	70
(parents) $\chi^2 = .776$ ; df = 1; p = .378; phi = .083; gamma = -.209			
(students) $\chi^2 = 10.87$ ; df = 1; p = .001; phi = .137; gamma = .210			
Father's Level of Education (1)	high	47%	83%
	medium	56	66
	low	55	60
	no education	66	58
(parents) $\chi^2 = .873$ ; df = 3; p = .832; V = .072; gamma = .035			
(students) $\chi^2 = 11.56$ ; df = 3; p = .009; V = .140; gamma = -.195			
Mother's Level of Education	high	--	78%
	medium	--	73
	low	--	64
	no education	--	56
(students) $\chi^2 = 8.68$ ; df = 3; p = .034; V = .120; gamma = -.206			
Family Income Level	high	54%	64%
	medium	56	63
	low	63	59
(parents) $\chi^2 = 1.04$ ; df = 2; p = .594; V = .080; gamma = .126			
(students) $\chi^2 = 1.44$ ; df = 2; p = .485; V = .049; gamma = .304			
Level of Cosmopolitanism	1- high	65%	70%
	2	48	54
	3	67	55
	4	60	51
	5- low	25	44
(parents) $\chi^2 = 10.2$ ; df = 4; p = .037; V = .246; gamma = .204			
(students) $\chi^2 = 22.04$ ; df = 4; p = .0002; V = .190; gamma = .304			

(1) For parents' column, the "Father's Level of Education" is the mother's level of education when she was the respondent.



Cosmopolitanism proved to have significant association with variable 21 for both parents ( $\gamma = .204$ ) and students ( $\gamma = .304$ ). Students in the most cosmopolitan area--i.e., Tehran--agreed 70 percent with government aid to the unemployed, while only 44 percent of those in the least cosmopolitan areas thought that the government should aid the unemployed. A similar trend was also evident among the parents (Table 14). Such a tendency is perhaps the result of acute unemployment or job insecurity which is present in major urban areas, while the problem facing rural areas is under-employment. Farmers and their families lack any major source of income in seasons when they are not preoccupied by farming (weaving rugs and gelims is an exception in some areas and basically is the preoccupation of the females and children).


#### Socio-Political Tolerance

The second set of variables dealing with public policy issues, by virtue of their composition, also measured the level of socio-political tolerance of both students and parents, including political fanaticism and religious zeal. It is in variable 41, "If a person wanted to make a speech against religion in this community he should be allowed," that the greatest diversity between student and parent responses is discovered, while in variable 26, "Our socio-political system should be a blueprint for all other nations in the world," both samples concur.

Parent-student comparison. As the next diagram (Fig. 3) shows, the varying degrees of disagreement on the issue of political chauvinism

Figure 3

Comparison of Parent-Student Responses to Variable 26 in a Six-Level Continuum



seem to be nearly identical for both parents and students. On the agree side, however, some differences begin to emerge. Fewer students agree strongly (+3) with variable 26 than do parents; while more students agree somewhat (+1) with the issue than do parents. This signifies the fact that students are somewhat less forceful in their level of political intolerance than are parents, despite the fact that both groups are vastly intolerant.

The cross-tabulation and association analysis reveals that the female students are somewhat politically tolerant than the male students ( $\gamma = .215$ ). As will be seen below, since high level of

education results in higher level of political tolerance (also deduced by Jennings and Niemi),<sup>8</sup> the impact of parent's education on the students becomes a significant factor.

The analysis of cross-tabulation data suggests that the father's education is an important factor influencing student orientation ( $\gamma = .227$ ). Of those students whose fathers had had a high level of education, 66 percent agreed with the issue regarding political intolerance. On the other hand, of those students whose fathers had had no education, 85 percent agreed that "our socio-political system should be a blueprint for all other nations," displaying a high level of political chauvinism. In short, those with high education are more politically tolerant than those with low level of education.

The cross-tabulation of mother's level of education with variable 26 also suggested a similar trend to that of the father's education ( $\gamma = .220$ ). Of students whose mothers had had no education, 83 percent agreed with variable 26, compared to 66 percent of the students whose mothers had had some high school education.

As concurred by Jennings and Niemi in their study of American students and parents, "individuals with narrow, parochial outlook strongly (agree) that everyone else should adopt (their) system, while those with a broader perspective apparently recognize some of the difficulties inherent in so sweeping a judgement."<sup>9</sup> Although in the Jennings and Niemi study only 54 percent of the students agreed with the statement identical to the one in variable 26, seventy-nine percent of the

students in our study agreed with the statement, displaying a much greater political intolerance.

Parent's education level proved of no significance in determining their own posture in regard to variable 26, as it had failed to do so in the previous two variables--i.e., variables 18 and 21. It seems that a parent's education is of more consequence in determining his child's orientation than his own. This pattern is very likely the result of greater socio-cultural conditioning on parents which lessens the impact of education except where a very high level of education has been obtained.

The level of cosmopolitanism that proved significant in determining the student's attitude on the two issues dealing with the role of the government displayed no tangible bearing in relation to this issue.

Variable 41, dealing with attitudes towards tolerance, was seen as rather controversial by respondents. More than 11 percent of parents and six percent of students, the largest number for both groups, refused to answer the question. The question stated that "If a person wanted to make a speech in this community against religion, he should be allowed." Some may have been incensed or even outraged by the question. Since Iran is a country where 97 percent of the population is Muslim with 90 percent of them belonging to the Shiah sect, there is a general consensus on religion. Even those who do not consider themselves practicing Muslims seldom criticize the religion. Therefore, criticising the religion, let alone speaking against it, seems to be

TABLE 15

Cross-Tabulation of "Our socio-political system is the best in the world"  
Variable 26 with Socio-Economic Status

Socio-Economic Status		"Our socio-political system should be a blue-print for all other nations in the world."	
		Agree	
		parents	students
Sex	male	76%	82%
	female	80	75
(parents) $\chi^2 = .050$ ; df = 1; p = .822; phi = .035; gamma = -.106			
(students) $\chi^2 = 4.37$ ; df = 1; p = .036; phi = .089; gamma = .215			
Father's Level of Education (1)	high	65%	66%
	medium	82	75
	low	79	80
	no education	80	85
(parents) $\chi^2 = 4.28$ ; df = 3; p = .232; V = .166; gamma = .184			
(students) $\chi^2 = 8.92$ ; df = 3; p = .03; V = .123; gamma = .227			
Mother's Level of Education	high	--	71%
	medium	--	66
	low	--	80
	no education	--	83
(students) $\chi^2 = 9.41$ ; df = 3; p = .024; V = .127; gamma = .220			
Family Income Level	high	75%	75%
	medium	69	82
	low	85	80
(parents) $\chi^2 = 4.25$ ; df = 2; p = .119; V = .164; gamma = .207			
(students) $\chi^2 = 3.1$ ; df = 2; p = .212; V = .073; gamma = .099			
Level of Cosmopolitanism	1- high	75%	78%
	2	67	75
	3	84	82
	4	76	81
	5- low	87	78
(parents) $\chi^2 = 3.19$ ; df = 4; p = .522; V = .140; gamma = -.121			
(students) $\chi^2 = 1.32$ ; df = 4; p = .858; V = .047; gamma = -.044			

(1) For parents' column, the "Father's Level of Education" is the mother's level of education when she was the respondent.




rather an extreme undertaking. Thus, this question seems to measure more than simply an attitude towards a policy issue. It measures, perhaps, an extreme level of tolerance/intolerance of freedom of expression. It also could measure the level of acquisition of secular norms in one's attitudes and orientation.

The results of the analysis of the data were most interesting. While there were some anticipated findings, there were some that were unexpected. As the next diagram (Fig. 4) shows, the differences between student and parent orientations were phenomenal. While 44 percent of parents disagreed strongly (-3) with the issue regarding religious intolerance, only 22 percent of the students, or half as many, did the same. In short, while only 28 percent of parents agreed in varying degrees with the issue, 53 percent of the students, or almost twice as many, did the same. This item has shown the greatest disparity in parent-student orientation so far. The level of parent-student difference in response to the previous items was four percent on variable 21 and two percent each on variables 18 and 26, while the difference on this issue is a rather impressive 25 percentage points (see Table 12). What could be the source of such a great difference in attitudes.

Father's education level, in contrast to the earlier items, offered no significant association, although the chi-square probability was significant at .008 level. The data suggested that those students whose fathers had had a middle school level of education--i.e., some high school education--were the most tolerant, whereas, those with

Figure 4

Comparison of Parent-Student Responses to Variable 41 in a Six-Level Continuum



fathers who had had no education were more tolerant than those with either fathers with low level or high level education. This finding posed certain difficulties. It is apparent that, despite the generally accepted rule that as the level of education increases so does the level of tolerance, the data here posed some exceptions to the rule. In their research, Jennings and Niemi found the question of religious tolerance causing significant differences in their samples of American parents and students. They, however, observed a pattern of positive correlation between higher level of education and religious tolerance. They also noticed that the parent-student differences were greatest

TABLE 16

Cross-Tabulation of "Socio-religious toleration",  
Variable 41 with Socio-Economic Status

Socio-Economic Status		"If a person wanted to make a speech against religion in this community he should be allowed."	
		Agree	
		parents	students
Sex	male	29%	44%
	female	26	51
(parents) $\chi^2 = .014$ ; df = 1; p = .904; phi = .028; gamma = .078			
(students) $\chi^2 = 2.41$ ; df = 1; p = .120; phi = .067; gamma = -.135			
Father's Level of Education (1)	high	25%	37%
	medium	28	59
	low	27	43
	no education	37	48
(parents) $\chi^2 = .853$ ; df = 3; p = .836; V = .075; gamma = .082			
(students) $\chi^2 = 11.6$ ; df = 3; p = .008; V = .143; gamma = -.070			
Mother's Level of Education	high	--	29%
	medium	--	54
	low	--	48
	no education	--	44
(students) $\chi^2 = 1.66$ ; df = 3; p = .647; V = .05; gamma = -.089			
Family Income Level	high	33%	49%
	medium	22	49
	low	26	45
(parents) $\chi^2 = 1.20$ ; df = 2; p = .547; V = .090; gamma = -.089			
(students) $\chi^2 = 1.36$ ; df = 2; p = .505; V = .049; gamma = -.073			
Level of Cosmopolitanism	1-high	30%	51%
	2	26	45
	3	27	47
	4	26	35
	5-low	37	36
(parents) $\chi^2 = 1.0$ ; df = 4; p = .908; V = .081; gamma = -.008			
(students) $\chi^2 = 7.05$ ; df = 4; p = .133; V = .109; gamma = .162			

(1) For parents' column, the "Father's Level of Education" is the mother's level of education when she was the respondent.

between those with lowest parental education level and smallest between those with a high education level.<sup>10</sup> In the analysis of this present data, however, no such findings were revealed. In fact, it was found that the greatest differences between the parent and student data on the question of religious tolerance was between those with middle level education--i.e., some high school education--and the smallest differences were between those with either no education or a high level of education, 11 and 12 percent respectively (see Table 17). However, there is a marked increase in level of religious tolerance from parents to students in all levels.

To explain the source of religious tolerance/intolerance, perhaps, the data should be viewed in several segments with attempts made to explain the factors influencing each strata of the sample rather than attempting to make sweeping generalizations. It is surmised here that the higher level of religious intolerance among the students and parents with high level of education is perhaps the result of the association made between the institution of religion and political activism in Iran in past few years, particularly during the period leading to the Iranian revolution. Religion had become the only institution through which the people could voice their opposition to the policies of the government. More and more, with the suppression of political opposition, the educated took advantage of this situation and the institution of religion became a symbol of opposition to the government. To speak out against religion, therefore, to many was to speak against the people and the popular sentiments and for the

government. Many of the educated, who were amongst the most vocal of the opposition, as witnessed throughout the political turmoil of 1978-79, displayed a less tolerant attitude about permitting speech against religion, as is reflected in the case of the question in our questionnaire. This, perhaps, is the major factor contributing to the confusion around the fact that many of those with a high level of education indicated a lesser tolerance than those with a low level of education or no education at all.

In factor analysis of the data, which will be discussed in detail in Chapter IX, a major factor contributing to religious intolerance among parents was traditionalism and adherence to traditional values. This segment of the population manifested itself in respect for family and friends (variables 19, 27 and 39, indexed respectively at .454, .263 and .597), social class (variable 34, indexed at .401), and individualism (variable 45, indexed at .280), while religious intolerance, variable 41, was indexed at .289 (see Fig. 14). The factor analysis of the student data, in addition to the association between religious intolerance, variable 41 (indexed at .234) and traditionalism (variables 17, 19, 24 and 25), suggested a relationship between political factors and intolerance. The same factor matrix indexed religious tolerance with political tolerance (variable 26) at .398, with political inefficacy (variable 31) at .553, and with political distrust (variables 35, 38, 40 and 42) respectively at .699, .487, .627 and .662. Also related were high parental education and high family income (see Fig. 15). Thus, it could be surmised that in certain segments of the student



population similar indications to that of the Jennings and Niemi study, where high level of parental education increases level of religious tolerance, are to be found. However, traditional values and orientations seem to be the dominant factor, particularly among parents, causing a higher level of intolerance.

Although the question in variable 41 was constructed purely to measure religious toleration and the impact of variables such as education, income and cosmopolitanism on the orientation of and the similarities and differences between parents and students, the events that led to the Iranian revolution were already in the works and, as we see, influenced, at least, the responses of those with a higher level of education to this question. It is presumed that if the above question were put to test in November/December 1978, shortly before the return of Ayatollah Khomeini to Iran from France, rather than the spring of 1978 when most of the questionnaires were actually completed, there would have been a much greater association between religious intolerance, as a political statement against the Shah and his rule, and political distrust.

It was apparent that many with a high level of education, as early as the spring of 1978, were displaying anti-government sentiments by supporting the religious establishment and the clergy. To find such a pattern developing was interesting and exciting, yet our original question and expectations remained somewhat unanswered. With the available responses, however, one cannot measure the long-term question of religious tolerance, although it seems that traditionalism and

parochialism encourage religious intolerance. A widespread margin between parent-student orientations, nevertheless, is evident from the data. Such a wide disparity, one could surmise, despite the political underpinnings, is a reflection of differing orientations between the parents and the students.

Summary. In three out of four issues discussed in this chapter, we find basic similarities between student and parent orientations on public policy issues. The similarities at first sight looked rather impressive. A more indepth analysis of the data, however, showed that the students differed substantially on at least one issue and to a significant degree on two others. The students tended basically to be less forceful in their attitudes and to follow a less resolute pattern of behavior than the parents. For example, as the graphs indicate on all issues in this chapter, there was a smaller percentage of students than parents at either end of the graphs responding either agreed strongly (+3) or disagreed strongly (-3) to the questions.

Level of education of parents seems to be the most significant variable influencing the student's behavior, while it is of little consequences for the parents themselves. In many cases there seems to be a similar level of agreement between parents who have a high level of education and the students whose fathers have had a high level of education. However, as the father's level of education decreases, a gap between parent's and student's responses begins to emerge. Furthermore, we also discover that students whose fathers have no education tend to respond more efficaciously--i.e., to give support to the

government--than those parents who had had no education. On the other hand, we find that often the students whose fathers have a high level of education tend to be as open-minded or more so, on the issues, than the parents. This finding is similar to Jennings' and Niemi's findings, where, as noted earlier, the education level tends to enhance one's interest and involvement in socio-political endeavors. In short, it is expected that education would provide a fairly reliable prediction of attitudes and orientations.

Generally, as the father's education level decreases, the student's response becomes more close-minded and a gap that exists between the student and the parent responses begins to merge until, seemingly, the students whose fathers had had no education display responses more close-minded than parents who had had no education. The largest gap between parent and student responses was between students whose fathers had had a moderate level of education and the parents who had had a moderate level of education. An exception was on the issue of government aid to unemployed where the largest difference was between the students whose fathers had had a high level of education and the parents who had had a high level of education. This attests to the fact that as the level of education of the parent sample rose, they displayed a reduced desire for government to aid the unemployed. Nevertheless, the children of highly educated parents remained strong proponents of government aid to the unemployed. The disparity in the parent-student attitude on this issue is perhaps partly due to the presense of idealism among the students. Furthermore, the need for

social security among the least educated of the parents who usually labor in unskilled professions is higher than among those with higher level of education whose skills are direly needed in the country. The parents' attitudes could also be motivated by the fact of their obligations to self and family. This would be in contrast to issues such as aid to the unemployed, which concerns itself with altruistic societal issues. Individualism, as discussed in earlier chapters, has its bias in the cultural tradition of the country. In a society where most are motivated by self-serving interests, attempts are made to secure a rewarding position within the society, and little attention is given to group needs. The above assumptions are thus held to be responsible for the difference in parent-student orientation. With support from Marshall Meyer's study of the Harvard students in the midst of the Vietnam crisis, it could be surmised that situations and events could and do radicalize students to an extent that results in students dissociating their views from that of their parents.<sup>11</sup> Such disparities in the parent-student orientation is referred to as "generation gap." The data here suggests such gaps on two of the items--aid to the unemployed and the issue of religious toleration.

Although on these two issues (variables 23 and 41), students have been shown to be more open-minded than their parents, on the question dealing with whether the "Iranian socio-political system should become a blueprint for all other nations," the students were, generally, less open-minded than the parents. As the level of father's and mother's education rose, the students gave more liberal responses,

TABLE 17

Changes in 'Liberal' Responses from Parents to Students

		parents		students		change
		%	n	%	n	%
Father's Level of Education (1)	Variable 18: "The government should (not) have plenty of power and influence over people's lives."					
	high	25%	(9)	26%	(12)	+1
	medium	18	(11)	29	(40)	+11
	low	10	(5)	18	(50)	+8
	no education	14	(3)	9	(10)	-5
	(parents) $\chi^2 = 3.4$ ; df = 3; p = .33; gamma = .260					
	(students) $\chi^2 = 17.5$ ; df = 3; p = .0006; gamma = .337					
	Variable 21: "The government should give money and food to the unemployed."					
	high	47%	(17)	83%	(40)	+36
	medium	56	(35)	66	(93)	+10
	low	55	(27)	60	(173)	+5
	no education	66	(14)	58	(66)	-8
	(parents) $\chi^2 = .873$ ; df = 3; p = .832; gamma = .035					
	(students) $\chi^2 = 11.56$ ; df = 3; p = .009; gamma = -.195					
Father's Level of Education (1)	Variable 26: "Our socio-political system should (not) be a blueprint for all other nations in the world."					
	high	35%	(13)	34%	(16)	-1
	medium	18	(10)	25	(35)	+7
	low	21	(10)	20	(56)	-1
	no education	20	(4)	15	(17)	-5
	(parents) $\chi^2 = 4.28$ ; df = 3; p = .232; gamma = .184					
	(students) $\chi^2 = 9.92$ ; df = 3; p = .03; gamma = .227					
	Variable 41: "If a person wanted to make a speech against religion in this community he should be allowed."					
	high	25%	(7)	37%	(17)	+12
	medium	28	(17)	59	(82)	+31
	low	27	(13)	43	(120)	+16
	no education	37	(6)	48	(51)	+11
	(parents) $\chi^2 = .853$ ; df = 3; p = .836; gamma = .082					
	(students) $\chi^2 = 11.66$ ; df = 3; p = .008; gamma = -.070					

(1) For parents' column, the "Father's Level of Education" is the mother's level of education when she was the respondent.



disagreeing with their system becoming a blueprint for all other nations. Nevertheless, the level of change from parents to students remained negative (see Table 17), except for those students whose parents had had high school education. Students coming from families where the fathers have had high school education seem to be a rather unique segment. The rate of change in open-minded responses from parents to students was the greatest among them, except in the case of variable 21. It seems that, generally, the students coming from this group, for reason or another, have the environment conducive to the widest change and difference from that of the parents with similar education level. Reasons for such a contrariety cannot be discerned from this data; only speculation could be made.

A somewhat more indepth evaluation of the data reveals that the size of the city of residence (cosmopolitanism), generally, is quite significant and often is associated with the respondent's attitude. Although, due to technical difficulties explained earlier, the parents' data for cosmopolitanism could not be relied on, the data for the students, however, was significantly related with variables 18 and 21. In variables 26 and 41, the items dealing with intolerance and chauvinism, however, a different kind of relationship is revealed. The data suggests that the parents and students who reside in cities labeled "second level cosmopolitan"--i.e., cities with population of 100,000 to 1,000,000--were less in favor of the item suggesting that "our socio-political system become a blueprint for all other nations," than the remaining groups in the sample. Some 76 percent of the parent sample



and 57 percent of the student sample for this category were residents of the city of Tabriz in northwest Iran. The population of this city and the whole northwest region of Iran, ethnically and linguistically, is different than the rest of the Iranians. There have been demands for autonomy in this region in the past, most recently during 1945-46. Therefore, it could be assumed that the underlying feeling of being different could be responsible for a somewhat lower level of political intolerance for both parents and students in this category, which subsequently affects the outcome of the data for level of cosmopolitanism.

In short, similarities or near similarities suggested by the data represented in Table 12 in the subsequent analysis appears to be of little relevance. There are great diversities in the parent-student orientations enhanced by many factors, namely the parental education and level of cosmopolitanism. The parents' orientations seem to be affected little by the variables that affect the student's attitudes. It is suggested that parental orientations are the result of a more complex set of variables and circumstances reinforced by longer exposure to socio-cultural traits of the environment which they are part of.

## FOOTNOTES

<sup>1</sup>M. Kent Jennings and Richard G. Niemi, The Political Character of Adolescence, (Princeton: 1974), p. 63.

<sup>2</sup>Gregory Jaynes, "Tehran Students Demand Role in University Control," New York Times (February 23, 1979) p. A3.

<sup>3</sup>Marvin Zonis, The Political Elites of Iran, (Princeton: 1971), p. 252.

<sup>4</sup>Wayne Untereiner, cited in Norman Jacobs, Sociology of Development, (New York: 1961), p. 19.

<sup>5</sup>See Chapter I, p. 1, and also see the above footnote.

<sup>6</sup>Donald Wilber, Iran; Past and Present (Princeton: 1975), see table on p. 206.

<sup>7</sup>The total circulation reported in U.N. Statistical Yearbook: 1976 (New York: 1978), Table 215, pp. 933-37; the number of daily papers reported in "List of Iranian Press," Iran Almanac and Book of Facts: 1971, (Tehran: 1972), pp. 171-180.

<sup>8</sup>Jennings and Niemi, p. 68.

<sup>9</sup>Ibid.

<sup>10</sup>Ibid., pp. 73-74.

<sup>11</sup>Marshall W. Meyer, "Harvard Students in the Midst of Crisis: A note on the sources of Leftism," Sociology of Education, 46:2 (Spring 1973), p. 216.

## CHAPTER VIII

### POLITICAL PARTICIPATION

It is purposed here that the deceptive facade put up by the government to display popular support for the regime, as described earlier, resulted in further cynicism and alienation of the public rather than in gaining support for the regime. The implications of this proposal will be demonstrated in this chapter.

The citizenship role in Iran, unlike in Western democracies, did not appear in the forms of membership in or affiliation with political groups, voting regularity, or even participation in civic responsibilities. There were a few who were members of political groups or organizations like the National Front, the Tudeh Party, or the Confederation of Iranian Students which were all "illegal." Membership in such organizations was punished by imprisonment. Voting in elections was often not a result of one's affinity for a certain political party or individual but a duty imposed on citizens, mainly those who were civil servants or factory workers since they were led to believe that they had to show their voter registration cards to receive their salaries. Civic responsibilities seldom took forms of political participation, instead they were often conducted within one's neighborhood, motivated by religious and moral duties. Thus, it is improper to use the mold developed to study political participation in the West for the

purpose of this inquiry. For analysis purpose, political alienation, general political interest, and level of political efficacy will be used as measures of the citizenship role. The measures will be used in three levels: passive, active and political efficacy. Passive measures will basically deal with the individual's interest in listening to news on the radio, watching it on television or reading it in newspapers and magazines. Active measures will be attitudes such as thinking about politics or talking about it with others. Lastly, political efficacy will measure one's responsiveness to political system functions.

#### Passive Measures

This category is measured by two variables: variable 11, "Some people often listen to news on radio or television, how about you?" and variable 12, "Some people often read newspaper and magazine articles about political, economic and social matters, how about you?". Although listening to, watching or reading about news in newspapers and magazines does not constitute an act of political participation, nevertheless, it displays a level of interest in the affairs of the country or of the world.

An analysis of the association between these two measures with indicators of active measures--"talking about politics" and "thinking about politics"--confirmed a significant relationship between these two types of measures. Therefore, it can be assumed that these

TABLE 18

## Parent-Student Comparison on 'Passive' Political Measures

passive participation on Passive Political Measures				
Passive participation variables	frequency			total
	often %	sometimes %	seldom %	
Variable 12: "Some people often listen to news on radio or television, how about you?"				
parents	81%	2%	17%	100% (168)
students	71	4	25	100% (622)
-----				
Variable 13: "Some people often read newspapers and magazine articles about political, economic and social matters, how about you?"				
parents	67%	9%	24%	100% (145)
students	65	14	21	100% (621)

indicators will be useful, even under the circumstances, in measuring political interest among both parents and students.

The media, as discussed in Chapter II, was greatly handicapped by governmental controls. Perhaps it was an indication of such controls and a perception of the unreliability of the news that resulted in no association between a student's education and his parent's education in regard to the habit of listening to news (see Table 19).

Table 19 suggests a rather significant difference between parents' and students' habits of listening to the news. Parents listen to news more often than students. On the other hand, there seems to be little difference between parents' and students' habits of reading newspaper and magazine articles about political matters. Further breakdown of the data reveals some important differences between the two samples.

TABLE 19

Cross-Tabulation of "Listening to news",  
Variable 12, with Socio-Economic Status

Socio-Economic Status		"Some people listen to news on the radio or television, how about you? I listen to it:					
		often		sometimes		seldom	
		parents	students	parents	students	parents	students
Sex	male	83%	77%	2%	3%	15%	20%
	female	71	63	3	6	26	31
(parents) $\chi^2 = 2.66$ ; df = 2; p = .26; V = .125; gamma = .336							
(students) $\chi^2 = 13.05$ ; df = 2; p = .001; V = .164; gamma = .319							
Father's Level of Education (1)	high	91%	65%	3%	4%	6%	31%
	medium	87	77	--	3	13	20
	low	76	69	4	6	20	26
	no education	52	71	5	3	43	26
(parents) $\chi^2 = 17.2$ ; df = 6; p = .008; V = .226; gamma = -.483							
(students) $\chi^2 = 3.63$ ; df = 6; p = .73; V = .067; gamma = -.035							
Mother's Level of Education	high	--	100%	--	--	--	--
	medium	--	76	--	5%	--	20%
	low	--	71	--	4	--	25
	no education	--	70	--	5	--	25
(students) $\chi^2 = 4.7$ ; df = 6; p = .57; V = .063; gamma = -.099							
Family Income Level	high	88%	72%	2%	3%	10%	25%
	medium	87	70	2	8	15	23
	low	69	72	3	3	27	25
(parents) $\chi^2 = 9.23$ ; df = 4; p = .05; V = .168; gamma = -.418							
(students) $\chi^2 = 3.5$ ; df = 4; p = .45; V = .072; gamma = -.003							
Level of Cosmopolitanism	1-high	70%	65%	4%	6%	26%	29%
	2	90	80	--	1	10	19
	3	76	76	--	3	24	21
	4	88	78	2	2	10	20
	5-low	94	89	6	3	--	8
(parents) $\chi^2 = 12.7$ ; df = 8; p = .12; V = .195; gamma = -.353							
(students) $\chi^2 = 17.6$ ; df = 8; p = .025; V = .106; gamma = -.268							

(1) For parents' column, the "Father's Level of Education" is the mother's level of education when she was the respondent.



Habit of listening to news. The data in Table 19 reveals that male students listened to news more often than female students. The chi-square probability was significant at .001 level. A significant association between a student's habit of listening to news and gender was also revealed ( $\gamma = .319$ ). Among parents there was an association between level of education and frequency of listening to news ( $\gamma = .483$ ). Gender was also significantly associated with "listening to news" in the parents' sample with male parents having this habit more often than female parents ( $\gamma = .336$ ).

Among the student respondents, the chi-square probability for fathers' education level and frequency of listening to news was not significant.

The analysis of the parent data suggested that parents with higher levels of education more frequently had the habit of listening to news. The data suggested that almost all the parents with high education level listened to news while only half of the parents with no education indicated a similar habit ( $\gamma = .483$ ).

The family income of the parents was of significance in determining whether they listened to news often. The chi-square probability was significant at .05 level, but as indicated by  $\gamma$ , there was no significant relationship between income level and habit of listening to news among parents. The cross-tabulation revealed that there was the tendency among the low income parents to listen to news less often than other income groups.

The level of cosmopolitanism was significant for students with chi-square probability at .025 level. The students in all areas, as suggested by the data, relied heavily on radio and television as their major source of news. However, the students from smaller towns and rural areas used electronic media more often than those from Tehran. While 65 percent of the students from Tehran indicated that they often listened to news on radio and television, some 89 percent did so in rural areas. The fact of printed news and information sources being less available in smaller towns and rural areas was an obvious reason for the popularity of electronic media as a source of information in smaller towns and rural areas.

In summary, the data suggested that the male students tended to listen to news on radio and television more often than female students. Furthermore, while the higher the parent's education level, the higher their frequency of listening to news, education level of parents had little impact on the student's likelihood of listening to the news. The data also indicated that as the level of cosmopolitanism decreased there was an apparent increase in frequency of listening to the news among students.

Habit of reading newspapers. The variable dealing with the habit of reading newspaper and magazine articles about political, economic and social matters, according to the data (Table 20), revealed that more male parents showed an interest in reading newspapers than did female parents. The probability of chi-square was significant at .009 level. The relationship of these items also proved to be significant

TABLE 20

Cross-Tabulation of "Reading newspapers"  
Variable 13, with Socio-Economic Status

Socio-Economic Status		"Some people read newspaper and magazine articles about political, social and economic matters, how about you?" I read them:					
		often		sometimes		seldom	
		parents	students	parents	students	parents	students
Sex	male	61%	68%	9%	13%	30%	19%
	female	48	62	3	14	48	24
(parents) $\chi^2 = 4.82$ ; df = 2; p = .009; V = .171; gamma = .295							
(students) $\chi^2 = 3.12$ ; df = 2; p = .21; V = .07; gamma = .131							
Father's Level of Education	high	83%	79%	11%	12%	6%	8%
	medium	71	76	10	12	19	12
	low	47	61	6	14	47	25
	no education	--	53	--	15	--	32
(parents) $\chi^2 = 53.8$ ; df = 6; p = .0000; V = .404; gamma = -.670							
(students) $\chi^2 = 24.7$ ; df = 6; p = .0004; V = .143; gamma = -.302							
Mother's Level of Education	high	--	100%	--	--	--	--
	medium	--	84	--	8%	--	8%
	low	--	67	--	13	--	21
	no education	--	55	--	18	--	27
(students) $\chi^2 = 26.8$ ; df = 6; p = .0002; V = .149; gamma = -.320							
Family Income Level	high	76%	74%	11%	12%	12%	14%
	medium	64	66	8	17	28	17
	low	39	57	7	13	54	29
(parents) $\chi^2 = 22.0$ ; df = 4; p = .0002; V = .260; gamma = -.510							
(students) $\chi^2 = 18.7$ ; df = 4; p = .0009; V = .124; gamma = -.245							
Level of Cosmopolitanism	1-high	64%	70%	4%	11%	33%	19%
	2	55	57	10	16	35	27
	3	54	61	12	19	33	21
	4	60	55	5	16	35	30
	5-low	56	64	19	14	25	22
(parents) $\chi^2 = 5.87$ ; df = 8; p = .66; V = .133; gamma = .039							
(students) $\chi^2 = 11.7$ ; df = 8; p = .16; V = .097; gamma = .156							

(1) For parents' column, the "Father's Level of Education" is the mother's level of education when she was the respondent.

(gamma = .295). The cross-tabulation showed a rather substantial gap (13 percent) between the male and female parents' habits of reading newspapers. Such a difference, understandably, was the direct result of a lower rate of literacy among female parents.

The level of education had a significant impact on the parent's and the student's habit of reading newspapers. Father's education level was significant and instrumental in influencing student's interest in reading newspapers and magazines (gamma = .302). Mother's education level was also a significant factor influencing the student's interest in reading newspapers (gamma = .320).

The association between parent's education level and the habit of reading newspapers and magazines was very significant (gamma = .670). The chi-square probability was significant at .0000 level, revealing that 83 percent of parents with high level of education often read newspapers, while 47 percent of those with lower level of education did the same. The finding, however, was only a demonstration of the fact that the educated read more often than those with less education.

The family income level was also significant for both parents and students in relation to their habit of reading newspapers and magazines for political news. While the chi-square probability for the students was significant at .0009 level, for the parents it was significant at .0002 level. Of those parents from high income level, 76 percent indicated that they often read newspapers, while 39 percent of those from low income level responded in a similar manner. Of the students from high income families, 74 percent indicated that they

often read newspapers and magazines, while 57 percent from low income families did the same. Certainly, since level of education and income are interdependent, and analysis of the two items showed an association significant at  $\gamma = .548$ , among parents, therefore, such a relationship was expected.

Level of cosmopolitanism proved of no significance when analyzed against either the student's or the parent's habit of reading about political matters in the printed news media.

Parent-student similarities and differences. The items denoting "passive" political interest seemingly measured similar attitudes. Listening to news and reading newspapers were associated at very significant levels: for the parents,  $\gamma$  was .808; and for the students,  $\gamma$  was .479. This indicated that those interested in the news utilized both electronic and printed media as their sources. This was particularly evident, as reflected in the data, among the parents.

The analysis showed that gender was a significant variable among parents in regard to reading newspapers, while the student data indicated that the male students listened to news more often than the female students. Parent's level of education seemed to influence both parents themselves and students in regard to reading newspapers, and parents themselves in regard to listening to electronic media. All students relied more often on printed news media than parents, with the exception of parents with high education level. It is assumed that if and when these students would attain a similar level of high education themselves, there would be an increase in their habit of reading



printed material for their source of information regarding political, social and economic matters.

The family income level was significant for both parents and students in determining their attitudes about reading newspapers. On the other hand, income level proved of no significance for either sample in determining their interest in listening to news. Furthermore, while cosmopolitanism was significant in determining level of interest in listening to news for the students, it failed to attain significance in regard to reading newspapers.

In short, one could note that while education and family income were all influential in bringing about an interest in both parents and students in regard to reading newspapers, they did not aid in frequency of listening to news, due to the basic differences in the nature of these two media. From the analysis of the data, it seemed that these two measures were perhaps suggestive of general political interest among both parents and students regardless of their political perspective. It seemed that the educated parents relied on reading material as well as electronic media as their sources of political information. On the other hand, while higher parental education caused more use of printed media among the students, the same was not true in regard to electronic media.

#### Active Measures

Active measures of political interest were measured, for the purpose of this study, by the following two items: "thinking about



politics" and "talking about politics." There may have been some procedural and built-in flaws in the questionnaire. For example, when the word politics entered the questionnaire, it may have given rise to some degree of suspiciousness and uncertainty in some respondents. They probably were not certain how confidentially their answers would be treated. There may even have been suspicions in their minds that the questionnaire had been devised by the government to find out about their political beliefs, thoughts and habits. The significant association between these two measures and with passive measures,<sup>1</sup> however, suggested that there was a great deal of consistency in both the parent and student data. As noted earlier, the respondents were given assurances that the data was for research purposes and that there was no interest in knowing the identity of the individual respondents. Names and addresses of the respondents were not asked for nor collected. Also, it may be significant to keep in mind that the time of this questionnaire coincided with some relative relaxation of the press and freedom of expression.

Over half of both parents and students noted that they never think or talk about politics! Only one out of three students, and one out of four parents indicated that they often thought or talked about politics (see Table 21). The data suggested an extremely high association between those who thought and those who talked about politics; gamma was .885 for parents and .774 for students, both highly significant.

TABLE 21

Parent-Student Comparison on 'Active' Political Measures

Active political participation measures	frequency			total %      n
	often %	sometimes %	seldom %	
Variable 14: "Some people often think about political and economic condition of our country, how about you?"				
parents	26%	17%	57%	100% (166)
students	35	15	50	100% (617)
-----				
Variable 15: "Some people talk about political and economic issues facing our contry, how about you?"				
parents	26%	11%	63%	100% (167)
students	34	14	52	100% (621)

The cross-tabulation of the data revealed some attitude differences resulting from the sex of the responding parents. Male parents thought and talked more often about politics than female parents, a likely result of higher level of education among the male parents. The chi-square probability was .002 for thinking about politics and .06 for talking about politics with parent's sex, gamma at .622 and .447 respectively, indicating a very significant association. The chi-square probability did not emerge as significant for student's sex with either measure.

The higher frequency of talking and thinking about politics among male parents is in part due to a higher level of education among them, as the cross-tabulations in Tables 22 and 23 suggested. Furthermore, the patriarchal nature of Iranian culture also contributed to

their increased level of contact with and interest in socio-political issues.

The parent's education level did associate significantly with their habit of talking about politics ( $\gamma = .419$ ) and thinking about politics ( $\gamma = .334$ ). The cross-tabulation suggested that those parents who had a higher level of education talked and thought more often about politics than those who had a lower level of education. Of those parents who had a high level of education, 44 percent talked often and 40 percent thought often about politics, while of those parents who had a low level of education, 23 percent often talked and 29 percent often thought about politics. Parent's education level was also of some significance in determining student's orientation. There was an association, with  $\gamma$  at .275 and .286, respectively, for both thinking about politics and talking about politics with father's level of education. Of those students whose father had a high level of education, 58 percent talked and 56 percent thought often about politics, whereas of those students whose fathers had no education 23 percent talked and 21 percent thought often about politics.

Mother's education level, as suggested by the data, was also significant. The chi-square probability was .003, and  $\gamma$  reflected the association between mother's level of education with thinking and talking about politics at .216 and .229 respectively.

The data also suggested that the rate of change in orientation from parents to students coming from similar educational backgrounds was lowest among students whose fathers had a low level of education

TABLE 22

Cross-Tabulation of "Thinking about politics",  
Variable 14, with Socio-Economic Status

Socio-Economic Status		"Some people often think about political and economic condition of our country, how about you?" I think about it:					
		often		sometimes		seldom	
		parents	students	parents	students	parents	students
Sex	male	31%	32%	18%	16%	50%	52%
	female	9	39	8	13	83	48
(parents) $\chi^2 = 12.1$ ; df = 2; p = .002; V = .270; gamma = .622							
(students) $\chi^2 = 3.88$ ; df = 2; p = .14; V = .08; gamma = -.101							
Father's Level of Education (1)	high	40%	56%	26%	12%	34%	31%
	medium	26	43	13	15	61	41
	low	29	33	17	14	54	53
	no education	--	21	10	16	90	62
(parents) $\chi^2 = 18.5$ ; df = 6; p = .005; V = .236; gamma = -.334							
(students) $\chi^2 = 25.9$ ; df = 6; p = .001; V = .147; gamma = -.275							
Mother's Level of Education	high	--	86%	--	--	--	14%
	medium	--	47	--	20%	--	33
	low	--	35	--	16	--	49
	no education	--	28	--	13	--	57
(students) $\chi^2 = 19.5$ ; df = 6; p = .003; V = .128; gamma = -.216							
Family Income Level	high	37%	45%	16%	14%	47%	16%
	medium	34	35	17	17	49	48
	low	13	28	15	14	72	59
(parents) $\chi^2 = 10.5$ ; df = 4; p = .03; V = .181; gamma = -.330							
(students) $\chi^2 = 16.0$ ; df = 6; p = .003; V = .115; gamma = -.221							
Level of Cosmopolitanism	1-high	14%	38%	10%	12%	75%	50%
	2	40	41	15	15	45	43
	3	30	31	9	14	61	55
	4	30	35	20	21	50	44
	5-low	40	14	47	31	13	54
(parents) $\chi^2 = 26.2$ ; df = 8; p = .001; V = .281; gamma = -.336							
(students) $\chi^2 = 18.1$ ; df = 8; p = .02; V = .121; gamma = .050							

(1) For parents' column, the "Father's Level of Education" is the mother's level of education when she was the respondent.

(Table 24). The students coming from families where the fathers had no education had the highest rate of change compared to their fathers. The difference was partly due to the fact that none of the parents with "no education" had indicated a high interest in thinking or talking about politics. Despite the lowest level of active political interest among the students coming from those of "no education" background, with 21 percent thinking and 23 percent talking about politics, the gap was considerable enough, resulting in the greatest change in orientation from parents to students coming from similar educational backgrounds.

It is apparent that a higher level of education often resulted in a broader socio-political perspective, giving an impetus to both parents and students for "active" political participation. The result was a higher level of political discourse among parents with higher level of education and among students coming from similar educational backgrounds, who by the virtue of their own education and by the exposure to a higher level of activism in families where parents have high level of education, became more conditioned to political action.

The data in Tables 21 and 22 also suggested that as the income level among families rose so did the level of political thinking and discourse. Of parents with high income level, 37 percent thought often about politics and 36 percent talked often about politics, whereas, of parents who had low income, 13 percent thought and talked about politics. The students from all three income levels were more active than the parents. Of students from high income groups, 45



TABLE 23

Cross-Tabulation of "Talking about politics,"  
Variable 15, with Socio-Economic Status

Socio-Economic Status		"Some people often talk about political and economic issues of our country with their friends, how about you?" I talk about them:					
		often		sometimes		seldom	
		parents	students	parents	students	parents	students
Sex	male	30%	33%	12%	14%	58%	53%
	female	14	34	6	15	80	50
(parents) $\chi^2 = 5.56$ ; df = 2; p = .06; V = .182; gamma = .447							
(students) $\chi^2 = .42$ ; df = 2; p = .81; V = .026; gamma = -.033							
Father's Level of Education (1)	high	44%	58%	11%	12%	44%	29%
	medium	27	41	13	15	60	44
	low	23	30	10	15	67	55
	no education	--	23	5	12	95	65
(parents) $\chi^2 = 16.9$ ; df = 6; p = .01; V = .225; gamma = -.419							
(students) $\chi^2 = 28.3$ ; df = 6; p = .0001; V = .153; gamma = -.286							
Mother's Level of Education	high	--	56%	--	22%	--	22%
	medium	--	50	--	14	--	36
	low	--	33	--	15	--	53
	no education	--	28	--	14	--	58
(students) $\chi^2 = 19.5$ ; df = 6; p = .003; V = .127; gamma = -.229							
Family Income Level	high	36%	36%	14%	18%	50%	46%
	medium	32	33	8	17	60	49
	low	13	32	12	11	75	59
(parents) $\chi^2 = 10.1$ ; df = 4; p = .04; V = .175; gamma = -.335							
(students) $\chi^2 = 7.5$ ; df = 4; p = .11; V = .079; gamma = -.109							
Level of Cosmopolitanism	1-high	19%	34%	9%	14%	72%	51%
	2	43	29	5	22	52	48
	3	24	38	6	9	70	53
	4	27	33	15	11	57	56
	5-low	33	31	27	22	40	47
(parents) $\chi^2 = 12.0$ ; df = 8; p = .15; V = .189; gamma = -.179							
(students) $\chi^2 = 8.3$ ; df = 8; p = .40; V = .081; gamma = .015							

(1) For parents' column, the "Father's Level of Education" is the mother's level of education when she was the respondent.



percent thought often about politics, while 28 percent from low income level did similarly. There was an increase of 15 percent from parents to students of the low income families in their attitude of thinking about politics, as a measure of their "active" political interest. Chi-square probability for the student data with respect to talking about politics failed to reach a significant level (see Table 22). The analysis of variables "thinking about politics" and "talking about politics" with family income supported a significant relationship with gamma at .330 and .335, respectively, for thinking and talking about politics among the parents, while failing to display any significant association with regard to the student data.

Cosmopolitanism failed to suggest any pattern of association with the respondent's frequency of "talking about politics." The probability of chi-square, however, was significant for both parents and students in regard to thinking about politics and level of cosmopolitanism. The parent data suggested an association significant with gamma at -.336 level. While 14 percent of parents from Tehran noted that they often thought about politics, some 40 percent rural areas and small towns indicated a similar habit. In general, however, the respondents from all areas, excluding Tehran, indicated a high level of "active" political interest.

Political thinking, it was hoped, would be a better measurement of political interest. Since it was assumed that while one did not necessarily report indulging himself in political discussions which supposedly could have had undesirable consequences, he would,

TABLE 24

Rate of Change from parents to Students on 'Active' Measures

Independent variable		Parents on "Active" Measures				
		parents		students		change
		%	n	%	n	%
Parents level of education	high	44%	(16)	58%	(28)	+14
	medium	27	(17)	41	(59)	+14
	low	23	(11)	30	(86)	+7
	no education	--		23	(27)	+23
	"I often think about political and economic issues facing our country."					
	high	40%	(14)	56%	(27)	+16
	medium	26	(16)	43	(60)	+17
	low	29	(14)	33	(92)	+4
	no education	--		21	(25)	+21


nonetheless, reveal a degree of politicalization or lack of it by responding to this question. Though the pattern of political thinking was supposedly of little cause for concern with the authorities, the responses we received for this question closely resembled the responses to the item denoting political discussion. As noted, there was a high measure of association for parents ( $\gamma = .885$ ) and for the students ( $\gamma = .774$ ) with the two measures of "active" political interest. In short, those who thought often about politics also often talked about it.

The level of parent's education, as well as income, influenced significantly the student's frequency of political thinking. One finding, however, stressed the importance of high family income on student's level of political thinking, while not attaining a significant

level as to their frequency of talking about politics. The data revealed that a greater rate of students from high or low income families showed interest in thinking about politics than parents with those income levels (see Table 23).

The data analysis also suggests some similarities and, in fact, some dissimilarities between parents and students from similar backgrounds. Students, in both cases, seemed to be more interested in politics and, therefore, more politicized than parents. Although gender did not seem to have a significant influence on student orientation, male parents, were interested in politics at twice the rate of female parents. Parent's education exerted a great influence on student's orientation, and was also associated, at a significant level, with their habit of talking and thinking about politics. Tables 22 and 23 suggested a high frequency of talking and thinking about politics among those parents who had a high level of education. Those with moderate or low level of education, as suggested by the data, seemed to have a similar orientation regarding "active" political participation. The most probable cause of such a differentiation, perhaps, was implicit in the nature of higher educational institutions of Iran. Historically, Iranian colleges and universities have been centers of political activism. The graduates of such institutions, by the same token, after graduation would very likely continue to express at least some of their socio-political concerns. The result, as the data suggests, is a higher level of "active" political interest among those with high education--i.e., at least some college education.

Figure 5. Scatter plot indicating the impact of education on parents "passive" and "active" orientations.




To further illustrate the relationship of passive and active habits with socio-economic status and political indicators, the results from the factor analysis of the parent and the student data was utilized here. The factor analysis indicated two factors with political interest as the main factor for both parents and students, significant at above 1.0 Eigenvalue.

The first factor was characterized by the impact of education on levels of political interest. This factor indicated that the parents who had a very low education level, a low income level, and many children in their families seldom listened to news or read newspapers and magazines concerning the socio-political and economic affairs of the country. They also seldom spoke or thought about political matters. These parents, furthermore, favored government influence and power over their lives. They also indicated a low level of efficacy, agreeing that they did not understand what was going on in the government since it was so complicated (see Fig. 5).

The students from this background also factored along the same basic line with little differentiation from parents. The students whose parents had a low education level, a low income level, and had many children in their families seldom read newspapers and magazines and seldom talked or thought about political matters. These students, moreover, favored a political system that greatly influenced citizens' lives. They indicated that all other countries in the world should adopt their socio-political system as a blueprint. These same students



Figure 6. Scatter plot indicating the impact of education on students "passive" and "active" orientations.



had a high level of trust in the government and did not think that the government should aid the unemployed (see Fig. 6).

The factor analysis, in short, supported the previous assumption that while level of education was highly associated with active and passive political interest in both parents and students, there was little association between education and active or passive political interests with political attitude and orientation. The relationship of the political variables with the other factors in the tables were too weak to be regarded as a basis for any fundamental discussion.

The second fact dealt with the habit of political interest and the impact of age. This factor was shared by both samples. It simply suggested that the male parents who were younger and had fewer children often thought and talked about politics. This factor for parents, however, was devoid of any political implications. It just suggested that active political interest was higher among parents who had small families, with youth as the overriding factor. Perhaps it was the youthful political interest, without any support by other factors such as education, that made this important.

The student index suggested that the students in upper grades more often had "passive" and "active" political interests than those in lower grades. As they got to higher classes they listened to news and read newspapers more. They also thought and talked about politics. The student factor index, however, was loaded by one political indicator. The analysis suggested that these students were rather efficacious, in that they indicated that the government paid attention

to people's needs. It could only be surmised that these efficacious students were upwardly mobile individuals who hoped to gain advantage by positive response to government demands. They hoped to be recruited into the political system, therefore, they were somewhat receptive to system demands.

### Political Efficacy

As the third measure of political interest, political efficacy is thought to function as an indicator of individual's responsiveness to political system functions. Thus, a politically efficacious individual will report a government to be responsive to his or her efforts and demands, whereas, a politically inefficacious individual is cynical of the political system. A politically efficacious individual would most likely subscribe to the system norms, and, as Easton and Dennis have argued, they would in effect support the system.<sup>2</sup>

The two questions (see Table 25) used for this part of the inquiry have often been used by researchers for measurement of political efficacy. The level of political efficacy found in this study does not resemble other studies, namely the Easton and Dennis<sup>3</sup> or the Jennings and Niemi studies.<sup>4</sup> Both of these studies reported a higher level of political efficacy among students than parents. However, in this inquiry, as indicated in Table 25, the students resemble their parents closely in their level of political efficacy. Of course, one should not closely compare studies done in a society with a high level of perceived role of citizen participation in political functions of the

TABLE 25

## Parent-Student Comparison on Levels of Political Efficacy

Efficacy/inefficacy indicators	frequency		total
	agree (inefficacy)	disagree (efficacy)	
Variable 23: "Sometimes politics and government seem so complicated that a person like me can not really understand what is going on."			
parents	80%	20%	100% (160)
students	82	18	100% (599)
-----			
Variable 31: "Over the years, the government has paid no attention to what people like me think when it decides what to do."			
parents	58%	42%	100% (162)
students	54	46	100% (584)


society to Iran under the Pahlavis. As is suggested by the high numbers of inefficacious respondents in both samples, political efficacy in Iran functioned as the level of support/lack of support for the government.

Politics are complicated. As Table 25 suggests, the level of agreement between parents and students on both issues is rather similar, which may indicate a parent-student similarity on the issue. However, as Fig. 7 reveals, there are some differences on the parent-student responses when measured on a six-level continuum. While a substantially higher percentage of parents strongly agree (+3) that "politics are complicated" than students, more students somewhat agree (+1) with the issue than parents. This indicates a more determined level of political



Figure 7

Comparison of Parent-Student Responses to Variable 23 in a Six Level Continuum



efficacy among parents than students, although our first data (Table 25) did not reveal such a trend.

The cross-tabulation of variable 23, "Sometimes politics and government seem so complicated that a person like me cannot really understand what is going on," with socio-economic status of parents and student's parents revealing some similarities between the two samples. There is no strong association between father's education and student's level of political efficacy ( $\gamma = -.195$ ), although the chi-square probability was significant at .009 level. The level of income associated at a significant level ( $\gamma = .456$ ) with political efficacy/inefficacy among the parents. Furthermore, the level of cosmopolitanism failed to indicate any significant relationship with the parent sample,

while there was a significant association between the size of student's place of residence and attitude towards this item ( $\gamma = .309$ ). As the size of their city of residence grew, there was a decline in level of political efficacy (see Table 26).

The relationship of high level of cosmopolitanism with low level of political efficacy was expected, though, at first glance, it contradicted our primary assumptions. It was earlier surmised that higher family income would result in higher level of political efficacy. Thus, assuming that since those in the more cosmopolitan areas have higher level of income and those in smaller towns and rural areas have lower income, the students in least cosmopolitan areas, by the same token, were expected to be less efficacious. The cross-tabulation of family income with variable 23, however, did not produce a significant chi-square probability and, as such, could not aid in any generalization. The following explanation, while not negating the previous assumption, will aid in understanding the relationship between cosmopolitanism and political efficacy. The attitude could be related to the respondent's interaction with or their assumptions about the functions of the political system they know best; that is, the local government. Although the Iranian political system under the Pahlavis was highly centralized and almost all orders were generated in Tehran, most students, who were not in everyday contact with government bureaucracy and the havoc of big city life, were familiar with a smaller administration, where channels of authority were more distinct and visible, and, thus, easier to digest and relate to. It would, therefore, allow one

TABLE 26

Cross-Tabulation of "Government and politics are complicated,"  
(Variable 23), with Socio-Economic Status

Socio-Economic Status		"Sometimes politics and government seem so complicated that a person like me cannot really understand what is going on."	
		Agree (political inefficacy)	
		parents	students
Sex	male	79% (100)	79% (254)
	female	80 (28)	94 (235)
(parents)	$\chi^2 = .60$ ; df = 1; p = .44; phi = .076; gamma = -.206		
(students)	$\chi^2 = 10.87$ ; df = 1; p = .001; phi = .137; gamma = -.280		
Father's Level of Education (1)	high	66% (23)	74% (35)
	medium	82 (47)	85 (119)
	low	80 (39)	83 (235)
	no education	95 (19)	81 (90)
(parents)	$\chi^2 = 7.3$ ; df = 3; p = .06; V = .213; gamma = .323		
(students)	$\chi^2 = 11.6$ ; df = 3; p = .009; V = .140; gamma = -.195		
Mother's Level of Education	high	--	71% (5)
	medium	--	85 (73)
	low	--	85 (214)
	no education	--	78 (185)
(students)	$\chi^2 = 8.7$ ; df = 3; p = .03; V = .120; gamma = -.206		
Family Income Level	high	67% (32)	78% (146)
	medium	78 (40)	84 (141)
	low	90 (54)	82 (187)
(parents)	$\chi^2 = 8.8$ ; df = 2; p = .01; V = .236; gamma = .456		
(students)	$\chi^2 = 1.44$ ; df = 2; p = .48; V = .049; gamma = -.079		
Level of Cosmopolitanism	1-high	75% (39)	85% (285)
	2	81 (17)	83 (55)
	3	81 (26)	79 (77)
	4	87 (34)	75 (48)
	5-low	69 (11)	67 (24)
(parents)	$\chi^2 = 3.4$ ; df = 4; p = .48; V = .146; gamma = -.089		
(students)	$\chi^2 = 22.0$ ; df = 4; p = .0002; V = .190; gamma = .304		

(1) For the parent's column, the "Father's Level of Education" is the mother's level of education when she was the respondent.

to gain a semblance of efficacy, particularly since the question in variable 23 was centered around the complexity of visible political and administrative posture. By the same token, life in a city like Tehran with all the everyday concerns of a hectic captial city, with most channels of authority rather blurred, plus the higher level of politicalization coupled with lesser level of political visibility caused by the sheer number of high school students, would only serve as fertile ground for political inefficacy.

The students whose fathers had a high education level displayed a high level of political efficacy. Another significant find was that the students whose fathers and mothers had no education displayed a higher level of political efficacy than those students whose parents had a low or moderate level of education. Furthermore, the increase in level of political efficacy from parents to students among the no education group was enormous, while there was a decline in level of political efficacy from parents to students among the other segments.

The orientation pattern, in some ways, resembled the association found earlier in the measures of active political interest. With little knowledge about the workings of the political system among parents with no education, and some semblance of system recognition among students who have some high school education, the wide gap between the parents with no education and the students whose parents had no education is understandable.

The family income level was related at a significant level with variable 23 among the parents. The cross-tabulation suggested that

those with a higher level of income were more efficacious than those with lower income levels. Of the parents with high income, 33 percent agreed with variable 23, whereas 10 percent of those with low income did the same.

In short, some anticipated patterns were suggested by the analysis. Among parents, a high level of education and a high level of income were associated with a decreased level of political inefficacy. The same pattern, however, was not displayed by the students. A basically similar trend was indicated by Jennings and Niemi when they administered the same question to their sample of parents and students.<sup>5</sup> The higher level of efficacy among the more educated parents, as suggested by variable 23, was the result of their education, which gave them a better understanding of what is going on in the government. The reverse is true for those with less education. The students, who all had basically similar levels of education, indicated a generally similar level of efficacy, except when overwhelmed by high parental education.

It also seems that certain students who resided in less cosmopolitan areas, motivated by upward mobility, became more responsive to the political system demands and thus were less inefficacious than those from more cosmopolitan areas.

Cross-tabulation of variable 23 with the measures of passive and active political interest along with items denoting levels of political trust or distrust were thought to give a better understanding of the impact or relationship of political efficacy/inefficacy to the



TABLE 27

Cross-Tabulation of 'Political Inefficacy,' Variable 23, with Passive and Active Participation, Trust and Distrust Political Items

Passive, active, trust and distrust variables		"Sometimes politics and government seem so complicated that a person like me cannot really understand what is going on."			
		Agree (inefficacy)		Disagree (efficacy)	
		parents	students	parents	students
Variable 12: Listening to news	often	80%	71%	91%	72%
	sometimes	2	5	6	5
	seldom	18	24	3	23
	total	100% (127)	100% (488)	100% (32)	100% (110)
(parents) $\chi^2 = 6.32$ ; df = 2; p = .035; V = .192; gamma = -.123					
(students) $\chi^2 = .44$ ; df = 2; p = .80; V = .086; gamma = .074					
Variable 13: Reading news-papers	often	58%	66%	66%	66%
	sometimes	8	14	9	10
	seldom	34	20	25	24
	total	100% (125)	100% (486)	100% (32)	100% (110)
(parents) $\chi^2 = 1.49$ ; df = 2; p = .48; V = .124; gamma = -.061					
(students) $\chi^2 = 2.82$ ; df = 2; p = .23; V = .093; gamma = .038					
Variable 14: Thinking about politics	often	30%	34%	21%	41%
	sometimes	15	16	21	9
	seldom	55	50	58	50
	total	100% (124)	100% (488)	100% (33)	100% (109)
(parents) $\chi^2 = 1.83$ ; df = 2; p = .40; V = .194; gamma = .019					
(students) $\chi^2 = 6.18$ ; df = 2; p = .04; V = .164; gamma = .065					
Variable 15: Talking about politics	often	28%	34%	25%	44%
	sometimes	11	16	9	11
	seldom	61	50	66	45
	total	100% (127)	100% (488)	100% (32)	100% (109)
(parents) $\chi^2 = .39$ ; df = 2; p = .85; V = .043; gamma = .010					
(students) $\chi^2 = 3.23$ ; df = 2; p = .20; V = .125; gamma = .059					
Variable 30: Big business influences gov't	agree	66%	71%	45%	54%
	disagree	34	29	55	46
	total	100% (125)	100% (478)	100% (33)	100% (108)
(parents) $\chi^2 = 3.66$ ; df = 1; p = .055; phi = .168; r = .168; p = .017					
(students) $\chi^2 = 11.2$ ; df = 1; p = .0008; phi = .143; r = .143; p = .0003					

continued in next page



TABLE 27 (Continued)

Variable 35:					
Gov't wastes our	agree	52%	55%	42%	40%
tax money	disagree	48	45	58	60
	total	100% (120)	100% (470)	100% (33)	100% (102)
(parents) $\chi^2 = .7$ ; df = 1; p = .41; phi = .083; r = .083; p = .153					
(students) $\chi^2 = 6.5$ ; df = 1; p = .01; phi = .111; r = .111; p = .004					
Variable 38:					
Some people in	agree	86%	82%	67%	66%
gov't are crooked	disagree	14	18	33	34
	total	100% (125)	100% (471)	100% (33)	100% (102)
(parents) $\chi^2 = 5.4$ ; df = 1; p = .025; phi = .199; r = .199; p = .006					
(students) $\chi^2 = 12.8$ ; df = 1; p = .0003; phi = .155; r = .155; p = .0001					
Variable 40:					
Gov't knows what	agree	80%	71%	97%	69%
is best for people	disagree	20	29	3	31
	total	100% (119)	100% (479)	100% (30)	100% (105)
(parents) $\chi^2 = 3.7$ ; df = 1; p = .053; phi = .181; r = -.181; p = .014					
(students) $\chi^2 = .22$ ; df = 1; p = .64; phi = .024; r = .024; p = .28					
Variable 42:					
People in the	agree	72%	65%	83%	71%
gov't are smart	disagree	28	35	17	29
	total	100% (118)	100% (474)	100% (29)	100% (106)
(parents) $\chi^2 = .89$ ; df = 1; p = .34; phi = .097; r = -.097; p = .12					
(students) $\chi^2 = 1.04$ ; df = 1; p = .31; phi = .047; r = -.047; p = .13					

political orientations of our samples, and to distinguish differences, if any, between parent and student populations.

Levels of political efficacy, as measured by variable 23, did not relate at significant levels with either passive or active political participation measures, as indicated by "listening to news," "reading newspapers," "talking and thinking about politics." Chi-square analysis resulted in below significant probability for all the cross-tabulations of parent data, except for frequency of listening to news ( $p = .035$ ). The data failed to display a significant association between frequency of listening to news and variable 23. There was a somewhat similar

outcome from the analysis of the student data. Chi-square probability was only significant for cross-tabulation of "thinking about politics" and variable 23 ( $p = .04$ ), once again with no significant association as indicated by gamma. In short, there were no significant relationships between political inefficacy, as indicated by variable 23, and passive or active political participation measures.

The levels of political trust/distrust, which will be dealt with in detail in Chapter IX, were the next control items in the analysis of efficacy. Variables 30, 35 and 38 indicated distrust in the government while variables 40 and 42 indicated levels of trust in the government. (Throughout this discussion refer to Table 27.)

The inefficacious respondents, both parents and students, as suggested by the data, had less trust in the government than the efficacious respondents. The analysis of the parent data did not reveal any major association between political trust/distrust and political efficacy at levels considered significant. Of the five analyses based on Pearson's correlation, none attained a level of .005 which was regarded in this discussion as significant.

In variable 30, "The government was influenced by a few big interests," the data indicated a chi-square probability significant at .0008 level, with Pearson's correlation also significant at .0003 level for the student sample with political efficacy--i.e., variable 23. Of the efficacious students, 54 percent agreed with variable 30, while of the inefficacious students, 71 percent did the same. There

was an increase of 17 percent in level of distrust from efficacious to inefficacious students.

In variable 35, "The government is wasting the taxpayers' money," the student data revealed a chi-square probability significant at .01 level, with Pearson's correlation also significant at .004 level (see Table 27). The cross-tabulation of the student data suggested that there was an increase in level of distrust in government from efficacious to inefficacious students. Of the efficacious students, 40 percent agreed with the statement, whereas, of the inefficacious, 55 percent did the same.

In variable 38, "Some people in the government are crooked," the analysis revealed that the chi-square probability was significant at .025 level for parents and at .0003 level for students, with Pearson's correlations also significant at .0001 level for the latter. Although the Pearsons correlation for the parent data failed to attain the .005 level, nonetheless, based on measurement of association indicated by gamma, the relationship was significant ( $\gamma = .496$ ). Based on the cross-tabulation of the efficacious students, 66 percent agreed with the statement in variable 38, while 82 percent of the inefficacious agreed. There was an increase of 16 percent in distrust of government from efficacious to inefficacious students. Of the efficacious parents, 67 percent agreed with variable 38, while 86 percent of the inefficacious did the same. There was an increase of 19 percent in level of government distrust from efficacious to inefficacious parents.

Of the two items dealing with political trust, the only one with significant chi-square probability in the parent data was between variable 40, "The government knows what is best for people," and variable 23, at .053 level. The correlation analysis for this table also failed to reach the anticipated level of significance. Based on the analysis of cross-tabulation, however, it was indicated that of the efficacious parents, 97 percent agreed with the statement, whereas, of the inefficacious, 80 percent did the same; a decline of 17 percent in level of government support from efficacious to inefficacious parents.

In the last item dealing with political trust, variable 42, "The people running the government are smart," the data ceased to indicate any significant chi-square probability for either sample.

In summary, neither set of data revealed any strong links between political efficacy and "passive" political interest. There were also no major associations between political efficacy and "active" political interest. The data, however, suggested significant relationships between political distrust and political inefficacy, particularly among the students. In short, the data supported the earlier assumptions that politically efficacious individuals more often will subscribe to system norms and have a higher level of trust in government, while the politically inefficacious individuals will behave in an opposite manner.


Government pays no attention. The second item in this section dealing with political efficacy/inefficacy was variable 31, "Over the years, the government has paid no attention to what people like me think when it decides what to do." This item, like the previous one, has often been

used in research to measure the level of political efficacy. This item, as seen in Table 25, received a more efficacious response than variable 23 since it made a more forceful and less ambiguous suggestion that indicated a more indepth feeling between the individual and system functions. Without any pretense, the statement attempted to engage the respondent in a situation whereby his or her ascription to system norms could be measured. Perhaps it was for this reason that the two variables, variable 23 and 31, did not even correlate ( $p = .119$ ) in the parent data. Thus, it could be assumed that the two variables were not measuring exactly the same attitudes. The assumption was that variable 31, as suggested above, measured a higher level of political efficacy/inefficacy, perhaps coupled with some measure of political trust/distrust in the government.

The level of political efficacy, and, therefore, support for system norms, as suggested by this item (see Fig. 5), was higher than in variable 23. Some 42 percent of parents and 46 percent of students responded efficaciously as measured by variable 31, in contrast to 20 and 18 percent respectively, as measured by variable 23. The students responded to this question in a slightly more efficacious manner than did the parents, whereas, the parents responded somewhat more efficaciously to variable 23. In either case, the differences between the two groups were minimal and did not seem to be statistically significant. Furthermore, as Fig. 8 shows, when the two groups were compared in a six-level continuum, the similarities between the two samples were rather striking.

Figure 8

Comparison of Parent-Student Responses to Variable 31 in a Six Level Continuum



The data analysis, however, indicated some basic dissimilarities. While the chi-square probability for the cross-tabulation of student's gender with variable 31 was significant at .05 level, it failed to display any significant association between the two ( $\gamma = -.170$ ). The cross-tabulation, however, suggested that male students were slightly more efficacious than female students. Of the female students, 59 percent gave efficacious responses, while 51 percent of the male students did the same. The explanation put forth previously as to the higher percentage of female students from families with a higher level of education was credited with a pronounced orientation among female students resulting in a higher level of inefficacy among the male students, since higher level of parental education, as will



TABLE 28

Cross-Tabulation of "Government pays no attention to people,"  
(Variable .31), with Socio-Economic Status

Socio-Economic Status		"Over the years, the government has paid no attention to what people like me think when it decides what to do."	
		Agree (political inefficacy)	
		parents	students
Sex	male	61% (79)	51% (159)
	female	48 (16)	59 (159)
(parents) $\chi^2 = 1.16$ ; df = 1; p = .28; phi = .10; gamma = .244 (students) $\chi^2 = 3.86$ ; df = 1; p = .055; phi = .085; gamma = -.170			
Father's Level of Education (1)	high	71% (25)	74% (34)
	medium	54 (33)	58 (79)
	low	52 (25)	50 (135)
	no education	63 (12)	55 (60)
(parents) $\chi^2 = 3.87$ ; df = 3; p = .27; V = .154; gamma = -.130 (students) $\chi^2 = 10.1$ ; df = 3; p = .02; V = .134; gamma = -.137			
Mother's Level of Education	high	--	57% (4)
	medium	--	64 (54)
	low	--	57 (141)
	no education	--	48 (111)
(students) $\chi^2 = 7.4$ ; df = 3; p = .06; V = .114; gamma = .192			
Family Income Level	high	57% (27)	60% (110)
	medium	62 (32)	57 (92)
	low	57 (34)	47 (106)
(parents) $\chi^2 = .30$ ; df = 2; p = .86; V = .043; gamma = -.018 (students) $\chi^2 = 7.0$ ; df = 2; p = .03; V = .111; gamma = -.177			
Level of Cosmopolitanism	1- high	53% (29)	61% (209)
	2	67 (14)	55 (37)
	3	59 (19)	49 (41)
	4	63 (24)	39 (24)
	5- low	50 (8)	24 (8)
(parents) $\chi^2 = 2.31$ ; df = 4; p = .68; V = .119; gamma = -.059 (students) $\chi^2 = 27.4$ ; df = 4; p = .0000; V = .216; gamma = .321			

(1) For the parent's column, the "Father's Level of Education" is the mother's level of education when she was the respondent.

be discussed shortly, seemingly was associated with increased political inefficacy among students.

The analysis also revealed that while there were relationships between some of the socio-economic variables and the student's efficacy level, no significant association existed in the parent data. Among the students the chi-square probability for father's level of education and variable 31 was significant at .02 level. Of those students whose fathers had a high level of education, 74 percent gave inefficacious responses, whereas, 50 percent of the students whose fathers had low education and 55 percent whose fathers had no education gave inefficacious responses.

The chi-square probability for mother's education and level of efficacy/inefficacy was just below significance at .06 level. The chi-square probability for family income and variable 31 was significant at .03 level for the students. The cross-tabulation analysis showed that, of the students from high income families, 60 percent gave inefficacious responses, whereas, 47 percent of the students from income families did the same.

Finally, the chi-square probability for level of cosmopolitanism and variable 31 among the students was significant at .0000 level. Also, as indicated by the data, there was a significant association ( $\gamma = .321$ ) between the two variables. Of the students from small towns and rural areas, 24 percent responded inefficaciously, while 61 percent of the students from Tehran did the same. Higher level of education and income, plus the living conditions in the more

cosmopolitan areas, as discussed above, are perhaps responsible for the negative association between cosmopolitanism and political efficacy.

As indicated in Table 28, in contrast to variable 23, where students with higher parental education had a higher level of political efficacy, in variable 31 those with highest parental education and income had the lowest level of political efficacy. Such a finding is not all that unexpected since one would assume that individuals with lower education level would have less understanding of politics and government. On the other hand, those with a higher level of education would anticipate a higher level of interplay with and response from the system and would have more explicit demands on the system. They, thus, would be less efficacious when measured by the statement "The government pays no attention to what people think when it decides what to do." Furthermore, there were several other reasons for such an otherwise unexpected difference in orientation of students, most of which have been discussed previously when resulting in similar circumstances. They include heightened idealism among students, particularly among those from more educated backgrounds. The disparity in parent-student orientation, particularly among the well-to-do, has already been noted with references to Marshall Meyer's study of Harvard students in the midst of the Vietnam war.<sup>6</sup> In short, the more efficacious the parents, that is the more highly educated with higher income, who interact positively with the prevailing system, the more inefficacious the students, who, at least during their youth, tended to become more

socially and politically conscious and active. As a result, some students emerged as inefficacious and dejected by the system functions. This interplay, augmented by political repression in the country, may have been greatly responsible for the drop in the efficacy rate from parents to students among the high income groups. The opposite is also true; some students from lower income families tended to favor the system more than parents from similar groups since, having already attained a level of education higher than their parents, they can expect to reap better economic benefits than their parents. An obvious example was the great number of lower and lower-middle class joining the ranks of the armed forces, the national police, and the secret police, SAVAK, as system support elements. Of course, such was not the general orientation of either group, as suggested also by the data. Those few who were coopted into the system, however, resulted in some change in orientation pattern from parents to students as indicated by the foregoing analysis. Furthermore, the assumption that the children of the less educated and lower income groups with upward mobility drive become more efficacious and support the system norms also seemed to be relevant in this case. This aided the assumption that, either for financial gains or lack of political convictions, there was a tendency among those students with low parental education levels and lower income to support the system functions in the hope of securing a position within the system. For example, in recent years the ranks of the armed forces and the national police have been filled with junior officers who were mostly from very humble backgrounds. It was alleged

TABLE 29

Cross-Tabulation of 'Political Inefficacy,' Variable 31, with Passive and Active Participation, Trust and Distrust Political Items

Passive, active, trust, and distrust variables	"Over the years, the government has paid no attention to what people like me think when it decides what to do."				
	Agree (inefficacy)		Disagree (efficacy)		
		parents	students	parents	students
Variable 12: Listening to news	often	80%	68%	82%	74%
	sometimes	3	7	2	3
	seldom	17	25	16	23
	total	100% (94)	100% (318)	100% (67)	100% (259)
(parents) $\chi^2 = .52$ ; df = 2; p = .78; V = .060; gamma = -.008					
(students) $\chi^2 = .16$ ; df = 2; p = .90; V = .059; gamma = -.078					
Variable 13: Reading news-papers	often	59%	67%	58%	64%
	sometimes	11	14	5	12
	seldom	30	19	38	24
	total	100% (93)	100% (317)	100% (66)	100% (265)
(parents) $\chi^2 = 2.24$ ; df = 2; p = .30; V = .199; gamma = .054					
(students) $\chi^2 = 2.8$ ; df = 2; p = .23; V = .134; gamma = .068					
Variable 14: Talking about politics	often	34%	40%	16%	28%
	sometimes	12	15	9	14
	seldom	54	45	75	58
	total	100% (92)	100% (315)	100% (65)	100% (262)
(parents) $\chi^2 = 7.8$ ; df = 2; p = .022; V = .261; gamma = .347					
(students) $\chi^2 = 11.16$ ; df = 2; p = .002; V = .254; gamma = .316					
Variable 15: Thinking about politics	often	32%	40%	20%	30%
	sometimes	17	14	13	16
	seldom	51	47	67	54
	total	100% (93)	100% (316)	100% (66)	100% (263)
(parents) $\chi^2 = 4.4$ ; df = 2; p = .11; V = .196; gamma = .252					
(students) $\chi^2 = 5.27$ ; df = 2; p = .062; V = .179; gamma = .232					
Variable 30: Big business influences gov't	agree	73%	71%	43%	63%
	disagree	27	29	57	37
	total	100% (92)	100% (313)	100% (68)	100% (261)
(parents) $\chi^2 = 13.6$ ; df = 1; p = .0002; phi = .304; r = .304; p = .0000					
(students) $\chi^2 = 3.2$ ; df = 1; p = .07; phi = .078; r = .078; p = .03					

continued in next page . . .



TABLE 29 (continued)

Variable 35: Gov't wastes our tax	agree	72%	49%	18%	29%
	disagree	28	51	82	71
	total	100% (92)	100% (313)	100% (67)	100% (262)
(parents) $\chi^2 = 42.8$ ; df = 1; p = .0000; phi = .531; r = .531; p = .0000					
(students) $\chi^2 = 102$ ; df = 1; p = .0000; phi = .425; r = .425; p = .0000					
Variable 38: Some people in gov't are crooked	agree	93%	89%	64%	67%
	disagree	7	11	36	33
	total	100% (94)	100% (317)	100% (67)	100% (9258)
(parents) $\chi^2 = \pm 8.5$ ; df = 1; p = .0000; phi = .355; r = .355; p = .0000					
(students) $\chi^2 = 38.8$ ; df = 1; p = .0000; phi = .264; r = .264; p = .0000					
Variable 40: Gov't knows what is best for people	agree	80%	71%	97%	69%
	disagree	20	29	3	31
	total	100% (84)	100% (310)	100% (67)	100% (255)
(parents) $\chi^2 = 16.8$ ; df = 1; p = .0001; phi = .352; r = -.352; p = .0000					
(students) $\chi^2 = 34.5$ ; df = 1; p = .0000; phi = .251; r = -.251; p = .0000					
Variable 42: People in the gov't are smart	agree	63%	53%	88%	81%
	disagree	37	47	12	19
	total	100% (84)	100% (311)	100% (68)	100% (254)
(parents) $\chi^2 = 11.2$ ; df = 1; p = .0008; phi = .286; r = -.286; p = .0002					
(students) $\chi^2 = 46.6$ ; df = 1; p = .0001; phi = .291; r = -.291; p = .0000					

that some had even been recruited out of orphanages. This changed the traditional complexion of the armed forces and the police which had previously been filled from the middle class. With the increased unpopularity of the army after the fall of Mossadegh, particularly with the army's participation in suppression of the June 1963 uprising, an army career had become less enticing to the middle class. The economic boom of the 1970s that benefited the middle class saw the children of the middle class vying for professional careers outside the armed forces. Thus, the ranks of the armed forces and the police began to be filled with recruits from among the high school graduates of the low income



families. Thus, it is not surprising to find a higher level of political efficacy among those students who came from families with lower incomes and from less cosmopolitan areas.

Cross-tabulations and Pearson's correlation analysis of variable 31 with "passive" and "active" political interests and the levels of political interests and the levels of political trust/distrust in the government also proved very useful in the understanding of political efficacy/inefficacy.

Although no significant association between "passive" political interests and variable 31 was found, the analysis indicated a significant chi-square probability in both samples between "talking about politics," with variable 31 indicating a chi-square probability significant at .02 level for parents and at .022 level for students. There were also significant associations between the two variables among the parents ( $\gamma = .374$ ) and among the students ( $\gamma = .316$ ). Of the efficacious parents, 16 percent often talked about politics and of the inefficacious, 34 percent did the same. There was an increase of 18 percent in the number of inefficacious parents who often talked about politics. Of the efficacious students, 16 percent often talked about politics, whereas, of the inefficacious, 40 percent did similarly. This was an increase of 24 percent in frequency of talking about politics from efficacious to inefficacious students. Increased political "activism" among inefficacious, whether parents or students, was universal. Despite the severe controls on public protest against the government and its policies, political activism and anti-government agitation

continued among the inefficacious adults and students. It happened mainly by discussion of political issues with peers in school and by participation in marches and demonstrations in the streets during the 1978-79 uprising.

The inefficacious adults, despite the controls and limitations, also expressed their opinions to trusted friends, relatives, or cohorts. These expressions took varying forms, including participation in religious ceremonies or even associations with literary circles. Poetry and anecdotes were often used to express opinions, especially since the wealth of Persian literature provides an almost endless resource which can be utilized for naked or veiled socio-political expressions (see Chapter II).

The cross-tabulation of variable 31 with "thinking about politics," did not attain a significant chi-square probability for either the parent or the student sample. However, the analysis of variable 31 with political trust/distrust variables suggested significant associations between them. Cross-tabulation analysis and Pearson's correlation analysis were used to analyze the relationships. As in variable 23, the inefficacious respondents, both parents and students, indicated distrust in government, while the efficacious respondents displayed a greater level of trust in it.

In the analysis of variable 31 with variable 30, "The government was influenced by a few big interests," there was a significant correlation ( $r = .304$ ) at .0000 level for parents. Of the efficacious parents, 43 percent agreed with the item, while 73 percent of the inefficacious

parents did the same. This was an increase of 30 percent in government distrust from efficacious to inefficacious parents. The analysis of the student data, however, did not indicate a significant chi-square probability.

In regard to variable 35, "The government wasted our tax money," there was a correlation with variable 31 for parents ( $r = .531$ ), significant at .0000 level and for students ( $r = .425$ ) also significant at .0000 level. Of the efficacious parents, 18 percent agreed with the statement, while 72 percent of those labeled inefficacious agreed. This was an increase of 52 percent in level of distrust in government from efficacious to inefficacious parents. Of the efficacious students, 29 percent agreed with variable 31, whereas, 49 percent of the inefficacious responded in a similar manner. This was an increase of 20 percent in government distrust from efficacious to inefficacious students.

In regard to variable 38, "Some people in the government are crooked," there was a correlation with variable 31 for parents ( $r = .355$ ), significant at .0000 level. Of the efficacious parents, 64 percent agreed with the suggestion in variable 31, while 93 percent of the inefficacious agreed. This was an increase of 29 percent in government distrust from efficacious to inefficacious parents. Of the efficacious students, 67 percent agreed with the suggestion, whereas, 89 percent of the inefficacious did the same. This was an increase of 22 percent in government distrust from efficacious to inefficacious students.

Levels of trust in the government, indicated by response to the following two questions, further revealed the relationship between trust in government and political efficacy. Stressing the assumption that the inefficacious disapproved of system functions present in the Shah's government, the efficacious approved of and interacted positively with the system functions. Both variables 40 and 42 correlated significantly with variable 31, denoting political efficacy, at above .001 level for both parents and students.

In regard to variable 40, "The government knows what is best for people," there was a significant correlation with variable 31 for parents ( $r = -.352$ ), at .0000 level of significance. Of the efficacious parents, 98 percent agreed with the statement in variable 40, while 73 percent of the inefficacious did the same. Despite the indication that the vast majority of the respondents displayed trust in government, nonetheless, there was a decline of 25 percent in level of trust in government from efficacious to inefficacious parents. The analysis of the student data indicated a significant correlation ( $r = -.251$ ), significant at .0000 level. Of the efficacious students, 84 percent agreed with the statement in variable 40, while 61 percent of the inefficacious did the same. There was a decline of 23 percent in government trust from efficacious to inefficacious students.

The second item dealing with trust in government was variable 42, "People in the government are smart." There was a significant correlation ( $r = -.286$ ), at .0002 level of significance with variable 31. Of the efficacious parents, 88 percent agreed with the statement

while 63 percent of the inefficacious did the same. There was a decline of 25 percent in level of government trust from efficacious to inefficacious parents. The student data indicated a significant correlation ( $r = -.291$ ) at .0000 level. Of the efficacious students, 81 percent agreed with variable 42, while 53 percent of the inefficacious responded similarly. Once again, there was a decline of 28 percent in government trust from efficacious to inefficacious students.

As the above data indicates, there was a suggested association between distrust of government and respondent's inefficacy. On the average, there was an increase of 32 percent in government distrust from efficacious to inefficacious parents and an increase of 18 percent in government distrust from efficacious to inefficacious students. In general, the students displayed a higher level of political efficacy than the parents.

The data also indicated an increase in level of political efficacy from parents to students in both variables 23 and 31 (see Table 30). The table suggests that in all cases, except in the case of variable 23 with variable 38, there was an increase in level of efficacy, as high as 20 percent, from parents to students. This find is similar to the Jennings and Niemi study of the American parents and students, where there was a reported increase of 13 to 17 percent in rate of efficacy from parents to students.<sup>7</sup> Similar findings were also reported by Jack Dennis, in his study of the eleventh-graders and their parents in Milwaukee, Wisconsin.<sup>8</sup>



TABLE 30

Change in Level of Political Efficacy from Parents to Students\*

Trust/distrust variables	Variable 23; "Politics and government are complicated for a person like me."			Variable 31; "Government pays no attention to what people like me think."		
	efficacious responses			inefficacious responses		
	parents	students	change	parents	students	change
Variable 30: Big business influence gov't. parents students	66% r = .168; p = .017 r = .143; p = .0003	71% r = .168; p = .017 r = .143; p = .0003	+5	43% r = .304; p = .0000 r = .078; p = .03	63% r = .304; p = .0000 r = .078; p = .03	+20
Variable 35: Gov't wastes our tax money. parents students	52% r = .083; p = .153 r = .111; p = .004	55% r = .083; p = .153 r = .111; p = .004	+3	18% r = .531; p = .0000 r = .425; p = .0000	29% r = .531; p = .0000 r = .425; p = .0000	+11
Variable 38: Some people in gov't are crooked. parents students	85% r = .199; p = .006 r = .155; p = .0001	82% r = .199; p = .006 r = .155; p = .0001	-4	64% r = .355; p = .0000 r = .204; p = .0000	67% r = .355; p = .0000 r = .204; p = .0000	+3
Variable 40: Gov't knows what is best for people. parents students	20% r = -.181; p = .014 r = -.024; p = .28	29% r = -.181; p = .014 r = -.024; p = .28	+9	27% r = -.352; p = .0000 r = -.251; p = .0000	39% r = -.352; p = .0000 r = -.251; p = .0000	+12
Variable 42: People in the gov't are smart. parents students	28% r = -.097; p = .12 r = -.047; p = .13	35% r = -.097; p = .12 r = -.047; p = .13	+7	37% r = -.286; p = .0002 r = -.291; p = .0000	47% r = -.286; p = .0002 r = -.291; p = .0000	+10

(\*) Cross-tabulation analysis for the parents data between variables 23 and 35, 23 and 42, and in the students data between variables 23 and 40, 23 and 42, 31 and 30 did not achieve significant chi-square probabilities.



It is proposed here that the higher level of political efficacy among students indicated that the influence of the educational system, whereby political efficacy was taught by the educational institutions and through textbooks, resulted in some positive response to the government. The fact that these students have not had a chance to test their interactions with the government as of yet also contributed to their higher level of political efficacy.

In contrast, distrust of government and alienation among parents resulted in lower efficacy. As noted previously, in some cases even education was a factor in increasing the level of political inefficacy. In this case, based on the nature of the question and the socio-political situation under the Shah's rule, the demands of the educated were more articulated and were perceived by the regime to be contrary to its own best interests, since many such demands included basic political reforms. These were thus less likely to materialize than demands from the less educated and poorer citizens who desired such things as higher wages and job security.

#### Parent-Student Similarities and Differences

In this chapter, more differences between parents and students were encountered than similarities. While socio-economic status was of some value in determining the attitudes of parents, it proved of more value in determining the attitudes of the students. Parent's education, family income, cosmopolitanism were all of major significance in the shaping of student orientations. The data has shown that the majority

of parents of students did listen to news on radio and watched news on television. In contrast, the majority of the same respondents indicated that they seldom thought or talked about political matters, displaying a high degree of political inefficacy. An obvious consequence would be a citizenry who at least appeared to be politically aloof, seldom taking part in the political processes of the nation. This high rate of political inefficacy impeded the aggregation of political demands on the government. As a result, few grassroots political parties or other such political institutions developed.

In short, "passive" political interest measures did not emerge as significant in typifying either the student or the parent sample. Both parents and students, regardless of their political mode, engaged in "passive" political behavior equally.

Parental education emerged as one of the most significant indicators of the likelihood that a student would engage in "active" political behavior, and their own education was equally important in determining the parent's behavior.

As noted earlier, parental education was of significance in determining if the students would be politically efficacious, which in turn influenced individual trust/distrust of the government. The efficacy/inefficacy level of students, moreover, seemed to be influenced by different variables for different groups. The efficacy level of the students whose fathers had a higher level of education was lower than the parents in the case of variable 31 and higher in the case of

variable 23. Such an inverse relationship was due to the nature of the question, it is proposed, and not a contradictory finding.

Parental education emerges as the most persistent determinant of political efficacy/inefficacy, as seen in the case of those students coming from families with high parental education. On the other hand, those students who come from more humble backgrounds were more influenced by their own education than by that of their parents. The data also suggested that, at these levels, cosmopolitanism became a major factor influencing the student's orientation. It is proposed here that many students from smaller towns and rural areas, who also come from families with low or no education background, found recruitment into the system as a major avenue open to them for upward mobility, and were also less politicized due to the more simple nature of their communities. For this reason a perceptible increase in the level of political efficacy among the students from the least cosmopolitan areas and with lower than average parental education was observed. It should also not be ignored that since the land reforms which increased the influence of the central government in rural areas due to the removal of landlords, the regime had done its utmost to create a support foundation for itself among the farmers. Although it has been suggested that this policy failed in many cases, the government, as late as December 1978, was able to muster support for the faltering Pahlavi regime from the rural population.<sup>9</sup>

Finally, it is presumed that in the absence of a strong familial politicalization effect on students from families with low or no

education, the apparent void was filled by other agents, namely peers, or by the socialization and politicalization attempts undertaken by the system, particularly through the educational system and mass communication. The result, as the data suggests, was a higher level of political efficacy among the students, particularly among those whose parents had lower education levels.

## FOOTNOTES

<sup>1</sup>Following are the strength of associations between "passive" and "active" variables as measured by gamma. For parents: "listening to news" and "thinking about politics," gamma = .644; with "talking about politics," gamma = .592. For students: "listening to news" and "thinking about politics," gamma = .389; with "talking about politics," gamma = .369. For parents: "reading newspapers" with "thinking about politics," gamma = .647; with "talking about politics," gamma = .729. For students: "reading newspapers" with "thinking about politics," gamma = .435; with "talking about politics," gamma = .774. All the above cross tabulations had a chi-square probability significant at .0000 level.

<sup>2</sup>David Easton and Jack Dennis, "The Child's Acquisition of Regime Norms: Political Efficacy," The American Political Science Review (March 1967), pp. 25-38.

<sup>3</sup>David Easton and Jack Dennis, Children in the Political System (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1969).

<sup>4</sup>M. Kent Jennings and Richard G. Niemi, The Political Character of Adolescence (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974), p. 126.

<sup>5</sup>Jennings and Niemi, p. 126.

<sup>6</sup>Marshal W. Meyer, "Harvard Students in the Midst of Crisis: A Note on the Sources of Leftism," Sociology of Education (Spring 1973, no. 2), p. 204.

<sup>7</sup>Jennings and Niemi, table on page 125.

<sup>8</sup>Jack Dennis, "Political Learning in Childhood and Adolescence: A Study of Fifth, Eighth and Eleventh Graders in Milwaukee, Wisconsin," Madison, University of Wisconsin Research and Development Center for Cognitive Learning, 1969, p. 27, cited in Jennings and Niemi.

<sup>9</sup>"Hard Choices in Tehran," Time, December 25, 1978, see also "A Case of Worrying Perception," p. 38, an interview with Mashhadi Mohammad Nik-Dehghan, a farmer. Farmers' support for the regime was also reported by UPI on December 13, 1978, cited in New Castle News, New Castle, Pennsylvania, reporting attacks on anti-Shah groups, in one of which, in Isfahan, some 40 people were reportedly killed. See also New York Times, December 14, 1978.

## C H A P T E R        I X

### POLITICAL TRUST AND DISTRUST

In Chapter VIII it was discussed in detail that political efficacy was positively associated with political trust; those who had a higher level of political efficacy also had a higher level of trust in the government. However, the data had suggested that not all the efficacious respondents trusted the government. There were many efficacious respondents who did not trust the government and there were many inefficacious respondents who had indicated trust in the government (see Tables 27 and 28). In this chapter, the aim is to discuss the attributes of those individuals, both parents and students, who trust or distrust the government. Furthermore, attempts will be made to explore the similarities and dissimilarities between the parent and the student populations.

The five items in this chapter, as displayed in Table 31, are ordered in a Guttman scale so that the top of the table is the highest level of trust in government while the bottom of the table represents the lowest level of trust in government among the respondents. The responses of both parents and students have met our scaling requirements in both cases. Due to the unique situation and differing circumstances in each case study, different scaling methods have been utilized than those used in other research studies of a similar kind.<sup>1</sup> In Guttman



TABLE 31

Level of Trust in Government and Change from Parents to Students (\*)

Trust/distrust variables	parents %	students %	change %
The government usually knows what is best for people (variable 40)			
agree	83	71	-12
People running the government are smart and usually know what they are doing (variable 42)			
agree	74	66	-8
The government wastes needlessly a lot of the money we pay in taxes (variable 35)			
disagree	51	48	-3
Some people believe that the government is influenced by a few big interests (variables 30)			
disagree	40	33	-7
I think some people in the government are crooked (variable 38)			
disagree	19	21	+2

(\*) For variables 40 and 42, levels of agreement are regarded as trust in the government, whereas, for variables 30, 35 and 38, levels of disagreement are regarded as such.


scaling, it is stipulated that those who respond favorably, for example, to item 3 also will respond favorably to items 1 and 2, but not necessarily favorably to items 4 and 5. In Table 31, while negative responses for items 1 and 2 were regarded as a level of distrust, positive responses for items 3 through 5 were regarded as such. Adjustments were made in the computations so all items were scaled in one slope. Thus, item 5 measured the lowest level of trust, while item 1 measured the highest level. The coefficient of reproducibility for parents' data was .91 and for students' data it was .93.

The simple data analysis in the Table 31 indicates a decline in government trust from parents to students in all cases, except in one. The increase of two percent was in the case of variable 38, measuring the lowest level of trust and the highest level of distrust. The higher level of trust among parents, apparent from Table 31, is contradictory to the studies of American parent-student attitudes. Jennings and Niemi found that students trusted the government twice as often as parents, giving the students, rather than parents, a higher level of trust in government.<sup>2</sup> Thus, further analysis of the data is needed to establish a pattern and also identify causes of a somewhat higher level of distrust among the students.

Government distrust. For analysis purpose, we shall, however, start from variable 38 which received the highest level of answers indicating distrust in government. As the following graph (Fig. 9) suggests, while there was a rather similar disagreement level among parents and students when viewed in a six-level continuum (Fig. 9), there was a

Figure 9

Comparison of Parent-Student Responses to Variable 38 in a Six Level Continuum



substantial difference in frequencies of agreement. While the students were rather evenly divided between the three frequencies of agreement, the parents showed a rather assertive orientation, mostly agreeing (+2) or strongly agreeing (+3) with the statement that "some people in the government are crooked."

The cross-tabulation analysis of socio-economic status with variable 38 revealed no significant relationship for either the parents or the students. None of the nine cross-tabulations (see Table 32) attained a significant chi-square probability.

The question itself, suggesting that only "some people in the government were crooked," instead of many, most or all, is greatly responsible for bringing out such a vehement response agreeing with the statement, since even in the more idealistic societies there certainly

TABLE 32

Cross-Tabulation of "Some people in the government are crooked"  
(variable 38) With Socio-Economic Status

Socio-economic status		"Some people in the government are crooked."	
		Agree (distrust in government)	
		parents	students
Sex	male	81% (106)	79% (249)
	female	80 (28)	78 (213)
(parents) $\chi^2 = .001$ ; $df = 1$ ; $p = .97$ ; $\phi = .061$ ; $\gamma = .049$			
-----			
Father's Level of Education (1)	high	84% (31)	87 (42)
	medium	80 (48)	79 (107)
	low	81 (39)	78 (212)
	no education	80 (16)	79 (88)
(parents) $\chi^2 = .23$ ; $df = 3$ ; $p = .97$ ; $V = .038$ ; $\gamma = -.045$			
(students) $\chi^2 = 2.4$ ; $df = 3$ ; $p = .49$ ; $V = .065$ ; $\gamma = -.059$			
-----			
Mother's Level of Education	high	--	86% (6)
	medium	--	86 (67)
	low	--	79 (201)
	no education	--	76 (175)
(students) $\chi^2 = 2.5$ ; $df = 3$ ; $p = .46$ ; $V = .066$ ; $\gamma = -.129$			
-----			
Family Income Level	high	74% (37)	81% (153)
	medium	73 (44)	77 (124)
	low	72 (49)	77 (175)
(parents) $\chi^2 = 2.5$ ; $df = 2$ ; $p = .28$ ; $V = .124$ ; $\gamma = .149$			
(students) $\chi^2 = 1.3$ ; $df = 2$ ; $p = .53$ ; $V = .045$ ; $\gamma = -.086$			
-----			
Level of Cosmopolitanism	1-high	79% (44)	81% (268)
	2	71 (15)	79 (53)
	3	88 (29)	78 (74)
	4	82 (32)	70 (44)
	5-low	87 (14)	68 (23)
(parents) $\chi^2 = 2.97$ ; $df = 4$ ; $p = .56$ ; $V = .134$ ; $\gamma = -.144$			
(students) $\chi^2 = 7.2$ ; $df = 4$ ; $p = .12$ ; $V = .111$ ; $\gamma = .192$			

(1) For the parents' column, the "Father's Level of Education" is the mother's level of education when she was the respondent.


are some individuals in the government who are crooked. The question was intended to approach the feeling of distrust in respondents rather cautiously and thus sense the most widespread feeling of some distrust in the government. As a result, a feeling is revealed that seemingly cuts across all levels of education, income and cosmopolitanism. Certainly those respondents who disagreed with variable 38 are the most trustful of the government. With variable 30, the second item in our scale of distrust, suggesting that "Some people believe that the government is pretty much influenced by a few big interests looking out for themselves," once again we find an overwhelming rate of approval. Some three out of five parents and two out of three students agreed with the statement. More parents had disagreed with the statement than students, thus showing a higher level of trust in government. When viewed in a six-level continuum (see Fig. 10), the parent-student responses followed a rather similar pattern. The graph, once again, suggests a slightly more assertive attitude among the parents than among the students. As in the past graphs and, as we shall see in the future graphs, the parents display assertive attitudes, indicating a strong favor or disfavor for statements more often than the students. This pattern, perhaps, is indicative of their general attitude towards the issues which by this time and age is more crystallized than it is among students who still have most of their socio-political experiences before them.

The cross-tabulation analysis of variable 30 with the socio-economic status of parents and students did not reveal any major



Figure 10

Comparison of Parent-Student Responses to Variable 30 in a Six-Level Continuum



significant relationships. Only one of the socio-economic variables, father's education level proved significant in influencing the student's level of distrust in the government (Table 33). The chi-square probability was significant at .025 level, nonetheless, the association between parental education and students' level of distrust did not emerge as significant ( $\gamma = .105$ ).

From the third item in our scale of political trust, variable 35, a very close agreement between both parents and the students on the question, "The government wastes needlessly a lot of our tax money," emerges. Almost half of the parent and the student samples agreed with the statement. Those parents and students who disagreed with the statement displayed a similar frequency in their level of disagreement. Those parents who agreed with the statement, as indicated in Fig. 11,



TABLE 33


Cross-Tabulation of "Government is influenced by big business"  
(Variable30) with Socio-Economic Status

Socio-Economic Status		"Some People believe that the government is very much influenced by a few big interests looking out for themselves."	
		Agree (distrust in government)	
		parents	students
Sex	male	59% (75)	66% (212)
	female	65 (22)	68 (191)
(parents) $\chi^2 = .202$ ; df = 1; p = .65; phi = .051; gamma = -.129			
(students) $\chi^2 = .179$ ; df = 1; p = .67; phi = .020; gamma = -.044			
-----			
Father's Level of Education (1)	high	62% (21)	72% (35)
	medium	62 (37)	75 (104)
	low	55 (27)	62 (175)
	no education	63 (12)	70 (78)
(parents) $\chi^2 = .68$ ; df = 3; p = .88; V = .068; gamma = -.045			
(students) $\chi^2 = 9.3$ ; df = 3; p = .025; V = .126; gamma = -.105			
-----			
Mother's Level of Education	high	--	71% (5)
	medium	--	77 (59)
	low	--	69 (175)
	no education	--	63 (149)
(students) $\chi^2 = 5.9$ ; df = 3; p = .117; V = .100; gamma = -.146			
-----			
Family Income Level	high	62% (29)	67% (129)
	medium	56 (28)	71 (117)
	low	63 (39)	64 (148)
(parents) $\chi^2 = .60$ ; df = 2; p = .74; V = .061; gamma = .029			
(students) $\chi^2 = 2.23$ ; df = 2; p = .32; V = .062; gamma = -.064			
-----			
Level of Cosmopolitanism	1- high	54% (30)	69% (231)
	2	60 (12)	71 (46)
	3	55 (17)	72 (73)
	4	60 (24)	56 (35)
	5- low	87 (14)	53 (19)
(parents) $\chi^2 = 6.4$ ; df = 4; p = .17; V = .198; gamma = -.217			
(students) $\chi^2 = 8.3$ ; df = 4; p = .078; V = .118; gamma = .110			

(1) For the parents' column, the "Father's Level of Education" is the mother's level of education when she was the respondent.

Figure 11

Comparison of Parent-Student Responses to Variable 35 in a Six-Level Continuum



once again displayed a more assertive level of distrust in the government. Of those parents who agreed with the statement, 20 percent agreed strongly (+3), whereas only 13 percent of the students did.

The cross-tabulation analysis revealed significant chi-square probability between the students socio-economic status and their responses to variable 35, except in the case of family income level. In the parents' data, on the other hand, only education level attained a significant chi-square probability in cross-tabulation with variable 35.

The data revealed that the chi-square probability between the students' sex and distrust in government (variable 35) was significant at .0018 level. It indicated that there was a higher level of trust among the male respondents than among the female students (gamma = .261). The difference in male/female student orientation, as noted in the previous chapter, was due to a direct relationship between higher parental education among the female student respondents and the fact that parental education, most often, had been an influence on the student orientations.

The chi-square probability for father's education and variable 35 was significant at .001 level and was also associated at a significant level (gamma = .251). Of those students whose parents had a high education level, some 70 percent of them indicated distrust in the government, as measured by variable 35, whereas, of those students whose parents had no education, some 45 percent of them concurred. As indicated by the data, there was an increase of 25 percent in the level of trust in the government from those students whose parents had a high level of education to those whose parents had no education at all.

The chi-square probability of mother's education level was also significant at .002 level and was associated with variable 35 at a significant level (gamma = .269). The cross-tabulation suggested a decline in the level of support for the government as the level of education increased. While 71 percent of the students with

TABLE 34

Cross-Tabulation of "Government Needlessly Wastes Out Tax Money"  
(Variable 35) with Socio-Economic Status

Socio-Economic Status		"I think the government wastes needlessly alot of the money we pay in taxes."	
		Agree (distrust in government)	
		parents	students
Sex	male	47% (68)	46% (143)
	female	56 (18)	59 (160)
(parents) $\chi^2 = .622$ ; df = 1; p = .43; phi = .078; gamma = -.193			
(students) $\chi^2 = 9.77$ ; df = 1; p = .0018; phi = .132; gamma = -.261			
Father's Level of Education (1)	high	67% (24)	70% (32)
	medium	50 (29)	62 (84)
	low	34 (16)	48 (131)
	no education	45 (9)	45 (50)
(parents) $\chi^2 = 8.8$ ; df = 3; p = .03; V = .234; gamma = -.304			
(students) $\chi^2 = 15.7$ ; df = 3; p = .001; V = .166; gamma = -.251			
Mother's Level of Education	high	--	71% (5)
	medium	--	64 (49)
	low	--	55 (139)
	no education	--	43 (99)
(students) $\chi^2 = 14.97$ ; df = 3; p = .0018; V = .164; gamma = -.269			
Family Income Level	high	52% (25)	56% (103)
	medium	52 (26)	55 (88)
	low	44 (26)	45 (104)
(parents) $\chi^2 = .94$ ; df = 2; p = .62; V = .077; gamma = -.113			
(students) $\chi^2 = 5.4$ ; df = 2; p = .065; V = .097; gamma = -.148			
Level of Cosmopolitanism	1- high	59% (33)	63% (210)
	2	57 (12)	44 (29)
	3	42 (13)	37 (36)
	4	35 (13)	21 (13)
	5- low	44 (7)	44 (15)
(parents) $\chi^2 = 6.4$ ; df = 4; p = .17; V = .199; gamma = .256			
(students) $\chi^2 = 49.8$ ; df = 4; p = .0000; V = .291; gamma = .432			

(1) For the parents' column, the "Father's Level of Education" is the mother's level of education when she was the respondent.

a high level of mothers' education distrusted the government, a total of 43 percent of those with a lower level of education also mistrusted the government.

The level of distrust (variable 35) among parents also had a significant chi-square probability at the .03 level with their education level. The two items were also associated at a significant level ( $\gamma = .304$ ). Of those parents who had a high education level 67 percent of them distrusted the government, while 34 percent of those with a low education level also mistrusted the government.

The cross-tabulation of cosmopolitanism with variable 35 revealed the impact of city of residence on the students' attitudes. The two items had a chi-square probability significant at the .0000 level and were associated at a significant level ( $\gamma = .432$ ). Of the students who lived in Tehran, 63 percent of them indicated a distrust in the government, whereas, 65 percent from the least cosmopolitan areas also had a distrust for the government. Aside from the urban-rural dichotomy, discussed several times previously as reasons for a higher level of support for the government in rural areas, and a lower level of support in the major urban areas due to a combination of factors, the responses in this case were perhaps influenced by the nature of the question--i.e., payment and waste of the taxpayers' money. The fact that the burden of direct taxes is mostly on the shoulders of those living in the major cities, particularly Tehran due to a much higher level of income, makes the question

of taxes become rather academic for those people who live in the less urban and rural areas of the country and who have the lowest income levels. If the phrase oil money could have been used instead of the phrase tax money, perhaps it would have created a different impression and would have solicited a far different response. Due to the implications present in the expression of oil money, and the possible problems in securing permission for the administration of the questionnaires in the schools, the less explosive connotation of tax money was used.


Trusting the government. The next two items, variables 40 and 42, as noted previously, were stated in a positive manner in the questionnaires. Therefore, a favorable response to either of these questions indicated a level of trust in the government. These two items, as displayed in Table 31, were fashioned in a manner which would attract the highest level of distrust in the government from the respondents. These two items are in contrast to variable 38 and are intended to measure the broadest level of trust in the government.

Almost three out of four parents agreed with variable 42, "The people running the government are smart and usually know what they are doing." Only two-thirds of the students agreed with the statement, indicating a higher level of distrust among students than among parents. The parent-student responses, viewed in a six-level frequency continuum, differed substantially (Fig. 12). As in the earlier items, the parents



Figure 12

Comparison of Parent-Student Responses to Variable 42 in a Six Level Continuum



displayed a more assertive attitude in their responses than the students did. While 28 percent of the parents agreed strongly (+3) or disagreed strongly (-3) with the statement in variable 42, only 18 percent of the students responded in a similar assertive fashion.

The cross-tabulation analysis of the parents' socio-economic status with variable 42 suggested no significant relationship, while the cross-tabulation analysis of the student data suggested significant chi-square probability for students' sex and cosmopolitanism (Table 35).

The chi-square probability for students' sex and trust in government (variable 42) was significant at .012 level; the two items had a relationship significant at  $\gamma = .223$ . Of the male students, 71 percent indicated trust in the government while 61 percent of the female students had similar feelings.

TABLE 35

Cross-Tabulation of "People in the Government are Smart"  
(Variable 42) with Socio-Economic Status

Socio-Economic Status		"People running the government are smart and usually know what they are doing."	
		Agree ( trust in government)	
		parents	students
Sex	male	76% (93)	71% (94)
	female	67 (22)	61 (106)
(parents) $\chi^2 = .79$ ; df = 1; p = .37; phi = .089; gamma = .232			
(students) $\chi^2 = 6.3$ ; df = 1; p = .012; phi = .106; gamma = .223			
Father's Level of Education (1)	high	71% (14)	51% (12)
	medium	68 (41)	70 (184)
	low	85 (40)	67 (98)
	no education	70 (20)	66 (24)
(parents) $\chi^2 = 4.7$ ; df = 3; p = .19; V = .174; gamma = .150			
(students) $\chi^2 = 5.5$ ; df = 3; p = .142; V = .097; gamma = .044			
Mother's Level of Education	high	--	57% (4)
	medium	--	57 (47)
	low	--	65 (164)
	no education	--	71 (161)
(students) $\chi^2 = 6.8$ ; df = 3; p = .078; V = .109; gamma = .186			
Family Income Level	high	70% (44)	63% (116)
	medium	75 (37)	70 (112)
	low	75 (31)	71 (158)
(parents) $\chi^2 = .34$ ; df = 2; p = .84; V = .04; gamma = .066			
(students) $\chi^2 = 2.01$ ; df = 2; p = .36; V = .059; gamma = .067			
Level of Cosmopolitanism	1- high	68% (34)	59% (196)
	2	65 (13)	73 (50)
	3	77 (24)	74 (73)
	4	81 (30)	79 (49)
	5- low	87 (14)	73 (25)
(parents) $\chi^2 = 3.98$ ; df = 4; p = .41; V = .160; gamma = -.242			
(students) $\chi^2 = 18.8$ ; df = 4; p = .002; V = .168; gamma = -.291			


(1) For the parents' column, the "Father's Level of Education" is the mother's level of Education when she was the respondent.

The chi-square probability for level of cosmopolitanism was significant at .002 level. Once again the data suggested that the students from Tehran had the least trust in the government, whereas, those students from the least cosmopolitan areas had the most trust in the government ( $\gamma = .291$ ). Of those students from Tehran, 59 percent indicated trust in the government, while those from small towns and rural areas had a 77 percent trust in the government, as indicated by the statement in variable 42.

The last item in this section, variable 40, states that "The government usually knows what is best for people." While a positive response indicated support for the government, a negative response was the manifestation of the least trust in the government. As displayed in Table 31, while 17 percent of the parents indicated that they did not trust the government as measured by this item, 29 percent of the students had similar feelings. There was an increase of 12 percent in level of distrust from parents to students. When viewed in a six-level continuum (Fig. 13) over 32 percent of the parents had agreed strongly (+3) with the statement, indicating an assertive response favoring the government, while only 18 percent of the student sample had done similarly. This further supported the previous assertion that the parents had been resolute in their political opinion whether pro or anti-government. Such a response pattern indicates that the parents had already arrived at certain conclusions in regard to the government in Tehran. The students, on the other hand, were less resolute than the parents. Many students held to the middle ground--i.e., somewhat agreed

Figure 13

Comparison of Parent-Student Responses to Variable 40 in a Six-Level Continuum



(+1) or somewhat disagreed (-1)--more frequently than the parents. The students, as measured by the trust/distrust variables in this chapter, in general trusted the government somewhat less than the parents.

As in the last item, cross-tabulation of socio-economic variables with variable 40 revealed no significant chi-square probability for the parents (see Table 36). Parental education, family income and cosmopolitanism displayed significant chi-square probabilities with variable 40 for the students.

The chi-square probability of father's education level with variable 40 was significant at .0002 level. The two items also were associated at a significant level ( $\gamma = .234$ ). Of those students

TABLE 36

Cross-Tabulation of "Government knows what is best for people"  
(Variable 40) With Socio-Economic Status

Socio-Economic Status		"The government usually knows what is best for people."	
		Agree (trust in government)	
		parents	students
Sex	male	81% (100)	73% (235)
	female	91 (30)	69 (189)
(parents) $\chi^2 = 1.1$ ; df = 1; p = .29; phi = .105; gamma = -.394			
(students) $\chi^2 = 1.2$ ; df = 1; p = .26; phi = .049; gamma = .108			
Father's Education Level (1)			
	high	68% (16)	42% (88)
	medium	88 (42)	71 (200)
	low	87 (53)	72 (100)
	no education	80 (19)	79 (21)
(parents) $\chi^2 = 6.67$ ; df = 3; p = .083; V = .206; gamma = .190			
(students) $\chi^2 = 19.6$ ; df = 3; p = .0002; V = .184; gamma = .234			
Mother's Education Level			
	high	--	43% (3)
	medium	--	61 (49)
	low	--	73 (185)
	no education	--	74 (169)
(students) $\chi^2 = 12.1$ ; df = 3; p = .0075; V = .144; gamma = .175			
Family Income Level			
	high	83% (48)	63% (117)
	medium	82 (40)	79 (127)
	low	84 (39)	74 (172)
(parents) $\chi^2 = .12$ ; df = 2; p = .94; V = .029; gamma = .034			
(students) $\chi^2 = 11.34$ ; df = 2; p = .0035; V = .140; gamma = .168			
Level of Cosmopolitanism			
	1- high	85% (41)	66% (221)
	2	70 (14)	70 (47)
	3	81 (26)	78 (76)
	4	87 (35)	90 (57)
	5- low	87 (14)	70 (24)
(parents) $\chi^2 = 3.51$ ; df = 4; p = .47; V = .15; gamma = -.050			
(students) $\chi^2 = 18$ ; df = 4; p = .001; V = .174; gamma = .270			

(1) For the parents' column, the "Father's Level of Education" is the mother's level of education when she was the respondent.

whose fathers had had a high level of education, 42 percent indicated trust in the government, whereas, of those students whose fathers had no education, only 79 percent responded in a similar manner.

The chi-square probability of mothers' education with variable 40 was significant at .0075 level. The data also indicated trends similar to the impact of father's education level. Of those students whose mothers had a high level of education, 43 percent trusted the government, while of those students whose mothers had no education, 74 percent did the same.

The chi-square probability of family income with variable 40 was significant at .0035 level. According to the data, the students from high income families had a lower level of trust in government than those from lower income groups. The relationship, however, was not statistically significant ( $\gamma = .168$ ). Of those students from high income families, 63 percent indicated trust in government, whereas, of those from low income families, 74 percent responded similarly.

Level of cosmopolitanism also proved significant in delineating the students' response pattern. The indication was that the students from the larger cosmopolitan areas had a higher level of distrust in the government, while those from the lesser cosmopolitan areas had a higher level of trust in the government. The probability of chi-square for variable 40 and cosmopolitanism was significant at .001 level and the two items were associated at a significant level ( $\gamma = .270$ ). Of those students who lived in Tehran, 66 percent trust the government.



While 90 percent of those students who lived in smaller towns (level 4) trusted the government to a similar degree.

Summary. The cross-tabulation analysis so far in this chapter has indicated some relationship between certain socio-economic variables and frequencies of trust/distrust in the government. Some socio-economic variables have proved significant in certain levels and not so indicative of the attitudes of the respondents in other levels.

While the female students trusted the government less than the male students (Tables 34 and 35), the chi-square probability for parents' sex was not significant. The causes for the female student orientation were situational. As discussed several times already, the unique position of female students contributed to the great difference in their orientation. They usually came from families where parents had a higher level of education. In a traditional male oriented society such as Iran, where women in many cases have been relegated a second class role, and, as attested by the data in Appendix II (Table 42), only half as many female students as male students are enrolled in high schools, these female students are certainly a special breed. The fact of their parents' higher education level resulting, perhaps, in a more broad-minded perspective on socio-political affairs than that of the male students should result, as witnessed, in a tangible difference in male/female student orientation. The association of female students' responses with that of individuals with higher education is witnessed throughout the preceding chapters. The higher level of familial education in the female students' families makes them rather unique

individuals, compared to the male students, and their attitudes are decidedly more open-minded.

The two most important variables found to associate significantly, on several occasions, with levels of trust/distrust in government among the students are parental education and cosmopolitanism. The level of education had little impact on the parents' attitudes, but it did have an influence on the students' orientations. The data and the analysis often revealed a relationship between high level of education and distrust of the government (see Tables 33, 34 and 36). High level of education associated positively with high level of distrust in the government in regard to variables 35 and 40, while low level of education at the same time associated with high level of trust in the government. The level of distrust among the students from highly educated families, as indicated by the data, usually exceeded that of the parents. Even the students whose fathers had low educational level often superseded their parents in level of government distrust. Fathers' low level of education was seemingly responsible for the students' lower level of distrust in the government (see Tables 34, 35 and 36). The data provides no clue for the disparity of influence of education, particularly so far as the high level of parental education helping to increase the level of distrust in the government. Marshall Meyer's study of Harvard students in the midst of Vietnam War, as already noted, attempts to explain the emergence of inefficacy among such students.<sup>3</sup> The educated parents, in general, provide their children with better social and educational circumstances resulting in their higher level of

awareness and broader socio-political perspective. Consequently, many of these students, aware of the socio-economic conditions and the state of deprivation that many of their countrymen live in, coupled with the prevalent idealism of youth, have an increased level of inefficacy.

The reverse, as suggested by the same indicators, is true among some students who display a higher level of efficacy, perhaps as an indicator of upward socio-economic mobility, and who come from low education, low income background and live in the lesser cosmopolitan areas of the country.

Cosmopolitanism also seems to influence the behavior of the responding students. Detailed analysis of cosmopolitanism, however, at first resulted in some confusion. The question was raised as to whether cosmopolitanism was causing attitudinal changes in the respondents or was there some intrinsic problem with the data? It was found that the students from larger urban areas came from families where the parents, in general, had higher levels of education. This finding in itself conforms with the national statistics of Iran. There is a higher percentage of educated in larger urban areas, particularly in Tehran, whereas, there are fewer educated individuals in less urban and in rural areas. The parents' data was also in conformity with this norm. Thus, it could be stated that cosmopolitanism, as an independent variable, denotes that those living in larger urban areas also have a higher education level, and, due to the cause and effect relationship between education and income, the residents of the more cosmopolitan areas also have a higher level of income.

As indicated in the previous chapters, there was a substantial lifetime migration among the parents rendering their present city of residence of little value in determining any attitudinal changes. The data in this chapter has not indicated a strong association between parents' level of cosmopolitanism and their orientations. The students' data, on the other hand, in most cases, has associated cosmopolitanism with change in their attitudes towards trust/distrust in government. The data has indicated that the students from larger urban areas have less trust in government than the students from small towns and rural areas.

#### Political Participation and Trust/Distrust in Government

The data, also has indicated a strong relationship between political participation and frequencies of trust/distrust in the government. The data analysis was accomplished through Pearson's correlation analysis. For the analysis, the four items measuring political participation were recorded into two values: high and low participation, while the trust/distrust variables along with the other political and social variables (variables 16 through 46) had already been collapsed into agree/disagree categories.<sup>4</sup>

Parents. The analysis of "passive" political participation variables, indicated by "listening to news" and "reading newspapers," revealed no significant association with trust/distrust variables among parents. On the other hand, "active" political participation, measured by items "thinking about politics" and "talking about politics," showed some

significant associations with trust/distrust variables. "Thinking about politics" correlated at  $r = .290$ , significant at .001 level, with variable 35, stating that "The government needlessly wasted a lot of the taxpayer's money."

"Talking about politics," on the other hand, correlated at  $r = .266$ , significant at .001 level with variable 30, stating that "The government was influenced by a few big interests." It was also correlated negatively with variable 42 that stated "People running the government are smart" at  $r = -.333$ , significant at .001 level. In short, there was a rather apparent association between high level of "active" political participation and distrust in the government, while the opposite was also correct. Those who talked little about politics had a higher level of political trust in the government.

Students. The data revealed that there was a significant correlation,  $r = .151$ , significant at .001 level, between "reading newspapers and variable 35, suggesting that "The government wasted a lot of the tax money needlessly." The correlation, however, may be an indirect result of association between "reading newspapers" and parental education ( $\gamma = .302$ ), on the one hand, and the association between the latter and the habit of "reading newspapers" ( $\gamma = .251$ ), on the other, rather than a direct causal link between reading newspapers and distrust in the government. In other words, those who are more educated are more likely to read newspapers and are also more likely to have a distrust in government because of the disparity between the educated man's

perception of what government should be and the Shah's handling of the affairs of state.

The "active" political participation items, "thinking about politics" and "talking about politics," associated at significant levels with items measuring distrust in government, variables 35 and 38, and negatively with items measuring trust in the government, variables 40 and 42 (see Table 38). The analysis indicated that those who thought and talked more often about politics had a high distrust of the government, whereas, those who indicated that they seldom thought or talked about politics had a high level of trust in the government.

"Thinking about politics" correlated at  $r = .176$  with variable 35, suggesting that "government wasted a lot of the tax money needlessly," and with variable 38, suggesting that "some people in the government are crooked" at  $r = .276$ , both significant at .001 level. It also correlated negatively with variable 40, stating that "government knew what was best for people" at  $r = -.152$  and with variable 42, stating that "people running the government are smart and know what they doing" at  $r = -.252$ , both significant also at .001 level.

"Talking about politics" correlated at  $r = .211$  with variable 35, and at  $r = .231$  with variable 38, both measuring distrust in the government and both significant at .001 level. It also correlated negatively with variable 40 at  $r = -.187$  and with variable 42 at  $r = -.254$ , indicating trust in government, both also significant at .001 level.



### Political Orientation and Trust/Distrust in the Government

Thus far the impact of socio-economic status and political participation on both parents and students has been analyzed and discussed. At this juncture, it would be helpful to group the political variables together to determine their impact on trust/distrust orientation of the respondents. This would help in observing the association of such issues as efficacy, public policy orientation vis-a-vis political trust/distrust. Pearson's correlation and factor analysis will be used to assist in typifying the respondents as to their political posture. This will aid in analysis of variables, whereby the items denoting a political factor would be grouped together indicating the strength in the relationships.

Parents. An assumption, verified by the data, is that the parents' behavior is more complex than the students due to facts such as age and experience. Thus, the change in parents' behavior pattern stems from a more differentiated set of circumstances. For example, the factor analysis of the parents' data produced six-factors above 1.0 of Eigenvalue, while for the students there were only four factors for the same range.

The parents' data (Table 37) indicated that no significant associations existed between variable 18, denoting government control and authoritarianism, and other political variables. However, variable 26, which measured the level of political intolerance, indicated positive correlation with variable 40 ( $r = .309$ ) and with variable 42



( $r = .294$ ), specifying trust in the government, both significant at .001 level. The same item correlated negatively with variables "talking about politics" ( $r = -.302$ ) and "thinking about politics" ( $r = -.262$ ), measuring "active" political interest, and with variable 35 ( $r = -.262$ ), indicating political trust, all significant at .001 level.

Furthermore, variable 21, stating a public policy issue encouraging government aid to the unemployed, correlated only with political inefficacy, variable 23 at  $r = .256$ , significant at .001 level. Variable 41, measuring religious tolerance, also did not correlate positively or negatively with any of the political indicators. While the variables measuring political distrust, variables 30, 35 and 38, correlated positively together, variables 40 and 42, measuring trust in the government, correlated together also. Moreover, the variables measuring political distrust correlated negatively at .001 level of significance with variables measuring political trust, indicating that those distrusting the government consistently responded in that manner, while those trusting the government also persisted in their responses.

The factor analysis of the political variables was another method of indicating a consistency in method of responses and it also proved of aid in the grouping of the significant variables. As the diagram in Fig. 14 indicates, while the variables indicating political distrust, inefficacy, religious tolerance and government aid to the unemployed were grouped together at one end of the diagram, at the opposing end the variables indicating political trust in the government and authoritarianism also were grouped together. The data, as the

diagram displays, indicates that those parents who have a high level of trust in the government are also in favor of an authoritarian system whereby the government has control over the citizens' everyday life, and that such individuals are also intolerant of other socio-political systems and believe that their system is superior to the other existing systems. As the correlation analysis and cross-tabulation, discussed in detail earlier, had negated any association between education and distrust, the factor analysis also failed to note education as a contributing factor to distrust of government among parents.

As it was assumed earlier, the factor analysis indicated that those parents who seldom think or talk about politics are also the individuals who have a high level of trust in the government, are politically intolerant, and favor an authoritarian political system.

As noted in the last chapter, political inefficacy, as measured by variables 23 and 31, correlated positively and was factored with variables denoting political distrust in the government. In other words, the inefficacious parents also were distrustful of the government, while the efficacious trusted the government.


Students. In the correlation analysis of the political indicators in the student sample, there were more correlations than in the parent sample. This perhaps supports the prior assumption that there are more complex variables responsible for the change in the parents' attitudes, whereas, many of the indicators present in this study explain the reasons for the change in the students' attitudes. For example, education of parents has been of considerable influence in the development

of a general pattern of orientation among the students. Other variables, such as cosmopolitanism, have also been of aid in understanding some of the determinants of student attitudes. Other orientations, such as traditionalism are also good indicators of student orientations. Such relationships, however, seldom occur in the parents' data leading one to presume that more complex indicators influence the parents' attitudes.

Variable 18, indicating government control and authoritarianism, correlated at  $r = .220$  at .001 level of significance with variables 40 and 42, indicating political trust in the government, at  $r = .344$  and  $r = .294$ , respectively, both significant at .001 level of significance. Variable 18 correlated negatively with variable 31 ( $r = -.186$ ), measuring political inefficacy, and with variables 35 ( $r = -.303$ ) and 38 ( $r = -.159$ ), indicating political distrust in the government, both significant at .001 level. In short, those students who favored strong government control were also politically intolerant and felt that their socio-political system should be a blueprint for all other nations to follow. These same students also had a high level of trust in the government control over the citizens were politically tolerant and did not subscribe to the system norms--i.e., they were politically efficacious. They had a high distrust of the government. These correlations demonstrate the sources of support and opposition to the Pahlavi regime. On one hand, the students displayed their trust in the political approach of the Shah, where opposition is not tolerated and it is affirmed that the monarchical regime is the ideal and divine form of

Fig. 14. Scatter plot of political factors influencing parents' orientations.





government. On the other hand, the students opposing the government display a high level of distrust in the political process and demonstrate an openness to other ideals by discounting the Iranian system as the best in the world. These same students also agree with an open and democratic government where polity would have a control over governmental policy formulations.

As in the parents' data, variable 26, which measured political intolerance, correlated positively at  $r = .273$  with variable 40 and at  $r = .261$  with variable 42, denoting political trust in the government, both significant at .001 level. Variable 26 also correlated negatively with variable 31 ( $r = -.194$ ), indicating political inefficacy. These associations pointed out that those students who have a high level of political intolerance are those who have a high level of trust in the government. On the other hand, those who are politically tolerant have a high level of distrust in the government and are not responsive to political system functions.

Variable 21, suggesting government aid to the unemployed, correlated positively with variable 35, denoting political distrust in the government ( $r = .230$ ), significant at .001 level. This suggested that those who favored government aid to the unemployed were also distrustful of the government.

The item dealing with religious intolerance, variable 41, correlated positively with variable 31, measuring political inefficacy, at  $r = .183$ , and with variable 38, indicating distrust in the government, at  $r = .339$ , both significant at .001 level. In short, those




students who indicated that they would not oppose speeches in their communities against religion did not subscribe to the system norms and were also somewhat distrustful of the political system.

As previously discussed in the section dealing with political efficacy, variables 23 and 31 have significant positive associations with political distrust and negative associations with political trust. Those students who were efficacious were trusting of the government, while those students who were inefficacious were distrustful of the government.

Finally, as expected, the variables denoting political distrust correlated positively together against the two variables indicating political trust in the government. This once again confirmed the consistency of the student responses to these political questions.

Parent-student similarities. The factor analysis of the students' political indicators revealed a pattern very much like that of the parents'. The variables indicating political trust in the government, variables 40 and 42, and the items denoting political intolerance, variable 26, and political authoritarianism, variable 18, were grouped together in one extreme of the factor matrix. The variables indicating political distrust in the government, variables 30, 35 and 38, and variables denoting political inefficacy, variables 23 and 31, plus items measuring aid to the needy, variable 21, and religious tolerance, variable 41, were grouped together at the other extreme of the factor matrix (see Fig. 14 and 15). In addition, the students who had indicated that they often read newspaper and magazine articles for their

Fig. 15. Scatter plot of political factors influencing students' orientations





political reports and those who had noted that they often thought and talked about political matters were placed with the "anti-government" group.

The implications of the above data analysis are that the political posture of the respondents, both parents and students, are divided into two very distinct orientations. One orientation is characterized by traditional political *modus operandi*, where the authority of the ruler is supreme and the government controls all aspects of life. This mode is also held to by the Islamic tradition where political and religious life are considered one in all, and the khaliph or the Imam, as the divine representative, is the unquestioned authority. The opposing orientation is a more Western-oriented political attitude, where the authoritarian approach and idea is negated and distrusted with a broad-minded approach to political and social approach indicated.

It was in the first category--i.e., the traditional-conservative mode--that there could have existed a basis of support for a style of government as conceived and idealized by the Shah. It is the same sentiments that give rise to the popular support for Ayatollah Khomeini's rule, where traditional political approach and Islamic puritanism are merged to give rise to a philosopher king who is expected to bring about the Iranian utopia. By the same token, those who opposed the Shah's authoritarian rule and his disdain for a democratic form of government also would oppose Ayatollah Khomeini's charismatic grip on the process of government.

TABLE 39

## Factor Analysis of Indicators of Political Trust/Distrust

parent index	political indicators	student index
.669	(variable 42) People running the government are smart and usually know what they are doing	.674
.555	(variable 40) The government usually knows what is best for people.	.607
.381	(variable 26) Our socio-political system should be a blueprint for all other nations in the world	.320
.240	(variable 18) The government should have plenty of power and influence over people's lives.	.383
(*)	(variable 2) Age of student (16 or less)	-.141
(*)	(variable 13) I often read newspapers and magazine articles about political and social matters of our country.	-.203
-.276	(variable 21) The government should give money and food to the unemployed.	-.157
-.278	(variable 41) If a person wanted to make a speech against religion in this community, he should be allowed.	-.200
-.307	(variable 23) Sometimes politics and government seem so complicated that a person like me can't really understand what is going on.	-.197
-.356	(variable 14) I often think about the political and economic condition of our country.	-.450
-.439	(variable 30) I think that the government is pretty much influenced by a few big interests looking out for themselves.	-.211
-.444	(variable 15) I often talk about political and economic matters of our country with my friends.	-.451
-.614	(variable 38) I think some people in the government are crooked.	-.569
-.655	(variable 31) Over the years, the government has paid no attention to what people like me think when it decides what to do.	-.567

continued . . . .

TABLE 39 (continued)

parent index	political indicators	student index
-.777	(variable 35) I think the government wastes needlessly alot of the money we pay in taxes.	-.709

(\*) These indexes were not significant for the parents.

The top of the table represents the positive end of the matrix, while the lower part displays the negative end of the matrix.

There were a total of 34 political correlations in the two samples that were significant at above .005 level. Of these, 16 correlations were shared by both samples. There were 17 correlations that were significant in the students' data that were not present at a significant level in the parents' data. There was only one correlation (variable 21 with variable 23) that attained a significant level in the parents' data and not in the students' data. One item that emerged twice in the student correlation analysis and attained a level of significance was the seemingly high level of religious tolerance. This item did not correlate with socio-economic status, namely parental education, family income or cosmopolitanism. As indicated above, variable 41 correlated positively with distrust in government and, as such, is perhaps a by-product of open-mindedness, brought about by secular education, among the students.

In the past few pages, correlations of political indicators for both samples were discussed. The above discussions enabled us to observe the positive and negative relationships between the different political indicators. It also made it possible for us to observe the

similarities and dissimilarities between the parents' and the students' samples. The factor analysis, furthermore, assisted in grouping the political indicators. It displayed the clusters of emerging political indicators and the strength of the relationships. The combined factor analysis of the socio-economic variables along with the political indicators, in a sense, summarized all the discussions in the last three chapters. The factor analysis indicated that those respondents distrustful of the government are likely to be politically tolerant, have religious tolerance, have a high level of political inefficacy, favor government assistance to the unemployed, and have active political interests (see Table 39). These matched with totally contradictory inclinations on the opposite end of the spectrum.

## FOOTNOTES

<sup>1</sup>See Morris Rosenberg, "Misanthropy and Political Ideology," *American Sociological Review*, Vol. 21, December 1956, pp. 690-95; and M. Kent Jennings and Richard G. Niemi, The Political Character of Adolescence (Princeton: 1974), pp. 140-42.

<sup>2</sup>See Table 5.5, and the discussion in Jennings and Niemi, pp. 141-44.

<sup>3</sup>Marshall Meyers, "Harvard Students in the Midst of Crisis: A Note on the Source of Leftism, Sociology of Education, 2 (Spring, 1973) p. 204.

<sup>4</sup>To comply with the norms of Pearson's correlation analysis and factor analysis, all the data used for statistical observations were collapsed into either a high/low (for education, age, income, cosmopolitanism, "listening to news," "reading newspapers," "thinking about politics," and "talking about politics") or agree/disagree (variables 16 through 46) dichotomy.

## C H A P T E R X

### SOCIAL-CULTURAL ATTITUDES AND POLITICAL PERSPECTIVES

As the first segment of analysis, an examination of the impact of socio-economic status of the respondents and their political orientations was undertaken (Chapters VII, VIII and IX). It was assumed that there would be associations between the two and that certain political attitudes were the result of differing socio-economic status. In this chapter, however, an examination of socio-cultural attitudes and political orientations will be undertaken to see whether there are significant associations between the two.

#### Impact of Socio-Cultural Attitudes on Parents and Students

The analysis of socio-cultural data revealed few significant associations to political orientations among parents, while a substantial number of such associations were found among students. There were a total of 13 correlations significant at above .005 level among the parents' data, while there were 51 such correlations among the students' data. Only three of these correlations were shared by both samples (see Tables 40 and 41). This finding suggested that while there was a considerable association between socio-cultural attitudes and political perspective among students, there were less such associations among parents.



Parents. The data revealed that determinism, variables 17, 43 and 44,<sup>1</sup> and collectivity, variables 20 and 22, were the more significant indicators of political orientation. Other significant indicators included traditional norms--variables 19 and 25, impulse--variable 16, and hard work--variable 46.

Variable 17, suggesting that "When a man is born, the success he is going to have is already in the cards so he might as well accept it and not fight against it," correlated at a significant level with variable 18 which measured authoritarianism ( $r = .271$ ), significant at .001 level. Variable 17 correlated negatively at  $r = -.219$  with frequency of listening to news. The relationship suggested that those individuals favoring determinism seldom listen to news on the radio. Another indicator of determinism, variable 43, stating that "Planning makes a person unhappy since plans hardly ever work out anyway," correlated negatively with "thinking about politics" ( $r = -.292$ ) at .001 level of significance. The relationship suggested that those parents who are deterministic seldom think about politics. Variable 43 also correlated at a significant level with political inefficacy, variable 23, at  $r = .227$ , indicating that the parents who believe in determinism are also politically inefficacious. The last indicator of determinism, variable 44, suggesting that "Nowadays with world conditions the way they are, the wise person lives for today and lets tomorrow take care of itself," correlated with the parents' habit of listening to news at  $r = -.244$ , indicating that parents believing in determinism seldom listen to news on radio.



The importance of friendship, as measured by variable 22, "There is no satisfaction in any good deed without a companion," correlated with political inefficacy, variable 23, at  $r = .337$  at a very significant level. The correlation suggested that those inclined to join in cooperative undertakings with friends were politically inefficient. The data also indicated a significant correlation between variable 22 and education level. The parents who had a low level of education agreed more with the statement in variable 22 than did those with high education. Another variable which actually more represents peer pressure, with bearing on collectivity, is variable 20, "The negative opinion of others often keeps me from seeing a movie or a play that I had planned to attend," correlated negatively ( $r = -.272$ ) with frequency of listening to news at .001 level of significance. The association suggested that parents who are influenced by peer pressure seldom listen to news on the radio. Variable 20 also correlated with variable 21, suggesting government aid to the unemployed ( $r = .224$ ) at .003 level of significance. The relationship implied that parents influenced by peer pressure are also supportive of government support for the needy.

Traditional norms as indicated by variable 19, "There is hardly anybody lower than a person who does not feel a great love, gratitude and respect for his parents," correlated with variable 21, measuring political authoritarianism, ( $r = .266$ ) at .001 level of significance. The relationship indicated that those parents believing in unequivocal respect for parents supported a system of government which held power

and influence over people. Traditional norms, as indicated by variable 25, "Respect is due an older man no matter what kind of a person he is," also correlated with variable 21, political authoritarianism, at  $r = .217$ , significant at .005 level. The association reflected the tie between political authoritarianism and traditional cultural values in Iranian society.

Hard work for the sake of hard work, as measured by variable 46, "I often do something just to prove to myself that I can do it," correlated with variable 21, suggesting government aid to the unemployed, at  $r = .217$ , significant at .005 level. It also correlated with political inefficacy, variable 23 ( $r = .267$ ), at .001 level of significance. The relationships indicated that those parents who believe in hard work approve of government assistance to those who are out of work, yet indicated that these same parents are politically inefficacious.

The only other significant correlation in the parents' data was between impulse control, variable 16, "If you get bad news, it is better to hide your emotions and behave as if you do not care," and parental age ( $r = -.278$ ), significant at .001 level. The relationship indicated that parents who are older approve of hiding their emotions when confronted with bad news.

In short, the analysis of parental socio-cultural attitudes revealed few associations with their political perspectives. Of particular importance was that determinism had a significant association with political authoritarianism. Other attitudes such as collectivity and peer pressure had significant relationships with political inefficacy

and a feeling that government should aid the unemployed. Traditional cultural norms, upholding elders and parents in unquestioned high esteem, also was associated with political authoritarianism, which in itself has been a manifestation of Iranian culture.<sup>2</sup>

Students. As noted above, there were a substantial number of significant associations between various socio-cultural attributes and the political orientation of the students. The most significant attributes were determinism (variables 17, 43 and 44), traditional values (variables 19, 25 and 39), collectivity (variables 22 and 45), hard work (variables 32 and 46), particularism (variables 24 and 34), impulse control (variable 16), peer pressure (variable 28), importance of time (variable 29), respect for children (variable 33), and risk taking (variable 37).

#### Impact of Socio-Cultural Attitudes on Political Orientation.

The only orientation that had any significant impact on political participation was determinism as manifested in Variable 17. Variable 17, "When a man is born, the success he is going to have in life is already in the cards," correlated negatively with "reading newspapers" ( $r = -.154$ ), with "thinking about politics" ( $r = -.220$ ), and with "talking about politics" ( $r = -.131$ ), all significant at .001 level. The association suggested that students believing in determinism were the least interested in reading newspapers, think about politics, or talking about politics.

Impact of determinism on political orientation. Determinism in this analysis is measured by variables 17, 43 and 44, which all correlated significantly with the political attitudes of students.<sup>3</sup> Variable 17, "When a man is born, the succes he is going to have in his life is already in the cards," correlated at a very significant level ( $r = .317$ ) with variable 18, denoting acceptance of political authoritarianism. Variable 17 also correlated with variable 40 ( $r = .221$ ) and variable 42 ( $r = .259$ ), both indicating political trust in government, both significant at .001 level. Variable 17 also correlated with variable 21, suggesting that government should aid the unemployed ( $r = .130$ ), significant at .001 level.

Variable 43, "Planning only makes a person unhappy since plans hardly ever work out anyway," correlated with variable 30 at  $r = .146$ , with variable 31 at  $r = .148$ , and with variable 38 at  $r = .124$ , indicating political inefficacy and distrust in government.

Variable 44, "Nowadays with world conditions the way they are, the wise person lives for today and lets tomorrow take care of itself," correlated with variable 18, indicating acceptance of political authoritarianism at  $r = .125$ , significant at .003 level, with variable 21, supporting aid to the unemployed at  $r = .186$ , and with variable 31, measuring political inefficacy at  $r = .148$ , both significant at .001 level.

In short, determinism was significantly associated, in particular, with political inefficacy, support for an authoritarian government, and a belief that government should aid the unemployed. Such





associations presumably agree with the general assumptions of determinism where government is accepted just because it is there, although its interworkings may not be clear to the public. It is also along the same line of thought that the determinists urge government support for the unemployed, since their misfortune is beyond their control.

Impact of traditional values on political orientations. Traditional norms were measured by variables 19, 25 and 39.<sup>4</sup> Traditional norms are such values as respect for parents, elders and friends which have a national/cultural consistency, while other values such as determinism and particularism are more philosophical preferences.

Variable 19, "There is hardly anybody lower than a person who does not feel a great love, gratitude and respect for his parents," correlated with variable 26, suggesting political intolerance, ( $r = .140$ ) significant at .001 level. Variable 19 also correlated negatively with variable 41, suggesting religious toleration, ( $r = -.153$ ) at .001 level of significance. Furthermore, it correlated with political trust ( $r = .119$ ) at .004 level of significance. Those who believed in respect for parents, as indicated by the data, also believed that their socio-political system was the best in the world (variable 26) and had little tolerance for anyone making a speech against religion in their community. These same students also had trust in the government.

Variable 25, "Respect is due an older man no matter what kind of a person he is," correlated with variable 18, indicating acceptance of political authoritarianism at  $r = .191$ , significant at .001 level.

Variable 25 also correlated with variable 26, measuring political intolerance at  $r = .162$ , significant at .001 level. Furthermore, variable 25 correlated with variables 40 and 42, indicating political trust in government at  $r = .203$ , significant at .001 level, and at  $r = .131$ , significant at .002 level, respectively. Once again, a measure of traditionalism displayed significant correlations with acceptance of political authoritarianism, political intolerance, and trust in the government. There is a trend that trust in the government--i.e., the Pahlavi regime--and acceptance of political authoritarianism correlate with the acceptance of traditional values.

Variable 39, although ranked along with other items in this section as a traditional norm, is, nonetheless, tinted with philosophical interpretation. It states that "No sane, decent person would ever think of hurting a close friend." The idea of respect for friends is ideally applauded in the Iranian tradition, but it does not reach the magnitude of respect for parents and elderly. Perhaps it is for this reason that variable 39 correlated significantly with another humanitarian gesture, variable 23, which suggested aid to the unemployed. Variables 39 and 23 correlated at  $r = .142$ , significant at .001 level. Variable 39 also correlated with variables 30 and 38, measuring distrust in the government at  $r = .139$ , significant at .002 level, and at  $r = .122$ , significant at .003 level, respectively. Perhaps it is the humanitarian nature of variable 39 that emerges as the more significant indicator rather than its status as a measure of traditionalism. This explains its association with distrust in government as indicated

through such statements as "The government is controlled by a few interests looking after their own," and that "Some people in the government are crooked."

In short, traditionalism seems to associate closely with the feeling that the Iranian socio-political system is far superior to other systems in the world and with a significant degree of trust in the political system of Mohammad-Reza Shah.

Impact of collectivity on political orientation. Two of the items, variables 22 and 45, as measures of collectivity had significant associations with students' political orientations.<sup>5</sup> While variable 45 was associated with political orientation of students only on one occasion, variable 22 was related to political attitudes on six different levels. Variable 22, "There is no satisfaction in any good without a companion," correlated with variable 21, measuring aid to the unemployed at  $r = .218$ , significant at .001 level. Those students believing in collective action also believed that the government should aid the unemployed. Variable 22 also correlated with variables 23 and 31, measuring political inefficacy at  $r = .129$ , significant at .002 level, and  $r = .151$ , significant at .001 level, respectively. The students subscribing to collective action, according to the data, also were politically inefficacious. Furthermore, the same students displayed distrust in the government. Variable 22 correlated with variables 30 and 38 at  $r = .142$  and  $r = .142$ , respectively, both significant at .001 level, indicating that belief in collectivity also was associated with distrust in the government. Variable 45, "It is better to go without

something than to ask for a favor from somebody, "a negative measure of collectivity, or an indicator of individualism, correlated at  $r = .128$  with variable 38, indicating distrust in the government, at .003 level of significance. This association was rather unexpected, or at least a negative correlation would have been more in line with the findings in variable 22. It is presumed that variable 45 was measuring an attitude somewhat different than variable 22, and, for this reason, no significant association between the two variables existed.

As suggested by variable 22, collectivity was associated with political inefficacy and distrust in government. It also had a significant relationship with the feeling that government should aid the unemployed.

Impact of belief in hard work on political orientation. Two items denoting "hard work," variables 32 and 46, emerged with significant bearing on the political orientation of the students. Variable 32, "I set difficult goals for myself which I attempt to reach," correlated at  $r = .147$ , significant at .001 level, with variable 38, indicating political distrust in the government. There were five significant correlations between variable 46 and political orientation items. Variable 46, "I often do something just to prove to myself that I can do it," correlated with variable 21, suggesting government aid to the unemployed at  $r = .131$ , significant at .002 level. The association clearly reflected the attitude that public welfare was supported by individuals who had a belief in hard work. Variable 46 also correlated with variable 31, denoting political inefficacy at  $r = .137$ , significant



at .001 level, thus, those students believing in hard work also were politically inefficacious. Furthermore, variable 31 correlated at a significant level with variables 30, 35 and 38, all indicating political distrust in government at  $r = .165$ ,  $r = .146$  and  $r = .146$ , respectively, all significant at the .001 level. The association indicated that those who believed in hard work had a high level of distrust in the government. The correlation between variable 32 and political distrust, on the one hand, and variable 46 and items denoting political distrust, on the other, clearly signifies the association between those who believe in hard work and feelings of distrust towards the government. Such feelings are perhaps enforced by the notion that the government was corrupt and that hard work and perserverance were not rewarded properly. Only those with connections and a willingness to become a part of a system that thrived on bribery and corruption were able to advance within its ranks. The association between hard work and political inefficacy, further, supports such a surmise.

Impact of "particularism" on political orientation. Particularism here is defined as the opposite of "universalism" which aims to develop norms that are equally applied to all; particularism tends to suppress the ideal of universalism. Variable 24, "There are some people like great artists and musicians who can be forgiven for not being considerate of others, kind to poor, etc.," correlated with variable 18, measuring political authoritarianism at  $r = .177$ , significant at .001 level. Variable 24 also correlated at  $r = .145$ , significant at .001 level, with variable 40, indicating political trust in the government.



The associations reveal the impact of particularism which in fact is a form of social determinism that supports authoritarianism and, thus, the Shah's government. The association between particularism and support for the government is enforced by the close association between determinism and particularism.

The second item dealing with particularism was variable 34, "A man with money cannot really learn how to behave among dignified people if he has not had a proper up-bringing." Although both variables 24 and 34 seem to suggest a notion of particularism, the responses from the students did not bear this out. While variable 24 indicated feelings of trust and support for the Shah's government, those students agreeing with variable 34 displayed exactly the opposite. The difference apparently was the result of an association between variable 34 and those variables indicating traditionalism, such as variables 19 and 27. The responding students thus saw a clear relationship between variable 34 and socio-cultural traditional values, whereas, variable 24 was perceived as approving exemption from certain rules for the benefit of the more famous citizens. Although the questions stated "artists and musicians" as the example, the intention was actually intended to refer to politicians. Although this was not expressly stated, the response of the students seems to bear out that they, in fact, did make the association. From the analysis, a correlation between variable 34 and political distrust emerges. The two items correlated at  $r = .152$ , significant at .001 level. Variable 34 also

correlated with variable 23, denoting political inefficacy at  $r = .144$ , significant at .001 level.

In short, particularism, as an expression of the socio-cultural tradition of the country, seems to be supported by those students who have an efficacious orientation. These students did not agree with granting exemptions from the rules for certain individuals.

Other social norms influencing political orientation. The data analysis also indicated there were significant associations between variable 29, "It would irritate me to have a watch or clock which was off by several minutes everyday," and the political attitudes of students. Those students believing in the importance of time displayed a high degree of distrust in the government, as indicated by variable 30. The two variables correlated at  $r = .199$ , significant at .001. Variable 29 also correlated with variables 23 and 31, both indicating political inefficacy, at  $r = .128$ , significant at .002 level, and  $r = .116$ , significant at .005 level, respectively.

The associations seem to indicate that those students believing in the significance of time were politically inefficacious and distrustful of the government. Variable 29 was associated with variables indicating belief in hard work,<sup>7</sup> indicating that those who believed in importance of time also believed in hard work and perseverance. As noted earlier, there were strong associations between belief in hard work, distrust in government, and political inefficacy. Therefore, the association between those who believe in importance of time and distrust in government should have been expected.

Variable 37 attempted to measure the relationship between belief in chance and political attitude. It stated that "I enjoy a race or a game better when I bet on it." Variable 37 was closely associated with determinism and belief in traditional values.<sup>8</sup> Variable 37 correlated with belief in authoritarianism, itself also an extension of determinism, at  $r = .186$ , significant at .001 level, and with variable 40, denoting trust in the government at  $r = .132$ , significant at .002 level. In short, the associations seem to further indicate the relationship between determinism and trust in the Pahlavi government with approval of its style of government.

Summary. The items dealing with policy issues, favoring authoritarian political process and political intolerance displayed significant levels of association with traditional system values--determinism, particularism, and fate. Although the students' data displayed a much higher frequency of association, nonetheless, both sets of data had basic similarities.

Political inefficacy, according to the data of both samples, displayed associations with collective orientation, hard work, and determinism. Political inefficacy was also associated with belief in importance of time among students.

Levels of political trust in the Pahlavi government were positively associated with traditional system values--determinism, fate and particularism, while political distrust was positively related with hard work, collective orientation, importance of time and self-esteem. Although distrust in government was also associated with determinism

and respect for friends, it is inevitable that norms would be encountered which were shared by people from two opposing political perspective, since traditional socio-cultural norms seem to be present in most individuals to differing degrees.

### Factor Analysis of Socio-Cultural Orientations

Aside from the political factors displayed in the analysis of the parents' and the students' data as discussed in Chapters VIII and IX, two major factors with "determinism" and "traditionalism" as the main factors with above 1.0 Eigenvalue have emerged as a result of the data analysis. The factor labelled here as traditionalism includes religious intolerance, familialism and institutional norms as its main components.

Determinism. The impact of determinism on political attitudes of parents is displayed in Fig. 16. The table displays that determinism, as measured by variables 17 and 44, is associated with traditional values as signified by variable 19, promoting respect for parents, and with variable 25, stating that elders, irrespective of their accomplishments, should be respected. Determinism is closely associated with low family income, as well as with political inefficacy and distrust in government as measured by variables 23 and 38, respectively.

The impact of determinism on the political orientation of the students (Fig. 17) was more varied. The variables measuring determinism were closely associated with several items also displayed in the parents' data, namely respect for elders, particularism (variable 24)

Fig. 16. Scatter plot of items associated with determinism that influence parents' orientations.







Fig. 17. Scatter plot of items associated with determinism that influence student's orientation.



collective orientation (variable 22), and low family income. Although in the factor analysis of the parents' data determinism was associated with political inefficacy and distrust in the government, the student data revealed the opposite. Determinism in the student data was closely associated with trust in the government, as measured by variables 40 and 42. Furthermore, variable 18, measuring authoritarianism, was closely associated with determinism among the students.

Determinism among the students was also negatively associated with political participation. Those students who scored high on determinism seldom read newspapers, listened to radio or watched news on television. Furthermore, they seldom thought or talked about political issues and matters. Another factor associated with determinism among the students was a low level of parental education. Another interesting find was the low level of determinism among the female students. Actually the female gender, as displayed in the graph, was associated with a non-deterministic orientation.

Determinism among the students was also closely associated with a favorable attitude towards government aid to the unemployed (variable 21). As anticipated, the students' attitude towards fate, as measured by variable 37, was significantly associated with determinism.

In short, determinism is responsible for some traditional orientations such as respect for age and particularism among both parents and students. However, determinism, while associated with inefficacy and distrust of the government among parents, is associated with trust in the government among the students.

Traditionalism. Another set of variables emerging from the factor analysis was the traditional factor, indicated by such items as respect for parents (variable 19), for elderly (variable 25) and for friends (variable 39), and particularism (variable 34).

Traditionalism was positively associated with pride in the socio-political system of the country, as measured by variable 26, and was also negatively associated with government aid to the unemployed (variable 21) among parents. Traditionalism was also negatively associated with chance, betting, or gambling, as the case may be, as measured by variable 37, and also with religious tolerance, as measured by variable 41. The traditional indicators were also closely associated with such attitudes as respect for children (variable 33), hard work (variable 36), and importance to time, as measured by variable 29 (see Fig. 18).

Among the students, the same traditional indicators as mentioned above were associated with pride in the socio-political system of the country (variable 26) yet also with political distrust, as measured by variables 30 and 38, and political inefficacy, as measured by variable 23. It was clear that those traditional elements among the students who had pride in their socio-political system were rather dissatisfied with the prevailing political administration and had a high degree of distrust in the political process.

Among the parents, the norms labeled here as traditional were also closely associated with such attitudes as hard work, as measured

Fig. 18. Scatter plot of items associated with traditional system values that influence parent's orientations







Fig. 19. Scatter plot of items associated with traditional system values that influence students' orientations.



by variables 32, 36 and 46; respect for children, as measured by variable 33; collectivity and group action, as measured by variable 22; and importance of time, as measured by variable 29. This factor also revealed a close association between traditionalism, as indicated by the designated variables, and sex of the responding students, namely the male students. While female students were closely associated with non-determinism, the male students were closely associated with traditionalism.

While there is no conclusive data here to reveal the differences between the male-female student samples perhaps the apparent "modernity" among the female students, as indicated in the previous chapters, is the result of their being a select group of students. As indicated in Appendix II, since only a third of the high school population of the country is female, they represent a group that is more cosmopolitan<sup>9</sup> than male students. Their parents are more educated<sup>10</sup> and family income tends to be somewhat higher than that of male students.<sup>11</sup>

Summary. Although there is an association between "traditionalism" and pride in the socio-political system among both parents and students, the student sample displayed a noticeable distrust in the political process of the government under the Shah's regime. The combination of traditionalism and anti-government orientation is perhaps indicative of the political posture of many who took part in the uprising against the Shah's government during 1978 and early 1979 and their support for the traditionalist elements, namely the clergy.

The association between determinism, traditionalism and political trust seems to contradict the association between traditionalism and political distrust, as stated earlier. These seemingly contradictory relationships reveal the socio-political complexities of Iranian society. As also displayed in the factor analysis of both samples, the same variables are shared by different or even opposing groups.

The data analysis also reveals that the parents' orientations are more complex and have been influenced by a wider variety of variables, many of which were not included in the questionnaire. This is evident particularly from the looser association between the variables in the correlation analyses. This was expected since the age and, therefore, longer life experience of parents exposed them to a greater variety of socio-cultural and political influences. This results, in turn, in more sophisticated individuals with greater number of values influencing perception and orientation.

## FOOTNOTES

Variables 17 and 43 correlated at  $r = .320$  at .001 level of significance. Variables 17 and 44 correlated at  $r = .154$  at .061 level of significance. Variables 43 and 44 correlated at  $r = .305$ , significant at .001 level.

19. Norman Jacobs, Sociology of Development (New York: 1966), p.

Among the students, variables 17 and 43 correlated at  $r = .236$  at .001 level of significance. Variables 17 and 44 correlated at  $r = .249$ , significant at .001 level. Variables 43 and 44 correlated at  $r = .229$  at .001 level of significance.

Variables 19 and 25 correlated at  $r = .068$  at .094 level of significance. Variables 19 and 39 correlated at  $r = .226$  at .001 level of significance. Variables 25 and 39 correlated at  $r = .031$  at .445 level of significance.

Variables 22 and 45 correlated at  $r = .100$  at .018 level of significance.

Variables 25 and 17 correlated at  $r = .213$  at .001 level of significance. Variable 25 and 43 correlated at  $r = .128$  at .002 level of significance. Variables 17 and 43 both indicate determinism. See also the discussion of the association between determinism and support for the system in pp. 7-8.

Variables 29 and 32 correlated at  $r = .161$  at .001 level of significance. Variables 29 and 46 correlated at  $r = .159$  at .001 level of significance.

Variable 37 correlated with variable 17 at  $r = .226$  and with variable 44 at  $r = .218$ , both significant at .001 level. Variables 17 and 43 both indicate belief in determinism.

The correlation of cosmopolitanism with student sex was  $r = -.342$ , significant at .001 level. The association signified the concentration of female students in larger urban centers.

The correlation of father's education with student sex was  $r = .164$ , significant at .001 level.

The correlation of family income with student sex was  $r = .102$ , somewhat significant at  $p = .012$ .

## CHAPTER XI

### CONCLUSIONS

The foregoing inquiry has passed through three stages of analyses with varying emphasis but a unified focus: political institutions and their place in the Iranian political system. If one believes that the future is a fairly valid reflection of the past, given the socio-cultural continuity of a nation, the study of Iranian political institutions of the past 70-years and the socio-cultural milieu of the nation should shed some light on our path with which one may theorize about future developments. Although the Iranian socio-political posture at present is in an extremely fluid state, our access to the past history and some of the prevailing socio-cultural norms ought to enable us to predict some likely future trends and problems on the road to political development.

This present analysis began by eliciting theoretical help from Lucian Pye who proposes three themes as necessary for the actualization of political development in any society: equality, capacity and differentiation. As was noted in presenting Pye's view, equality connotes popular participation in the political process. It also infers that performance and achievement standards should be used as qualification for recruitment into the political system rather than ascriptive considerations. Lastly, the ideal of equality assumes that laws will be



applied equally to all and have a universalistic nature. Iranian culture has always had some semblance of class structure, nevertheless, this inclination was seldom a barrier to upward social mobility. Iranian history is replete with examples of those who have climbed the ladder of financial success from humble beginnings. The Pahlavis are a case in point. Reza Shah was a simple soldier; his father, a farmer. Transition from financial equality to political equality, the borders of which at times become very blurred, however, was not as easily accessible. Political institutions of the nation were recreated or subverted to serve the purpose and objectives of the ruling monarchs. Loyalty to the throne and aggrandizement of the tradition of Iranian monarchy were the hallmarks of a successful politician. There was no application of performance and achievement standards nor of equal protection under the law. Those who favored the regime were favored by it; those who opposed it suffered from it. Although traditionally a high level of education and professionalism were considered to facilitate one's entry to the ranks of the political elite, many politicians had few such merits but were, more importantly, loyal to the person of the Shah. Upward political mobility was granted only because one supported the regime. Certainly those with a high level of education and, at the same time, loyalty to the regime got a large share of the political power. At medium levels of bureaucracy, favoritism and nepotism traditionally have determined recruitment rather than achievement and performance.

In short, the Iranian political institutions were generally staffed at the higher levels by those loyal to the person of the Shah and the institution of monarchy and at the lower levels by those placed through nepotism and favoritism.

The concept of equality basically arises from the belief in individual rights and the idea of social contract. Both of these ideas were dealt with in the Constitution of 1906-07. In fact, this constitution was the first such contract agreed to between the people and their sovereign. Many of the proponents of the constitution, however, had been moved by goals which were in opposition to the merits of the constitution. The liberals had hoped for a democratic system emulating European democracies where individual rights, equal protection of the law, and many freedoms were guaranteed. The clergy had hoped, by reliance on popular support and blessing, to stop the growing tide of Westernization and, along with it, the secularization that was submerging their traditional hold and influence on the political process of the nation. The ulama, under the leadership of Sheikh Nuri, vied to install Sharia (religious laws) as the law of the land in the face of the propositions by the Western-oriented constitutionalists who favored a secular civil code.

In short, to the ulama, democracy became a vehicle by which they could prevent the infiltration of Western-secular ideals to the Shiah state, the majority of whose citizens were illiterate, poor, living in rural areas and very religious. Thus, the modern ideals such as social contracts, individual rights and equal protection of the law were

generations, if not centuries, away from the thoughts of the overwhelming majority. Due to domestic circumstances and foreign pressure, the constitution was guaranteed. The inevitable conflict between the Western-oriented intellectuals and the ulama led to the civil war (1908-1909), from which the moderates emerged victorious. Their victory signalled the beginning of a new era. Modernization and secularization became the dominant theme. These ideals had to be forced on a largely traditional society. Values, norms and mores had to be altered and changed. The strains of this still linger on after 70 years since the inception of the constitution.

Although education greatly enhanced the introduction and acceptance of modernization, the socio-cultural environment still retained a great deal of influence over the socialization process which in turn made the application and infusion of these ideals a very difficult task. Familialism still dominated the cultural perspective of most Iranians. As such, individuals were not freed from customs, traditions and consensus. As noted by Robert Lane, individual freedom and cognitive complexity are required to enable one to think for himself. Individualism and, thus, the concept of equality were stages above the prevailing socio-political sentiments. A constitution and forced modernization could not result in changes overnight, particularly during a century where political stability was shortlived.

Although the data analysis suggested that the students were more secular-minded (variable 41) than the parents, the students, nonetheless, displayed a strong institutional and traditional preference

(variables 17, 19, 24, 25 and 34) similar to that of the parents. Some traditional values which were contrary to the equality theme, such as the unquestionable right of authority, were present in the textbooks. Most often the entries in the elementary and particularly in the guidance school texts were borrowed from traditional Persian literature, many of which stressed the wisdom and compassion of kings, rulers and governors for their subjects. In all, over one-quarter of the entries in these texts stressed some noble authority as the main figure. Seldom did any of the entries portray the attitudes of the authority figure as anything less than benevolent. In the few cases where the authority acted in error or wickedness, a higher authority emerged as benevolent and corrected the wrongdoing. Few stories showed overt challenges of established authority.

Historically, when the system faltered, the desire for adjudication was replaced with fatalism. As discussed previously, the history of the nation with its experiences of invasions, the physical harshness of the land, and natural disasters all contributed to the birth of a man who feels insecure and fatalistic. Most writers on Iran have discussed the high level of distrust present among the people. Familialism encourages the individual's isolation from other members of the society and thus does not encourage mutual cooperation between the citizenry. As a result, attributes such as hard work, achievement, affect and thoughtfulness, and self-discipline blossom and benefit family and kin, with their outcome only on occasion spilling over to the society in general to the benefit of others.

Distrust of the government was very much in evidence from the parent-student questionnaires. At the same time, however, there were high demands on the government. It was expected that the government should aid the poor and needy. The most interesting point, however was the amount of power that was delegated to the government (variable 18). The trend confirmed persistence of the traditional perception of the role of government--that it ought to do good and deliver good things to the public. The distrust of a particular leader--i.e., the Shah--however, did not seem to have caused much change in the people's perception of the authority of the government.

The Western contractual form of government has evolved through certain historical molds that had no similar counterparts in the Iranian experience. Reformation, for example, settled the tension between the secular and ecclesiastical forces in Europe. Following the industrial revolution, the conflict between the ruling class and the middle class was resolved by social contracts. In Iran, on the other hand, the king remained absolute and autocratic. Such was demanded and such was the role of the sovereign. The king, since the rise of Shi'ism during the Safavid period, personified the aggregation of political as well as religious sentiments. It was only with the threat of Western influence and the increasing humiliation of the Shiah State at the hands of the imperial powers of Russia and Britain that there was a challenge to the authority of the monarch by checking the absolute powers of the monarchy.

For a political system to operationalize the theme of equality, first and foremost the individual and his rights must be recognized.



In a society where individual recognition is largely dependent on familial, clan, and tribal association, universalism as a basis of its operation would be difficult, if not impossible, to undertake.

The editors of the Farsi readers, besides the customary and required lip service to the Shah and his family, attempted to put out texts which intended to instill orientations and attitudes in students which would be conducive to the goals of development.

The shortcomings of the entries were basically a projection of the complexity of the cultural environment which has surrounded the life of Persian literature. Although equality is often enumerated as virtue and praised as a merit, in practice, it has been often neglected. The strong influence of spiritualism and mysticism which is sustained by the Platonic vision of man, manifested in Sufi philosophy, comprises a part of Iranian literary tradition which confutes the other part of this tradition which is nourished by Western realist tradition, embodied in the teachings of Islam. Such realism is most visible in the excerpts from Saadi in the textbooks. They emphasize supremacy of education, actualization of skill and knowledge, equality, impulse control, contentment, moderation, philanthropy and love for human kind, social responsibility and self-reliance.

Despite the overwhelming influence of culture and tradition, there seemed to be factors that were influencing the student's orientation which were conducive to the idea of equality. Such a tendency was evident in the students' responses to the idea of speech against religion (variable 41). Almost twice as many students as parents seemed



to support the idea of speech against religion, which in a way could be construed as belief in individual rights and freedom of speech. Through a question as controversial as the one in variable 41, it was evident that a traditional and fundamentalist society such as Iran, over time, could conform to values and norms conducive to the theme of equality.

In pre-Constitutional Iran, the government consisted of a small number of departments staffed with a scant number of employees. With the advent of constitutional government and Western-style governmental institutions, the number of bureaucrats multiplied rapidly. Despite the extensive growth in the number of offices and people working for the government, the effectiveness and efficiency of government performance remained minimal. A strong ruler, such as Reza Shah, who reigned from 1925-1941 was the main guarantor of performance. He personally made the decisions that were carried through by the bureaucracy and he personally checked every aspect of the performance. As a result, the bureaucracy was left with little power. It was Reza Shah who delivered services to the public. The government and all other institutions were there to perform their duties as instructed by the monarch. Reza Shah was feared. Any public servant who was unable to deliver results on an assignment would certainly feel the wrath of the king. Thus, the governmental institutions were primarily motivated by the dictate to perform to satisfy the king's objectives in order to avert the harsh results of failure--a relationship similar to that of a student and teacher in the traditional maktab (school). The bureaucracy remained

totally dependent on the person of the Shah. As such, it only superficially resembled its Western counterparts in Europe. Thus, the institutional modernization claimed by the Pahlavis was superimposed and artificial.

The effectiveness of the bureaucracy remained unquestionable as long as the king remained in power. The authority of the central government reached the remotest corners of the nation. A conscript army was organized and put into operation for the first time in Iranian history. Furthermore, new civil codes were drawn and put into effect which were secular in nature and influenced by similar European codes.

Following the forced abdication of Reza Shah in 1941, however, the institutions of government and bureaucracy experienced chaos and total disarray. The army almost disintegrated and, as a result, challenges to the government's authority from many regions of the country were raised. The ineffectiveness of government control and influence was very much evident. This was the obvious and natural consequence of a political administration that had depended on one man as the controlling influence. The system was effective and able to deliver as long as the captain remained on the keel. The overdependence of the political administration on the directives of the Shah was catastrophic for the system. At the same time, many of the reforms imposed on the system were undone either due to neglect or lack of faith.

Perhaps the overriding factor keeping the nation together was the presence in Iran of the contending allied forces (1941-1946) which took charge of security in their respective zones and deemed it in their

own best interest to resurrect the Majlis as an arena for their respective political aspirations. As a result, the traditional forces of the web system soon emerged and the traditional tensions of the political system gave rise to a period of relative political freedom with the Constitution as the compelling force of the system. Despite the many prevailing weaknesses, the Majlis was able to deliver several important legislative bills which were to affect Iran's political and economic posture for many years to come.

The lessons of Reza Shah, however, were lost to his son, Mohammad-Reza Shah who took power in 1941. He committed the same mistakes by making the system, once again, dependent on royal directives, mainly to secure the hold of the monarchy. Parliament and political parties were created in the royal image. All political institutions and national bureaucracies were dependent on orders from the sovereign. The bureaucracies, by now, were many times bigger than under Reza Shah and employed hundreds of thousands of people. Inefficiency, ineffectiveness and corruption were rampant. The system of checks and balances had broken down. Civil servants took no responsibility for any action lest they suffer the consequences in a growing government paranoia. Thus, paperwork and red tape increasingly gave rise to a frustrated and a dejected public. Unlike the Reza Shah period, however, there were no serious investigations or threats against civil servants for job failure, wrongdoings, or inefficiency. Civil service positions, in fact, were sought after since one could do almost nothing while earning a living at a very secure job.

The distrust of government displayed by both parents and students, coupled with a relatively high level of political inefficacy as reflected in the questionnaires, supported the above arguments that few people felt satisfaction with government's performance. A vast majority of parents and students thought that the government was influenced by a few big interests and that many people in the government were crooked. Moreover, some half of the respondents in both samples indicated that the government needlessly wasted a lot of money. Apparently, the respondents had great doubts concerning the government's effectiveness and efficiency.

The ethical tradition of kingship perpetuated the concept of an ideal ruler who ought to deliver good things and lead the nation on the right course. The expectations that a king be pious, just and compassionate, among other things, was reflected in the books of statecraft already referred to in the main text. These expectations, reflected in many of the entries in the textbooks, certainly promoted this concept of the ruler's responsibility and his capacity to deliver. Kings are traditionally perceived as the highest authority and as responsible for the performance, effectiveness and efficiency of their administrations. Subordinates are responsible to the kings. Kings have an ethical responsibility to the people and moral responsibility to God for the performance of their duties; a just king is seen as the shadow of God on earth.

The political administration of the nation in recent decades seemed to have had as its highest priority the preservation of the

Pahlavi system not by tending to the inadequacies of the system with its inefficiency and ineffectiveness, but by silencing any criticism of the systems inadequacies. This should be viewed against the traditional expectations of the ruler. The system suffered from severe capacity problems, where its institutions were not capable of performing their duties, thus resulting in failures and impotence in the execution of public policies. The system suffered from criticism on the one side, by those who had high traditional expectations from their ruler, and, on the other side, from those who saw the failure of the political system as the result of the Shah's meddling in the integrity of the political institutions conceived by the Constitution

Furthermore, the system faced a variety of challenges. With the highest priority of the government being the preservation of the Pahlavi rule, to enable the rule to continue and, perhaps, to prosper, economic development was perceived as a tangible course whereby some support for the system would be gained. Due to the nature of inequality present in the system, those who benefited most from the system were those who were connected with the system already. The widening gap between the rich and the poor, so evident in recent years, became a severe handicap and a cause of bitter complaints. With the rising expectations following the flow of petro-dollars, the system's inadequacies became more pronounced. The government was unable to deliver some of the most basic demands such as piped water and electricity to city dwellers, many of whom were recent migrants from farms. Reforms to correct the system's ineffectiveness and inefficiency were either



late or totally absent. The system had become dependent on approval and even initiative for all projects of consequence on the person of the Shah and, with the increase in spending, the Shah was hardly able to keep up with the pace. The system structure, at the same time, had made it rather impossible for anybody else to take responsibility or initiative. Furthermore, with huge government revenues, the Shah had become more interested in extravagant projects than in those which improved the public lot. In short, the political system was handicapped by its lack of capacity to perform in either the traditional orientation or the modern mode.

Closely related to system capacity is "differentiation and specialization of system structure" which is perceived by Lucian Pye to be the third theme of political development. The constitution had perceived three separate but equal branches in the organization of the government. They included executive, legislative and judiciary. Although the concept was basically aimed at reducing the power of the rulers, creating checks and balances on the process of political administration and safeguarding the individual's rights, it also gave rise to differentiation and specialization in the structure of government in the macro sense. Furthermore, the division of government responsibilities into as many as 24 ministries and seven ministers without portfolio, in recent years, reflected the modern and Western concept of role specificity and job differentiation. However, the ministries performed little independent planning on their own. The ministries were relegated the job of actualization of the plans and projects



envisioned and dictated at the highest policy making level. It would be, however, far from the truth to say that the Shah himself conceived all plans and projects. He relied heavily on his advisors for policy direction and at times supported, for implementation, certain plans conceived by his ministers. Such plans could not reach a policy state unless they were supported by the Shah or made into one of his "pet" projects. Again the Shah's role symbolized that of a medieval king who initiated all plans and projects and the public servants were there to carry them out and to make sure that they were actualized.

Another shortcoming of Shah Mohammad-Reza's administrative approach was his reliance on a few loyal diehard politicians who performed many different and even opposing roles. Such job rotation did not imply that these men had administrative capability, outstanding performance, or brilliance but only that they had the loyalty and submission to serve the Shah at any position. Such job rotation also served to prevent any politician from developing a strong power base from which he might conceivably pose a threat to the Shah. Of course, there were a few who exhibited a course independent from that of the throne's approach to political and economic affairs. Such individuals, on suspicion of wavering loyalty, would be cast into either political oblivion or into exile where many would join the ranks of the opposition.

The concept of renaissance man who is capable of undertaking all roles is still very strong, both among those who have a college education and among those who claim experience. There is little

understanding or appreciation for the concept of role differentiation and job specialization in most Iranian minds. Differentiation and specialization imply that a group of individuals would, for a common purpose, come together to strive to reach a proposed common goal each by taking part in the section of the project that falls within his specialty. Insecurity, self-preservation and distrust render inoperable the concept of interdependence which would initiate a free flow of ideas from one sector of the government or economy to another. Extreme jealousy, envy and lack of cooperation governed the relationships between the different segments of the administration. It was rather usual to learn about similar projects going on in several ministries without one department knowing about the project of the other department. Most reports on projects, without any rational reason, would be stamped "secret" and thus out of circulation. So, specialization and differentiation in Iranian political structure meant fragmentation and isolation of different components of the government from each other. These pieces came together only at the highest levels of decision making.

Although there is role specificity and job differentiation explicit in the Iranian tradition, reflected in the establishment of guilds, there is no functional differentiation reflected in the structure of political administration. This could be attributed to the tradition of divine right of kings in which the king was seen as the ultimate source of decisions. Though sometimes advice was sought from confidants, there was no obligation on the part of the king to demand

or use such help. Traditional political systems operated on such a premise: some tribal primitive cultures still do. In the latter cases, the autocratic ruler has the capacity to deliver due mainly to the simple nature of such societies. As societies modernize and public expectations grow, need for differentiation and job delegation becomes a necessity. In short, a modernizing society cannot function within a traditional framework; such a system, sooner or later, is doomed to failure.

In summary, the tradition of political institutions in Iran, as discussed here, does not meet any of the criteria put forth by Lucian Pye as essential to political development. The political tradition remains one dominated by particularism based on a system of rewards, nepotism and loyalty. The political system, due to the nature of divine rule and one man's domination of the total political process, had been rendered incapable of delivering to a large and complex society its needs and wants and, thus, remained ineffective and inefficient. Initiation of all major policies by the monarch at the highest level of the government prevented the institutions of government from functional specificity and specialization of structure that was foreseen as necessary by the constitution. The control and influence by the throne rendered the three but equal branches of the government into the ineffectual domain of the monarch.

The analysis of parent-student orientations also revealed a strong preference among the vast majority for a traditional political system with high popular expectations from the government. There was

acceptance of some social inequality by most respondents, in similar proportions among parents and students. Furthermore, there was a basic trust of the professional capabilities of government employees. However, there existed a high level of political inefficacy and distrust of the government suggesting widespread dissatisfaction regarding its capabilities to deliver good things. The data suggested that distrust of the government among parents was not only by those who had a high level of education, who very likely favored a democratic and Western style government, but also by those who preferred the traditional Iranian concept of administration, as discussed earlier, whereby the ruler is bestowed by a divine right to rule and is bound by ethical and moral obligations to his subjects. In other words, the Shah had failed to gain the support of the democratically oriented segment of the population because of his autocratic and undemocratic rule and, at the same time, had failed to attract the support of the traditional elements who would have supported his traditional approach to political administration.

The textbooks reflected the ideal circumstances of a political system where justice and compassion prevailed. Most of the entries depicted a traditional framework of administration where kings were responsible, ethical and moral in fulfilling their duties. The rulers took responsibility for the actions of the bureaucracy and corrected its wrongs. With such expectations from the system transferred to the minds of the youth and with increasing demands put on the system for delivery of goods due to rapid modernization, the traditional

orientation put all responsibility on the monarchy--i.e., the Shah. The individual's responsibility, in retrospect, was only to be obedient to a just ruler.

The insufficiency of the political system to deliver on its presumed duties, its lack of cohesiveness, rampant corruption and subservience to international superpowers were all in dire contrast to notions developed and nurtured by the presentations in the textbooks. Perhaps, a kind of political confusion and schizophrenia was developed among the polity by the heralded glory of the past in contrast with the realities of the present. The textbooks were filled with the details of innovations and achievements in ancient Iran and the accomplishments in the West during the past few centuries while recent Iranian history was devoid of similar major achievements. The constant stress on the glorious accomplishments of the past, particularly with the attempted connections to the ancient Persian Empire by the Pahlavi monarchs, emulated in the concept of "Great Civilization," contrasted with the inability of the system to deliver on such promises, resulting in public frustration and alienation. The raised expectations remained high, reaching even higher levels with the surge in oil income after 1973. In the face of unrealized goals and unkept promises, the level of distrust in government and political inefficacy, as displayed in the data analysis, was certainly understandable.

Education seemed to cause little difference in parent orientation. Parent's education, on the other hand, was of some significance in increasing the level of political awareness among students. Although



the student's traditional orientation was perhaps somewhat altered by his own education or that of his parent, nevertheless, it remained strong among all respondents (see Table 41). The persistence of many traditional perspectives such as determinism (variables 19, 43 and 44), respect for age despite the qualitative aspects of an individual (variable 25), respect for friends (variables 27 and 39), and respect for social standing (variable 24) was posited as discouraging to the idea of political development. It was partly these attitudes that gave rise to inequality and particularism in the application of political laws and rules. These orientations, furthermore, reduced the capacity of the political system to perform effectively and efficiently despite the high level of training and skill at the disposal of the political bureaucracy.

The authoritative rule of kings, particularly during the Pahlavi era, had in fact prevented the development of political institutions if one is to uphold Huntington's view of the process of political development. In his view, political institutions develop as a result of competing social conflicts, and institutions take the form of arenas for resolving such disagreements. Since the Pahlavis resolved all problems, made all the decisions and allocated all the resources from the top, there was little or no conflict to be passed down to the institutions devised by the constitution for decision making purposes. The duty of political institutions remained two-fold--to give an aura of constitutionality and thus legitimacy to the process of decision



making and to act as channels for dissemination of news and information from the top of the pyramid to the public at the bottom.

The web system, inherent in the traditional political structure of the nation could have been of great service in the development of political institutions. The web system traditionally transcended the tension between the competing centers of political influence. It proved its viability during the parliamentary periods when the institutions of the government remained populist and the national interest was the overriding goal in decision making. Despite the overwhelming presence of the aristocracy and the landowners, or their representatives, in institutions such as the Majlis, the parliamentary system did not spur on any feeling that the parliamentary system was a stumping ground for the oligarchy.

With the addition of new segments to the web system, such as the military, a strong bureaucracy, and a new economic elite, the tension became even more balanced. The web system seemed more ready than ever before to assume its role in the political life of the nation. In contract, there was an added hesitation by the monarch to share power and the decision making process. With the suppression of all opposition organizations, including the moderates and traditional elements, and denial of a safety valve for the accumulating political demands, frustrations and dissent finally resulted in political violence. The government sponsored political institutions--i.e., the political parties and the Majlis--as means of political modernization

were too artificial and, thus, were unsuccessful in gaining legitimacy or grassroots support.

Cultural environment is constantly evolving and, in a sense, is organic. Although it is rooted in the past and inspired by long-held beliefs and customs, it cannot exist in isolation due to new and modern developments in communication techniques. A nation consequently is impressed by a great many factors from outside its own environment. Thus, it would be a great mistake to assume that cultures--or nations--have a uniform vision of a political system throughout their history. The people-culture cycle evolves and so do their demands on the political system. Nowadays the people have definite demands from their government. These demands include moral and ethical responsibility (variables 30, 31 and 38) and explicit economic demands (variables 21 and 35). With the complexities of the socio-economic situation, economic demands may--or have--become more crucial than before. The public awareness, as shown by the data, is increasing from generation to generation, and as such it will continue to expand. Education may be greatly responsible for increased public conscience and responsibility (variable 41), but pride in nation and tradition remain high. Culture and tradition certainly are not isolated phenomena. They are influenced by a great variety of agents, including education. As such, education and culture act in a sort of symbiotic relationship. The textbooks certainly reflect this relationship. However, emphasis of certain norms, while de-emphasizing certain others deemed not helpful for the development process, should show some results in the long term

supporting of the emphasized norms. Institutions such as education, however, are challenged in their socialization influence by formidable counterparts such as family. The hope remains that education will influence parents which in turn will influence the children, which in turn, over time, will be absorbed and become part of the cultural tradition. Such a procedure was somewhat evident among the students whose fathers had a high level of education. It will be a while, however, before any appreciable change conducive to political development can be detected and examined among the general public.

Nevertheless, since the educated people tend to compose most of the political elite and the politicized public, the impact of education on the behavior of the polity should be evident in short to mid-term. Rationality, equality and efficiency are among the traits of such a political elite. The present modicum of government in Iran, however, may suggest an opposite view leaning in the direction of irrationality, fanaticism and isolationism. Lessons of the past history, however, are a prescription for tomorrow. Excesses of the Pahlavi regime, particularly in the undermining of traditional political tensions, resulted in total demise of that system. Ignoring history and the contending social and political forces and subjugation of web members to the will of one force, in any administration, is the first and major step in the direction of instability. Not only will the system operate ineffectively, but it will not gain legitimacy. To continue to impose its will on the public, especially the politicized public, the government will have to resort to repression which is the

second, and probably the last step before its doom--in a manner similar to the Pahlavi experience.

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APPENDIX I

QUESTIONNAIRES

### Parent Questionnaire

The following is the translation of the original questionnaire which was in Farsi. The format and the design follow exactly the original questionnaire.

---

#### Part One

---

##### 1) Sex

1. ☐ Male

2. ☐ Female

---

##### 2) Age

1. ☐ 25 years or less

2. ☐ 26 to 30 years old

3. ☐ 31 to 35 years old

4. ☐ 36 to 40 years old

5. ☐ 41 to 45 years old

6. ☐ 46 to 50 years old

7. ☐ 51 to 60 years old

8. ☐ More than 60 years old

---

##### 3) Marital Status

1. ☐ Single

2. ☐ Married

3. ☐ Divorced

4. ☐ Widowed

---

##### 4) Number of Children

1. ☐ No children

2. ☐ One or two children

3. ☐ Three or four children

4. ☐ Five or more children

---

##### 5) Religion

1. ☐ Shia Moslem

2. ☐ Sunni Moslem

3. ☐ Zoroastrian

4. ☐ Orthodox Christian

5. ☐ Catholic or Protestant

6. ☐ Jewish

7. ☐ Other religions (please specify)

☐ \_\_\_\_\_

---

##### 6) Education (specify highest achievement)

1. ☐ No educational training

2. ☐ Traditional education

3. ☐ Few years grade school

4. ☐ Sixth grade

5. ☐ 7th to 9th grade

6. ☐ 10th to 12 grade

7. ☐ High school diploma

8. ☐ Few years college or AA

9. ☐ Bachelors or equivalent

10. ☐ M.A. or equivalent

11. ☐ M.D. or equivalent

12. ☐ Ph.D. or equivalent

---

## 7) Your Job

- |  |   |
|--|---|
| 1. <input type="checkbox"/> Professional or technical    | 6. <input type="checkbox"/> Farmer or farm related      |
| 2. <input type="checkbox"/> Administration or management | 7. <input type="checkbox"/> Production worker or driver |
| 3. <input type="checkbox"/> Clerical or related          | 8. <input type="checkbox"/> Military or police          |
| 4. <input type="checkbox"/> Sales or related             | 9. <input type="checkbox"/> Housewife                   |
| 5. <input type="checkbox"/> Service sector               | 10. <input type="checkbox"/> Other (Please specify)     |

## 8) Average monthly family income

- |  |  |
|--|--|
| 1. <input type="checkbox"/> Less than 30,000 rials   | 6. <input type="checkbox"/> 125,000 to 149,999 rials |
| 2. <input type="checkbox"/> 30,000 to 49,999 rials   | 7. <input type="checkbox"/> 150,000 to 199,999 rials |
| 3. <input type="checkbox"/> 50,000 to 74,999 rials   | 8. <input type="checkbox"/> 200,000 to 249,999 rials |
| 4. <input type="checkbox"/> 75,000 to 99,999 rials   | 9. <input type="checkbox"/> 250,000 to 299,999 rials |
| 5. <input type="checkbox"/> 100,000 to 124,999 rials | 10. <input type="checkbox"/> More than 300,000 rials |

## 9)

a. Your place of birth \_\_\_\_\_

b. Your city of residence \_\_\_\_\_

c. How many years have you been residing in this place?

- |  |  |
|--|--|
| 1. <input type="checkbox"/> Less than one year | 4. <input type="checkbox"/> 10 to 15 years     |
| 2. <input type="checkbox"/> 1 to 5 years       | 5. <input type="checkbox"/> 15 to 20 years     |
| 3. <input type="checkbox"/> 5 to 10 years      | 6. <input type="checkbox"/> More than 20 years |

## 10) From what country did you receive your last degree?

- |  |  |
|--|--|
| 1. <input type="checkbox"/> Iran (name of the city or university?) | 6. <input type="checkbox"/> Great Britain            |
| 2. <input type="checkbox"/> U.S.A.                                 | 7. <input type="checkbox"/> Other European countries |
| 3. <input type="checkbox"/> Canada                                 | 8. <input type="checkbox"/> Other Asian countries    |
| 4. <input type="checkbox"/> France                                 | 9. <input type="checkbox"/> Other countries          |
| 5. <input type="checkbox"/> Germany                                |  |

## Part Two

## 12) Some people often listen to the news on the radio or TV, how about you?

- |  |
|--|
| 1. <input type="checkbox"/> I listen to the news everyday              |
| 2. <input type="checkbox"/> I listen to the news a few times a week    |
| 3. <input type="checkbox"/> I listen to the news a few times a month   |
| 4. <input type="checkbox"/> I listen to the news once every few months |
| 5. <input type="checkbox"/> I seldom listen to the news                |
| 6. <input type="checkbox"/> I never listen to the news                 |



13) Some people often read newspaper and magazine articles about political and social matters, how about you?

1. ☐ I read them everyday
  2. ☐ I read them a few times a week
  3. ☐ I read them a few times a month
  4. ☐ I read them once every few months
  5. ☐ I seldom read them
  6. ☐ I never read them
- 

14) Some people often converse about the political and economic issues of our country with their friends, how about you?

1. ☐ I talk about such issues everyday
  2. ☐ I talk about such issues a few times a week
  3. ☐ I talk about such issues a few times a month
  4. ☐ I talk about such issues once every few months
  5. ☐ I seldom talk about such issues
  6. ☐ I never talk about such issues
- 

15) Some people often think about the political and economic condition of our country, how about you?

1. ☐ I think about it everyday
  2. ☐ I think about it a few times a week
  3. ☐ I think about it a few times a month
  4. ☐ I think about in once every few months
  5. ☐ I seldom think about such conditions
  6. ☐ I never think about such conditions
- 

### Part Three

---

16) If you get bad news, it is better to hide what you feel and behave as if you don't care.

- |  |   |
|--|---|
| 1. <input type="checkbox"/> I agree strongly | 4. <input type="checkbox"/> I disagree somewhat |
| 2. <input type="checkbox"/> I agree          | 5. <input type="checkbox"/> I disagree          |
| 3. <input type="checkbox"/> I agree somewhat | 6. <input type="checkbox"/> I agree stongly     |
- 

17) When a man is born, the success he is going to have is already in the cards, so he might as well accept it and not fight against it.

- |  |   |
|--|---|
| 1. <input type="checkbox"/> I agree strongly | 4. <input type="checkbox"/> I disagree somewhat |
| 2. <input type="checkbox"/> I agree          | 5. <input type="checkbox"/> I disagree          |
| 3. <input type="checkbox"/> I agree somewhat | 6. <input type="checkbox"/> I disagree strongly |
-

18) The government should have plenty of power and influence over people's lives.

1. ☐ I agree strongly
2. ☐ I agree
3. ☐ I agree somewhat

4. ☐ I disagree somewhat
  5. ☐ I disagree
  6. ☐ I disagree strongly
- 

19) There is hardly anything lower than a person who does not feel a great love, gratitude, and respect for his parents.

1. ☐ I agree strongly
2. ☐ I agree
3. ☐ I agree somewhat

4. ☐ I disagree somewhat
  5. ☐ I disagree
  6. ☐ I disagree strongly
- 

20) The negative opinion of others often keeps me from seeing a movie or play I had planned to attend.

1. ☐ I agree strongly
2. ☐ I agree
3. ☐ I agree somewhat

4. ☐ I disagree somewhat
  5. ☐ I disagree
  6. ☐ I disagree strongly
- 

21) The government should give money and food to the unemployed.

1. ☐ I agree strongly
2. ☐ I agree
3. ☐ I agree somewhat

4. ☐ I disagree somewhat
  5. ☐ I disagree
  6. ☐ I disagree strongly
- 

22) There is no satisfaction in any good without a companion.

1. ☐ I agree strongly
2. ☐ I agree
3. ☐ I agree somewhat

4. ☐ I disagree somewhat
  5. ☐ I disagree
  6. ☐ I disagree strongly
- 

23) Sometimes politics and government seem so complicated that a person like me can't really understand what is going on.

1. ☐ I agree strongly
2. ☐ I agree
3. ☐ I agree somewhat

4. ☐ I disagree somewhat
  5. ☐ I disagree
  6. ☐ I disagree strongly
-

24) There are some people like great artists and musicians who can be forgiven for not being considerate of others, kind to poor, etc.

1. ☐ I agree strongly
2. ☐ I agree
3. ☐ I agree somewhat

4. ☐ I disagree somewhat
  5. ☐ I disagree
  6. ☐ I disagree strongly
- 

25) Respect is due an older man no matter what kind of a person he is.

1. ☐ I agree strongly
2. ☐ I agree
3. ☐ I agree somewhat

4. ☐ I disagree somewhat
  5. ☐ I disagree
  6. ☐ I disagree strongly
- 

26) Our socio-political system should be a blueprint for all other nations in the world.

1. ☐ I agree strongly
2. ☐ I agree
3. ☐ I agree somewhat

4. ☐ I disagree somewhat
  5. ☐ I disagree
  6. ☐ I disagree strongly
- 

27) Real friendship is permanent friendship; friends don't change with circumstances.

1. ☐ I agree strongly
2. ☐ I agree
3. ☐ I agree somewhat

4. ☐ I disagree somewhat
  5. ☐ I disagree
  6. ☐ I disagree strongly
- 

28) My political opinion is not easily swayed by what I read in the papers.

1. ☐ I agree strongly
2. ☐ I agree
3. ☐ I agree somewhat

4. ☐ I disagree somewhat
  5. ☐ I disagree
  6. ☐ I disagree strongly
- 

29) It would irritate me very much to have a watch or clock which was off by several minutes everyday.

1. ☐ I agree strongly
2. ☐ I agree
3. ☐ I agree somewhat

4. ☐ I disagree somewhat
  5. ☐ I disagree
  6. ☐ I disagree strongly
-

30) Some people believe that the government is overly influenced by a few big interests looking out for themselves.

1. ☐ I agree strongly  
 2. ☐ I agree  
 3. ☐ I agree somewhat

4. ☐ I disagree somewhat  
 5. ☐ I disagree  
 6. ☐ I disagree strongly
- 

31) Over the years, the government has paid no attention to what the people think when it decides what to do.

1. ☐ I agree strongly  
 2. ☐ I agree  
 3. ☐ I agree somewhat

4. ☐ I disagree somewhat  
 5. ☐ I disagree  
 6. ☐ I disagree strongly
- 

32) I set difficult goals for myself which I attempt to reach.

1. ☐ I agree strongly  
 2. ☐ I agree  
 3. ☐ I agree somewhat

4. ☐ I disagree somewhat  
 5. ☐ I disagree  
 6. ☐ I disagree strongly
- 

33) I child should never be asked to do something unless he is told why he is asked to do it.

1. ☐ I agree strongly  
 2. ☐ I agree  
 3. ☐ I agree somewhat

4. ☐ I disagree somewhat  
 5. ☐ I disagree  
 6. ☐ I disagree strongly
- 

34) A man with money cannot really learn how to behave in a polite society if has not had the proper upbringing.

1. ☐ I agree strongly  
 2. ☐ I agree  
 3. ☐ I agree somewhat

4. ☐ I disagree somewhat  
 5. ☐ I disagree  
 6. ☐ I disagree strongly
- 

35) I think the government wastes needlessly a lot of the money that we pay in taxes.

1. ☐ I agree strongly  
 2. ☐ I agree  
 3. ☐ I agree somewhat

4. ☐ I disagree somewhat  
 5. ☐ I disagree  
 6. ☐ I disagree strongly
-

36) I work hard at everything I undertake until I am satisfied with the results.

- |  |   |
|--|---|
| 1. <input type="checkbox"/> I agree strongly | 4. <input type="checkbox"/> I disagree somewhat |
| 2. <input type="checkbox"/> I agree          | 5. <input type="checkbox"/> I disagree          |
| 3. <input type="checkbox"/> I agree somewhat | 6. <input type="checkbox"/> I disagree strongly |
- 

37) I enjoy a race or game better when I bet on it.

- |  |   |
|--|---|
| 1. <input type="checkbox"/> I agree strongly | 4. <input type="checkbox"/> I disagree somewhat |
| 2. <input type="checkbox"/> I agree          | 5. <input type="checkbox"/> I disagree          |
| 3. <input type="checkbox"/> I agree somewhat | 6. <input type="checkbox"/> I disagree strongly |
- 

38) I think some people in the government are crooked.

- |  |   |
|--|---|
| 1. <input type="checkbox"/> I agree strongly | 4. <input type="checkbox"/> I disagree somewhat |
| 2. <input type="checkbox"/> I agree          | 5. <input type="checkbox"/> I disagree          |
| 3. <input type="checkbox"/> I agree somewhat | 6. <input type="checkbox"/> I disagree strongly |
- 

39) No sane, decent person would ever think of hurting a close friend.

- |  |   |
|--|---|
| 1. <input type="checkbox"/> I agree strongly | 4. <input type="checkbox"/> I disagree somewhat |
| 2. <input type="checkbox"/> I agree          | 5. <input type="checkbox"/> I disagree          |
| 3. <input type="checkbox"/> I agree somewhat | 6. <input type="checkbox"/> I disagree strongly |
- 

40) The government usually knows what is best for people.

- |  |   |
|--|---|
| 1. <input type="checkbox"/> I agree strongly | 4. <input type="checkbox"/> I disagree somewhat |
| 2. <input type="checkbox"/> I agree          | 5. <input type="checkbox"/> I disagree          |
| 3. <input type="checkbox"/> I agree somewhat | 6. <input type="checkbox"/> I disagree strongly |
- 

41) If a person wanted to make a speech in this community against religion, he should be allowed.

- |  |   |
|--|---|
| 1. <input type="checkbox"/> I agree strongly | 4. <input type="checkbox"/> I disagree somewhat |
| 2. <input type="checkbox"/> I agree          | 5. <input type="checkbox"/> I disagree          |
| 3. <input type="checkbox"/> I agree somewhat | 6. <input type="checkbox"/> I disagree strongly |
- 

42) People running the government are smart people who usually know what they are doing.

- |  |   |
|--|---|
| 1. <input type="checkbox"/> I agree strongly | 4. <input type="checkbox"/> I disagree somewhat |
| 2. <input type="checkbox"/> I agree          | 5. <input type="checkbox"/> I disagree          |
| 3. <input type="checkbox"/> I agree somewhat | 6. <input type="checkbox"/> I disagree strongly |
-

43) Planning only makes a person unhappy since plans hardly ever work out anyway.

1. ☐ I agree strongly  
 2. ☐ I agree  
 3. ☐ I agree somewhat

4. ☐ I disagree somewhat  
 5. ☐ I disagree  
 6. ☐ I disagree strongly
- 

44) Nowadays with world conditions the way they are, the wise person lives for today and lets tomorrow take care of itself.

1. ☐ I agree strongly  
 2. ☐ I agree  
 3. ☐ I agree somewhat

4. ☐ I disagree somewhat  
 5. ☐ I disagree  
 6. ☐ I disagree strongly
- 

45) It is better to go without something than to ask for a favor from somebody.

1. ☐ I agree strongly  
 2. ☐ I agree  
 3. ☐ I agree somewhat

4. ☐ I disagree somewhat  
 5. ☐ I disagree  
 6. ☐ I disagree strongly
- 

46) I often do something just to prove to myself that I can do it.

1. ☐ I agree strongly  
 2. ☐ I agree  
 3. ☐ I agree somewhat

4. ☐ I disagree somewhat  
 5. ☐ I disagree  
 6. ☐ I disagree strongly
-



### Student Questionnaire

The following is the translation of the original questionnaire which was in Farsi. The format and the design follow exactly the original questionnaire.

---

#### 1) Sex

1. ☐ Male

2. ☐ Female

---

#### 2) Age

1. ☐ Less than 14 years

2. ☐ Fourteen years old

3. ☐ Fifteen years old

4. ☐ Sixteen years old

5. ☐ Seventeen years old

6. ☐ Eighteen years old

7. ☐ Nineteen years old

8. ☐ Twenty or more years old

---

#### 3) Education

1. ☐ 9th grade

2. ☐ 10th grade

3. ☐ 11th grade

4. ☐ 12th grade

---

#### 4) Father's education

1. ☐ No educational training

2. ☐ Traditional education

3. ☐ Few years grade school

4. ☐ Sixth grade

5. ☐ 7th to 9th grade

6. ☐ 10th to 12th grade

7. ☐ High School diploma

8. ☐ Few years of college or AA

9. ☐ Bachelors or equivalent

10. ☐ M.A. or equivalent

11. ☐ M.D. or equivalent

12. ☐ Ph.D. or equivalent

---

#### 5) Number of children in your family

1. ☐ One or two

2. ☐ Three or four

3. ☐ Five or six

4. ☐ Seven or more

---

6) Where do you stand in age among the children in your family?

- |                             |              |                             |                        |
|-----------------------------|--------------|-----------------------------|------------------------|
| 1. <input type="checkbox"/> | Oldest child | 5. <input type="checkbox"/> | Fifth child            |
| 2. <input type="checkbox"/> | Second child | 6. <input type="checkbox"/> | Youngest               |
| 3. <input type="checkbox"/> | Third child  | 7. <input type="checkbox"/> | Other (please specify) |
| 4. <input type="checkbox"/> | Fourth child |                             |                        |

7) Your place of birth \_\_\_\_\_

8) Your place of residence \_\_\_\_\_

9) Mother's education

- |                             |                         |                              |                         |
|-----------------------------|-------------------------|------------------------------|-------------------------|
| 1. <input type="checkbox"/> | No educational training | 7. <input type="checkbox"/>  | High school diploma     |
| 2. <input type="checkbox"/> | Traditional education   | 8. <input type="checkbox"/>  | Few years college or AA |
| 3. <input type="checkbox"/> | Few years grade school  | 9. <input type="checkbox"/>  | Bachelors or equivalent |
| 4. <input type="checkbox"/> | Sixth grade             | 10. <input type="checkbox"/> | M.A. or equivalent      |
| 5. <input type="checkbox"/> | 7th to 9th grade        | 11. <input type="checkbox"/> | M.D. or equivalent      |
| 6. <input type="checkbox"/> | 10th to 12th grade      | 12. <input type="checkbox"/> | Ph.D. or equivalent     |

10) Your father's job

- |                             |                              |                             |                              |
|-----------------------------|------------------------------|-----------------------------|------------------------------|
| 1. <input type="checkbox"/> | Professional or technical    | 6. <input type="checkbox"/> | Farmer or farm-related       |
| 2. <input type="checkbox"/> | Administration or Management | 7. <input type="checkbox"/> | Production laborer or driver |
| 3. <input type="checkbox"/> | Clerical or related          | 8. <input type="checkbox"/> | Armed forces or police       |
| 4. <input type="checkbox"/> | Sales or related             | 9. <input type="checkbox"/> | Other (please specify)       |
| 5. <input type="checkbox"/> | Service sector               |                             |                              |

11) Your family's average monthly income

- |                             |                          |                              |                          |
|-----------------------------|--------------------------|------------------------------|--------------------------|
| 1. <input type="checkbox"/> | Less than 30,000 rials   | 6. <input type="checkbox"/>  | 125,000 to 149,999 rials |
| 2. <input type="checkbox"/> | 30,000 to 49,999 rials   | 7. <input type="checkbox"/>  | 150,000 to 199,999 rials |
| 3. <input type="checkbox"/> | 50,000 to 74,999 rials   | 8. <input type="checkbox"/>  | 200,000 to 249,999 rials |
| 4. <input type="checkbox"/> | 75,000 to 99,999 rials   | 9. <input type="checkbox"/>  | More than 250,000 rials  |
| 5. <input type="checkbox"/> | 100,000 to 124,999 rials | 10. <input type="checkbox"/> | Not available            |

---

Part Two

---

12) Some people often listen to the news on the radio or TV, how about you?

1. ☐ I listen to the news everyday
  2. ☐ I listen to the news a few times a week
  3. ☐ I listen to the news a few times a month
  4. ☐ I listen to the news every few months
  5. ☐ I seldom listen to news
  6. ☐ I never list to news
- 

13) Some people often read newspaper and magazine articles about political and social matters, how about you?

1. ☐ I read them everyday
  2. ☐ I read them a few times a week
  3. ☐ I read them a few times a month
  4. ☐ I read them once every few months
  5. ☐ I seldom read them
  6. ☐ I never read them
- 

14) Some people often converse about the political and economic issues of our country with their friends, how about you?

1. ☐ I talk about such issues everyday
  2. ☐ I talk about such issues a few times a week
  3. ☐ I talk about such issues a few times a month
  4. ☐ I talk about such issues once every few months
  5. ☐ I seldom talk about such issues
  6. ☐ I never talk about such issues
- 

15) Some people often think about the political and economic condition of our country, how about you?

1. ☐ I think about it everyday
  2. ☐ I think about it a few times a week
  3. ☐ I think about it a few times a month
  4. ☐ I think about it once every few months
  5. ☐ I seldom think about such conditions
  6. ☐ I never think about such conditions.
-

---

Part Three

---

16) If you get bad news, it is better to hide what you feel and behave as if you don't care.

1. ☐ I agree strongly  
2. ☐ I agree  
3. ☐ I agree somewhat

4. ☐ I disagree somewhat  
5. ☐ I disagree  
6. ☐ I disagree strongly
- 

17) When a man is born, the success he is going to have is already in the cards, so he might as well accept it and not fight against it.

1. ☐ I agree strongly  
2. ☐ I agree  
3. ☐ I agree somewhat

4. ☐ I disagree somewhat  
5. ☐ I disagree  
6. ☐ I disagree strongly
- 

18) The government should have plenty of power and influence over people's lives.

1. ☐ I agree strongly  
2. ☐ I agree  
3. ☐ I agree somewhat

4. ☐ I disagree somewhat  
5. ☐ I disagree  
6. ☐ I disagree strongly
- 

19) There is hardly anything lower than a person who does not feel a great love, gratitude, and respect for his parents.

1. ☐ I agree strongly  
2. ☐ I agree  
3. ☐ I agree somewhat

4. ☐ I disagree somewhat  
5. ☐ I disagree  
6. ☐ I disagree strongly
- 

20) The negative opinion of others often keeps me from seeing a movie or play I had planned to attend.

1. ☐ I agree strongly  
2. ☐ I agree  
3. ☐ I agree somewhat

4. ☐ I disagree somewhat  
5. ☐ I disagree  
6. ☐ I disagree strongly
-

21) The government should give money and food to the unemployed.

- |  |                  |  |                     |
|--|------------------|--|---------------------|
| 1. <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> | I agree strongly | 4. <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> | I disagree somewhat |
| 2. <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> | I agree          | 5. <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> | I disagree          |
| 3. <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> | I agree somewhat | 6. <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> | I disagree strongly |
- 

22) There is no satisfaction in any good without a companion.

- |  |                  |  |                     |
|--|------------------|--|---------------------|
| 1. <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> | I agree strongly | 4. <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> | I disagree somewhat |
| 2. <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> | I agree          | 5. <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> | I disagree          |
| 3. <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> | I agree somewhat | 6. <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> | I disagree strongly |
- 

23) Sometimes politics and government seem so complicated that a person like me can't really understand what is going on.

- |  |                  |  |                     |
|--|------------------|--|---------------------|
| 1. <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> | I agree strongly | 4. <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> | I disagree somewhat |
| 2. <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> | I agree          | 5. <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> | I disagree          |
| 3. <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> | I agree somewhat | 6. <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> | I disagree strongly |
- 

24) There are some people like great artists and musicians who can be forgiven for not being considerate of others, kind to poor, etc.

- |  |                  |  |                     |
|--|------------------|--|---------------------|
| 1. <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> | I agree strongly | 4. <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> | I disagree somewhat |
| 2. <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> | I agree          | 5. <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> | I disagree          |
| 3. <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> | I agree somewhat | 6. <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> | I disagree strongly |
- 

25) Respect is due an older man no matter what kind of a person he is.

- |  |                  |  |                     |
|--|------------------|--|---------------------|
| 1. <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> | I agree strongly | 4. <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> | I disagree somewhat |
| 2. <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> | I agree          | 5. <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> | I disagree          |
| 3. <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> | I agree somewhat | 6. <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> | I disagree strongly |
- 

26) Our socio-political system should be a blueprint for all other nations in the world.

- |  |                  |  |                     |
|--|------------------|--|---------------------|
| 1. <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> | I agree strongly | 4. <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> | I disagree somewhat |
| 2. <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> | I agree          | 5. <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> | I disagree          |
| 3. <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> | I agree somewhat | 6. <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> | I disagree strongly |
-

27) Real friendship is permanent friendship; friends don't change with circumstances.

- |  |   |
|--|---|
| 1. <input type="checkbox"/> I agree strongly | 4. <input type="checkbox"/> I disagree somewhat |
| 2. <input type="checkbox"/> I agree          | 5. <input type="checkbox"/> I disagree          |
| 3. <input type="checkbox"/> I agree somewhat | 6. <input type="checkbox"/> I disagree strongly |
- 

28) My political opinion is not easily swayed by what I read in the papers.

- |  |   |
|--|---|
| 1. <input type="checkbox"/> I agree strongly | 4. <input type="checkbox"/> I disagree somewhat |
| 2. <input type="checkbox"/> I agree          | 5. <input type="checkbox"/> I disagree          |
| 3. <input type="checkbox"/> I agree somewhat | 6. <input type="checkbox"/> I disagree strongly |
- 

29) It would irritate me very much to have a watch or clock which was off by several minutes everyday.

- |  |   |
|--|---|
| 1. <input type="checkbox"/> I agree strongly | 4. <input type="checkbox"/> I disagree somewhat |
| 2. <input type="checkbox"/> I agree          | 5. <input type="checkbox"/> I disagree          |
| 3. <input type="checkbox"/> I agree somewhat | 6. <input type="checkbox"/> I disagree strongly |
- 

30) Some people believe that the government is overly influenced by a few big interests looking out for themselves.

- |  |   |
|--|---|
| 1. <input type="checkbox"/> I agree strongly | 4. <input type="checkbox"/> I disagree somewhat |
| 2. <input type="checkbox"/> I agree          | 5. <input type="checkbox"/> I disagree          |
| 3. <input type="checkbox"/> I agree somewhat | 6. <input type="checkbox"/> I disagree strongly |
- 

31) Over the years, the government has paid no attention to what the people think when it decides what to do.

- |  |   |
|--|---|
| 1. <input type="checkbox"/> I agree strongly | 4. <input type="checkbox"/> I disagree somewhat |
| 2. <input type="checkbox"/> I agree          | 5. <input type="checkbox"/> I disagree          |
| 3. <input type="checkbox"/> I agree somewhat | 6. <input type="checkbox"/> I disagree strongly |
- 

32) I set difficult goals for myself which I attempt to reach.

- |  |   |
|--|---|
| 1. <input type="checkbox"/> I agree strongly | 4. <input type="checkbox"/> I disagree somewhat |
| 2. <input type="checkbox"/> I agree          | 5. <input type="checkbox"/> I disagree          |
| 3. <input type="checkbox"/> I agree somewhat | 6. <input type="checkbox"/> I disagree strongly |
-



33) A child should never be asked to do something unless he is told why he is asked to do it.

1. ☐ I agree strongly  
 2. ☐ I agree  
 3. ☐ I agree somewhat

4. ☐ I disagree somewhat  
 5. ☐ I disagree  
 6. ☐ I disagree strongly
- 

34) A man with money cannot really learn how to behave in a polite society if he has not had the proper upbringing.

1. ☐ I agree strongly  
 2. ☐ I agree  
 3. ☐ I agree somewhat

4. ☐ I disagree somewhat  
 5. ☐ I disagree  
 6. ☐ I disagree strongly
- 

35) I think the government wastes needlessly a lot of the money that we pay in taxes.

1. ☐ I agree strongly  
 2. ☐ I agree  
 3. ☐ I agree somewhat

4. ☐ I disagree somewhat  
 5. ☐ I disagree  
 6. ☐ I disagree strongly
- 

36) I work very hard at everything I undertake until I am satisfied with the results.

1. ☐ I agree strongly  
 2. ☐ I agree  
 3. ☐ I agree somewhat

4. ☐ I disagree somewhat  
 5. ☐ I disagree  
 6. ☐ I disagree strongly
- 

37) I enjoy a race or game better when I bet on it.

1. ☐ I agree strongly  
 2. ☐ I agree  
 3. ☐ I agree somewhat

4. ☐ I disagree somewhat  
 5. ☐ I disagree  
 6. ☐ I disagree strongly
- 

38) I think some people in the government are crooked.

1. ☐ I agree strongly  
 2. ☐ I agree  
 3. ☐ I agree somewhat

4. ☐ I disagree somewhat  
 5. ☐ I disagree  
 6. ☐ I disagree strongly
-

39) No sane, decent person would ever think of hurting a close friend.

- |  |                  |  |                     |
|--|------------------|--|---------------------|
| 1. <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> | I agree strongly | 4. <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> | I disagree somewhat |
| 2. <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> | I agree          | 5. <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> | I disagree          |
| 3. <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> | I agree somewhat | 6. <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> | I disagree strongly |
- 

40) The government usually knows what is best for people.

- |  |                  |  |                     |
|--|------------------|--|---------------------|
| 1. <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> | I agree strongly | 4. <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> | I disagree somewhat |
| 2. <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> | I agree          | 5. <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> | I disagree          |
| 3. <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> | I agree somewhat | 6. <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> | I disagree strongly |
- 

41) If a person wanted to make a speech in this community against religion, he should be allowed.

- |  |                  |  |                     |
|--|------------------|--|---------------------|
| 1. <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> | I agree strongly | 4. <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> | I disagree somewhat |
| 2. <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> | I agree          | 5. <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> | I disagree          |
| 3. <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> | I agree somewhat | 6. <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> | I disagree strongly |
- 

42) People running the government are smart people who usually know what they are doing.

- |  |                  |  |                     |
|--|------------------|--|---------------------|
| 1. <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> | I agree strongly | 4. <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> | I disagree somewhat |
| 2. <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> | I agree          | 5. <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> | I disagree          |
| 3. <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> | I agree somewhat | 6. <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> | I disagree strongly |
- 

43) Planning only makes a person unhappy since plans hardly ever work out anyway.

- |  |                  |  |                     |
|--|------------------|--|---------------------|
| 1. <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> | I agree strongly | 4. <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> | I disagree somewhat |
| 2. <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> | I agree          | 5. <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> | I disagree          |
| 3. <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> | I agree somewhat | 6. <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> | I disagree strongly |
- 

44) Nowadays with world conditions the way they are, the wise person lives for today and lets tomorrow take care of itself.

- |  |                  |  |                     |
|--|------------------|--|---------------------|
| 1. <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> | I agree strongly | 4. <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> | I disagree somewhat |
| 2. <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> | I agree          | 5. <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> | I disagree          |
| 3. <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> | I agree somewhat | 6. <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> | I disagree strongly |
-

45) It is better to go without something than to ask for a favor from somebody.

1. ☐ I agree strongly

2. ☐ I agree

3. ☐ I agree somewhat

4. ☐ I disagree somewhat

5. ☐ I disagree

6. ☐ I disagree strongly

---

46) I often do something just to prove to myself that I can do it.

1. ☐ I agree strongly

2. ☐ I agree

3. ☐ I agree somewhat

4. ☐ I disagree somewhat

5. ☐ I disagree

6. ☐ I disagree strongly

---

APPENDIX II

METHODOLOGICAL APPENDIX  
ON THE ANALYSIS OF PARENT-STUDENT DATA

METHODOLOGICAL APPENDIX  
ON THE ANALYSIS OF PARENT-STUDENT DATA

Part Three, which consists of Chapters VI through X, consists of primary and secondary material. The theoretical literature is drawn from the works of David C. McClelland, The Achieving Society; David Easton and Jack Dennis, Children in the Political System; M. Kent Jennings and Richard G. Niemi, The Political Character of Adolescence; Fred I. Greenstein, Children and Politics; Richard Dawson and Kenneth Prewitt, Political Socialization; and Robert D. Hess and Judith V. Thorney, The Development of Political Attitudes in Children.

The theoretical data has been supplemented by statistical data, generated by questionnaires administered to a randomly selected nationwide sample of students and parents. During fall 1977 and winter 1978, a questionnaire composed of three parts--socio-economic status, communication habits and socio-political attributes--was drafted. Almost all the items in the questionnaire were borrowed from socio-political studies intended for purposes similar to this inquiry. The items in the major part of the questionnaire--i.e., socio-political attributes--were drawn from the "four country study" reported by McClelland, and from studies by Jennings and Niemi, and David Easton and Jack Dennis.

Some difficulty was encountered in the translation of the items into Farsi. Several tests were made to insure the accuracy and cultural adaptability of the items. For example, in the part dealing with

pub policy issues, an item stating, "If a communist were legally elected to some public office around here, the people should allow him to take office," was put aside since the Communist Party (Tudeh) in Iran was illegal and underground at that time. Moreover, "legal elections" were a non-existent entity during most of the Pahlavi period. Some other standard items had to be modified to fit the Iranian socio-cultural milieu. In general, however, the items were so basic that their cross-cultural transplantation posed few problems. Some problems were detected after the questionnaire had been administered. For example, item 37, "I enjoy a race or a game better when I bet on it," was too closely associated with gambling to give an indication of "risk taking," as originally was hoped. Since gambling is a cardinal sin among Moslems, it was on this basis that our respondents probably viewed this item.

The questionnaires for parents and students were alike except for some changes in the first part dealing with socio-economic status. Unlike the McClelland and Jennings-Niemi studies, the parents and the students did not come from the same families. Both samples were selected independently of each other, although the ostans (provinces) used in both samples were the same. Ten ostans, out of a total of twenty-two, were selected randomly for the sampling out of a bag containing the names of all the ostans. It was decided in advance that in case the Central Ostan, which includes Tehran, was not selected by the ninth draw, due to its significance in population and number of students (see Table 42), at the tenth round it would be automatically selected.



The Central Ostan, however, was the fifth selection and no special attempt was necessary.

The student questionnaire. There were approximately 350,000 high school students who attended classes in the ten selected ostans. Some 70 percent of these attended schools in the Central Ostan. The majority of them were enrolled in schools in the city of Tehran. From among the cities in each ostan, a random selection of cities was made. Based on the population of the city, questionnaires were apportioned. Seven-hundred-twenty-four students, or 1/500th of the 350,000 students in the ten ostans, were to receive the questionnaires which were distributed to randomly selected school(s). Although the sample ostans showed balanced representation of the nation, the urban population was disproportionately represented. This resulted from the fact that almost all the high schools were located in urban areas. Since the questionnaires were intended for high school students and were to be administered, for the most part, by the schools themselves, inevitably, the urban population was overly represented. Nevertheless, as the sample reveals, some of the high school students were from rural areas, attending schools in urban areas and living, presumably, with relatives or friends. Moreover, it was not the intention of this inquiry to undertake a survey analysis of teenagers and their parents. A comparative analysis of intergenerational transfer of socio-political norms from parents to high school students is the main focus of this study. Since, inevitably, these are the ones, by the nature of their education, who will be the main force behind the future socio-political

scene in Iran, it is, therefore, intended to study their orientations, attributes and attitudes toward socio-political norms with an eye to political development.

The questionnaires for areas outside of Tehran, which constituted about 50 percent of the total sample of students, were mailed to the principals of the randomly selected schools who were asked to distribute them to one student from each class with the first letter of his/her last name that which had previously been randomly selected. The principals were also requested to supervise personally or through a representative, the administration of the questionnaire, watching that all students be gathered in the same room and be given about 15 minutes for its completion.

For the schools in Tehran and vicinity, the questionnaires were personally administered by a group of three people under my personal supervision. The same method of student selection as above was used and the students were gathered in a classroom or an office where they were given approximately fifteen minutes to complete the questionnaires.


The rate of return for the student questionnaires was very impressive. A total of 624 questionnaires, or about 86 percent, were completed and returned. The response and acceptance by schools was partly due to letters of introduction from the Ministry of Science and Higher Education, the Ministry of Education, the Tehran Education Office and the district education offices.

At first it was planned that the parents of the students who responded to the student questionnaire would also be selected as the

parent sample. Later, however, this plan was dropped since it was thought that there may be some concurrence between students and their parents in the responses to the questions, particularly due to the fact that the parent's questionnaire could not be personally administered and had to be taken home by students for their parents to complete. Moreover, it was thought that further involvement with the same students might create, or further, any sense of suspicion about our intentions. They already had been assured that no records of their names had been kept. Given the political situation in Iran at that time, it was important that this be true if we were to get real responses.

The parent questionnaire. Although it was deemed useful to test the values and norms of the parents of the students being sampled, due to problems noted above, a new sample had to be created for the analysis of parental norms and values. A new city sample survey in the same 10 ostans was conducted. From these cities, elementary, guidance and high schools were randomly selected. While 63 percent of the new sample were high schools, 9 percent were guidance and 28 percent were elementary schools. All the selected high schools were, in fact, present in the student sample. The change from high schools only, in the student sample, to include all levels of schools in the parent sample was undertaken to broaden the parent representation and to include a wider age range and, hopefully, more varying perspectives among parents, since the parents of high school students would at least be 35 years old, and more likely 40 and over.

Figure 20  
The Sample Provinces Used for Parent-Student Inquiry



The same pattern as in the student selection was applied for selection of students whose parents would be asked to complete the questionnaires. School principals were again requested to assist in distribution and return of the questionnaires. Some 700 questionnaires were mailed or hand-carried to 84 schools in the sample ostans. The return was not to match the success we had had with the student questionnaires due to several reasons. The questionnaires were mailed in late April, shortly before the period for final exams. The school preoccupation with exams considerably affected their success in locating the preselected students whose parents were to respond to the questions. Furthermore, the accelerating political turmoil, which was becoming also commonplace in high schools, resulted in a further slowdown of school responses.

Another attempt was made in October 1978 with additional questionnaires sent to the schools that had not yet responded. By December 1978, some 170 questionnaires, or 25 percent of the total, had been completed and returned. It was deemed that the heightened political turmoil and the onset of the revolutionary atmosphere was preventing a high return rate of parent questionnaires. Consequently, the 170 completed parent questionnaires were used in the survey analysis. Altogether, responses had been received from 26 schools, 16 of which, or 62 percent, were from high schools. Since many of the schools were the same in the parent and student samples and since the process of picking students in both samples remained the same, it was likely that



many of the parents of the students who had completed the questionnaires were among the parent sample.

### Composite Outlook of the Respondents

Students. The sample was somewhat evenly divided between the sexes. About 54 percent were male and 46 percent were female in a national high school population that is two-thirds male. This was basically due to the presence of high school students from the Central Ostan, where female students composed 42 percent of the total high school enrollment in 1977. The female representation was further amplified by the fact that 56 percent of the students in the sample were from Tehran, where male and female students are rather evenly represented. The sample was made up of 22 percent ninth graders, 27 percent tenth graders, 30 percent eleventh graders and 21 percent twelfth graders. The mean age of respondents for both sexes was 17 years. The students came mostly (59 percent) from families that had 5 or more children, higher than the average of 3.9 children per family.

Level of literacy among fathers typified that of the urban male population: some 20 percent had had no education; less than 12 percent had had traditional education--i.e., non-formal maktab education; 37 percent had had some grade school education; 24 percent had some high school education; and less than 8 percent had had at least some exposure to college education.

The sample also represented varying backgrounds in parental job outlook. Professional and managerial represented the smallest



group, each 5 percent; clerical and sales represented the largest group, each 19 percent; production laborers followed closely at 15 percent; farmers and military were represented at 8 and 7 percent respectively.

Income followed closely the job description: about 40 percent of respondents had noted that they had a family income of less than \$425 per month; 43 percent bringing in between \$425 to \$1,235 per month; and the remaining 17 percent had income of over \$1,235 per month. The high income level is rather surprising, since average national income per capita per year for 1977 was \$1,950. It may be asserted that the students did not have a clear notion of their family income and put down an amount that they thought was correct. However, it must be noted that the sample does not represent the average national family. It is obvious that the high school students were not average Iranian youths of between 15 to 19 years of age. They are rather a minority of youth in their age bracket. They necessarily came from families with above average education and income, since at least a moderate income was necessary to abate pressure on youth so they could continue their education instead of taking a job to help with family finances.

Although the students in the sample lived in 30 different cities and towns in eight ostans, they had been born in 97 different localities in 20 different ostans. As such, they represented almost all the ostans.

Parents. Unlike the student sample, almost 80 percent of the responding parents were male and the remaining 20 percent were female. It was the

TABLE 42  
A Summary Population Profile of the Sample Provinces

Sample <u>ostan</u>	population of ostan (1976) (in thousands)	population of age 15-19 (in thousands)	high school enrollment (9-12th grade)	% of 15-19 yr. olds actually in high school	number of girls attending high school; 7-12 gr.	female ratio attending high school
Bushehr	259	36	2,635	7.3%	901	23%
Central (Tehran)	4,985	761	164,000	21.5	102,842	42
East Azarbaijan	2,636	321	23,050	7.2	11,510	33
Hormozgan	350	45	1,941	4.3	916	31
Kerman	842	110	12,404	11.3	7,926	42
Kohkiluyeh & Boyer Ahmadi	190	23	1,936	8.4	611	21
Semnan	208	56	4,072	7.3	2,110	35
Sistan & Baluchistan	503	59	4,338	7.3	1,639	25
Yazd	281	38	5,355	14.0	2,267	28
Zanjan	462	55	3,026	5.5	1,732	38

Source: Census Bureau of Iran, the Results of National Population and Housing Census, Aban 1355 (November 1976), based on 5 percent province sample; also Census Bureau of Iran, Census of Public High Schools for each province, December 1975

intention of this inquiry that the head of household respond to the questionnaire. Since fathers usually are household heads, therefore, overwhelming numbers of fathers responding was to be expected. The mean age of responding father was in his 40s, with female respondents somewhat younger.

Large families with five or more children made up 45 percent of the parent sample. This was in contrast to 59 percent of students coming from large families. This resulted from several factors. The parents in the parent sample were younger, since it included parents of students in all grades. This is presuming that younger parents are still in an early stage of reproductive capability and will probably have more children. On the other hand, the student sample included only students above age of 14. This would put their parents in a higher age bracket than that of the parents in the parent sample, and, therefore, in a later stage of reproductive capability. Furthermore, there was a definite and significant association between number of children and level of education with parents with high education having fewer children (students: chi-square = 55.6; df = 12;  $p = .0000$ ;  $\gamma = -.379$ ). Also, the higher level of education among parents in the parent sample than among the parents of the student sample could also explain the difference.

The sample was composed of 22 percent who had some exposure to college education, 35 percent who had had some high school education, 24 percent with some grade school education, less than 6 percent with traditional maktab education and 12 percent who had had no education

TABLE 43

A Summary Table of Return Rate on Both Types of Questionnaires by Ostan

Sample <u>ostans</u>	s t u d e n t s				p a r e n t s			
	actually sent		actually comp		actually sent		actually comp	
	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%
Bushehr	10	1.4	--	--	17	2.4	7	4.1
Central (Tehran)	485	67.0	459	73.5	335	47.8	73	42.9
East Azarbaijan	95	13.1	82	13.1	160	22.8	51	30.0
Hormozgan	10	1.4	--	--	23	3.2	--	--
Kerman	48	6.6	30	4.8	55	7.8	8	4.7
Kohkiloyeh and Boyer Ahmadi	6	.8	6	1.0	12	1.7	--	--
Semnan	18	2.5	18	2.9	15	2.1	5	2.9
Sistan and Baluchistan	12	1.7	1	.2	33	4.7	13	7.6
Yazd	28	3.9	17	2.7	20	2.8	5	2.9
Zanjan	12	1.7	12	1.9	30	4.3	8	4.7
total	724	100.0%	624	100.0%	700	100.0%	170	100.0%

at all. The responding parents, on the average, had a much higher level of education than the fathers of the responding students. Since the parents in this sample are younger than the parents in the student sample, and since it is assumed that there is an association between high level of education and younger age, therefore, there is a progressive increase in the number of educated as the age of the adults declines. Some of the discrepancy could be explained by the presence of parents of elementary and guidance school students, who in general would be younger than the parents of the high school students.

Parents' job descriptions closely follows that of the students' responses, except in the professional category comprising 14 percent, which may reflect the increased number of of younger parents. On the other hand, 8 percent of parents had stated their employment as production worker or drivers, whereas, 15 percent of the students had stated that their parents had similar employment. This, furthermore, amplifies the impact of education on parent's employment. Clerical and sales represented the largest groups, 21 and 15 percent respectively. Service sector employees were the smallest group with 3.5 percent, followed by military and police, farmers and managerial, each approximately 6 percent. Production workers made up about 8 percent of the sample, 10 percent indicated that they were housewives.

Despite a higher level of education reported by the responding parents coupled with increased percentage of professionals among them, the parents reported a lower level of income than the responding students. On the other hand, there were fewer parents who had low income compared to the student sample. Some 36 percent had family income of \$425 per month; 50 percent reported \$425 to \$1,235; and the remaining 14 percent had averaged about \$1,235 a month. Assuming an association between high level of income and high level of education, the income level reported by the responding parents should have been above that of the income reported by the responding students for their families. Since the parents in general have reported a lower income level, it could be assumed that there may have been some exaggeration or simple lack of knowledge about family income by responding students, or that



due to taxation fear, the parents may have understated their actual income. However, it is noteworthy to indicate that 56 percent of the responding students lived in Tehran, compared to 34 percent of the responding parents. Since Tehran has the highest income and the highest cost of living, the income level reported by the parent sample and the student sample may indeed be an accurate estimation.

Taking into consideration the fewer number of responding parents, this sample well represented the national character. Responding parents had been born in 80 different localities in 15 different ostans, with some 12 percent having been born in rural areas. Only 15 percent of the responding parents were born in Tehran, compared to 34 percent residing there at the time of this survey. Some 22 percent had received some of their education in Tehran. Most of the respondents (54 percent) had lived in their present city of residence for 20 years or longer. Almost all the respondents who had education were educated in Iran except for two individuals who had been educated in Germany.

The great majority of respondents were Moslem: 93 percent were Shiah and 6.5 percent were Sunni. Only one responded with "other" religion.

Although neither sample typified the population of the country, or even that of the urban population, nevertheless, given the facts and surmises above, they perhaps can fulfill our intentions for the analysis of intergenerational transmission of values and provide indications of each group. As noted above, this universe is not typical of the country. Illiteracy and absence of adequate educational facilities are



a major problem in Iran. Presently, over 60 percent of the population is illiterate. High school education and parents who deem education as a significant vehicle for achievement are a rarity in a system that has made high school education as inaccessible as college education in European countries. Only 15 percent of the high school age population of our sample ostans were enrolled in high schools. Of course, the high ration in the Central Ostan, 21 percent, overloaded the average. As is evident in Table 42, normally around 7 percent of the high school age students in the sample ostans attended high school in 1977. Thus, it could be safely assumed that the sample of our high school students is certainly a sample of the next generation of Iranian elite who will have above average participation and influence in the socio-political affairs of the nation.

APPENDIX III

FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF PARENT-STUDENT DATA

## APPENDIX III

## Frequency Distribution of Parent-Student Data

	parents		students	
	n	%	n	%
Sex (respondents' sex)				
male	135	79.4	335	53.7
female	35	20.6	289	46.3
total	170	100.0%	624	100.0%
Age (respondents' age)				
Less than 14 years old			2	.3
14 years old			22	3.5
15 years old			79	12.7
16 years old			149	23.4
17 years old			165	26.4
18 years old			157	25.2
19 years old			29	4.6
20 years or older			9	1.4
25 years or less	2	1.2		
26 to 30 years old	5	2.9		
31 to 35 years old	34	20.0		
36 to 40 years old	36	21.2		
41 to 45 years old	29	17.1		
46 to 50 years old	25	14.7		
51 to 60 years old	1	.6		
Not available	-	-	15	2.4
total	170	100.0%	624	99.9%
Marital Status				
single	3	1.8		
married	148	87.1		
divorced	1	.6		
widowed	3	1.8		
Not available	15	8.8		
total	170	100.1%		
Number of Children in the Family				
No children	5	2.9	-	-
One or two children	29	17.1	39	6.3
Three or four children	54	31.8	190	30.4
Five or more children	69	40.6	369	59.1
Not available	13	7.6	26	4.2
total	170	100.0%	624	100.0%

	parents		students	
	n	%	n	%
Parents' Education				
No education	21	12.3		
Traditional education	9	5.3		
Few grades	11	6.5		
Sixth grade	30	17.6		
7th to 9th grade	17	10.0		
10th to 12th grade	22	12.9		
High school diploma	23	13.5		
Few years of college	6	3.5		
B. A. or equivalent	25	14.7		
M. A. or equivalent	5	2.9		
M. D. or equivalent	1	.6		
total	170	99.8%		
Fathers' Education				
No education			117	18.7
Traditional education			70	11.2
Few grades			80	12.8
Sixth grade			144	23.1
7th to 9th grade			56	9.0
10th to 12th grade			33	5.3
High school diploma			55	8.8
Few years of college			9	1.4
B. A. or equivalent			27	4.3
M. A. or equivalent			8	1.3
M. D. or equivalent			4	.6
Not available			21	3.4
total			624	99.9%
Mothers' Education				
No education			254	39.4
Traditional education			50	8.1
Few grades			107	17.2
Sixth grade			104	16.7
7th to 9th grade			42	6.7
10th to 12th grade			13	2.1
High school diploma			26	4.2
Few years college			5	.8
B. A. or equivalent			5	.8
M. A. or equivalent			2	.3
M. D. or equivalent			2	.3
Ph. D. or equivalent			1	.2
Not available			21	3.4
total			624	100.2%

	parents		students	
	n	%	n	%
Education				
9th grade			134	21.4
10th grade			165	26.4
11th grade			185	29.7
12th grade			126	20.2
Not available			14	2.2
total			624	100.0%
Country of Education				
Iran	139	81.8		
Germany	2	1.2		
Not available	29	17.0		
total	170	100.0%		
Job (For parents; the responding parent's employment is stated, and for the students, the head of household's employment is stated).				
Professional or technical	24	14.2	34	5.4
Administration or management	11	6.5	32	5.1
Clerical and related	37	21.8	120	19.2
Sales and related	26	15.3	117	18.7
Service sector	6	3.5	49	7.8
Farmer and farm related	11	6.5	52	8.3
Production worker or driver	14	8.2	95	15.2
Military or police	11	6.5	46	7.4
Housewives	17	10.0	-	-
Other/not available	13	7.7	89	12.7
total	170	100.0%	624	100.0%
Family Income (In 1978, 70 Rials--abbr. Rls.--equalled \$1.00).				
Less than 39,000 Rls.	62	36.5	240	38.5
30,000 to 49,999 Rls.	53	31.2	174	27.9
50,000 to 74,999 Rls.	23	13.5	89	14.3
75,000 to 99,999 Rls.	13	7.6	39	6.3
100,000 to 124,999 Rls.	6	3.5	28	4.5
125,000 to 149,999 Rls.	3	1.8	14	2.2
150,000 to 199,999 Rls.	1	.6	7	1.1
200,000 to 249,999 Rls.	2	1.2	6	1.0
More than 250,000 Rls.	5	2.9	8	1.3
Not available	4	2.4	19	3.0
total	170	100.2%	624	100.1%

	parents		students	
	n	%	n	%
Place of residence				
Tehran	57	33.5	352	56.4
Cities of over 100,000	20	11.7	69	11.1
Cities with population from 25,000 to 99,999	33	19.4	103	16.5
Cities with population from 5,000 to 24,999	41	24.1	64	10.3
Places with a population of less than 5,000	16	9.4	36	5.8
Not available	3	1.8	-	-
total	170	99.9%	624	100.1%
Years at the city of residence				
Less than one year	7	4.1		
1 to 5 years	17	10.0		
5 to 10 years	16	9.4		
10 to 15 years	16	9.4		
15 to 20 years	17	10.0		
Over 20 years	91	53.5		
Not available	6	3.5		
total	170	99.9%		
Province of residence				
Central incl. Tehran	71	41.8	455	72.9
Guilan	2	1.2	3	.5
East Azarbaijan	50	29.4	83	13.3
West Azarbaijan	1	.6	-	-
Kerman	9	5.3	30	4.8
Khorasan	1	.6	-	-
Baluchistan	12	7.1	1	.2
Bushehr	7	4.1	-	-
Zanjan	8	4.7	11	1.8
Yazd	4	2.4	10	1.6
Kohkiloyeh & Boyer-Ahmad	-	-	10	1.6
Semnan	5	2.9	21	3.4
total	170	100.1%	624	100.1%
Religion				
Shiah	158	92.9		
Sunni	11	6.5		
Not available	1	.6		
total	170	100.0%		



	parents		students	
	n	%	n	%
Variable 12: Some people often listen to news on radio or television, how about you? I listen to it:				
Everyday	90	52.9	246	39.4
Few times a week	45	26.5	195	31.2
Few times amonth	3	1.8	16	2.6
Once every few months	1	.6	11	1.8
Seldom	25	14.7	137	22.0
Never	4	2.4	17	2.7
Not available	2	1.2	2	.3
total	170	100.1%	624	100.0%

Variable 13: Some people read newspaper and magazine articles about political, economic and social matters, how about you? I read them:				
Everyday	54	31.8	157	25.2
Few times a week	43	25.3	247	39.6
Few times a month	10	5.9	64	10.3
Once every few months	3	1.8	20	3.2
Seldom	25	14.7	107	17.2
Never	30	17.6	26	4.1
Not available	5	2.9	3	.5
total	170	100.0%	624	100.1%

Variable 14: Some people think about political and economic condition of our country, how about you? I think about it:				
Everyday	25	14.7	114	18.3
Few times a week	18	10.6	104	16.7
Few times a month	16	9.4	58	9.3
Once every few months	12	7.1	32	5.1
Seldom	45	26.5	181	29.0
Never	50	29.4	128	20.5
Not available	4	2.4	7	1.1
total	170	100.1%	624	100.0%

Variable 15: Some people talk about political and economic condition of our country with their friends, how about you? I talk about them:				
Everyday	19	11.2	88	14.1
Few times a week	25	14.7	122	19.6
Few times amonth	15	8.8	54	8.6
Once every few months	3	1.8	36	5.8
Seldom	50	29.4	203	32.5
Never	55	32.3	118	18.9
Not available	3	1.8	3	.5
total	170	100.0%	624	100.0%

	parents		students	
	n	%	n	%
Variable 16: If one gets a bad news, it is better to hide one's feeling and behave as nothing has happened.				
Agree strongly	45	26.5	134	21.5
Agree	84	49.4	226	36.2
Agree somewhat	19	11.2	140	22.4
Disagree somewhat	6	3.5	55	8.8
Disagree	10	5.9	43	6.9
Disagree strongly	4	2.3	14	2.2
Not available	2	1.2	12	1.9
total	170	100.0%	624	99.9%

Variable 17: When a man is born, the success he is going to have is already in the cards, so he may as well accept it and not fight against it.				
Agree strongly	25	14.7	54	8.7
Agree	34	20.0	114	18.3
Agree somewhat	24	14.1	78	12.5
Disagree somewhat	7	4.1	33	5.3
Disagree	40	23.5	170	27.2
Disagree strongly	34	20.0	160	25.6
Not available	6	3.5	15	2.4
total	170	99.9%	624	100.0%

Variable 18: The government should have plenty of power and influence over people's lives.				
Agree strongly	65	38.2	169	27.1
Agree	47	27.7	197	31.6
Agree somewhat	26	15.3	121	19.4
Disagree somewhat	8	4.7	46	7.4
Disagree	16	9.4	50	8.0
Disagree strongly	5	2.9	18	2.9
Not available	3	1.8	23	3.7
total	170	100.0%	624	100.1%

Variable 19: There is hardly anybody lower than a person who does not feel a great love, gratitude and respect for his parents.				
Agree strongly	75	44.1	300	48.1
Agree	44	25.9	165	26.4
Agree somewhat	25	14.7	65	10.4
Disagree somewhat	3	1.8	22	3.5
Disagree	11	6.5	31	5.0
Disagree strongly	10	5.9	29	4.7
Not available	2	1.2	12	1.9
total	170	100.1%	624	100.0%

	parents		students	
	n	%	n	%
Variable 20: The negative opinion of others often keeps me from seeing a movie or a play I had planned to attend.				
Agree strongly	13	7.6	32	5.1
Agree	23	13.5	116	18.6
Agree somewhat	23	13.5	140	22.4
Disagree somewhat	15	8.8	55	8.8
Disagree	55	32.4	203	32.5
Disagree strongly	24	14.1	56	9.0
Not available	17	10.0	22	3.5
total	170	99.9%	624	99.9%

Variable 21: The government should give money and food to the unemployed.				
Agree strongly	47	27.7	171	27.4
Agree	36	21.2	130	20.8
Agree somewhat	15	8.8	81	13.0
Disagree somewhat	16	9.4	48	7.7
Disagree	29	17.1	101	16.2
Disagree strongly	25	14.7	80	12.8
Not available	2	1.2	13	2.1
total	170	100.1%	624	100.0%

Variable 22: There is no satisfaction in any undertaking without a companion.				
Agree strongly	40	23.5	149	23.9
Agree	54	31.8	175	28.0
Agree somewhat	16	9.4	89	14.3
Disagree somewhat	5	2.9	31	5.0
Disagree	33	19.4	108	17.3
Disagree strongly	19	11.2	57	9.1
Not available	3	1.8	15	2.4
total	170	100.0%	624	100.0%

Variable 23: Sometimes politics and government seem so complicated that a person like me can't really understand what is going on.				
Agree strongly	44	25.9	102	16.4
Agree	55	32.4	222	35.6
Agree somewhat	29	17.1	165	26.4
Disagree somewhat	9	5.3	36	5.8
Disagree	14	8.2	49	7.8
Disagree strongly	9	5.3	25	4.0
Not available	10	5.9	25	4.0
total	170	100.0%	624	100.0%

	parents		students	
	n	%	n	%
Variable 24: There are some people like great artists and musicians who can be forgiven for not being considerate of others, kind to poor, etc.				
Agree strongly	16	9.4	48	7.7
Agree	47	27.7	147	23.6
Agree somewhat	22	12.9	127	20.4
Disagree somewhat	14	8.2	61	9.8
Disagree	42	13.5	141	22.6
Disagree Strongly	23	13.5	77	12.3
Not available	6	3.5	23	3.7
total	170	99.9%	624	100.1%

Variable 25: Respect is due an older man no matter what kind of a person he is.				
Agree strongly	53	31.2	196	31.4
Agree	48	28.2	156	25.0
Agree somewhat	19	11.2	101	16.2
Disagree somewhat	4	2.4	56	9.0
Disagree	32	18.8	67	10.7
Disagree strongly	10	5.9	41	6.6
total	170	100.1%	624	100.0%

Variable 26: Our socio-political system should be a blue-print for all other nations in the world.				
Agree strongly	55	32.4	182	29.2
Agree	51	30.0	187	30.0
Agree somewhat	19	11.2	109	17.5
Disagree somewhat	10	5.9	37	5.9
Disagree	19	11.2	65	10.4
Disagree strongly	8	4.7	26	4.2
Not available	8	4.7	18	2.9
total	170	100.1%	624	100.1%

Variable 27: Real friendship is permanent friendship; friends don't change with circumstances.				
Agree strongly	77	45.3	268	43.0
Agree	56	32.9	201	32.2
Agree somewhat	8	4.7	62	9.9
Disagree somewhat	4	2.4	29	4.7
Disagree	17	10.0	36	5.8
Disagree strongly	3	1.8	13	2.1
Not available	5	2.9	15	2.4
total	170	100.0%	624	100.1%

	parents		students	
	n	%	n	%
Variable 28: My political opinion is not easily swayed by what I read in the newspapers.				
Agree strongly	41	24.1	105	16.8
Agree	66	38.8	219	35.1
Agree somewhat	33	19.4	145	23.2
Disagree somewhat	3	1.8	53	8.5
Disagree	9	5.3	63	10.1
Disagree strongly	4	2.4	18	2.9
Not available	14	8.2	21	3.4
total	170	100.0%	624	100.0%

Variable 29: It would irritate me very much to have a watch or clock that was off by several minutes everyday.				
Agree strongly	27	15.9	102	16.4
Agree	43	25.3	132	21.1
Agree somewhat	32	18.8	109	17.5
Disagree somewhat	17	10.0	75	12.0
Disagree	33	19.4	133	21.3
Disagree strongly	12	7.1	63	10.1
Not available	6	3.5	10	1.6
total	170	100.0%	624	100.0%

Variable 30: Some people believe that the government is pretty much influenced by a few big interests looking out for themselves.				
Agree strongly	25	14.7	85	13.6
Agree	43	25.3	181	29.0
Agree somewhat	29	17.1	138	22.1
Disagree somewhat	22	12.9	55	8.8
Disagree	32	18.8	113	18.1
Disagree strongly	11	6.5	29	4.7
Not available	8	4.7	23	3.7
total	170	100.0%	624	100.0%

Variable 31: Over the years, the government has paid no attention to what people like me think when it decides what to do.				
Agree strongly	28	16.5	77	12.3
Agree	36	21.2	128	20.6
Agree somewhat	30	17.7	113	18.1
Disagree somewhat	12	7.1	73	11.7
Disagree	38	22.4	137	22.0
Disagree strongly	18	10.6	56	9.0
Not available	8	4.7	40	6.4
total	170	100.2%	624	100.1%

	parents		students	
	n	%	n	%
Variable 32: I set difficult goals for myself which I attempt to reach.				
Agree strongly	37	21.8	115	18.4
Agree	51	30.0	216	34.6
Agree somewhat	28	16.5	134	21.5
Disagree somewhat	17	10.0	54	8.7
Disagree	24	14.1	62	9.9
Disagree strongly	7	4.1	13	2.1
Not available	6	3.5	30	4.8
total	170	100.0%	624	100.0%

Variable 33: A child should never be asked to do anything unless he is told why he is asked to do it.				
Agree strongly	80	47.1	356	41.0
Agree	67	39.4	247	39.6
Agree somewhat	10	5.9	45	7.2
Disagree somewhat	3	1.8	18	2.9
Disagree	5	2.9	19	3.0
Disagree strongly	1	.6	5	.8
Not available	4	2.3	34	5.6
total	170	100.0%	624	100.0%

Variable 34: A wealthy person cannot really learn how to behave in a polite society if he has not had the proper up-bringing.				
Agree strongly	100	58.8	351	56.3
Agree	51	30.0	191	30.6
Agree somewhat	6	3.5	20	3.2
Disagree somewhat	3	1.8	7	1.1
Disagree	6	3.5	18	2.9
Disagree strongly	3	1.8	7	1.1
Not available	1	.6	30	4.8
total	170	100.0%	624	100.0%

Variable 35: I think the government wastes needlessly alot of the money we pay in taxes.				
Agree strongly	32	18.8	81	13.0
Agree	29	17.1	115	18.4
Agree somewhat	18	10.6	107	17.2
Disagree somewhat	13	7.7	60	9.6
Disagree	44	25.9	148	23.7
Disagree strongly	25	14.7	76	12.2
Not available	9	5.3	37	5.9
total	170	100.1%	624	100.0%



	parents		students	
	n	%	n	%
Variable 36: I work hard at everything I undertake until I am satisfied with the results.				
Agree strongly	94	55.3	247	39.6
Agree	67	39.4	270	43.3
Agree somewhat	3	1.8	59	9.5
Disagree somewhat	1	.6	7	1.1
Disagree	1	.6	6	1.0
Disagree strongly	1	.6	3	.5
Not available	3	1.8	32	5.1
total	170	100.1%	624	100.1%
Variable 37: I enjoy a race or a game better when I bet on it.				
Agree strongly	8	4.7	30	4.8
Agree	24	14.1	41	6.6
Agree somewhat	7	4.1	40	6.4
Disagree somewhat	9	5.3	43	6.9
Disagree	74	43.5	231	37.0
Disagree strongly	38	22.4	213	34.1
Not available	10	5.9	26	4.2
total	170	100.0%	624	100.0%
Variable 38: I think some people in the government are crooked.				
Agree strongly	56	32.9	169	27.1
Agree	56	32.9	159	25.5
Agree somewhat	22	12.9	134	21.5
Disagree somewhat	7	4.1	40	6.4
Disagree	18	10.6	62	9.9
Disagree strongly	6	3.5	23	3.7
Not available	5	2.9	37	5.9
total	170	99.8%	624	100.0%
Variable 39: No same and decent person would ever think of hurting a close friend.				
Agree strongly	100	58.8	327	52.4
Agree	45	26.5	212	34.0
Agree somewhat	5	2.9	26	4.2
Disagree somewhat	1	.6	16	2.6
Disagree	3	1.8	13	2.1
Disagree strongly	3	1.8	4	.6
Not available	13	7.7	26	4.2
total	170	100.1%	624	100.1%

	parents		students	
	n	%	n	%
Variable 40: The government usually knows what is best for people.				
Agree strongly	50	29.4	110	17.6
Agree	56	32.9	192	30.8
Agree somewhat	23	13.5	123	19.7
Disagree somewhat	11	6.5	66	10.6
Disagree	9	5.3	76	12.2
Disagree strongly	7	4.1	28	4.5
Not available	14	8.2	29	4.7
total	170	99.9%	624	100.1%

Variable 41: If a person wanted to make a speech in this community against religion he should be allowed.				
Agree strongly	15	8.8	84	13.5
Agree	15	8.8	115	18.4
Agree somewhat	13	7.7	79	12.7
Disagree somewhat	3	1.8	46	7.4
Disagree	39	22.9	136	21.8
Disagree strongly	66	38.8	129	20.7
Not available	19	11.2	35	5.6
total	170	100.0%	624	100.1%

Variable 42: People running the government are smart people who usually know what they are doing.				
Agree strongly	31	18.2	66	10.6
Agree	49	28.8	156	25.0
Agree somewhat	35	20.6	171	27.4
Disagree somewhat	12	7.1	87	13.9
Disagree	16	9.4	79	12.7
Disagree strongly	13	7.7	35	5.6
Not available	14	8.2	30	4.8
total	170	100.0%	624	100.0%

Variable 43: Planning only makes a person unhappy since plans hardly work out anyway.				
Agree strongly	16	9.4	52	8.3
Agree	49	28.8	122	19.6
Agree somewhat	23	13.5	160	25.6
Disagree somewhat	18	10.6	92	14.7
Disagree	27	15.6	122	19.6
Disagree strongly	24	14.1	45	7.2
Not available	13	7.7	31	5.0
total	170	100.0%	624	100.0%

	parents		students	
	n	%	n	%
Variable 44: Nowdays with world condition the way it is, the wise person lives for today and lets tommarow take care of itself.				
Agree strongly	15	8.8	54	8.7
Agree	21	12.4	93	14.9
Agree somewhat	12	7.1	58	9.3
Disagree somewhat	14	8.2	70	11.2
Disagree	58	34.1	193	30.9
Disagree strongly	35	20.6	124	19.9
Not available	15	8.8	32	5.1
total	170	100.0%	624	100.0%

Variable 45: It is better to go without something than to ask for a favor from somebody.				
Agree strongly	45	26.5	152	24.4
Agree	58	34.1	238	38.1
Agree somewhat	16	9.4	86	13.8
Disagree somewhat	9	5.3	30	4.8
Disagree	21	12.4	55	8.8
Disagree strongly	2	1.2	18	2.9
Not available	19	11.2	45	7.2
total	170	100.1%	624	100.1%

Variable 46: I often do something just to prove to myself that I can do them.				
Agree strongly	29	17.1	109	17.5
Agree	42	24.7	197	31.6
Agree somewhat	26	15.3	106	17.0
Disagree somewhat	8	4.7	60	9.6
Disagree	38	22.4	94	15.1
Disagree strongly	12	7.1	28	4.5
Not available	15	8.8	30	4.8
total	170	100.1%	624	100.1%



